X-Git-Url: http://git.onelab.eu/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lib%2Fstream-ssl.c;h=4874bbe482a79b9bc1b80b7ee7d7595bc8e74f26;hb=2401d853a400babaa2c7254851e751d3db9af8cb;hp=b14ce550b4dfcb6a92f283fba3f0e7c69811c673;hpb=9467fe624698a9b72f81bb1ddfce33a5fc85281c;p=sliver-openvswitch.git diff --git a/lib/stream-ssl.c b/lib/stream-ssl.c index b14ce550b..4874bbe48 100644 --- a/lib/stream-ssl.c +++ b/lib/stream-ssl.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright (c) 2008, 2009 Nicira Networks. + * Copyright (c) 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 Nicira Networks. * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -30,20 +32,25 @@ #include #include #include +#include "coverage.h" #include "dynamic-string.h" #include "leak-checker.h" #include "ofpbuf.h" #include "openflow/openflow.h" #include "packets.h" #include "poll-loop.h" -#include "socket-util.h" +#include "shash.h" #include "socket-util.h" #include "util.h" #include "stream-provider.h" #include "stream.h" - +#include "timeval.h" #include "vlog.h" -#define THIS_MODULE VLM_stream_ssl + +VLOG_DEFINE_THIS_MODULE(stream_ssl); + +COVERAGE_DEFINE(ssl_session); +COVERAGE_DEFINE(ssl_session_reused); /* Active SSL. */ @@ -61,11 +68,11 @@ struct ssl_stream { struct stream stream; enum ssl_state state; - int connect_error; enum session_type type; int fd; SSL *ssl; struct ofpbuf *txbuf; + unsigned int session_nr; /* rx_want and tx_want record the result of the last call to SSL_read() * and SSL_write(), respectively: @@ -124,25 +131,55 @@ struct ssl_stream * deadlock and livelock situations above. */ int rx_want, tx_want; + + /* A few bytes of header data in case SSL negotiation fails. */ + uint8_t head[2]; + short int n_head; }; /* SSL context created by ssl_init(). */ static SSL_CTX *ctx; -/* Required configuration. */ -static bool has_private_key, has_certificate, has_ca_cert; +/* Maps from stream target (e.g. "127.0.0.1:1234") to SSL_SESSION *. The + * sessions are those from the last SSL connection to the given target. + * OpenSSL caches server-side sessions internally, so this cache is only used + * for client connections. + * + * The stream_ssl module owns a reference to each of the sessions in this + * table, so they must be freed with SSL_SESSION_free() when they are no + * longer needed. */ +static struct shash client_sessions = SHASH_INITIALIZER(&client_sessions); + +/* Maximum number of client sessions to cache. Ordinarily I'd expect that one + * session would be sufficient but this should cover it. */ +#define MAX_CLIENT_SESSION_CACHE 16 + +struct ssl_config_file { + bool read; /* Whether the file was successfully read. */ + char *file_name; /* Configured file name, if any. */ + struct timespec mtime; /* File mtime as of last time we read it. */ +}; + +/* SSL configuration files. */ +static struct ssl_config_file private_key; +static struct ssl_config_file certificate; +static struct ssl_config_file ca_cert; + +/* Ordinarily, the SSL client and server verify each other's certificates using + * a CA certificate. Setting this to false disables this behavior. (This is a + * security risk.) */ +static bool verify_peer_cert = true; /* Ordinarily, we require a CA certificate for the peer to be locally - * available. 'has_ca_cert' is true when this is the case, and neither of the - * following variables matter. - * - * We can, however, bootstrap the CA certificate from the peer at the beginning - * of our first connection then use that certificate on all subsequent - * connections, saving it to a file for use in future runs also. In this case, - * 'has_ca_cert' is false, 'bootstrap_ca_cert' is true, and 'ca_cert_file' - * names the file to be saved. */ + * available. We can, however, bootstrap the CA certificate from the peer at + * the beginning of our first connection then use that certificate on all + * subsequent connections, saving it to a file for use in future runs also. In + * this case, 'bootstrap_ca_cert' is true. */ static bool bootstrap_ca_cert; -static char *ca_cert_file; + +/* Session number. Used in debug logging messages to uniquely identify a + * session. */ +static unsigned int next_session_nr; /* Who knows what can trigger various SSL errors, so let's throttle them down * quite a bit. */ @@ -153,10 +190,15 @@ static int do_ssl_init(void); static bool ssl_wants_io(int ssl_error); static void ssl_close(struct stream *); static void ssl_clear_txbuf(struct ssl_stream *); +static void interpret_queued_ssl_error(const char *function); static int interpret_ssl_error(const char *function, int ret, int error, int *want); -static DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, int is_export UNUSED, int keylength); +static DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, int is_export OVS_UNUSED, int keylength); static void log_ca_cert(const char *file_name, X509 *cert); +static void stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file__(const char *file_name, + bool bootstrap); +static void ssl_protocol_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, + const void *, size_t, SSL *, void *sslv_); static short int want_to_poll_events(int want) @@ -190,15 +232,15 @@ new_ssl_stream(const char *name, int fd, enum session_type type, /* Check for all the needful configuration. */ retval = 0; - if (!has_private_key) { + if (!private_key.read) { VLOG_ERR("Private key must be configured to use SSL"); retval = ENOPROTOOPT; } - if (!has_certificate) { + if (!certificate.read) { VLOG_ERR("Certificate must be configured to use SSL"); retval = ENOPROTOOPT; } - if (!has_ca_cert && !bootstrap_ca_cert) { + if (!ca_cert.read && verify_peer_cert && !bootstrap_ca_cert) { VLOG_ERR("CA certificate must be configured to use SSL"); retval = ENOPROTOOPT; } @@ -237,9 +279,16 @@ new_ssl_stream(const char *name, int fd, enum session_type type, retval = ENOPROTOOPT; goto error; } - if (bootstrap_ca_cert && type == CLIENT) { + if (!verify_peer_cert || (bootstrap_ca_cert && type == CLIENT)) { SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); } + if (type == CLIENT) { + /* Grab SSL session information from the cache. */ + SSL_SESSION *session = shash_find_data(&client_sessions, name); + if (session && SSL_set_session(ssl, session) != 1) { + interpret_queued_ssl_error("SSL_set_session"); + } + } /* Create and return the ssl_stream. */ sslv = xmalloc(sizeof *sslv); @@ -254,6 +303,14 @@ new_ssl_stream(const char *name, int fd, enum session_type type, sslv->ssl = ssl; sslv->txbuf = NULL; sslv->rx_want = sslv->tx_want = SSL_NOTHING; + sslv->session_nr = next_session_nr++; + sslv->n_head = 0; + + if (VLOG_IS_DBG_ENABLED()) { + SSL_set_msg_callback(ssl, ssl_protocol_cb); + SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, sslv); + } + *streamp = &sslv->stream; return 0; @@ -298,7 +355,7 @@ do_ca_cert_bootstrap(struct stream *stream) { struct ssl_stream *sslv = ssl_stream_cast(stream); STACK_OF(X509) *chain; - X509 *ca_cert; + X509 *cert; FILE *file; int error; int fd; @@ -309,11 +366,11 @@ do_ca_cert_bootstrap(struct stream *stream) "peer"); return EPROTO; } - ca_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1); + cert = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1); - /* Check that 'ca_cert' is self-signed. Otherwise it is not a CA + /* Check that 'cert' is self-signed. Otherwise it is not a CA * certificate and we should not attempt to use it as one. */ - error = X509_check_issued(ca_cert, ca_cert); + error = X509_check_issued(cert, cert); if (error) { VLOG_ERR("could not bootstrap CA cert: obtained certificate is " "not self-signed (%s)", @@ -325,53 +382,61 @@ do_ca_cert_bootstrap(struct stream *stream) return EPROTO; } - fd = open(ca_cert_file, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, 0444); + fd = open(ca_cert.file_name, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, 0444); if (fd < 0) { - VLOG_ERR("could not bootstrap CA cert: creating %s failed: %s", - ca_cert_file, strerror(errno)); - return errno; + if (errno == EEXIST) { + VLOG_INFO("reading CA cert %s created by another process", + ca_cert.file_name); + stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file(ca_cert.file_name, true); + return EPROTO; + } else { + VLOG_ERR("could not bootstrap CA cert: creating %s failed: %s", + ca_cert.file_name, strerror(errno)); + return errno; + } } file = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (!file) { - int error = errno; + error = errno; VLOG_ERR("could not bootstrap CA cert: fdopen failed: %s", strerror(error)); - unlink(ca_cert_file); + unlink(ca_cert.file_name); return error; } - if (!PEM_write_X509(file, ca_cert)) { + if (!PEM_write_X509(file, cert)) { VLOG_ERR("could not bootstrap CA cert: PEM_write_X509 to %s failed: " - "%s", ca_cert_file, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + "%s", ca_cert.file_name, + ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); fclose(file); - unlink(ca_cert_file); + unlink(ca_cert.file_name); return EIO; } if (fclose(file)) { - int error = errno; + error = errno; VLOG_ERR("could not bootstrap CA cert: writing %s failed: %s", - ca_cert_file, strerror(error)); - unlink(ca_cert_file); + ca_cert.file_name, strerror(error)); + unlink(ca_cert.file_name); return error; } - VLOG_INFO("successfully bootstrapped CA cert to %s", ca_cert_file); - log_ca_cert(ca_cert_file, ca_cert); + VLOG_INFO("successfully bootstrapped CA cert to %s", ca_cert.file_name); + log_ca_cert(ca_cert.file_name, cert); bootstrap_ca_cert = false; - has_ca_cert = true; + ca_cert.read = true; - /* SSL_CTX_add_client_CA makes a copy of ca_cert's relevant data. */ - SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, ca_cert); + /* SSL_CTX_add_client_CA makes a copy of cert's relevant data. */ + SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, cert); /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate() takes ownership of the certificate passed in. - * 'ca_cert' is owned by sslv->ssl, so we need to duplicate it. */ - ca_cert = X509_dup(ca_cert); - if (!ca_cert) { + * 'cert' is owned by sslv->ssl, so we need to duplicate it. */ + cert = X509_dup(cert); + if (!cert) { out_of_memory(); } - if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, ca_cert_file, NULL) != 1) { + if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, ca_cert.file_name, NULL) != 1) { VLOG_ERR("SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return EPROTO; @@ -380,6 +445,58 @@ do_ca_cert_bootstrap(struct stream *stream) return EPROTO; } +static void +ssl_delete_session(struct shash_node *node) +{ + SSL_SESSION *session = node->data; + SSL_SESSION_free(session); + shash_delete(&client_sessions, node); +} + +/* Find and free any previously cached session for 'stream''s target. */ +static void +ssl_flush_session(struct stream *stream) +{ + struct shash_node *node; + + node = shash_find(&client_sessions, stream_get_name(stream)); + if (node) { + ssl_delete_session(node); + } +} + +/* Add 'stream''s session to the cache for its target, so that it will be + * reused for future SSL connections to the same target. */ +static void +ssl_cache_session(struct stream *stream) +{ + struct ssl_stream *sslv = ssl_stream_cast(stream); + SSL_SESSION *session; + + /* Get session from stream. */ + session = SSL_get1_session(sslv->ssl); + if (session) { + SSL_SESSION *old_session; + + old_session = shash_replace(&client_sessions, stream_get_name(stream), + session); + if (old_session) { + /* Free the session that we replaced. (We might actually have + * session == old_session, but either way we have to free it to + * avoid leaking a reference.) */ + SSL_SESSION_free(old_session); + } else if (shash_count(&client_sessions) > MAX_CLIENT_SESSION_CACHE) { + for (;;) { + struct shash_node *node = shash_random_node(&client_sessions); + if (node->data != session) { + ssl_delete_session(node); + break; + } + } + } + } +} + static int ssl_connect(struct stream *stream) { @@ -396,6 +513,13 @@ ssl_connect(struct stream *stream) /* Fall through. */ case STATE_SSL_CONNECTING: + /* Capture the first few bytes of received data so that we can guess + * what kind of funny data we've been sent if SSL negotation fails. */ + if (sslv->n_head <= 0) { + sslv->n_head = recv(sslv->fd, sslv->head, sizeof sslv->head, + MSG_PEEK); + } + retval = (sslv->type == CLIENT ? SSL_connect(sslv->ssl) : SSL_accept(sslv->ssl)); if (retval != 1) { @@ -404,16 +528,31 @@ ssl_connect(struct stream *stream) return EAGAIN; } else { int unused; + + if (sslv->type == CLIENT) { + /* Delete any cached session for this stream's target. + * Otherwise a single error causes recurring errors that + * don't resolve until the SSL client or server is + * restarted. (It can take dozens of reused connections to + * see this behavior, so this is difficult to test.) If we + * delete the session on the first error, though, the error + * only occurs once and then resolves itself. */ + ssl_flush_session(stream); + } + interpret_ssl_error((sslv->type == CLIENT ? "SSL_connect" : "SSL_accept"), retval, error, &unused); shutdown(sslv->fd, SHUT_RDWR); + stream_report_content(sslv->head, sslv->n_head, STREAM_SSL, + THIS_MODULE, stream_get_name(stream)); return EPROTO; } } else if (bootstrap_ca_cert) { return do_ca_cert_bootstrap(stream); - } else if ((SSL_get_verify_mode(sslv->ssl) - & (SSL_VERIFY_NONE | SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) - != SSL_VERIFY_PEER) { + } else if (verify_peer_cert + && ((SSL_get_verify_mode(sslv->ssl) + & (SSL_VERIFY_NONE | SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) + != SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { /* Two or more SSL connections completed at the same time while we * were in bootstrap mode. Only one of these can finish the * bootstrap successfully. The other one(s) must be rejected @@ -425,6 +564,11 @@ ssl_connect(struct stream *stream) VLOG_ERR("rejecting SSL connection during bootstrap race window"); return EPROTO; } else { + /* Statistics. */ + COVERAGE_INC(ssl_session); + if (SSL_session_reused(sslv->ssl)) { + COVERAGE_INC(ssl_session_reused); + } return 0; } } @@ -437,11 +581,38 @@ ssl_close(struct stream *stream) { struct ssl_stream *sslv = ssl_stream_cast(stream); ssl_clear_txbuf(sslv); + + /* Attempt clean shutdown of the SSL connection. This will work most of + * the time, as long as the kernel send buffer has some free space and the + * SSL connection isn't renegotiating, etc. That has to be good enough, + * since we don't have any way to continue the close operation in the + * background. */ + SSL_shutdown(sslv->ssl); + + ssl_cache_session(stream); + + /* SSL_shutdown() might have signaled an error, in which case we need to + * flush it out of the OpenSSL error queue or the next OpenSSL operation + * will falsely signal an error. */ + ERR_clear_error(); + SSL_free(sslv->ssl); close(sslv->fd); free(sslv); } +static void +interpret_queued_ssl_error(const char *function) +{ + int queued_error = ERR_get_error(); + if (queued_error != 0) { + VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "%s: %s", + function, ERR_error_string(queued_error, NULL)); + } else { + VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "%s: SSL_ERROR_SSL without queued error", function); + } +} + static int interpret_ssl_error(const char *function, int ret, int error, int *want) @@ -498,17 +669,9 @@ interpret_ssl_error(const char *function, int ret, int error, } } - case SSL_ERROR_SSL: { - int queued_error = ERR_get_error(); - if (queued_error != 0) { - VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "%s: %s", - function, ERR_error_string(queued_error, NULL)); - } else { - VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "%s: SSL_ERROR_SSL without queued error", - function); - } + case SSL_ERROR_SSL: + interpret_queued_ssl_error(function); break; - } default: VLOG_ERR_RL(&rl, "%s: bad SSL error code %d", function, error); @@ -541,7 +704,8 @@ ssl_recv(struct stream *stream, void *buffer, size_t n) if (error == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN) { return 0; } else { - return interpret_ssl_error("SSL_read", ret, error, &sslv->rx_want); + return -interpret_ssl_error("SSL_read", ret, error, + &sslv->rx_want); } } } @@ -589,7 +753,7 @@ ssl_send(struct stream *stream, const void *buffer, size_t n) struct ssl_stream *sslv = ssl_stream_cast(stream); if (sslv->txbuf) { - return EAGAIN; + return -EAGAIN; } else { int error; @@ -598,13 +762,13 @@ ssl_send(struct stream *stream, const void *buffer, size_t n) switch (error) { case 0: ssl_clear_txbuf(sslv); - return 0; + return n; case EAGAIN: leak_checker_claim(buffer); - return 0; + return n; default: sslv->txbuf = NULL; - return error; + return -error; } } } @@ -710,9 +874,11 @@ pssl_pstream_cast(struct pstream *pstream) } static int -pssl_open(const char *name, char *suffix, struct pstream **pstreamp) +pssl_open(const char *name OVS_UNUSED, char *suffix, struct pstream **pstreamp) { struct pssl_pstream *pssl; + struct sockaddr_in sin; + char bound_name[128]; int retval; int fd; @@ -721,13 +887,15 @@ pssl_open(const char *name, char *suffix, struct pstream **pstreamp) return retval; } - fd = inet_open_passive(SOCK_STREAM, suffix, OFP_SSL_PORT); + fd = inet_open_passive(SOCK_STREAM, suffix, OFP_SSL_PORT, &sin); if (fd < 0) { return -fd; } + sprintf(bound_name, "pssl:%"PRIu16":"IP_FMT, + ntohs(sin.sin_port), IP_ARGS(&sin.sin_addr.s_addr)); pssl = xmalloc(sizeof *pssl); - pstream_init(&pssl->pstream, &pssl_pstream_class, name); + pstream_init(&pssl->pstream, &pssl_pstream_class, bound_name); pssl->fd = fd; *pstreamp = &pssl->pstream; return 0; @@ -753,7 +921,7 @@ pssl_accept(struct pstream *pstream, struct stream **new_streamp) new_fd = accept(pssl->fd, &sin, &sin_len); if (new_fd < 0) { - int error = errno; + error = errno; if (error != EAGAIN) { VLOG_DBG_RL(&rl, "accept: %s", strerror(error)); } @@ -820,7 +988,9 @@ do_ssl_init(void) SSL_library_init(); SSL_load_error_strings(); - method = TLSv1_method(); + /* New OpenSSL changed TLSv1_method() to return a "const" pointer, so the + * cast is needed to avoid a warning with those newer versions. */ + method = (SSL_METHOD *) TLSv1_method(); if (method == NULL) { VLOG_ERR("TLSv1_method: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); return ENOPROTOOPT; @@ -838,11 +1008,22 @@ do_ssl_init(void) SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, NULL); + /* We have to set a session context ID string in 'ctx' because OpenSSL + * otherwise refuses to use a cached session on the server side when + * SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set. And it not only refuses to use the cached + * session, it actually generates an error and kills the connection. + * According to a comment in ssl_get_prev_session() in OpenSSL's + * ssl/ssl_sess.c, this is intentional behavior. + * + * Any context string is OK, as long as one is set. */ + SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (const unsigned char *) PACKAGE, + strlen(PACKAGE)); + return 0; } static DH * -tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl UNUSED, int is_export UNUSED, int keylength) +tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl OVS_UNUSED, int is_export OVS_UNUSED, int keylength) { struct dh { int keylength; @@ -877,37 +1058,108 @@ tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl UNUSED, int is_export UNUSED, int keylength) /* Returns true if SSL is at least partially configured. */ bool -stream_ssl_is_configured(void) +stream_ssl_is_configured(void) { - return has_private_key || has_certificate || has_ca_cert; + return private_key.file_name || certificate.file_name || ca_cert.file_name; } -void -stream_ssl_set_private_key_file(const char *file_name) +static bool +update_ssl_config(struct ssl_config_file *config, const char *file_name) { - if (ssl_init()) { - return; + struct timespec mtime; + + if (ssl_init() || !file_name) { + return false; + } + + /* If the file name hasn't changed and neither has the file contents, stop + * here. */ + get_mtime(file_name, &mtime); + if (config->file_name + && !strcmp(config->file_name, file_name) + && mtime.tv_sec == config->mtime.tv_sec + && mtime.tv_nsec == config->mtime.tv_nsec) { + return false; + } + + /* Update 'config'. */ + config->mtime = mtime; + if (file_name != config->file_name) { + free(config->file_name); + config->file_name = xstrdup(file_name); } - if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, file_name, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1) { + return true; +} + +static void +stream_ssl_set_private_key_file__(const char *file_name) +{ + if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, file_name, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) == 1) { + private_key.read = true; + } else { VLOG_ERR("SSL_use_PrivateKey_file: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); - return; } - has_private_key = true; } void -stream_ssl_set_certificate_file(const char *file_name) +stream_ssl_set_private_key_file(const char *file_name) { - if (ssl_init()) { - return; + if (update_ssl_config(&private_key, file_name)) { + stream_ssl_set_private_key_file__(file_name); } - if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, file_name) != 1) { +} + +static void +stream_ssl_set_certificate_file__(const char *file_name) +{ + if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, file_name) == 1) { + certificate.read = true; + } else { VLOG_ERR("SSL_use_certificate_file: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); - return; } - has_certificate = true; +} + +void +stream_ssl_set_certificate_file(const char *file_name) +{ + if (update_ssl_config(&certificate, file_name)) { + stream_ssl_set_certificate_file__(file_name); + } +} + +/* Sets the private key and certificate files in one operation. Use this + * interface, instead of calling stream_ssl_set_private_key_file() and + * stream_ssl_set_certificate_file() individually, in the main loop of a + * long-running program whose key and certificate might change at runtime. + * + * This is important because of OpenSSL's behavior. If an OpenSSL context + * already has a certificate, and stream_ssl_set_private_key_file() is called + * to install a new private key, OpenSSL will report an error because the new + * private key does not match the old certificate. The other order, of setting + * a new certificate, then setting a new private key, does work. + * + * If this were the only problem, calling stream_ssl_set_certificate_file() + * before stream_ssl_set_private_key_file() would fix it. But, if the private + * key is changed before the certificate (e.g. someone "scp"s or "mv"s the new + * private key in place before the certificate), then OpenSSL would reject that + * change, and then the change of certificate would succeed, but there would be + * no associated private key (because it had only changed once and therefore + * there was no point in re-reading it). + * + * This function avoids both problems by, whenever either the certificate or + * the private key file changes, re-reading both of them, in the correct order. + */ +void +stream_ssl_set_key_and_cert(const char *private_key_file, + const char *certificate_file) +{ + if (update_ssl_config(&private_key, private_key_file) + || update_ssl_config(&certificate, certificate_file)) { + stream_ssl_set_certificate_file__(certificate_file); + stream_ssl_set_private_key_file__(private_key_file); + } } /* Reads the X509 certificate or certificates in file 'file_name'. On success, @@ -1023,29 +1275,23 @@ log_ca_cert(const char *file_name, X509 *cert) subject = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0); VLOG_INFO("Trusting CA cert from %s (%s) (fingerprint %s)", file_name, subject ? subject : "", ds_cstr(&fp)); - free(subject); + OPENSSL_free(subject); ds_destroy(&fp); } -/* Sets 'file_name' as the name of the file from which to read the CA - * certificate used to verify the peer within SSL connections. If 'bootstrap' - * is false, the file must exist. If 'bootstrap' is false, then the file is - * read if it is exists; if it does not, then it will be created from the CA - * certificate received from the peer on the first SSL connection. */ -void -stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file(const char *file_name, bool bootstrap) +static void +stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file__(const char *file_name, bool bootstrap) { X509 **certs; size_t n_certs; struct stat s; - if (ssl_init()) { - return; - } - - if (bootstrap && stat(file_name, &s) && errno == ENOENT) { + if (!strcmp(file_name, "none")) { + verify_peer_cert = false; + VLOG_WARN("Peer certificate validation disabled " + "(this is a security risk)"); + } else if (bootstrap && stat(file_name, &s) && errno == ENOENT) { bootstrap_ca_cert = true; - ca_cert_file = xstrdup(file_name); } else if (!read_cert_file(file_name, &certs, &n_certs)) { size_t i; @@ -1053,7 +1299,7 @@ stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file(const char *file_name, bool bootstrap) for (i = 0; i < n_certs; i++) { /* SSL_CTX_add_client_CA makes a copy of the relevant data. */ if (SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, certs[i]) != 1) { - VLOG_ERR("failed to add client certificate %d from %s: %s", + VLOG_ERR("failed to add client certificate %zu from %s: %s", i, file_name, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); } else { @@ -1061,6 +1307,7 @@ stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file(const char *file_name, bool bootstrap) } X509_free(certs[i]); } + free(certs); /* Set up CAs for OpenSSL to trust in verifying the peer's * certificate. */ @@ -1070,6 +1317,117 @@ stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file(const char *file_name, bool bootstrap) return; } - has_ca_cert = true; + bootstrap_ca_cert = false; + } + ca_cert.read = true; +} + +/* Sets 'file_name' as the name of the file from which to read the CA + * certificate used to verify the peer within SSL connections. If 'bootstrap' + * is false, the file must exist. If 'bootstrap' is false, then the file is + * read if it is exists; if it does not, then it will be created from the CA + * certificate received from the peer on the first SSL connection. */ +void +stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file(const char *file_name, bool bootstrap) +{ + if (!update_ssl_config(&ca_cert, file_name)) { + return; + } + + stream_ssl_set_ca_cert_file__(file_name, bootstrap); +} + +/* SSL protocol logging. */ + +static const char * +ssl_alert_level_to_string(uint8_t type) +{ + switch (type) { + case 1: return "warning"; + case 2: return "fatal"; + default: return ""; + } +} + +static const char * +ssl_alert_description_to_string(uint8_t type) +{ + switch (type) { + case 0: return "close_notify"; + case 10: return "unexpected_message"; + case 20: return "bad_record_mac"; + case 21: return "decryption_failed"; + case 22: return "record_overflow"; + case 30: return "decompression_failure"; + case 40: return "handshake_failure"; + case 42: return "bad_certificate"; + case 43: return "unsupported_certificate"; + case 44: return "certificate_revoked"; + case 45: return "certificate_expired"; + case 46: return "certificate_unknown"; + case 47: return "illegal_parameter"; + case 48: return "unknown_ca"; + case 49: return "access_denied"; + case 50: return "decode_error"; + case 51: return "decrypt_error"; + case 60: return "export_restriction"; + case 70: return "protocol_version"; + case 71: return "insufficient_security"; + case 80: return "internal_error"; + case 90: return "user_canceled"; + case 100: return "no_renegotiation"; + default: return ""; + } +} + +static const char * +ssl_handshake_type_to_string(uint8_t type) +{ + switch (type) { + case 0: return "hello_request"; + case 1: return "client_hello"; + case 2: return "server_hello"; + case 11: return "certificate"; + case 12: return "server_key_exchange"; + case 13: return "certificate_request"; + case 14: return "server_hello_done"; + case 15: return "certificate_verify"; + case 16: return "client_key_exchange"; + case 20: return "finished"; + default: return ""; + } +} + +static void +ssl_protocol_cb(int write_p, int version OVS_UNUSED, int content_type, + const void *buf_, size_t len, SSL *ssl OVS_UNUSED, void *sslv_) +{ + const struct ssl_stream *sslv = sslv_; + const uint8_t *buf = buf_; + struct ds details; + + if (!VLOG_IS_DBG_ENABLED()) { + return; + } + + ds_init(&details); + if (content_type == 20) { + ds_put_cstr(&details, "change_cipher_spec"); + } else if (content_type == 21) { + ds_put_format(&details, "alert: %s, %s", + ssl_alert_level_to_string(buf[0]), + ssl_alert_description_to_string(buf[1])); + } else if (content_type == 22) { + ds_put_format(&details, "handshake: %s", + ssl_handshake_type_to_string(buf[0])); + } else { + ds_put_format(&details, "type %d", content_type); } + + VLOG_DBG("%s%u%s%s %s (%zu bytes)", + sslv->type == CLIENT ? "client" : "server", + sslv->session_nr, write_p ? "-->" : "<--", + stream_get_name(&sslv->stream), ds_cstr(&details), len); + + ds_destroy(&details); }