X-Git-Url: http://git.onelab.eu/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=security%2Fselinux%2Fhooks.c;h=0b32f3020703df2ed266764b87aed32b0724f4ad;hb=e0ff8aa1acd079b70e796571917ae0449b7c465b;hp=d9d22ce4a4f1c558377818024fe24454b9dd0fd4;hpb=6a77f38946aaee1cd85eeec6cf4229b204c15071;p=linux-2.6.git

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d9d22ce4a..0b32f3020 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -10,13 +10,14 @@
  *
  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  *  Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
  *
  *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  */
 
-#include <linux/config.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -65,16 +66,21 @@
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
 
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
 #include "netif.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
 
 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
 
 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
+extern int selinux_compat_net;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
@@ -96,6 +102,8 @@ static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
+#else
+int selinux_enabled = 1;
 #endif
 
 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
@@ -112,18 +120,44 @@ static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 
+static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
+
+/* Return security context for a given sid or just the context 
+   length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
+static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+	char *context;
+	unsigned len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (!buffer || !size)
+		goto getsecurity_exit;
+
+	if (size < len) {
+		len = -ERANGE;
+		goto getsecurity_exit;
+	}
+	memcpy(buffer, context, len);
+
+getsecurity_exit:
+	kfree(context);
+	return len;
+}
+
 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 
 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 
-	tsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tsec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	memset(tsec, 0, sizeof(struct task_security_struct));
-	tsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
 	tsec->task = task;
 	tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	task->security = tsec;
@@ -134,10 +168,6 @@ static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
-
-	if (!tsec || tsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
-		return;
-
 	task->security = NULL;
 	kfree(tsec);
 }
@@ -147,21 +177,17 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
-	isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
 	if (!isec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct inode_security_struct));
+	memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec));
 	init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
-	isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
 	isec->inode = inode;
 	isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
-	if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC)
-		isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
-	else
-		isec->task_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
 	inode->i_security = isec;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -172,16 +198,13 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 
-	if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
-		return;
-
 	spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 	if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
 		list_del_init(&isec->list);
 	spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 
 	inode->i_security = NULL;
-	kfree(isec);
+	kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
 }
 
 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
@@ -189,20 +212,13 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 
-	fsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!fsec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	memset(fsec, 0, sizeof(struct file_security_struct));
-	fsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
 	fsec->file = file;
-	if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC) {
-		fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
-		fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
-	} else {
-		fsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-		fsec->fown_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-	}
+	fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
+	fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
 	file->f_security = fsec;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -211,10 +227,6 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
-
-	if (!fsec || fsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
-		return;
-
 	file->f_security = NULL;
 	kfree(fsec);
 }
@@ -223,19 +235,18 @@ static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 
-	sbsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!sbsec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	memset(sbsec, 0, sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct));
 	init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
 	spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
-	sbsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
 	sbsec->sb = sb;
 	sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
+	sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	sb->s_security = sbsec;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -245,9 +256,6 @@ static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 
-	if (!sbsec || sbsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
-		return;
-
 	spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 	if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 		list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
@@ -257,20 +265,17 @@ static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 	kfree(sbsec);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
-static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
+static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
 	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 
 	if (family != PF_UNIX)
 		return 0;
 
-	ssec = kmalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
+	ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
 	if (!ssec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	memset(ssec, 0, sizeof(*ssec));
-	ssec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
 	ssec->sk = sk;
 	ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	sk->sk_security = ssec;
@@ -282,13 +287,12 @@ static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
 
-	if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX || ssec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+	if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX)
 		return;
 
 	sk->sk_security = NULL;
 	kfree(ssec);
 }
-#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 /* The security server must be initialized before
    any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
@@ -316,19 +320,53 @@ enum {
 	Opt_context = 1,
 	Opt_fscontext = 2,
 	Opt_defcontext = 4,
+	Opt_rootcontext = 8,
 };
 
 static match_table_t tokens = {
 	{Opt_context, "context=%s"},
 	{Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
 	{Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
+	{Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
 };
 
 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 
+static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
+			struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
+			struct task_security_struct *tsec)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
+			struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
+			struct task_security_struct *tsec)
+{
+	int rc;
+	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+			  FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 {
 	char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
+	char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
 	const char *name;
 	u32 sid;
 	int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
@@ -371,7 +409,7 @@ static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 
 			switch (token) {
 			case Opt_context:
-				if (seen) {
+				if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
 					rc = -EINVAL;
 					printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 					goto out_free;
@@ -387,13 +425,13 @@ static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 				break;
 
 			case Opt_fscontext:
-				if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
+				if (seen & Opt_fscontext) {
 					rc = -EINVAL;
 					printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 					goto out_free;
 				}
-				context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
-				if (!context) {
+				fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+				if (!fscontext) {
 					rc = -ENOMEM;
 					goto out_free;
 				}
@@ -402,6 +440,22 @@ static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 				seen |= Opt_fscontext;
 				break;
 
+			case Opt_rootcontext:
+				if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) {
+					rc = -EINVAL;
+					printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+					goto out_free;
+				}
+				rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+				if (!rootcontext) {
+					rc = -ENOMEM;
+					goto out_free;
+				}
+				if (!alloc)
+					alloc = 1;
+				seen |= Opt_rootcontext;
+				break;
+
 			case Opt_defcontext:
 				if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 					rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -438,6 +492,28 @@ static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 	if (!seen)
 		goto out;
 
+	/* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
+	if (fscontext) {
+		rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+			       fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
+			goto out_free;
+		}
+
+		rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_free;
+
+		sbsec->sid = sid;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
+	 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
+	 * the superblock context if not already set.
+	 */
 	if (context) {
 		rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
 		if (rc) {
@@ -447,20 +523,38 @@ static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 			goto out_free;
 		}
 
-		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
-		                  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
-		if (rc)
+		if (!fscontext) {
+			rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out_free;
+			sbsec->sid = sid;
+		} else {
+			rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out_free;
+		}
+		sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
+
+		sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+	}
+
+	if (rootcontext) {
+		struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+		rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+			       rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 			goto out_free;
+		}
 
-		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
-		                  FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
+		rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 
-		sbsec->sid = sid;
-
-		if (seen & Opt_context)
-			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+		isec->sid = sid;
+		isec->initialized = 1;
 	}
 
 	if (defcontext) {
@@ -475,13 +569,7 @@ static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 		if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
 			goto out_free;
 
-		rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
-				  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
-		if (rc)
-			goto out_free;
-
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
-				  FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
+		rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 
@@ -492,6 +580,8 @@ out_free:
 	if (alloc) {
 		kfree(context);
 		kfree(defcontext);
+		kfree(fscontext);
+		kfree(rootcontext);
 	}
 out:
 	return rc;
@@ -589,7 +679,8 @@ next_inode:
 		spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 		inode = igrab(inode);
 		if (inode) {
-			inode_doinit(inode);
+			if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
+				inode_doinit(inode);
 			iput(inode);
 		}
 		spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
@@ -625,6 +716,16 @@ static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
 	return SECCLASS_FILE;
 }
 
+static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
+{
+	return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
+}
+
+static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
+{
+	return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
+}
+
 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
 {
 	switch (family) {
@@ -641,10 +742,16 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
 	case PF_INET6:
 		switch (type) {
 		case SOCK_STREAM:
-			return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
+			if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
+				return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
+			else
+				return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
 		case SOCK_DGRAM:
-			return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
-		case SOCK_RAW:
+			if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
+				return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
+			else
+				return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+		default:
 			return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
 		}
 		break;
@@ -654,7 +761,7 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
 		case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
-		case NETLINK_TCPDIAG:
+		case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
 		case NETLINK_NFLOG:
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
@@ -668,6 +775,8 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
 		case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
 		default:
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
 		}
@@ -675,6 +784,8 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
 		return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
 	case PF_KEY:
 		return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
+	case PF_APPLETALK:
+		return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
 	}
 
 	return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
@@ -819,14 +930,17 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 			sid = sbsec->def_sid;
 			rc = 0;
 		} else {
-			rc = security_context_to_sid(context, rc, &sid);
+			rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
+			                                     sbsec->def_sid);
 			if (rc) {
 				printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
 				       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
 				       __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
 				       inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
 				kfree(context);
-				goto out;
+				/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
+				rc = 0;
+				break;
 			}
 		}
 		kfree(context);
@@ -849,8 +963,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 			goto out;
 		isec->sid = sid;
 		break;
+	case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
+		isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+		break;
 	default:
-		/* Default to the fs SID. */
+		/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
 		isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 
 		if (sbsec->proc) {
@@ -871,18 +988,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 	isec->initialized = 1;
 
 out:
-	if (inode->i_sock) {
-		struct socket *sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
-		if (sock->sk) {
-			isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(sock->sk->sk_family,
-			                                             sock->sk->sk_type,
-			                                             sock->sk->sk_protocol);
-		} else {
-			isec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
-		}
-	} else {
+	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
 		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
-	}
 
 	if (hold_sem)
 		up(&isec->sem);
@@ -918,9 +1025,9 @@ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
 
 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
    fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
-int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
-		  struct task_struct *tsk2,
-		  u32 perms)
+static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
+			 struct task_struct *tsk2,
+			 u32 perms)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
 
@@ -931,8 +1038,8 @@ int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
 }
 
 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
-int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
-			int cap)
+static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			       int cap)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
@@ -948,8 +1055,8 @@ int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
 }
 
 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
-int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
-		    u32 perms)
+static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			   u32 perms)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 
@@ -962,10 +1069,10 @@ int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
-int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
-		   struct inode *inode,
-		   u32 perms,
-		   struct avc_audit_data *adp)
+static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			  struct inode *inode,
+			  u32 perms,
+			  struct avc_audit_data *adp)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
@@ -1007,7 +1114,7 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
-static inline int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				struct file *file,
 				u32 av)
 {
@@ -1082,6 +1189,17 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 			    FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
 }
 
+/* Check whether a task can create a key. */
+static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
+			  struct task_struct *ctx)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	tsec = ctx->security;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
+}
+
 #define MAY_LINK   0
 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
 #define MAY_RMDIR  2
@@ -1187,10 +1305,10 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 }
 
 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
-int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
-			struct super_block *sb,
-			u32 perms,
-			struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			       struct super_block *sb,
+			       u32 perms,
+			       struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
@@ -1247,7 +1365,7 @@ static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
 }
 
 /* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */
-int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
+static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
@@ -1265,85 +1383,6 @@ int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Set the security attributes on a newly created file. */
-static int post_create(struct inode *dir,
-		       struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-
-	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-	struct inode *inode;
-	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-	u32 newsid;
-	char *context;
-	unsigned int len;
-	int rc;
-
-	tsec = current->security;
-	dsec = dir->i_security;
-	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
-
-	inode = dentry->d_inode;
-	if (!inode) {
-		/* Some file system types (e.g. NFS) may not instantiate
-		   a dentry for all create operations (e.g. symlink),
-		   so we have to check to see if the inode is non-NULL. */
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  no inode, dir (dev=%s, "
-		       "ino=%ld)\n", dir->i_sb->s_id, dir->i_ino);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
-		newsid = tsec->create_sid;
-	} else {
-		rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
-					     inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
-					     &newsid);
-		if (rc) {
-			printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  "
-			       "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
-			       "ino=%ld)\n",
-			       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
-			return rc;
-		}
-	}
-
-	rc = inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
-	if (rc) {
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  inode_security_set_sid "
-		       "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
-		       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
-		return rc;
-	}
-
-	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
-	    inode->i_op->setxattr) {
-		/* Use extended attributes. */
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &len);
-		if (rc) {
-			printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  sid_to_context "
-			       "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
-			       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
-			return rc;
-		}
-		down(&inode->i_sem);
-		rc = inode->i_op->setxattr(dentry,
-					   XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
-					   context, len, 0);
-		up(&inode->i_sem);
-		kfree(context);
-		if (rc < 0) {
-			printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  setxattr failed, "
-			       "rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
-			       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
-			return rc;
-		}
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-
 /* Hook functions begin here. */
 
 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
@@ -1358,7 +1397,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
 
 	rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
 	/* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
-	if (!rc)
+	if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
 		csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -1546,12 +1585,10 @@ static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
 
-	bsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!bsec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	memset(bsec, 0, sizeof *bsec);
-	bsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
 	bsec->bprm = bprm;
 	bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	bsec->set = 0;
@@ -1585,8 +1622,10 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	/* Default to the current task SID. */
 	bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
 
-	/* Reset create SID on execve. */
+	/* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
 	tsec->create_sid = 0;
+	tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
+	tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
 
 	if (tsec->exec_sid) {
 		newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
@@ -1660,9 +1699,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	struct bprm_security_struct *bsec = bprm->security;
+	kfree(bprm->security);
 	bprm->security = NULL;
-	kfree(bsec);
 }
 
 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
@@ -1673,12 +1711,16 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
 {
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 	struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
-	struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
+	struct tty_struct *tty;
+	struct fdtable *fdt;
 	long j = -1;
+	int drop_tty = 0;
 
+	mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
+	tty = get_current_tty();
 	if (tty) {
 		file_list_lock();
-		file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_list);
+		file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
 		if (file) {
 			/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
 			   Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
@@ -1688,13 +1730,16 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
 			struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
 			if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
 					   FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
-				/* Reset controlling tty. */
-				current->signal->tty = NULL;
-				current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
+				drop_tty = 1;
 			}
 		}
 		file_list_unlock();
+
+		/* Reset controlling tty. */
+		if (drop_tty)
+			proc_set_tty(current, NULL);
 	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
 
 	/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
 
@@ -1707,9 +1752,10 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
 
 		j++;
 		i = j * __NFDBITS;
-		if (i >= files->max_fds || i >= files->max_fdset)
+		fdt = files_fdtable(files);
+		if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset)
 			break;
-		set = files->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
+		set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
 		if (!set)
 			continue;
 		spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
@@ -1730,7 +1776,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
 						continue;
 					}
 					if (devnull) {
-						atomic_inc(&devnull->f_count);
+						get_file(devnull);
 					} else {
 						devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
 						if (!devnull) {
@@ -1855,6 +1901,13 @@ static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
 			rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
 		}
+		if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
+			/*
+			 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
+			 * to be refigured.
+			 */
+			current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
@@ -1886,7 +1939,8 @@ static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
 {
 	return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
 	        match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
-	        match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
+	        match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
+		match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
 }
 
 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
@@ -1939,7 +1993,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void
 		}
 	} while (*in_end++);
 
-	copy_page(in_save, nosec_save);
+	strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
+	free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
 out:
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -1958,13 +2013,13 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 	return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
 }
 
-static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb)
+static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 
 	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
-	ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
-	return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
+	ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
+	return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
 }
 
 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
@@ -2011,14 +2066,65 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 	inode_free_security(inode);
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
+static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				       char **name, void **value,
+				       size_t *len)
 {
-	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+	u32 newsid, clen;
+	int rc;
+	char *namep = NULL, *context;
+
+	tsec = current->security;
+	dsec = dir->i_security;
+	sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+
+	if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+		newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+	} else {
+		rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
+					     inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
+					     &newsid);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
+			       "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
+			       "ino=%ld)\n",
+			       __FUNCTION__,
+			       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
+
+	if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (name) {
+		namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!namep)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		*name = namep;
+	}
+
+	if (value && len) {
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
+		if (rc) {
+			kfree(namep);
+			return rc;
+		}
+		*value = context;
+		*len = clen;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void selinux_inode_post_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
+static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
 {
-	post_create(dir, dentry);
+	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
@@ -2031,11 +2137,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, stru
 	return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
 }
 
-static void selinux_inode_post_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	int rc;
@@ -2051,21 +2152,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const
 	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
 }
 
-static void selinux_inode_post_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
-{
-	post_create(dir, dentry);
-}
-
 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
 {
 	return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
 }
 
-static void selinux_inode_post_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
-{
-	post_create(dir, dentry);
-}
-
 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
@@ -2082,23 +2173,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mod
 	return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
 }
 
-static void selinux_inode_post_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
-{
-	post_create(dir, dentry);
-}
-
 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
 	return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
 }
 
-static void selinux_inode_post_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
-                                      struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
@@ -2203,6 +2283,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
+	rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
+	                                  isec->sclass);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
 	return avc_has_perm(newsid,
 			    sbsec->sid,
 			    SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
@@ -2236,12 +2321,6 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
 
 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
-
-	if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
 	return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
 }
 
@@ -2272,34 +2351,27 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size)
+static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
 {
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
-	char *context;
-	unsigned len;
-	int rc;
+      return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
+}
 
-	/* Permission check handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.*/
+/*
+ * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user.  If the
+ * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
+ * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
+ *
+ * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
-	if (!buffer || !size) {
-		kfree(context);
-		return len;
-	}
-	if (size < len) {
-		kfree(context);
-		return -ERANGE;
-	}
-	memcpy(buffer, context, len);
-	kfree(context);
-	return len;
-}
+	return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
+}
 
 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
@@ -2434,35 +2506,56 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, prot, flags);
+	rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
+	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+		prot = reqprot;
+
 	return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
 				   (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
 }
 
 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				 unsigned long reqprot,
 				 unsigned long prot)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, prot);
+	rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	if (vma->vm_file != NULL && vma->anon_vma != NULL && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
-		/*
-		 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
-		 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been written,
-		 * check ability to execute the possibly modified content.
-		 * This typically should only occur for text relocations.
-		 */
-		int rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
+	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+		prot = reqprot;
+
+	if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
+		rc = 0;
+		if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
+		    vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
+			rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
+					   PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
+		} else if (!vma->vm_file &&
+			   vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
+			   vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
+			rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
+		} else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
+			/*
+			 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
+			 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
+			 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
+			 * modified content.  This typically should only
+			 * occur for text relocations.
+			 */
+			rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
+					   FILE__EXECMOD);
+		}
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
@@ -2587,9 +2680,11 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
 	tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
 
-	/* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */
+	/* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
 	tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
 	tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
+	tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
+	tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
 
 	/* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
 	   This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
@@ -2641,6 +2736,11 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 	return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
 }
 
+static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+	selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
+}
+
 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
 {
 	/* See the comment for setuid above. */
@@ -2658,6 +2758,16 @@ static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 	return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
 }
 
+static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+	return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
+}
+
 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
 	struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
@@ -2687,25 +2797,35 @@ static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 	return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
 }
 
-static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
+static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+				int sig, u32 secid)
 {
 	u32 perm;
 	int rc;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
+	rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	if (info && ((unsigned long)info == 1 ||
-	             (unsigned long)info == 2 || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
+	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (!sig)
 		perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
 	else
 		perm = signal_to_av(sig);
-
-	return task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
+	tsec = p->security;
+	if (secid)
+		rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+	else
+		rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
@@ -2752,8 +2872,6 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
 	return;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
-
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
@@ -2833,8 +2951,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad
 
 	nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
 	offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
-	offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr,
-				  skb->tail - skb->head - offset);
+	offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
 	if (offset < 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -2933,12 +3050,14 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	u32 newsid;
 
 	if (kern)
 		goto out;
 
 	tsec = current->security;
-	err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+	newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
+	err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
 			   socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
 			   protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
 
@@ -2949,18 +3068,17 @@ out:
 static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 				       int type, int protocol, int kern)
 {
-	int err;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	u32 newsid;
 
-	err = inode_doinit(SOCK_INODE(sock));
-	if (err < 0)
-		return;
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 
 	tsec = current->security;
+	newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
 	isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
-	isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
+	isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
+	isec->initialized = 1;
 
 	return;
 }
@@ -2982,6 +3100,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 
 	/*
 	 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
+	 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
+	 * check the first address now.
 	 */
 	family = sock->sk->sk_family;
 	if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -3026,12 +3146,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 				goto out;
 		}
 		
-		switch(sk->sk_protocol) {
-		case IPPROTO_TCP:
+		switch(isec->sclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
 			node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
 			break;
 			
-		case IPPROTO_UDP:
+		case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
 			node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
 			break;
 			
@@ -3064,7 +3184,53 @@ out:
 
 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
-	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	int err;
+
+	err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
+	 */
+	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
+		struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+		struct avc_audit_data ad;
+		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+		unsigned short snum;
+		u32 sid;
+
+		if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
+			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
+		} else {
+			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+		}
+
+		err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+					sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+
+		AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+		ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
+		ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
+		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
+				   TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+out:
+	return err;
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
@@ -3082,14 +3248,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	err = inode_doinit(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
-	if (err < 0)
-		return err;
 	newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
 
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
 	newisec->sid = isec->sid;
+	newisec->initialized = 1;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -3191,47 +3355,17 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+		struct avc_audit_data *ad, u32 sock_sid, u16 sock_class,
+		u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
 {
-	u16 family;
-	char *addrp;
-	int len, err = 0;
+	int err = 0;
 	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
-	u32 sock_sid = 0;
-	u16 sock_class = 0;
-	struct socket *sock;
-	struct net_device *dev;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
-
-	family = sk->sk_family;
-	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
-		goto out;
-
-	/* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
-	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
-		family = PF_INET;
-
- 	read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- 	sock = sk->sk_socket;
- 	if (sock) {
- 		struct inode *inode;
- 		inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
- 		if (inode) {
- 			struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- 			isec = inode->i_security;
- 			sock_sid = isec->sid;
- 			sock_class = isec->sclass;
- 		}
- 	}
- 	read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- 	if (!sock_sid)
-  		goto out;
 
-	dev = skb->dev;
-	if (!dev)
+	if (!skb->dev)
 		goto out;
 
-	err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
+	err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -3254,62 +3388,124 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		break;
 	}
 
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
-	ad.u.net.family = family;
-
-	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad);
+	err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 	
-	/* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
 	err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 	
-	err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad);
+	err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (recv_perm) {
 		u32 port_sid;
 
-		/* Fixme: make this more efficient */
 		err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
-		                        sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport),
+		                        sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
 		                        &port_sid);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 
 		err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
-				   sock_class, recv_perm, &ad);
+				   sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
 	}
+
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	u16 family;
+	u16 sock_class = 0;
+	char *addrp;
+	int len, err = 0;
+	u32 sock_sid = 0;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+	family = sk->sk_family;
+	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+
+ 	read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ 	sock = sk->sk_socket;
+ 	if (sock) {
+ 		struct inode *inode;
+ 		inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+ 		if (inode) {
+ 			struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ 			isec = inode->i_security;
+ 			sock_sid = isec->sid;
+ 			sock_class = isec->sclass;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ 	if (!sock_sid)
+  		goto out;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
+	ad.u.net.family = family;
+
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (selinux_compat_net)
+		err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, sock_sid,
+						  sock_class, family,
+						  addrp, len);
+	else
+		err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb);
 out:	
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
-				     int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+					    int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	char *scontext;
 	u32 scontext_len;
 	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 peer_sid = 0;
 
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-	if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
+
+	/* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */
+	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
+		ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
+	}
+	else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
+		peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk);
+
+		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+			err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	else {
 		err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	
-	err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -3330,7 +3526,24 @@ out:
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+{
+	u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (sock && (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX))
+		selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
+	else if (skb)
+		peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
+
+	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
+		err = -EINVAL;
+	*secid = peer_secid;
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
 	return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
 }
@@ -3340,6 +3553,24 @@ static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 	sk_free_security(sk);
 }
 
+static unsigned int selinux_sk_getsid_security(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir)
+{
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 sock_sid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
+
+	if (!sk)
+		return selinux_no_sk_sid(fl);
+
+	read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+	isec = get_sock_isec(sk);
+
+	if (isec)
+		sock_sid = isec->sid;
+
+	read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+	return sock_sid;
+}
+
 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err = 0;
@@ -3356,6 +3587,15 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	
 	err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
 	if (err) {
+		if (err == -EINVAL) {
+			audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+				  "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
+				  " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
+				  nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
+			if (!selinux_enforcing)
+				err = 0;
+		}
+
 		/* Ignore */
 		if (err == -ENOENT)
 			err = 0;
@@ -3369,42 +3609,18 @@ out:
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
 
-static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
-                                              struct sk_buff **pskb,
-                                              const struct net_device *in,
-                                              const struct net_device *out,
-                                              int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
-                                              u16 family)
+static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
+					    struct inode_security_struct *isec,
+					    struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+					    u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
 {
-	char *addrp;
-	int len, err = NF_ACCEPT;
+	int err;
 	u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
-	struct sock *sk;
-	struct socket *sock;
-	struct inode *inode;
-	struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-	struct avc_audit_data ad;
-	struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
 	
-	sk = skb->sk;
-	if (!sk)
-		goto out;
-		
-	sock = sk->sk_socket;
-	if (!sock)
-		goto out;
-		
-	inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
-	if (!inode)
-		goto out;
-
 	err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	isec = inode->i_security;
-	
 	switch (isec->sclass) {
 	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
 		netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
@@ -3424,52 +3640,90 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
 		break;
 	}
 
-
-	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
-	ad.u.net.family = family;
-
-	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp,
-				&len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
-	if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
-		goto out;
-
-	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF,
-	                   netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
-	if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
+	if (err)
 		goto out;
 		
-	/* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
-	err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len,
-				&node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
-	if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+	err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
+	if (err)
 		goto out;
 	
-	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
-	                   node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
-	if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
+	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (send_perm) {
 		u32 port_sid;
 		
-		/* Fixme: make this more efficient */
 		err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
 		                        sk->sk_type,
 		                        sk->sk_protocol,
-		                        ntohs(ad.u.net.dport),
-		                        &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
-		if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+		                        ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
+		                        &port_sid);
+		if (err)
 			goto out;
 
 		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
-		                   send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+				   send_perm, ad);
 	}
-
 out:
 	return err;
 }
 
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
+                                              struct sk_buff **pskb,
+                                              const struct net_device *in,
+                                              const struct net_device *out,
+                                              int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
+                                              u16 family)
+{
+	char *addrp;
+	int len, err = 0;
+	struct sock *sk;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+	struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
+
+	sk = skb->sk;
+	if (!sk)
+		goto out;
+
+	sock = sk->sk_socket;
+	if (!sock)
+		goto out;
+
+	inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+	if (!inode)
+		goto out;
+
+	isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
+	ad.u.net.family = family;
+
+	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (selinux_compat_net)
+		err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, isec, &ad,
+						       family, addrp, len);
+	else
+		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				   PACKET__SEND, &ad);
+
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb);
+out:
+	return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
 						struct sk_buff **pskb,
 						const struct net_device *in,
@@ -3494,43 +3748,34 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
 
-#else
-
-static inline int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
-
 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-	struct av_decision avd;
 	int err;
 
 	err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	tsec = current->security;
-
-	avd.allowed = 0;
-	avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
-				SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
-	cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
-
 	if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
 		err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
 
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
 {
-	if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
-	return 0;
+	int err;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+	err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+	ad.u.cap = capability;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
+	                    SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
 }
 
 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
@@ -3540,19 +3785,13 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
 
-	isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!isec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct));
-	isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
 	isec->sclass = sclass;
 	isec->ipc_perm = perm;
-	if (tsec) {
-		isec->sid = tsec->sid;
-	} else {
-		isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-	}
+	isec->sid = tsec->sid;
 	perm->security = isec;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -3561,9 +3800,6 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
-	if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
-		return;
-
 	perm->security = NULL;
 	kfree(isec);
 }
@@ -3572,12 +3808,10 @@ static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
 
-	msec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!msec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	memset(msec, 0, sizeof(struct msg_security_struct));
-	msec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
 	msec->msg = msg;
 	msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	msg->security = msec;
@@ -3588,15 +3822,13 @@ static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
-	if (!msec || msec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
-		return;
 
 	msg->security = NULL;
 	kfree(msec);
 }
 
 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
-			u16 sclass, u32 perms)
+			u32 perms)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
@@ -3608,7 +3840,7 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
 	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
 	ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, sclass, perms, &ad);
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
 }
 
 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
@@ -3693,7 +3925,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ, perms);
+	err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -3845,7 +4077,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM, perms);
+	err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -3864,7 +4096,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
 	else
 		perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
 
-	return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM, perms);
+	return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
 }
 
 /* Semaphore security operations */
@@ -3953,7 +4185,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM, perms);
+	err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -3967,18 +4199,13 @@ static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
 	else
 		perms = SEM__READ;
 
-	return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM, perms);
+	return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
 }
 
 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 {
-	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
-	u16 sclass = SECCLASS_IPC;
 	u32 av = 0;
 
-	if (isec && isec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC)
-		sclass = isec->sclass;
-
 	av = 0;
 	if (flag & S_IRUGO)
 		av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
@@ -3988,11 +4215,11 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 	if (av == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, sclass, av);
+	return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
 }
 
 /* module stacking operations */
-int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
+static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
 {
 	if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
 		printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  There is already a secondary security "
@@ -4009,7 +4236,7 @@ int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
+static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
 {
 	if (ops != secondary_ops) {
 		printk (KERN_INFO "%s:  trying to unregister a security module "
@@ -4032,8 +4259,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 			       char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-	u32 sid, len;
-	char *context;
+	u32 sid;
 	int error;
 
 	if (current != p) {
@@ -4042,9 +4268,6 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 			return error;
 	}
 
-	if (!size)
-		return -ERANGE;
-
 	tsec = p->security;
 
 	if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
@@ -4055,22 +4278,17 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 		sid = tsec->exec_sid;
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
 		sid = tsec->create_sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+		sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+		sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
 	else
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!sid)
 		return 0;
 
-	error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-	if (len > size) {
-		kfree(context);
-		return -ERANGE;
-	}
-	memcpy(value, context, len);
-	kfree(context);
-	return len;
+	return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
 }
 
 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
@@ -4079,6 +4297,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 	u32 sid = 0;
 	int error;
+	char *str = value;
 
 	if (current != p) {
 		/* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
@@ -4095,6 +4314,10 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
 		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
 		error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
 	else
@@ -4103,8 +4326,11 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 		return error;
 
 	/* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
-	if (size) {
-		int error;
+	if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
+		if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
+			str[size-1] = 0;
+			size--;
+		}
 		error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
 		if (error)
 			return error;
@@ -4121,6 +4347,13 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 		tsec->exec_sid = sid;
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
 		tsec->create_sid = sid;
+	else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
+		error = may_create_key(sid, p);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+		tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
+	} else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+		tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
 		struct av_decision avd;
 
@@ -4172,7 +4405,73 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 	return size;
 }
 
-struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
+static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+	return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
+}
+
+static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+{
+	if (secdata)
+		kfree(secdata);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
+			     unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec;
+
+	ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ksec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ksec->obj = k;
+	if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
+		ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
+	else
+		ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
+	k->security = ksec;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
+{
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
+
+	k->security = NULL;
+	kfree(ksec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
+			    struct task_struct *ctx,
+			    key_perm_t perm)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec;
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+
+	tsec = ctx->security;
+	ksec = key->security;
+
+	/* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
+	   permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
+	   appear to be created. */
+	if (perm == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
+			    SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.ptrace =			selinux_ptrace,
 	.capget =			selinux_capget,
 	.capset_check =			selinux_capset_check,
@@ -4205,20 +4504,15 @@ struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 
 	.inode_alloc_security =		selinux_inode_alloc_security,
 	.inode_free_security =		selinux_inode_free_security,
+	.inode_init_security =		selinux_inode_init_security,
 	.inode_create =			selinux_inode_create,
-	.inode_post_create =		selinux_inode_post_create,
 	.inode_link =			selinux_inode_link,
-	.inode_post_link =		selinux_inode_post_link,
 	.inode_unlink =			selinux_inode_unlink,
 	.inode_symlink =		selinux_inode_symlink,
-	.inode_post_symlink =		selinux_inode_post_symlink,
 	.inode_mkdir =			selinux_inode_mkdir,
-	.inode_post_mkdir =		selinux_inode_post_mkdir,
 	.inode_rmdir =			selinux_inode_rmdir,
 	.inode_mknod =			selinux_inode_mknod,
-	.inode_post_mknod =		selinux_inode_post_mknod,
 	.inode_rename =			selinux_inode_rename,
-	.inode_post_rename =		selinux_inode_post_rename,
 	.inode_readlink =		selinux_inode_readlink,
 	.inode_follow_link =		selinux_inode_follow_link,
 	.inode_permission =		selinux_inode_permission,
@@ -4229,6 +4523,7 @@ struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inode_getxattr =		selinux_inode_getxattr,
 	.inode_listxattr =		selinux_inode_listxattr,
 	.inode_removexattr =		selinux_inode_removexattr,
+	.inode_xattr_getsuffix =        selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
 	.inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
 	.inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
 	.inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
@@ -4254,11 +4549,15 @@ struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.task_setpgid =			selinux_task_setpgid,
 	.task_getpgid =			selinux_task_getpgid,
 	.task_getsid =		        selinux_task_getsid,
+	.task_getsecid =		selinux_task_getsecid,
 	.task_setgroups =		selinux_task_setgroups,
 	.task_setnice =			selinux_task_setnice,
+	.task_setioprio =		selinux_task_setioprio,
+	.task_getioprio =		selinux_task_getioprio,
 	.task_setrlimit =		selinux_task_setrlimit,
 	.task_setscheduler =		selinux_task_setscheduler,
 	.task_getscheduler =		selinux_task_getscheduler,
+	.task_movememory =		selinux_task_movememory,
 	.task_kill =			selinux_task_kill,
 	.task_wait =			selinux_task_wait,
 	.task_prctl =			selinux_task_prctl,
@@ -4297,7 +4596,9 @@ struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.getprocattr =                  selinux_getprocattr,
 	.setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+	.secid_to_secctx =		selinux_secid_to_secctx,
+	.release_secctx =		selinux_release_secctx,
+
         .unix_stream_connect =		selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
 	.unix_may_send =		selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
 
@@ -4315,13 +4616,31 @@ struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.socket_setsockopt =		selinux_socket_setsockopt,
 	.socket_shutdown =		selinux_socket_shutdown,
 	.socket_sock_rcv_skb =		selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
-	.socket_getpeersec =		selinux_socket_getpeersec,
+	.socket_getpeersec_stream =	selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
+	.socket_getpeersec_dgram =	selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
 	.sk_alloc_security =		selinux_sk_alloc_security,
 	.sk_free_security =		selinux_sk_free_security,
+	.sk_getsid = 			selinux_sk_getsid_security,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+	.xfrm_policy_alloc_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
+	.xfrm_policy_clone_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
+	.xfrm_policy_free_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
+	.xfrm_policy_delete_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
+	.xfrm_state_alloc_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
+	.xfrm_state_free_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_free,
+	.xfrm_state_delete_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
+	.xfrm_policy_lookup = 		selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	.key_alloc =                    selinux_key_alloc,
+	.key_free =                     selinux_key_free,
+	.key_permission =               selinux_key_permission,
 #endif
 };
 
-__init int selinux_init(void)
+static __init int selinux_init(void)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 
@@ -4338,6 +4657,9 @@ __init int selinux_init(void)
 	tsec = current->security;
 	tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
 
+	sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
+					    sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
+					    0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
 	avc_init();
 
 	original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
@@ -4351,6 +4673,15 @@ __init int selinux_init(void)
 	} else {
 		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
 	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	/* Add security information to initial keyrings */
+	selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
+			  KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+	selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
+			  KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+#endif
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -4360,6 +4691,7 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void)
 
 	/* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
 	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
+	spin_lock(&sb_lock);
 	spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 next_sb:
 	if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
@@ -4368,26 +4700,27 @@ next_sb:
 				           struct superblock_security_struct,
 				           list);
 		struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
-		spin_lock(&sb_lock);
 		sb->s_count++;
-		spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
 		spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
+		spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
 		down_read(&sb->s_umount);
 		if (sb->s_root)
 			superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
 		drop_super(sb);
+		spin_lock(&sb_lock);
 		spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 		list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
 		goto next_sb;
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
+	spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
 }
 
 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
    all processes and objects when they are created. */
 security_initcall(selinux_init);
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
+#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
 
 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
 	.hook =		selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
@@ -4429,6 +4762,7 @@ static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
 		panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
 
 #endif	/* IPV6 */
+
 out:
 	return err;
 }
@@ -4447,13 +4781,13 @@ static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
 }
 #endif
 
-#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
 #endif
 
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
 int selinux_disable(void)
@@ -4474,6 +4808,7 @@ int selinux_disable(void)
 	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
 
 	selinux_disabled = 1;
+	selinux_enabled = 0;
 
 	/* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
 	security_ops = secondary_ops;