-#----------------------------------------------------------------------\r
-# Copyright (c) 2008 Board of Trustees, Princeton University\r
-#\r
-# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining\r
-# a copy of this software and/or hardware specification (the "Work") to\r
-# deal in the Work without restriction, including without limitation the\r
-# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,\r
-# and/or sell copies of the Work, and to permit persons to whom the Work\r
-# is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:\r
-#\r
-# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be\r
-# included in all copies or substantial portions of the Work.\r
-#\r
-# THE WORK IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS \r
-# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF \r
-# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND \r
-# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT \r
-# HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, \r
-# WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, \r
-# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORK OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS \r
-# IN THE WORK.\r
-#----------------------------------------------------------------------\r
-\r
-##\r
-# SFA uses two crypto libraries: pyOpenSSL and M2Crypto to implement\r
-# the necessary crypto functionality. Ideally just one of these libraries\r
-# would be used, but unfortunately each of these libraries is independently\r
-# lacking. The pyOpenSSL library is missing many necessary functions, and\r
-# the M2Crypto library has crashed inside of some of the functions. The\r
-# design decision is to use pyOpenSSL whenever possible as it seems more\r
-# stable, and only use M2Crypto for those functions that are not possible\r
-# in pyOpenSSL.\r
-#\r
-# This module exports two classes: Keypair and Certificate.\r
-##\r
-#\r
-\r
-import functools\r
-import os\r
-import tempfile\r
-import base64\r
-from tempfile import mkstemp\r
-\r
-from OpenSSL import crypto\r
-import M2Crypto\r
-from M2Crypto import X509\r
-\r
-from sfa.util.faults import CertExpired, CertMissingParent, CertNotSignedByParent\r
-from sfa.util.sfalogging import logger\r
-\r
-glo_passphrase_callback = None\r
-\r
-##\r
-# A global callback may be implemented for requesting passphrases from the\r
-# user. The function will be called with three arguments:\r
-#\r
-# keypair_obj: the keypair object that is calling the passphrase\r
-# string: the string containing the private key that's being loaded\r
-# x: unknown, appears to be 0, comes from pyOpenSSL and/or m2crypto\r
-#\r
-# The callback should return a string containing the passphrase.\r
-\r
-def set_passphrase_callback(callback_func):\r
- global glo_passphrase_callback\r
-\r
- glo_passphrase_callback = callback_func\r
-\r
-##\r
-# Sets a fixed passphrase.\r
-\r
-def set_passphrase(passphrase):\r
- set_passphrase_callback( lambda k,s,x: passphrase )\r
-\r
-##\r
-# Check to see if a passphrase works for a particular private key string.\r
-# Intended to be used by passphrase callbacks for input validation.\r
-\r
-def test_passphrase(string, passphrase):\r
- try:\r
- crypto.load_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, string, (lambda x: passphrase))\r
- return True\r
- except:\r
- return False\r
-\r
-def convert_public_key(key):\r
- keyconvert_path = "/usr/bin/keyconvert.py"\r
- if not os.path.isfile(keyconvert_path):\r
- raise IOError, "Could not find keyconvert in %s" % keyconvert_path\r
-\r
- # we can only convert rsa keys\r
- if "ssh-dss" in key:\r
- raise Exception, "keyconvert: dss keys are not supported"\r
-\r
- (ssh_f, ssh_fn) = tempfile.mkstemp()\r
- ssl_fn = tempfile.mktemp()\r
- os.write(ssh_f, key)\r
- os.close(ssh_f)\r
-\r
- cmd = keyconvert_path + " " + ssh_fn + " " + ssl_fn\r
- os.system(cmd)\r
-\r
- # this check leaves the temporary file containing the public key so\r
- # that it can be expected to see why it failed.\r
- # TODO: for production, cleanup the temporary files\r
- if not os.path.exists(ssl_fn):\r
- raise Exception, "keyconvert: generated certificate not found. keyconvert may have failed."\r
-\r
- k = Keypair()\r
- try:\r
- k.load_pubkey_from_file(ssl_fn)\r
- return k\r
- except:\r
- logger.log_exc("convert_public_key caught exception")\r
- raise\r
- finally:\r
- # remove the temporary files\r
- if os.path.exists(ssh_fn):\r
- os.remove(ssh_fn)\r
- if os.path.exists(ssl_fn):\r
- os.remove(ssl_fn)\r
-\r
-##\r
-# Public-private key pairs are implemented by the Keypair class.\r
-# A Keypair object may represent both a public and private key pair, or it\r
-# may represent only a public key (this usage is consistent with OpenSSL).\r
-\r
-class Keypair:\r
- key = None # public/private keypair\r
- m2key = None # public key (m2crypto format)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Creates a Keypair object\r
- # @param create If create==True, creates a new public/private key and\r
- # stores it in the object\r
- # @param string If string!=None, load the keypair from the string (PEM)\r
- # @param filename If filename!=None, load the keypair from the file\r
-\r
- def __init__(self, create=False, string=None, filename=None):\r
- if create:\r
- self.create()\r
- if string:\r
- self.load_from_string(string)\r
- if filename:\r
- self.load_from_file(filename)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Create a RSA public/private key pair and store it inside the keypair object\r
-\r
- def create(self):\r
- self.key = crypto.PKey()\r
- self.key.generate_key(crypto.TYPE_RSA, 1024)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Save the private key to a file\r
- # @param filename name of file to store the keypair in\r
-\r
- def save_to_file(self, filename):\r
- open(filename, 'w').write(self.as_pem())\r
- self.filename=filename\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Load the private key from a file. Implicity the private key includes the public key.\r
-\r
- def load_from_file(self, filename):\r
- self.filename=filename\r
- buffer = open(filename, 'r').read()\r
- self.load_from_string(buffer)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Load the private key from a string. Implicitly the private key includes the public key.\r
-\r
- def load_from_string(self, string):\r
- if glo_passphrase_callback:\r
- self.key = crypto.load_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, string, functools.partial(glo_passphrase_callback, self, string) )\r
- self.m2key = M2Crypto.EVP.load_key_string(string, functools.partial(glo_passphrase_callback, self, string) )\r
- else:\r
- self.key = crypto.load_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, string)\r
- self.m2key = M2Crypto.EVP.load_key_string(string)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Load the public key from a string. No private key is loaded.\r
-\r
- def load_pubkey_from_file(self, filename):\r
- # load the m2 public key\r
- m2rsakey = M2Crypto.RSA.load_pub_key(filename)\r
- self.m2key = M2Crypto.EVP.PKey()\r
- self.m2key.assign_rsa(m2rsakey)\r
-\r
- # create an m2 x509 cert\r
- m2name = M2Crypto.X509.X509_Name()\r
- m2name.add_entry_by_txt(field="CN", type=0x1001, entry="junk", len=-1, loc=-1, set=0)\r
- m2x509 = M2Crypto.X509.X509()\r
- m2x509.set_pubkey(self.m2key)\r
- m2x509.set_serial_number(0)\r
- m2x509.set_issuer_name(m2name)\r
- m2x509.set_subject_name(m2name)\r
- ASN1 = M2Crypto.ASN1.ASN1_UTCTIME()\r
- ASN1.set_time(500)\r
- m2x509.set_not_before(ASN1)\r
- m2x509.set_not_after(ASN1)\r
- # x509v3 so it can have extensions\r
- # prob not necc since this cert itself is junk but still...\r
- m2x509.set_version(2)\r
- junk_key = Keypair(create=True)\r
- m2x509.sign(pkey=junk_key.get_m2_pkey(), md="sha1")\r
-\r
- # convert the m2 x509 cert to a pyopenssl x509\r
- m2pem = m2x509.as_pem()\r
- pyx509 = crypto.load_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, m2pem)\r
-\r
- # get the pyopenssl pkey from the pyopenssl x509\r
- self.key = pyx509.get_pubkey()\r
- self.filename=filename\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Load the public key from a string. No private key is loaded.\r
-\r
- def load_pubkey_from_string(self, string):\r
- (f, fn) = tempfile.mkstemp()\r
- os.write(f, string)\r
- os.close(f)\r
- self.load_pubkey_from_file(fn)\r
- os.remove(fn)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Return the private key in PEM format.\r
-\r
- def as_pem(self):\r
- return crypto.dump_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, self.key)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Return an M2Crypto key object\r
-\r
- def get_m2_pkey(self):\r
- if not self.m2key:\r
- self.m2key = M2Crypto.EVP.load_key_string(self.as_pem())\r
- return self.m2key\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Returns a string containing the public key represented by this object.\r
-\r
- def get_pubkey_string(self):\r
- m2pkey = self.get_m2_pkey()\r
- return base64.b64encode(m2pkey.as_der())\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Return an OpenSSL pkey object\r
-\r
- def get_openssl_pkey(self):\r
- return self.key\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Given another Keypair object, return TRUE if the two keys are the same.\r
-\r
- def is_same(self, pkey):\r
- return self.as_pem() == pkey.as_pem()\r
-\r
- def sign_string(self, data):\r
- k = self.get_m2_pkey()\r
- k.sign_init()\r
- k.sign_update(data)\r
- return base64.b64encode(k.sign_final())\r
-\r
- def verify_string(self, data, sig):\r
- k = self.get_m2_pkey()\r
- k.verify_init()\r
- k.verify_update(data)\r
- return M2Crypto.m2.verify_final(k.ctx, base64.b64decode(sig), k.pkey)\r
-\r
- def compute_hash(self, value):\r
- return self.sign_string(str(value))\r
-\r
- # only informative\r
- def get_filename(self):\r
- return getattr(self,'filename',None)\r
-\r
- def dump (self, *args, **kwargs):\r
- print self.dump_string(*args, **kwargs)\r
-\r
- def dump_string (self):\r
- result=""\r
- result += "KEYPAIR: pubkey=%40s..."%self.get_pubkey_string()\r
- filename=self.get_filename()\r
- if filename: result += "Filename %s\n"%filename\r
- return result\r
-\r
-##\r
-# The certificate class implements a general purpose X509 certificate, making\r
-# use of the appropriate pyOpenSSL or M2Crypto abstractions. It also adds\r
-# several addition features, such as the ability to maintain a chain of\r
-# parent certificates, and storage of application-specific data.\r
-#\r
-# Certificates include the ability to maintain a chain of parents. Each\r
-# certificate includes a pointer to it's parent certificate. When loaded\r
-# from a file or a string, the parent chain will be automatically loaded.\r
-# When saving a certificate to a file or a string, the caller can choose\r
-# whether to save the parent certificates as well.\r
-\r
-class Certificate:\r
- digest = "md5"\r
-\r
- cert = None\r
- issuerKey = None\r
- issuerSubject = None\r
- parent = None\r
- isCA = None # will be a boolean once set\r
-\r
- separator="-----parent-----"\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Create a certificate object.\r
- #\r
- # @param lifeDays life of cert in days - default is 1825==5 years\r
- # @param create If create==True, then also create a blank X509 certificate.\r
- # @param subject If subject!=None, then create a blank certificate and set\r
- # it's subject name.\r
- # @param string If string!=None, load the certficate from the string.\r
- # @param filename If filename!=None, load the certficiate from the file.\r
- # @param isCA If !=None, set whether this cert is for a CA\r
-\r
- def __init__(self, lifeDays=1825, create=False, subject=None, string=None, filename=None, isCA=None):\r
- self.data = {}\r
- if create or subject:\r
- self.create(lifeDays)\r
- if subject:\r
- self.set_subject(subject)\r
- if string:\r
- self.load_from_string(string)\r
- if filename:\r
- self.load_from_file(filename)\r
-\r
- # Set the CA bit if a value was supplied\r
- if isCA != None:\r
- self.set_is_ca(isCA)\r
-\r
- # Create a blank X509 certificate and store it in this object.\r
-\r
- def create(self, lifeDays=1825):\r
- self.cert = crypto.X509()\r
- # FIXME: Use different serial #s\r
- self.cert.set_serial_number(3)\r
- self.cert.gmtime_adj_notBefore(0) # 0 means now\r
- self.cert.gmtime_adj_notAfter(lifeDays*60*60*24) # five years is default\r
- self.cert.set_version(2) # x509v3 so it can have extensions\r
-\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Given a pyOpenSSL X509 object, store that object inside of this\r
- # certificate object.\r
-\r
- def load_from_pyopenssl_x509(self, x509):\r
- self.cert = x509\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Load the certificate from a string\r
-\r
- def load_from_string(self, string):\r
- # if it is a chain of multiple certs, then split off the first one and\r
- # load it (support for the ---parent--- tag as well as normal chained certs)\r
-\r
- string = string.strip()\r
- \r
- # If it's not in proper PEM format, wrap it\r
- if string.count('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE') == 0:\r
- string = '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n%s\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----' % string\r
-\r
- # If there is a PEM cert in there, but there is some other text first\r
- # such as the text of the certificate, skip the text\r
- beg = string.find('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE')\r
- if beg > 0:\r
- # skipping over non cert beginning \r
- string = string[beg:]\r
-\r
- parts = []\r
-\r
- if string.count('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----') > 1 and \\r
- string.count(Certificate.separator) == 0:\r
- parts = string.split('-----END CERTIFICATE-----',1)\r
- parts[0] += '-----END CERTIFICATE-----'\r
- else:\r
- parts = string.split(Certificate.separator, 1)\r
-\r
- self.cert = crypto.load_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, parts[0])\r
-\r
- # if there are more certs, then create a parent and let the parent load\r
- # itself from the remainder of the string\r
- if len(parts) > 1 and parts[1] != '':\r
- self.parent = self.__class__()\r
- self.parent.load_from_string(parts[1])\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Load the certificate from a file\r
-\r
- def load_from_file(self, filename):\r
- file = open(filename)\r
- string = file.read()\r
- self.load_from_string(string)\r
- self.filename=filename\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Save the certificate to a string.\r
- #\r
- # @param save_parents If save_parents==True, then also save the parent certificates.\r
-\r
- def save_to_string(self, save_parents=True):\r
- string = crypto.dump_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, self.cert)\r
- if save_parents and self.parent:\r
- string = string + self.parent.save_to_string(save_parents)\r
- return string\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Save the certificate to a file.\r
- # @param save_parents If save_parents==True, then also save the parent certificates.\r
-\r
- def save_to_file(self, filename, save_parents=True, filep=None):\r
- string = self.save_to_string(save_parents=save_parents)\r
- if filep:\r
- f = filep\r
- else:\r
- f = open(filename, 'w')\r
- f.write(string)\r
- f.close()\r
- self.filename=filename\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Save the certificate to a random file in /tmp/\r
- # @param save_parents If save_parents==True, then also save the parent certificates.\r
- def save_to_random_tmp_file(self, save_parents=True):\r
- fp, filename = mkstemp(suffix='cert', text=True)\r
- fp = os.fdopen(fp, "w")\r
- self.save_to_file(filename, save_parents=True, filep=fp)\r
- return filename\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Sets the issuer private key and name\r
- # @param key Keypair object containing the private key of the issuer\r
- # @param subject String containing the name of the issuer\r
- # @param cert (optional) Certificate object containing the name of the issuer\r
-\r
- def set_issuer(self, key, subject=None, cert=None):\r
- self.issuerKey = key\r
- if subject:\r
- # it's a mistake to use subject and cert params at the same time\r
- assert(not cert)\r
- if isinstance(subject, dict) or isinstance(subject, str):\r
- req = crypto.X509Req()\r
- reqSubject = req.get_subject()\r
- if (isinstance(subject, dict)):\r
- for key in reqSubject.keys():\r
- setattr(reqSubject, key, subject[key])\r
- else:\r
- setattr(reqSubject, "CN", subject)\r
- subject = reqSubject\r
- # subject is not valid once req is out of scope, so save req\r
- self.issuerReq = req\r
- if cert:\r
- # if a cert was supplied, then get the subject from the cert\r
- subject = cert.cert.get_subject()\r
- assert(subject)\r
- self.issuerSubject = subject\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Get the issuer name\r
-\r
- def get_issuer(self, which="CN"):\r
- x = self.cert.get_issuer()\r
- return getattr(x, which)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Set the subject name of the certificate\r
-\r
- def set_subject(self, name):\r
- req = crypto.X509Req()\r
- subj = req.get_subject()\r
- if (isinstance(name, dict)):\r
- for key in name.keys():\r
- setattr(subj, key, name[key])\r
- else:\r
- setattr(subj, "CN", name)\r
- self.cert.set_subject(subj)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Get the subject name of the certificate\r
-\r
- def get_subject(self, which="CN"):\r
- x = self.cert.get_subject()\r
- return getattr(x, which)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Get a pretty-print subject name of the certificate\r
-\r
- def get_printable_subject(self):\r
- x = self.cert.get_subject()\r
- return "[ OU: %s, CN: %s, SubjectAltName: %s ]" % (getattr(x, "OU"), getattr(x, "CN"), self.get_data())\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Get the public key of the certificate.\r
- #\r
- # @param key Keypair object containing the public key\r
-\r
- def set_pubkey(self, key):\r
- assert(isinstance(key, Keypair))\r
- self.cert.set_pubkey(key.get_openssl_pkey())\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Get the public key of the certificate.\r
- # It is returned in the form of a Keypair object.\r
-\r
- def get_pubkey(self):\r
- m2x509 = X509.load_cert_string(self.save_to_string())\r
- pkey = Keypair()\r
- pkey.key = self.cert.get_pubkey()\r
- pkey.m2key = m2x509.get_pubkey()\r
- return pkey\r
-\r
- def set_intermediate_ca(self, val):\r
- return self.set_is_ca(val)\r
-\r
- # Set whether this cert is for a CA. All signers and only signers should be CAs.\r
- # The local member starts unset, letting us check that you only set it once\r
- # @param val Boolean indicating whether this cert is for a CA\r
- def set_is_ca(self, val):\r
- if val is None:\r
- return\r
-\r
- if self.isCA != None:\r
- # Can't double set properties\r
- raise Exception, "Cannot set basicConstraints CA:?? more than once. Was %s, trying to set as %s" % (self.isCA, val)\r
-\r
- self.isCA = val\r
- if val:\r
- self.add_extension('basicConstraints', 1, 'CA:TRUE')\r
- else:\r
- self.add_extension('basicConstraints', 1, 'CA:FALSE')\r
-\r
-\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Add an X509 extension to the certificate. Add_extension can only be called\r
- # once for a particular extension name, due to limitations in the underlying\r
- # library.\r
- #\r
- # @param name string containing name of extension\r
- # @param value string containing value of the extension\r
-\r
- def add_extension(self, name, critical, value):\r
- oldExtVal = None\r
- try:\r
- oldExtVal = self.get_extension(name)\r
- except:\r
- # M2Crypto LookupError when the extension isn't there (yet)\r
- pass\r
-\r
- # This code limits you from adding the extension with the same value\r
- # The method comment says you shouldn't do this with the same name\r
- # But actually it (m2crypto) appears to allow you to do this.\r
- if oldExtVal and oldExtVal == value:\r
- # don't add this extension again\r
- # just do nothing as here\r
- return\r
- # FIXME: What if they are trying to set with a different value?\r
- # Is this ever OK? Or should we raise an exception?\r
-# elif oldExtVal:\r
-# raise "Cannot add extension %s which had val %s with new val %s" % (name, oldExtVal, value)\r
-\r
- ext = crypto.X509Extension (name, critical, value)\r
- self.cert.add_extensions([ext])\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Get an X509 extension from the certificate\r
-\r
- def get_extension(self, name):\r
-\r
- # pyOpenSSL does not have a way to get extensions\r
- m2x509 = X509.load_cert_string(self.save_to_string())\r
- value = m2x509.get_ext(name).get_value()\r
-\r
- return value\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Set_data is a wrapper around add_extension. It stores the parameter str in\r
- # the X509 subject_alt_name extension. Set_data can only be called once, due\r
- # to limitations in the underlying library.\r
-\r
- def set_data(self, str, field='subjectAltName'):\r
- # pyOpenSSL only allows us to add extensions, so if we try to set the\r
- # same extension more than once, it will not work\r
- if self.data.has_key(field):\r
- raise "Cannot set ", field, " more than once"\r
- self.data[field] = str\r
- self.add_extension(field, 0, str)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Return the data string that was previously set with set_data\r
-\r
- def get_data(self, field='subjectAltName'):\r
- if self.data.has_key(field):\r
- return self.data[field]\r
-\r
- try:\r
- uri = self.get_extension(field)\r
- self.data[field] = uri\r
- except LookupError:\r
- return None\r
-\r
- return self.data[field]\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Sign the certificate using the issuer private key and issuer subject previous set with set_issuer().\r
-\r
- def sign(self):\r
- logger.debug('certificate.sign')\r
- assert self.cert != None\r
- assert self.issuerSubject != None\r
- assert self.issuerKey != None\r
- self.cert.set_issuer(self.issuerSubject)\r
- self.cert.sign(self.issuerKey.get_openssl_pkey(), self.digest)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Verify the authenticity of a certificate.\r
- # @param pkey is a Keypair object representing a public key. If Pkey\r
- # did not sign the certificate, then an exception will be thrown.\r
-\r
- def verify(self, pkey):\r
- # pyOpenSSL does not have a way to verify signatures\r
- m2x509 = X509.load_cert_string(self.save_to_string())\r
- m2pkey = pkey.get_m2_pkey()\r
- # verify it\r
- return m2x509.verify(m2pkey)\r
-\r
- # XXX alternatively, if openssl has been patched, do the much simpler:\r
- # try:\r
- # self.cert.verify(pkey.get_openssl_key())\r
- # return 1\r
- # except:\r
- # return 0\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Return True if pkey is identical to the public key that is contained in the certificate.\r
- # @param pkey Keypair object\r
-\r
- def is_pubkey(self, pkey):\r
- return self.get_pubkey().is_same(pkey)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Given a certificate cert, verify that this certificate was signed by the\r
- # public key contained in cert. Throw an exception otherwise.\r
- #\r
- # @param cert certificate object\r
-\r
- def is_signed_by_cert(self, cert):\r
- k = cert.get_pubkey()\r
- result = self.verify(k)\r
- return result\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Set the parent certficiate.\r
- #\r
- # @param p certificate object.\r
-\r
- def set_parent(self, p):\r
- self.parent = p\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Return the certificate object of the parent of this certificate.\r
-\r
- def get_parent(self):\r
- return self.parent\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Verification examines a chain of certificates to ensure that each parent\r
- # signs the child, and that some certificate in the chain is signed by a\r
- # trusted certificate.\r
- #\r
- # Verification is a basic recursion: <pre>\r
- # if this_certificate was signed by trusted_certs:\r
- # return\r
- # else\r
- # return verify_chain(parent, trusted_certs)\r
- # </pre>\r
- #\r
- # At each recursion, the parent is tested to ensure that it did sign the\r
- # child. If a parent did not sign a child, then an exception is thrown. If\r
- # the bottom of the recursion is reached and the certificate does not match\r
- # a trusted root, then an exception is thrown.\r
- # Also require that parents are CAs.\r
- #\r
- # @param Trusted_certs is a list of certificates that are trusted.\r
- #\r
-\r
- def verify_chain(self, trusted_certs = None):\r
- # Verify a chain of certificates. Each certificate must be signed by\r
- # the public key contained in it's parent. The chain is recursed\r
- # until a certificate is found that is signed by a trusted root.\r
-\r
- # verify expiration time\r
- if self.cert.has_expired():\r
- logger.debug("verify_chain: NO, Certificate %s has expired" % self.get_printable_subject())\r
- raise CertExpired(self.get_printable_subject(), "client cert")\r
-\r
- # if this cert is signed by a trusted_cert, then we are set\r
- for trusted_cert in trusted_certs:\r
- if self.is_signed_by_cert(trusted_cert):\r
- # verify expiration of trusted_cert ?\r
- if not trusted_cert.cert.has_expired():\r
- logger.debug("verify_chain: YES. Cert %s signed by trusted cert %s"%(\r
- self.get_printable_subject(), trusted_cert.get_printable_subject()))\r
- return trusted_cert\r
- else:\r
- logger.debug("verify_chain: NO. Cert %s is signed by trusted_cert %s, but that signer is expired..."%(\r
- self.get_printable_subject(),trusted_cert.get_printable_subject()))\r
- raise CertExpired(self.get_printable_subject()," signer trusted_cert %s"%trusted_cert.get_printable_subject())\r
-\r
- # if there is no parent, then no way to verify the chain\r
- if not self.parent:\r
- logger.debug("verify_chain: NO. %s has no parent and issuer %s is not in %d trusted roots"%(self.get_printable_subject(), self.get_issuer(), len(trusted_certs)))\r
- raise CertMissingParent(self.get_printable_subject() + ": Issuer %s is not one of the %d trusted roots, and cert has no parent." % (self.get_issuer(), len(trusted_certs)))\r
-\r
- # if it wasn't signed by the parent...\r
- if not self.is_signed_by_cert(self.parent):\r
- logger.debug("verify_chain: NO. %s is not signed by parent %s, but by %s"%\\r
- (self.get_printable_subject(), \r
- self.parent.get_printable_subject(), \r
- self.get_issuer()))\r
- raise CertNotSignedByParent("%s: Parent %s, issuer %s"\\r
- % (self.get_printable_subject(), \r
- self.parent.get_printable_subject(),\r
- self.get_issuer()))\r
-\r
- # Confirm that the parent is a CA. Only CAs can be trusted as\r
- # signers.\r
- # Note that trusted roots are not parents, so don't need to be\r
- # CAs.\r
- # Ugly - cert objects aren't parsed so we need to read the\r
- # extension and hope there are no other basicConstraints\r
- if not self.parent.isCA and not (self.parent.get_extension('basicConstraints') == 'CA:TRUE'):\r
- logger.warn("verify_chain: cert %s's parent %s is not a CA" % \\r
- (self.get_printable_subject(), self.parent.get_printable_subject()))\r
- raise CertNotSignedByParent("%s: Parent %s not a CA" % (self.get_printable_subject(),\r
- self.parent.get_printable_subject()))\r
-\r
- # if the parent isn't verified...\r
- logger.debug("verify_chain: .. %s, -> verifying parent %s"%\\r
- (self.get_printable_subject(),self.parent.get_printable_subject()))\r
- self.parent.verify_chain(trusted_certs)\r
-\r
- return\r
-\r
- ### more introspection\r
- def get_extensions(self):\r
- # pyOpenSSL does not have a way to get extensions\r
- triples=[]\r
- m2x509 = X509.load_cert_string(self.save_to_string())\r
- nb_extensions=m2x509.get_ext_count()\r
- logger.debug("X509 had %d extensions"%nb_extensions)\r
- for i in range(nb_extensions):\r
- ext=m2x509.get_ext_at(i)\r
- triples.append( (ext.get_name(), ext.get_value(), ext.get_critical(),) )\r
- return triples\r
-\r
- def get_data_names(self):\r
- return self.data.keys()\r
-\r
- def get_all_datas (self):\r
- triples=self.get_extensions()\r
- for name in self.get_data_names():\r
- triples.append( (name,self.get_data(name),'data',) )\r
- return triples\r
-\r
- # only informative\r
- def get_filename(self):\r
- return getattr(self,'filename',None)\r
-\r
- def dump (self, *args, **kwargs):\r
- print self.dump_string(*args, **kwargs)\r
-\r
- def dump_string (self,show_extensions=False):\r
- result = ""\r
- result += "CERTIFICATE for %s\n"%self.get_printable_subject()\r
- result += "Issued by %s\n"%self.get_issuer()\r
- filename=self.get_filename()\r
- if filename: result += "Filename %s\n"%filename\r
- if show_extensions:\r
- all_datas=self.get_all_datas()\r
- result += " has %d extensions/data attached"%len(all_datas)\r
- for (n,v,c) in all_datas:\r
- if c=='data':\r
- result += " data: %s=%s\n"%(n,v)\r
- else:\r
- result += " ext: %s (crit=%s)=<<<%s>>>\n"%(n,c,v)\r
- return result\r
+#----------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Copyright (c) 2008 Board of Trustees, Princeton University
+#
+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+# a copy of this software and/or hardware specification (the "Work") to
+# deal in the Work without restriction, including without limitation the
+# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
+# and/or sell copies of the Work, and to permit persons to whom the Work
+# is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+#
+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+# included in all copies or substantial portions of the Work.
+#
+# THE WORK IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT
+# HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
+# WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORK OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
+# IN THE WORK.
+#----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+##
+# SFA uses two crypto libraries: pyOpenSSL and M2Crypto to implement
+# the necessary crypto functionality. Ideally just one of these libraries
+# would be used, but unfortunately each of these libraries is independently
+# lacking. The pyOpenSSL library is missing many necessary functions, and
+# the M2Crypto library has crashed inside of some of the functions. The
+# design decision is to use pyOpenSSL whenever possible as it seems more
+# stable, and only use M2Crypto for those functions that are not possible
+# in pyOpenSSL.
+#
+# This module exports two classes: Keypair and Certificate.
+##
+#
+
+import functools
+import os
+import tempfile
+import base64
+from tempfile import mkstemp
+
+from OpenSSL import crypto
+import M2Crypto
+from M2Crypto import X509
+
+from sfa.util.faults import CertExpired, CertMissingParent, CertNotSignedByParent
+from sfa.util.sfalogging import logger
+
+glo_passphrase_callback = None
+
+##
+# A global callback may be implemented for requesting passphrases from the
+# user. The function will be called with three arguments:
+#
+# keypair_obj: the keypair object that is calling the passphrase
+# string: the string containing the private key that's being loaded
+# x: unknown, appears to be 0, comes from pyOpenSSL and/or m2crypto
+#
+# The callback should return a string containing the passphrase.
+
+def set_passphrase_callback(callback_func):
+ global glo_passphrase_callback
+
+ glo_passphrase_callback = callback_func
+
+##
+# Sets a fixed passphrase.
+
+def set_passphrase(passphrase):
+ set_passphrase_callback( lambda k,s,x: passphrase )
+
+##
+# Check to see if a passphrase works for a particular private key string.
+# Intended to be used by passphrase callbacks for input validation.
+
+def test_passphrase(string, passphrase):
+ try:
+ crypto.load_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, string, (lambda x: passphrase))
+ return True
+ except:
+ return False
+
+def convert_public_key(key):
+ keyconvert_path = "/usr/bin/keyconvert.py"
+ if not os.path.isfile(keyconvert_path):
+ raise IOError, "Could not find keyconvert in %s" % keyconvert_path
+
+ # we can only convert rsa keys
+ if "ssh-dss" in key:
+ raise Exception, "keyconvert: dss keys are not supported"
+
+ (ssh_f, ssh_fn) = tempfile.mkstemp()
+ ssl_fn = tempfile.mktemp()
+ os.write(ssh_f, key)
+ os.close(ssh_f)
+
+ cmd = keyconvert_path + " " + ssh_fn + " " + ssl_fn
+ os.system(cmd)
+
+ # this check leaves the temporary file containing the public key so
+ # that it can be expected to see why it failed.
+ # TODO: for production, cleanup the temporary files
+ if not os.path.exists(ssl_fn):
+ raise Exception, "keyconvert: generated certificate not found. keyconvert may have failed."
+
+ k = Keypair()
+ try:
+ k.load_pubkey_from_file(ssl_fn)
+ return k
+ except:
+ logger.log_exc("convert_public_key caught exception")
+ raise
+ finally:
+ # remove the temporary files
+ if os.path.exists(ssh_fn):
+ os.remove(ssh_fn)
+ if os.path.exists(ssl_fn):
+ os.remove(ssl_fn)
+
+##
+# Public-private key pairs are implemented by the Keypair class.
+# A Keypair object may represent both a public and private key pair, or it
+# may represent only a public key (this usage is consistent with OpenSSL).
+
+class Keypair:
+ key = None # public/private keypair
+ m2key = None # public key (m2crypto format)
+
+ ##
+ # Creates a Keypair object
+ # @param create If create==True, creates a new public/private key and
+ # stores it in the object
+ # @param string If string!=None, load the keypair from the string (PEM)
+ # @param filename If filename!=None, load the keypair from the file
+
+ def __init__(self, create=False, string=None, filename=None):
+ if create:
+ self.create()
+ if string:
+ self.load_from_string(string)
+ if filename:
+ self.load_from_file(filename)
+
+ ##
+ # Create a RSA public/private key pair and store it inside the keypair object
+
+ def create(self):
+ self.key = crypto.PKey()
+ self.key.generate_key(crypto.TYPE_RSA, 1024)
+
+ ##
+ # Save the private key to a file
+ # @param filename name of file to store the keypair in
+
+ def save_to_file(self, filename):
+ open(filename, 'w').write(self.as_pem())
+ self.filename=filename
+
+ ##
+ # Load the private key from a file. Implicity the private key includes the public key.
+
+ def load_from_file(self, filename):
+ self.filename=filename
+ buffer = open(filename, 'r').read()
+ self.load_from_string(buffer)
+
+ ##
+ # Load the private key from a string. Implicitly the private key includes the public key.
+
+ def load_from_string(self, string):
+ if glo_passphrase_callback:
+ self.key = crypto.load_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, string, functools.partial(glo_passphrase_callback, self, string) )
+ self.m2key = M2Crypto.EVP.load_key_string(string, functools.partial(glo_passphrase_callback, self, string) )
+ else:
+ self.key = crypto.load_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, string)
+ self.m2key = M2Crypto.EVP.load_key_string(string)
+
+ ##
+ # Load the public key from a string. No private key is loaded.
+
+ def load_pubkey_from_file(self, filename):
+ # load the m2 public key
+ m2rsakey = M2Crypto.RSA.load_pub_key(filename)
+ self.m2key = M2Crypto.EVP.PKey()
+ self.m2key.assign_rsa(m2rsakey)
+
+ # create an m2 x509 cert
+ m2name = M2Crypto.X509.X509_Name()
+ m2name.add_entry_by_txt(field="CN", type=0x1001, entry="junk", len=-1, loc=-1, set=0)
+ m2x509 = M2Crypto.X509.X509()
+ m2x509.set_pubkey(self.m2key)
+ m2x509.set_serial_number(0)
+ m2x509.set_issuer_name(m2name)
+ m2x509.set_subject_name(m2name)
+ ASN1 = M2Crypto.ASN1.ASN1_UTCTIME()
+ ASN1.set_time(500)
+ m2x509.set_not_before(ASN1)
+ m2x509.set_not_after(ASN1)
+ # x509v3 so it can have extensions
+ # prob not necc since this cert itself is junk but still...
+ m2x509.set_version(2)
+ junk_key = Keypair(create=True)
+ m2x509.sign(pkey=junk_key.get_m2_pkey(), md="sha1")
+
+ # convert the m2 x509 cert to a pyopenssl x509
+ m2pem = m2x509.as_pem()
+ pyx509 = crypto.load_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, m2pem)
+
+ # get the pyopenssl pkey from the pyopenssl x509
+ self.key = pyx509.get_pubkey()
+ self.filename=filename
+
+ ##
+ # Load the public key from a string. No private key is loaded.
+
+ def load_pubkey_from_string(self, string):
+ (f, fn) = tempfile.mkstemp()
+ os.write(f, string)
+ os.close(f)
+ self.load_pubkey_from_file(fn)
+ os.remove(fn)
+
+ ##
+ # Return the private key in PEM format.
+
+ def as_pem(self):
+ return crypto.dump_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, self.key)
+
+ ##
+ # Return an M2Crypto key object
+
+ def get_m2_pkey(self):
+ if not self.m2key:
+ self.m2key = M2Crypto.EVP.load_key_string(self.as_pem())
+ return self.m2key
+
+ ##
+ # Returns a string containing the public key represented by this object.
+
+ def get_pubkey_string(self):
+ m2pkey = self.get_m2_pkey()
+ return base64.b64encode(m2pkey.as_der())
+
+ ##
+ # Return an OpenSSL pkey object
+
+ def get_openssl_pkey(self):
+ return self.key
+
+ ##
+ # Given another Keypair object, return TRUE if the two keys are the same.
+
+ def is_same(self, pkey):
+ return self.as_pem() == pkey.as_pem()
+
+ def sign_string(self, data):
+ k = self.get_m2_pkey()
+ k.sign_init()
+ k.sign_update(data)
+ return base64.b64encode(k.sign_final())
+
+ def verify_string(self, data, sig):
+ k = self.get_m2_pkey()
+ k.verify_init()
+ k.verify_update(data)
+ return M2Crypto.m2.verify_final(k.ctx, base64.b64decode(sig), k.pkey)
+
+ def compute_hash(self, value):
+ return self.sign_string(str(value))
+
+ # only informative
+ def get_filename(self):
+ return getattr(self,'filename',None)
+
+ def dump (self, *args, **kwargs):
+ print self.dump_string(*args, **kwargs)
+
+ def dump_string (self):
+ result=""
+ result += "KEYPAIR: pubkey=%40s..."%self.get_pubkey_string()
+ filename=self.get_filename()
+ if filename: result += "Filename %s\n"%filename
+ return result
+
+##
+# The certificate class implements a general purpose X509 certificate, making
+# use of the appropriate pyOpenSSL or M2Crypto abstractions. It also adds
+# several addition features, such as the ability to maintain a chain of
+# parent certificates, and storage of application-specific data.
+#
+# Certificates include the ability to maintain a chain of parents. Each
+# certificate includes a pointer to it's parent certificate. When loaded
+# from a file or a string, the parent chain will be automatically loaded.
+# When saving a certificate to a file or a string, the caller can choose
+# whether to save the parent certificates as well.
+
+class Certificate:
+ digest = "md5"
+
+ cert = None
+ issuerKey = None
+ issuerSubject = None
+ parent = None
+ isCA = None # will be a boolean once set
+
+ separator="-----parent-----"
+
+ ##
+ # Create a certificate object.
+ #
+ # @param lifeDays life of cert in days - default is 1825==5 years
+ # @param create If create==True, then also create a blank X509 certificate.
+ # @param subject If subject!=None, then create a blank certificate and set
+ # it's subject name.
+ # @param string If string!=None, load the certficate from the string.
+ # @param filename If filename!=None, load the certficiate from the file.
+ # @param isCA If !=None, set whether this cert is for a CA
+
+ def __init__(self, lifeDays=1825, create=False, subject=None, string=None, filename=None, isCA=None):
+ self.data = {}
+ if create or subject:
+ self.create(lifeDays)
+ if subject:
+ self.set_subject(subject)
+ if string:
+ self.load_from_string(string)
+ if filename:
+ self.load_from_file(filename)
+
+ # Set the CA bit if a value was supplied
+ if isCA != None:
+ self.set_is_ca(isCA)
+
+ # Create a blank X509 certificate and store it in this object.
+
+ def create(self, lifeDays=1825):
+ self.cert = crypto.X509()
+ # FIXME: Use different serial #s
+ self.cert.set_serial_number(3)
+ self.cert.gmtime_adj_notBefore(0) # 0 means now
+ self.cert.gmtime_adj_notAfter(lifeDays*60*60*24) # five years is default
+ self.cert.set_version(2) # x509v3 so it can have extensions
+
+
+ ##
+ # Given a pyOpenSSL X509 object, store that object inside of this
+ # certificate object.
+
+ def load_from_pyopenssl_x509(self, x509):
+ self.cert = x509
+
+ ##
+ # Load the certificate from a string
+
+ def load_from_string(self, string):
+ # if it is a chain of multiple certs, then split off the first one and
+ # load it (support for the ---parent--- tag as well as normal chained certs)
+
+ string = string.strip()
+
+ # If it's not in proper PEM format, wrap it
+ if string.count('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE') == 0:
+ string = '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n%s\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----' % string
+
+ # If there is a PEM cert in there, but there is some other text first
+ # such as the text of the certificate, skip the text
+ beg = string.find('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE')
+ if beg > 0:
+ # skipping over non cert beginning
+ string = string[beg:]
+
+ parts = []
+
+ if string.count('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----') > 1 and \
+ string.count(Certificate.separator) == 0:
+ parts = string.split('-----END CERTIFICATE-----',1)
+ parts[0] += '-----END CERTIFICATE-----'
+ else:
+ parts = string.split(Certificate.separator, 1)
+
+ self.cert = crypto.load_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, parts[0])
+
+ # if there are more certs, then create a parent and let the parent load
+ # itself from the remainder of the string
+ if len(parts) > 1 and parts[1] != '':
+ self.parent = self.__class__()
+ self.parent.load_from_string(parts[1])
+
+ ##
+ # Load the certificate from a file
+
+ def load_from_file(self, filename):
+ file = open(filename)
+ string = file.read()
+ self.load_from_string(string)
+ self.filename=filename
+
+ ##
+ # Save the certificate to a string.
+ #
+ # @param save_parents If save_parents==True, then also save the parent certificates.
+
+ def save_to_string(self, save_parents=True):
+ string = crypto.dump_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, self.cert)
+ if save_parents and self.parent:
+ string = string + self.parent.save_to_string(save_parents)
+ return string
+
+ ##
+ # Save the certificate to a file.
+ # @param save_parents If save_parents==True, then also save the parent certificates.
+
+ def save_to_file(self, filename, save_parents=True, filep=None):
+ string = self.save_to_string(save_parents=save_parents)
+ if filep:
+ f = filep
+ else:
+ f = open(filename, 'w')
+ f.write(string)
+ f.close()
+ self.filename=filename
+
+ ##
+ # Save the certificate to a random file in /tmp/
+ # @param save_parents If save_parents==True, then also save the parent certificates.
+ def save_to_random_tmp_file(self, save_parents=True):
+ fp, filename = mkstemp(suffix='cert', text=True)
+ fp = os.fdopen(fp, "w")
+ self.save_to_file(filename, save_parents=True, filep=fp)
+ return filename
+
+ ##
+ # Sets the issuer private key and name
+ # @param key Keypair object containing the private key of the issuer
+ # @param subject String containing the name of the issuer
+ # @param cert (optional) Certificate object containing the name of the issuer
+
+ def set_issuer(self, key, subject=None, cert=None):
+ self.issuerKey = key
+ if subject:
+ # it's a mistake to use subject and cert params at the same time
+ assert(not cert)
+ if isinstance(subject, dict) or isinstance(subject, str):
+ req = crypto.X509Req()
+ reqSubject = req.get_subject()
+ if (isinstance(subject, dict)):
+ for key in reqSubject.keys():
+ setattr(reqSubject, key, subject[key])
+ else:
+ setattr(reqSubject, "CN", subject)
+ subject = reqSubject
+ # subject is not valid once req is out of scope, so save req
+ self.issuerReq = req
+ if cert:
+ # if a cert was supplied, then get the subject from the cert
+ subject = cert.cert.get_subject()
+ assert(subject)
+ self.issuerSubject = subject
+
+ ##
+ # Get the issuer name
+
+ def get_issuer(self, which="CN"):
+ x = self.cert.get_issuer()
+ return getattr(x, which)
+
+ ##
+ # Set the subject name of the certificate
+
+ def set_subject(self, name):
+ req = crypto.X509Req()
+ subj = req.get_subject()
+ if (isinstance(name, dict)):
+ for key in name.keys():
+ setattr(subj, key, name[key])
+ else:
+ setattr(subj, "CN", name)
+ self.cert.set_subject(subj)
+
+ ##
+ # Get the subject name of the certificate
+
+ def get_subject(self, which="CN"):
+ x = self.cert.get_subject()
+ return getattr(x, which)
+
+ ##
+ # Get a pretty-print subject name of the certificate
+
+ def get_printable_subject(self):
+ x = self.cert.get_subject()
+ return "[ OU: %s, CN: %s, SubjectAltName: %s ]" % (getattr(x, "OU"), getattr(x, "CN"), self.get_data())
+
+ ##
+ # Get the public key of the certificate.
+ #
+ # @param key Keypair object containing the public key
+
+ def set_pubkey(self, key):
+ assert(isinstance(key, Keypair))
+ self.cert.set_pubkey(key.get_openssl_pkey())
+
+ ##
+ # Get the public key of the certificate.
+ # It is returned in the form of a Keypair object.
+
+ def get_pubkey(self):
+ m2x509 = X509.load_cert_string(self.save_to_string())
+ pkey = Keypair()
+ pkey.key = self.cert.get_pubkey()
+ pkey.m2key = m2x509.get_pubkey()
+ return pkey
+
+ def set_intermediate_ca(self, val):
+ return self.set_is_ca(val)
+
+ # Set whether this cert is for a CA. All signers and only signers should be CAs.
+ # The local member starts unset, letting us check that you only set it once
+ # @param val Boolean indicating whether this cert is for a CA
+ def set_is_ca(self, val):
+ if val is None:
+ return
+
+ if self.isCA != None:
+ # Can't double set properties
+ raise Exception, "Cannot set basicConstraints CA:?? more than once. Was %s, trying to set as %s" % (self.isCA, val)
+
+ self.isCA = val
+ if val:
+ self.add_extension('basicConstraints', 1, 'CA:TRUE')
+ else:
+ self.add_extension('basicConstraints', 1, 'CA:FALSE')
+
+
+
+ ##
+ # Add an X509 extension to the certificate. Add_extension can only be called
+ # once for a particular extension name, due to limitations in the underlying
+ # library.
+ #
+ # @param name string containing name of extension
+ # @param value string containing value of the extension
+
+ def add_extension(self, name, critical, value):
+ oldExtVal = None
+ try:
+ oldExtVal = self.get_extension(name)
+ except:
+ # M2Crypto LookupError when the extension isn't there (yet)
+ pass
+
+ # This code limits you from adding the extension with the same value
+ # The method comment says you shouldn't do this with the same name
+ # But actually it (m2crypto) appears to allow you to do this.
+ if oldExtVal and oldExtVal == value:
+ # don't add this extension again
+ # just do nothing as here
+ return
+ # FIXME: What if they are trying to set with a different value?
+ # Is this ever OK? Or should we raise an exception?
+# elif oldExtVal:
+# raise "Cannot add extension %s which had val %s with new val %s" % (name, oldExtVal, value)
+
+ ext = crypto.X509Extension (name, critical, value)
+ self.cert.add_extensions([ext])
+
+ ##
+ # Get an X509 extension from the certificate
+
+ def get_extension(self, name):
+
+ # pyOpenSSL does not have a way to get extensions
+ m2x509 = X509.load_cert_string(self.save_to_string())
+ value = m2x509.get_ext(name).get_value()
+
+ return value
+
+ ##
+ # Set_data is a wrapper around add_extension. It stores the parameter str in
+ # the X509 subject_alt_name extension. Set_data can only be called once, due
+ # to limitations in the underlying library.
+
+ def set_data(self, str, field='subjectAltName'):
+ # pyOpenSSL only allows us to add extensions, so if we try to set the
+ # same extension more than once, it will not work
+ if self.data.has_key(field):
+ raise "Cannot set ", field, " more than once"
+ self.data[field] = str
+ self.add_extension(field, 0, str)
+
+ ##
+ # Return the data string that was previously set with set_data
+
+ def get_data(self, field='subjectAltName'):
+ if self.data.has_key(field):
+ return self.data[field]
+
+ try:
+ uri = self.get_extension(field)
+ self.data[field] = uri
+ except LookupError:
+ return None
+
+ return self.data[field]
+
+ ##
+ # Sign the certificate using the issuer private key and issuer subject previous set with set_issuer().
+
+ def sign(self):
+ logger.debug('certificate.sign')
+ assert self.cert != None
+ assert self.issuerSubject != None
+ assert self.issuerKey != None
+ self.cert.set_issuer(self.issuerSubject)
+ self.cert.sign(self.issuerKey.get_openssl_pkey(), self.digest)
+
+ ##
+ # Verify the authenticity of a certificate.
+ # @param pkey is a Keypair object representing a public key. If Pkey
+ # did not sign the certificate, then an exception will be thrown.
+
+ def verify(self, pkey):
+ # pyOpenSSL does not have a way to verify signatures
+ m2x509 = X509.load_cert_string(self.save_to_string())
+ m2pkey = pkey.get_m2_pkey()
+ # verify it
+ return m2x509.verify(m2pkey)
+
+ # XXX alternatively, if openssl has been patched, do the much simpler:
+ # try:
+ # self.cert.verify(pkey.get_openssl_key())
+ # return 1
+ # except:
+ # return 0
+
+ ##
+ # Return True if pkey is identical to the public key that is contained in the certificate.
+ # @param pkey Keypair object
+
+ def is_pubkey(self, pkey):
+ return self.get_pubkey().is_same(pkey)
+
+ ##
+ # Given a certificate cert, verify that this certificate was signed by the
+ # public key contained in cert. Throw an exception otherwise.
+ #
+ # @param cert certificate object
+
+ def is_signed_by_cert(self, cert):
+ k = cert.get_pubkey()
+ result = self.verify(k)
+ return result
+
+ ##
+ # Set the parent certficiate.
+ #
+ # @param p certificate object.
+
+ def set_parent(self, p):
+ self.parent = p
+
+ ##
+ # Return the certificate object of the parent of this certificate.
+
+ def get_parent(self):
+ return self.parent
+
+ ##
+ # Verification examines a chain of certificates to ensure that each parent
+ # signs the child, and that some certificate in the chain is signed by a
+ # trusted certificate.
+ #
+ # Verification is a basic recursion: <pre>
+ # if this_certificate was signed by trusted_certs:
+ # return
+ # else
+ # return verify_chain(parent, trusted_certs)
+ # </pre>
+ #
+ # At each recursion, the parent is tested to ensure that it did sign the
+ # child. If a parent did not sign a child, then an exception is thrown. If
+ # the bottom of the recursion is reached and the certificate does not match
+ # a trusted root, then an exception is thrown.
+ # Also require that parents are CAs.
+ #
+ # @param Trusted_certs is a list of certificates that are trusted.
+ #
+
+ def verify_chain(self, trusted_certs = None):
+ # Verify a chain of certificates. Each certificate must be signed by
+ # the public key contained in it's parent. The chain is recursed
+ # until a certificate is found that is signed by a trusted root.
+
+ # verify expiration time
+ if self.cert.has_expired():
+ logger.debug("verify_chain: NO, Certificate %s has expired" % self.get_printable_subject())
+ raise CertExpired(self.get_printable_subject(), "client cert")
+
+ # if this cert is signed by a trusted_cert, then we are set
+ for trusted_cert in trusted_certs:
+ if self.is_signed_by_cert(trusted_cert):
+ # verify expiration of trusted_cert ?
+ if not trusted_cert.cert.has_expired():
+ logger.debug("verify_chain: YES. Cert %s signed by trusted cert %s"%(
+ self.get_printable_subject(), trusted_cert.get_printable_subject()))
+ return trusted_cert
+ else:
+ logger.debug("verify_chain: NO. Cert %s is signed by trusted_cert %s, but that signer is expired..."%(
+ self.get_printable_subject(),trusted_cert.get_printable_subject()))
+ raise CertExpired(self.get_printable_subject()," signer trusted_cert %s"%trusted_cert.get_printable_subject())
+
+ # if there is no parent, then no way to verify the chain
+ if not self.parent:
+ logger.debug("verify_chain: NO. %s has no parent and issuer %s is not in %d trusted roots"%(self.get_printable_subject(), self.get_issuer(), len(trusted_certs)))
+ raise CertMissingParent(self.get_printable_subject() + ": Issuer %s is not one of the %d trusted roots, and cert has no parent." % (self.get_issuer(), len(trusted_certs)))
+
+ # if it wasn't signed by the parent...
+ if not self.is_signed_by_cert(self.parent):
+ logger.debug("verify_chain: NO. %s is not signed by parent %s, but by %s"%\
+ (self.get_printable_subject(),
+ self.parent.get_printable_subject(),
+ self.get_issuer()))
+ raise CertNotSignedByParent("%s: Parent %s, issuer %s"\
+ % (self.get_printable_subject(),
+ self.parent.get_printable_subject(),
+ self.get_issuer()))
+
+ # Confirm that the parent is a CA. Only CAs can be trusted as
+ # signers.
+ # Note that trusted roots are not parents, so don't need to be
+ # CAs.
+ # Ugly - cert objects aren't parsed so we need to read the
+ # extension and hope there are no other basicConstraints
+ if not self.parent.isCA and not (self.parent.get_extension('basicConstraints') == 'CA:TRUE'):
+ logger.warn("verify_chain: cert %s's parent %s is not a CA" % \
+ (self.get_printable_subject(), self.parent.get_printable_subject()))
+ raise CertNotSignedByParent("%s: Parent %s not a CA" % (self.get_printable_subject(),
+ self.parent.get_printable_subject()))
+
+ # if the parent isn't verified...
+ logger.debug("verify_chain: .. %s, -> verifying parent %s"%\
+ (self.get_printable_subject(),self.parent.get_printable_subject()))
+ self.parent.verify_chain(trusted_certs)
+
+ return
+
+ ### more introspection
+ def get_extensions(self):
+ # pyOpenSSL does not have a way to get extensions
+ triples=[]
+ m2x509 = X509.load_cert_string(self.save_to_string())
+ nb_extensions=m2x509.get_ext_count()
+ logger.debug("X509 had %d extensions"%nb_extensions)
+ for i in range(nb_extensions):
+ ext=m2x509.get_ext_at(i)
+ triples.append( (ext.get_name(), ext.get_value(), ext.get_critical(),) )
+ return triples
+
+ def get_data_names(self):
+ return self.data.keys()
+
+ def get_all_datas (self):
+ triples=self.get_extensions()
+ for name in self.get_data_names():
+ triples.append( (name,self.get_data(name),'data',) )
+ return triples
+
+ # only informative
+ def get_filename(self):
+ return getattr(self,'filename',None)
+
+ def dump (self, *args, **kwargs):
+ print self.dump_string(*args, **kwargs)
+
+ def dump_string (self,show_extensions=False):
+ result = ""
+ result += "CERTIFICATE for %s\n"%self.get_printable_subject()
+ result += "Issued by %s\n"%self.get_issuer()
+ filename=self.get_filename()
+ if filename: result += "Filename %s\n"%filename
+ if show_extensions:
+ all_datas=self.get_all_datas()
+ result += " has %d extensions/data attached"%len(all_datas)
+ for (n,v,c) in all_datas:
+ if c=='data':
+ result += " data: %s=%s\n"%(n,v)
+ else:
+ result += " ext: %s (crit=%s)=<<<%s>>>\n"%(n,c,v)
+ return result
-#----------------------------------------------------------------------\r
-# Copyright (c) 2008 Board of Trustees, Princeton University\r
-#\r
-# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining\r
-# a copy of this software and/or hardware specification (the "Work") to\r
-# deal in the Work without restriction, including without limitation the\r
-# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,\r
-# and/or sell copies of the Work, and to permit persons to whom the Work\r
-# is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:\r
-#\r
-# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be\r
-# included in all copies or substantial portions of the Work.\r
-#\r
-# THE WORK IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS \r
-# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF \r
-# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND \r
-# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT \r
-# HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, \r
-# WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, \r
-# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORK OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS \r
-# IN THE WORK.\r
-#----------------------------------------------------------------------\r
-##\r
-# Implements SFA Credentials\r
-#\r
-# Credentials are signed XML files that assign a subject gid privileges to an object gid\r
-##\r
-\r
-import os\r
-from types import StringTypes\r
-import datetime\r
-from StringIO import StringIO\r
-from tempfile import mkstemp\r
-from xml.dom.minidom import Document, parseString\r
-\r
-HAVELXML = False\r
-try:\r
- from lxml import etree\r
- HAVELXML = True\r
-except:\r
- pass\r
-\r
-from xml.parsers.expat import ExpatError\r
-\r
-from sfa.util.faults import CredentialNotVerifiable, ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent\r
-from sfa.util.sfalogging import logger\r
-from sfa.util.sfatime import utcparse\r
-from sfa.trust.credential_legacy import CredentialLegacy\r
-from sfa.trust.rights import Right, Rights, determine_rights\r
-from sfa.trust.gid import GID\r
-from sfa.util.xrn import urn_to_hrn, hrn_authfor_hrn\r
-\r
-# 2 weeks, in seconds \r
-DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME = 86400 * 31\r
-\r
-\r
-# TODO:\r
-# . make privs match between PG and PL\r
-# . Need to add support for other types of credentials, e.g. tickets\r
-# . add namespaces to signed-credential element?\r
-\r
-signature_template = \\r
-'''\r
-<Signature xml:id="Sig_%s" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">\r
- <SignedInfo>\r
- <CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/>\r
- <SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>\r
- <Reference URI="#%s">\r
- <Transforms>\r
- <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" />\r
- </Transforms>\r
- <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>\r
- <DigestValue></DigestValue>\r
- </Reference>\r
- </SignedInfo>\r
- <SignatureValue />\r
- <KeyInfo>\r
- <X509Data>\r
- <X509SubjectName/>\r
- <X509IssuerSerial/>\r
- <X509Certificate/>\r
- </X509Data>\r
- <KeyValue />\r
- </KeyInfo>\r
-</Signature>\r
-'''\r
-\r
-# PG formats the template (whitespace) slightly differently.\r
-# Note that they don't include the xmlns in the template, but add it later.\r
-# Otherwise the two are equivalent.\r
-#signature_template_as_in_pg = \\r
-#'''\r
-#<Signature xml:id="Sig_%s" >\r
-# <SignedInfo>\r
-# <CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/>\r
-# <SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>\r
-# <Reference URI="#%s">\r
-# <Transforms>\r
-# <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" />\r
-# </Transforms>\r
-# <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>\r
-# <DigestValue></DigestValue>\r
-# </Reference>\r
-# </SignedInfo>\r
-# <SignatureValue />\r
-# <KeyInfo>\r
-# <X509Data >\r
-# <X509SubjectName/>\r
-# <X509IssuerSerial/>\r
-# <X509Certificate/>\r
-# </X509Data>\r
-# <KeyValue />\r
-# </KeyInfo>\r
-#</Signature>\r
-#'''\r
-\r
-##\r
-# Convert a string into a bool\r
-# used to convert an xsd:boolean to a Python boolean\r
-def str2bool(str):\r
- if str.lower() in ['true','1']:\r
- return True\r
- return False\r
-\r
-\r
-##\r
-# Utility function to get the text of an XML element\r
-\r
-def getTextNode(element, subele):\r
- sub = element.getElementsByTagName(subele)[0]\r
- if len(sub.childNodes) > 0: \r
- return sub.childNodes[0].nodeValue\r
- else:\r
- return None\r
- \r
-##\r
-# Utility function to set the text of an XML element\r
-# It creates the element, adds the text to it,\r
-# and then appends it to the parent.\r
-\r
-def append_sub(doc, parent, element, text):\r
- ele = doc.createElement(element)\r
- ele.appendChild(doc.createTextNode(text))\r
- parent.appendChild(ele)\r
-\r
-##\r
-# Signature contains information about an xmlsec1 signature\r
-# for a signed-credential\r
-#\r
-\r
-class Signature(object):\r
- \r
- def __init__(self, string=None):\r
- self.refid = None\r
- self.issuer_gid = None\r
- self.xml = None\r
- if string:\r
- self.xml = string\r
- self.decode()\r
-\r
-\r
- def get_refid(self):\r
- if not self.refid:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.refid\r
-\r
- def get_xml(self):\r
- if not self.xml:\r
- self.encode()\r
- return self.xml\r
-\r
- def set_refid(self, id):\r
- self.refid = id\r
-\r
- def get_issuer_gid(self):\r
- if not self.gid:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.gid \r
-\r
- def set_issuer_gid(self, gid):\r
- self.gid = gid\r
-\r
- def decode(self):\r
- try:\r
- doc = parseString(self.xml)\r
- except ExpatError,e:\r
- logger.log_exc ("Failed to parse credential, %s"%self.xml)\r
- raise\r
- sig = doc.getElementsByTagName("Signature")[0]\r
- self.set_refid(sig.getAttribute("xml:id").strip("Sig_"))\r
- keyinfo = sig.getElementsByTagName("X509Data")[0]\r
- szgid = getTextNode(keyinfo, "X509Certificate")\r
- szgid = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n%s\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----" % szgid\r
- self.set_issuer_gid(GID(string=szgid)) \r
- \r
- def encode(self):\r
- self.xml = signature_template % (self.get_refid(), self.get_refid())\r
-\r
-\r
-##\r
-# A credential provides a caller gid with privileges to an object gid.\r
-# A signed credential is signed by the object's authority.\r
-#\r
-# Credentials are encoded in one of two ways. The legacy style places\r
-# it in the subjectAltName of an X509 certificate. The new credentials\r
-# are placed in signed XML.\r
-#\r
-# WARNING:\r
-# In general, a signed credential obtained externally should\r
-# not be changed else the signature is no longer valid. So, once\r
-# you have loaded an existing signed credential, do not call encode() or sign() on it.\r
-\r
-def filter_creds_by_caller(creds, caller_hrn_list):\r
- """\r
- Returns a list of creds who's gid caller matches the\r
- specified caller hrn\r
- """\r
- if not isinstance(creds, list): creds = [creds]\r
- if not isinstance(caller_hrn_list, list): \r
- caller_hrn_list = [caller_hrn_list]\r
- caller_creds = []\r
- for cred in creds:\r
- try:\r
- tmp_cred = Credential(string=cred)\r
- if tmp_cred.get_gid_caller().get_hrn() in caller_hrn_list:\r
- caller_creds.append(cred)\r
- except: pass\r
- return caller_creds\r
-\r
-class Credential(object):\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Create a Credential object\r
- #\r
- # @param create If true, create a blank x509 certificate\r
- # @param subject If subject!=None, create an x509 cert with the subject name\r
- # @param string If string!=None, load the credential from the string\r
- # @param filename If filename!=None, load the credential from the file\r
- # FIXME: create and subject are ignored!\r
- def __init__(self, create=False, subject=None, string=None, filename=None):\r
- self.gidCaller = None\r
- self.gidObject = None\r
- self.expiration = None\r
- self.privileges = None\r
- self.issuer_privkey = None\r
- self.issuer_gid = None\r
- self.issuer_pubkey = None\r
- self.parent = None\r
- self.signature = None\r
- self.xml = None\r
- self.refid = None\r
- self.legacy = None\r
-\r
- # Check if this is a legacy credential, translate it if so\r
- if string or filename:\r
- if string: \r
- str = string\r
- elif filename:\r
- str = file(filename).read()\r
- \r
- if str.strip().startswith("-----"):\r
- self.legacy = CredentialLegacy(False,string=str)\r
- self.translate_legacy(str)\r
- else:\r
- self.xml = str\r
- self.decode()\r
-\r
- # Find an xmlsec1 path\r
- self.xmlsec_path = ''\r
- paths = ['/usr/bin','/usr/local/bin','/bin','/opt/bin','/opt/local/bin']\r
- for path in paths:\r
- if os.path.isfile(path + '/' + 'xmlsec1'):\r
- self.xmlsec_path = path + '/' + 'xmlsec1'\r
- break\r
-\r
- def get_subject(self):\r
- if not self.gidObject:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.gidObject.get_printable_subject()\r
-\r
- # sounds like this should be __repr__ instead ??\r
- def get_summary_tostring(self):\r
- if not self.gidObject:\r
- self.decode()\r
- obj = self.gidObject.get_printable_subject()\r
- caller = self.gidCaller.get_printable_subject()\r
- exp = self.get_expiration()\r
- # Summarize the rights too? The issuer?\r
- return "[ Grant %s rights on %s until %s ]" % (caller, obj, exp)\r
-\r
- def get_signature(self):\r
- if not self.signature:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.signature\r
-\r
- def set_signature(self, sig):\r
- self.signature = sig\r
-\r
- \r
- ##\r
- # Translate a legacy credential into a new one\r
- #\r
- # @param String of the legacy credential\r
-\r
- def translate_legacy(self, str):\r
- legacy = CredentialLegacy(False,string=str)\r
- self.gidCaller = legacy.get_gid_caller()\r
- self.gidObject = legacy.get_gid_object()\r
- lifetime = legacy.get_lifetime()\r
- if not lifetime:\r
- self.set_expiration(datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(seconds=DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME))\r
- else:\r
- self.set_expiration(int(lifetime))\r
- self.lifeTime = legacy.get_lifetime()\r
- self.set_privileges(legacy.get_privileges())\r
- self.get_privileges().delegate_all_privileges(legacy.get_delegate())\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Need the issuer's private key and name\r
- # @param key Keypair object containing the private key of the issuer\r
- # @param gid GID of the issuing authority\r
-\r
- def set_issuer_keys(self, privkey, gid):\r
- self.issuer_privkey = privkey\r
- self.issuer_gid = gid\r
-\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Set this credential's parent\r
- def set_parent(self, cred):\r
- self.parent = cred\r
- self.updateRefID()\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # set the GID of the caller\r
- #\r
- # @param gid GID object of the caller\r
-\r
- def set_gid_caller(self, gid):\r
- self.gidCaller = gid\r
- # gid origin caller is the caller's gid by default\r
- self.gidOriginCaller = gid\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # get the GID of the object\r
-\r
- def get_gid_caller(self):\r
- if not self.gidCaller:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.gidCaller\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # set the GID of the object\r
- #\r
- # @param gid GID object of the object\r
-\r
- def set_gid_object(self, gid):\r
- self.gidObject = gid\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # get the GID of the object\r
-\r
- def get_gid_object(self):\r
- if not self.gidObject:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.gidObject\r
- \r
- ##\r
- # Expiration: an absolute UTC time of expiration (as either an int or string or datetime)\r
- # \r
- def set_expiration(self, expiration):\r
- if isinstance(expiration, (int, float)):\r
- self.expiration = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(expiration)\r
- elif isinstance (expiration, datetime.datetime):\r
- self.expiration = expiration\r
- elif isinstance (expiration, StringTypes):\r
- self.expiration = utcparse (expiration)\r
- else:\r
- logger.error ("unexpected input type in Credential.set_expiration")\r
-\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # get the lifetime of the credential (always in datetime format)\r
-\r
- def get_expiration(self):\r
- if not self.expiration:\r
- self.decode()\r
- # at this point self.expiration is normalized as a datetime - DON'T call utcparse again\r
- return self.expiration\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # For legacy sake\r
- def get_lifetime(self):\r
- return self.get_expiration()\r
- \r
- ##\r
- # set the privileges\r
- #\r
- # @param privs either a comma-separated list of privileges of a Rights object\r
-\r
- def set_privileges(self, privs):\r
- if isinstance(privs, str):\r
- self.privileges = Rights(string = privs)\r
- else:\r
- self.privileges = privs \r
-\r
- ##\r
- # return the privileges as a Rights object\r
-\r
- def get_privileges(self):\r
- if not self.privileges:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.privileges\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # determine whether the credential allows a particular operation to be\r
- # performed\r
- #\r
- # @param op_name string specifying name of operation ("lookup", "update", etc)\r
-\r
- def can_perform(self, op_name):\r
- rights = self.get_privileges()\r
- \r
- if not rights:\r
- return False\r
-\r
- return rights.can_perform(op_name)\r
-\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Encode the attributes of the credential into an XML string \r
- # This should be done immediately before signing the credential. \r
- # WARNING:\r
- # In general, a signed credential obtained externally should\r
- # not be changed else the signature is no longer valid. So, once\r
- # you have loaded an existing signed credential, do not call encode() or sign() on it.\r
-\r
- def encode(self):\r
- # Create the XML document\r
- doc = Document()\r
- signed_cred = doc.createElement("signed-credential")\r
-\r
-# Declare namespaces\r
-# Note that credential/policy.xsd are really the PG schemas\r
-# in a PL namespace.\r
-# Note that delegation of credentials between the 2 only really works\r
-# cause those schemas are identical.\r
-# Also note these PG schemas talk about PG tickets and CM policies.\r
- signed_cred.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")\r
- signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/credential.xsd")\r
- signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/ext/policy/1 http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")\r
-\r
-# PG says for those last 2:\r
-# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")\r
-# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")\r
-\r
- doc.appendChild(signed_cred) \r
- \r
- # Fill in the <credential> bit \r
- cred = doc.createElement("credential")\r
- cred.setAttribute("xml:id", self.get_refid())\r
- signed_cred.appendChild(cred)\r
- append_sub(doc, cred, "type", "privilege")\r
- append_sub(doc, cred, "serial", "8")\r
- append_sub(doc, cred, "owner_gid", self.gidCaller.save_to_string())\r
- append_sub(doc, cred, "owner_urn", self.gidCaller.get_urn())\r
- append_sub(doc, cred, "target_gid", self.gidObject.save_to_string())\r
- append_sub(doc, cred, "target_urn", self.gidObject.get_urn())\r
- append_sub(doc, cred, "uuid", "")\r
- if not self.expiration:\r
- self.set_expiration(datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(seconds=DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME))\r
- self.expiration = self.expiration.replace(microsecond=0)\r
- append_sub(doc, cred, "expires", self.expiration.isoformat())\r
- privileges = doc.createElement("privileges")\r
- cred.appendChild(privileges)\r
-\r
- if self.privileges:\r
- rights = self.get_privileges()\r
- for right in rights.rights:\r
- priv = doc.createElement("privilege")\r
- append_sub(doc, priv, "name", right.kind)\r
- append_sub(doc, priv, "can_delegate", str(right.delegate).lower())\r
- privileges.appendChild(priv)\r
-\r
- # Add the parent credential if it exists\r
- if self.parent:\r
- sdoc = parseString(self.parent.get_xml())\r
- # If the root node is a signed-credential (it should be), then\r
- # get all its attributes and attach those to our signed_cred\r
- # node.\r
- # Specifically, PG and PLadd attributes for namespaces (which is reasonable),\r
- # and we need to include those again here or else their signature\r
- # no longer matches on the credential.\r
- # We expect three of these, but here we copy them all:\r
-# signed_cred.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")\r
-# and from PG (PL is equivalent, as shown above):\r
-# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")\r
-# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")\r
-\r
- # HOWEVER!\r
- # PL now also declares these, with different URLs, so\r
- # the code notices those attributes already existed with\r
- # different values, and complains.\r
- # This happens regularly on delegation now that PG and\r
- # PL both declare the namespace with different URLs.\r
- # If the content ever differs this is a problem,\r
- # but for now it works - different URLs (values in the attributes)\r
- # but the same actual schema, so using the PG schema\r
- # on delegated-to-PL credentials works fine.\r
-\r
- # Note: you could also not copy attributes\r
- # which already exist. It appears that both PG and PL\r
- # will actually validate a slicecred with a parent\r
- # signed using PG namespaces and a child signed with PL\r
- # namespaces over the whole thing. But I don't know\r
- # if that is a bug in xmlsec1, an accident since\r
- # the contents of the schemas are the same,\r
- # or something else, but it seems odd. And this works.\r
- parentRoot = sdoc.documentElement\r
- if parentRoot.tagName == "signed-credential" and parentRoot.hasAttributes():\r
- for attrIx in range(0, parentRoot.attributes.length):\r
- attr = parentRoot.attributes.item(attrIx)\r
- # returns the old attribute of same name that was\r
- # on the credential\r
- # Below throws InUse exception if we forgot to clone the attribute first\r
- oldAttr = signed_cred.setAttributeNode(attr.cloneNode(True))\r
- if oldAttr and oldAttr.value != attr.value:\r
- msg = "Delegating cred from owner %s to %s over %s replaced attribute %s value '%s' with '%s'" % (self.parent.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidObject.get_urn(), oldAttr.name, oldAttr.value, attr.value)\r
- logger.warn(msg)\r
- #raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Can't encode new valid delegated credential: %s" % msg)\r
-\r
- p_cred = doc.importNode(sdoc.getElementsByTagName("credential")[0], True)\r
- p = doc.createElement("parent")\r
- p.appendChild(p_cred)\r
- cred.appendChild(p)\r
- # done handling parent credential\r
-\r
- # Create the <signatures> tag\r
- signatures = doc.createElement("signatures")\r
- signed_cred.appendChild(signatures)\r
-\r
- # Add any parent signatures\r
- if self.parent:\r
- for cur_cred in self.get_credential_list()[1:]:\r
- sdoc = parseString(cur_cred.get_signature().get_xml())\r
- ele = doc.importNode(sdoc.getElementsByTagName("Signature")[0], True)\r
- signatures.appendChild(ele)\r
- \r
- # Get the finished product\r
- self.xml = doc.toxml()\r
-\r
-\r
- def save_to_random_tmp_file(self): \r
- fp, filename = mkstemp(suffix='cred', text=True)\r
- fp = os.fdopen(fp, "w")\r
- self.save_to_file(filename, save_parents=True, filep=fp)\r
- return filename\r
- \r
- def save_to_file(self, filename, save_parents=True, filep=None):\r
- if not self.xml:\r
- self.encode()\r
- if filep:\r
- f = filep \r
- else:\r
- f = open(filename, "w")\r
- f.write(self.xml)\r
- f.close()\r
-\r
- def save_to_string(self, save_parents=True):\r
- if not self.xml:\r
- self.encode()\r
- return self.xml\r
-\r
- def get_refid(self):\r
- if not self.refid:\r
- self.refid = 'ref0'\r
- return self.refid\r
-\r
- def set_refid(self, rid):\r
- self.refid = rid\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Figure out what refids exist, and update this credential's id\r
- # so that it doesn't clobber the others. Returns the refids of\r
- # the parents.\r
- \r
- def updateRefID(self):\r
- if not self.parent:\r
- self.set_refid('ref0')\r
- return []\r
- \r
- refs = []\r
-\r
- next_cred = self.parent\r
- while next_cred:\r
- refs.append(next_cred.get_refid())\r
- if next_cred.parent:\r
- next_cred = next_cred.parent\r
- else:\r
- next_cred = None\r
-\r
- \r
- # Find a unique refid for this credential\r
- rid = self.get_refid()\r
- while rid in refs:\r
- val = int(rid[3:])\r
- rid = "ref%d" % (val + 1)\r
-\r
- # Set the new refid\r
- self.set_refid(rid)\r
-\r
- # Return the set of parent credential ref ids\r
- return refs\r
-\r
- def get_xml(self):\r
- if not self.xml:\r
- self.encode()\r
- return self.xml\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Sign the XML file created by encode()\r
- #\r
- # WARNING:\r
- # In general, a signed credential obtained externally should\r
- # not be changed else the signature is no longer valid. So, once\r
- # you have loaded an existing signed credential, do not call encode() or sign() on it.\r
-\r
- def sign(self):\r
- if not self.issuer_privkey or not self.issuer_gid:\r
- return\r
- doc = parseString(self.get_xml())\r
- sigs = doc.getElementsByTagName("signatures")[0]\r
-\r
- # Create the signature template to be signed\r
- signature = Signature()\r
- signature.set_refid(self.get_refid())\r
- sdoc = parseString(signature.get_xml()) \r
- sig_ele = doc.importNode(sdoc.getElementsByTagName("Signature")[0], True)\r
- sigs.appendChild(sig_ele)\r
-\r
- self.xml = doc.toxml()\r
-\r
-\r
- # Split the issuer GID into multiple certificates if it's a chain\r
- chain = GID(filename=self.issuer_gid)\r
- gid_files = []\r
- while chain:\r
- gid_files.append(chain.save_to_random_tmp_file(False))\r
- if chain.get_parent():\r
- chain = chain.get_parent()\r
- else:\r
- chain = None\r
-\r
-\r
- # Call out to xmlsec1 to sign it\r
- ref = 'Sig_%s' % self.get_refid()\r
- filename = self.save_to_random_tmp_file()\r
- signed = os.popen('%s --sign --node-id "%s" --privkey-pem %s,%s %s' \\r
- % (self.xmlsec_path, ref, self.issuer_privkey, ",".join(gid_files), filename)).read()\r
- os.remove(filename)\r
-\r
- for gid_file in gid_files:\r
- os.remove(gid_file)\r
-\r
- self.xml = signed\r
-\r
- # This is no longer a legacy credential\r
- if self.legacy:\r
- self.legacy = None\r
-\r
- # Update signatures\r
- self.decode() \r
-\r
- \r
- ##\r
- # Retrieve the attributes of the credential from the XML.\r
- # This is automatically called by the various get_* methods of\r
- # this class and should not need to be called explicitly.\r
-\r
- def decode(self):\r
- if not self.xml:\r
- return\r
- doc = parseString(self.xml)\r
- sigs = []\r
- signed_cred = doc.getElementsByTagName("signed-credential")\r
-\r
- # Is this a signed-cred or just a cred?\r
- if len(signed_cred) > 0:\r
- creds = signed_cred[0].getElementsByTagName("credential")\r
- signatures = signed_cred[0].getElementsByTagName("signatures")\r
- if len(signatures) > 0:\r
- sigs = signatures[0].getElementsByTagName("Signature")\r
- else:\r
- creds = doc.getElementsByTagName("credential")\r
- \r
- if creds is None or len(creds) == 0:\r
- # malformed cred file\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Malformed XML: No credential tag found")\r
-\r
- # Just take the first cred if there are more than one\r
- cred = creds[0]\r
-\r
- self.set_refid(cred.getAttribute("xml:id"))\r
- self.set_expiration(utcparse(getTextNode(cred, "expires")))\r
- self.gidCaller = GID(string=getTextNode(cred, "owner_gid"))\r
- self.gidObject = GID(string=getTextNode(cred, "target_gid")) \r
-\r
-\r
- # Process privileges\r
- privs = cred.getElementsByTagName("privileges")[0]\r
- rlist = Rights()\r
- for priv in privs.getElementsByTagName("privilege"):\r
- kind = getTextNode(priv, "name")\r
- deleg = str2bool(getTextNode(priv, "can_delegate"))\r
- if kind == '*':\r
- # Convert * into the default privileges for the credential's type\r
- # Each inherits the delegatability from the * above\r
- _ , type = urn_to_hrn(self.gidObject.get_urn())\r
- rl = determine_rights(type, self.gidObject.get_urn())\r
- for r in rl.rights:\r
- r.delegate = deleg\r
- rlist.add(r)\r
- else:\r
- rlist.add(Right(kind.strip(), deleg))\r
- self.set_privileges(rlist)\r
-\r
-\r
- # Is there a parent?\r
- parent = cred.getElementsByTagName("parent")\r
- if len(parent) > 0:\r
- parent_doc = parent[0].getElementsByTagName("credential")[0]\r
- parent_xml = parent_doc.toxml()\r
- self.parent = Credential(string=parent_xml)\r
- self.updateRefID()\r
-\r
- # Assign the signatures to the credentials\r
- for sig in sigs:\r
- Sig = Signature(string=sig.toxml())\r
-\r
- for cur_cred in self.get_credential_list():\r
- if cur_cred.get_refid() == Sig.get_refid():\r
- cur_cred.set_signature(Sig)\r
- \r
- \r
- ##\r
- # Verify\r
- # trusted_certs: A list of trusted GID filenames (not GID objects!) \r
- # Chaining is not supported within the GIDs by xmlsec1.\r
- #\r
- # trusted_certs_required: Should usually be true. Set False means an\r
- # empty list of trusted_certs would still let this method pass.\r
- # It just skips xmlsec1 verification et al. Only used by some utils\r
- # \r
- # Verify that:\r
- # . All of the signatures are valid and that the issuers trace back\r
- # to trusted roots (performed by xmlsec1)\r
- # . The XML matches the credential schema\r
- # . That the issuer of the credential is the authority in the target's urn\r
- # . In the case of a delegated credential, this must be true of the root\r
- # . That all of the gids presented in the credential are valid\r
- # . Including verifying GID chains, and includ the issuer\r
- # . The credential is not expired\r
- #\r
- # -- For Delegates (credentials with parents)\r
- # . The privileges must be a subset of the parent credentials\r
- # . The privileges must have "can_delegate" set for each delegated privilege\r
- # . The target gid must be the same between child and parents\r
- # . The expiry time on the child must be no later than the parent\r
- # . The signer of the child must be the owner of the parent\r
- #\r
- # -- Verify does *NOT*\r
- # . ensure that an xmlrpc client's gid matches a credential gid, that\r
- # must be done elsewhere\r
- #\r
- # @param trusted_certs: The certificates of trusted CA certificates\r
- def verify(self, trusted_certs=None, schema=None, trusted_certs_required=True):\r
- if not self.xml:\r
- self.decode()\r
-\r
- # validate against RelaxNG schema\r
- if HAVELXML and not self.legacy:\r
- if schema and os.path.exists(schema):\r
- tree = etree.parse(StringIO(self.xml))\r
- schema_doc = etree.parse(schema)\r
- xmlschema = etree.XMLSchema(schema_doc)\r
- if not xmlschema.validate(tree):\r
- error = xmlschema.error_log.last_error\r
- message = "%s: %s (line %s)" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), error.message, error.line)\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable(message)\r
-\r
- if trusted_certs_required and trusted_certs is None:\r
- trusted_certs = []\r
-\r
-# trusted_cert_objects = [GID(filename=f) for f in trusted_certs]\r
- trusted_cert_objects = []\r
- ok_trusted_certs = []\r
- # If caller explicitly passed in None that means skip cert chain validation.\r
- # Strange and not typical\r
- if trusted_certs is not None:\r
- for f in trusted_certs:\r
- try:\r
- # Failures here include unreadable files\r
- # or non PEM files\r
- trusted_cert_objects.append(GID(filename=f))\r
- ok_trusted_certs.append(f)\r
- except Exception, exc:\r
- logger.error("Failed to load trusted cert from %s: %r", f, exc)\r
- trusted_certs = ok_trusted_certs\r
-\r
- # Use legacy verification if this is a legacy credential\r
- if self.legacy:\r
- self.legacy.verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)\r
- if self.legacy.client_gid:\r
- self.legacy.client_gid.verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)\r
- if self.legacy.object_gid:\r
- self.legacy.object_gid.verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)\r
- return True\r
- \r
- # make sure it is not expired\r
- if self.get_expiration() < datetime.datetime.utcnow():\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Credential %s expired at %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), self.expiration.isoformat()))\r
-\r
- # Verify the signatures\r
- filename = self.save_to_random_tmp_file()\r
- if trusted_certs is not None:\r
- cert_args = " ".join(['--trusted-pem %s' % x for x in trusted_certs])\r
-\r
- # If caller explicitly passed in None that means skip cert chain validation.\r
- # - Strange and not typical\r
- if trusted_certs is not None:\r
- # Verify the gids of this cred and of its parents\r
- for cur_cred in self.get_credential_list():\r
- cur_cred.get_gid_object().verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)\r
- cur_cred.get_gid_caller().verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)\r
-\r
- refs = []\r
- refs.append("Sig_%s" % self.get_refid())\r
-\r
- parentRefs = self.updateRefID()\r
- for ref in parentRefs:\r
- refs.append("Sig_%s" % ref)\r
-\r
- for ref in refs:\r
- # If caller explicitly passed in None that means skip xmlsec1 validation.\r
- # Strange and not typical\r
- if trusted_certs is None:\r
- break\r
-\r
-# print "Doing %s --verify --node-id '%s' %s %s 2>&1" % \\r
-# (self.xmlsec_path, ref, cert_args, filename)\r
- verified = os.popen('%s --verify --node-id "%s" %s %s 2>&1' \\r
- % (self.xmlsec_path, ref, cert_args, filename)).read()\r
- if not verified.strip().startswith("OK"):\r
- # xmlsec errors have a msg= which is the interesting bit.\r
- mstart = verified.find("msg=")\r
- msg = ""\r
- if mstart > -1 and len(verified) > 4:\r
- mstart = mstart + 4\r
- mend = verified.find('\\', mstart)\r
- msg = verified[mstart:mend]\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("xmlsec1 error verifying cred %s using Signature ID %s: %s %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), ref, msg, verified.strip()))\r
- os.remove(filename)\r
-\r
- # Verify the parents (delegation)\r
- if self.parent:\r
- self.verify_parent(self.parent)\r
-\r
- # Make sure the issuer is the target's authority, and is\r
- # itself a valid GID\r
- self.verify_issuer(trusted_cert_objects)\r
- return True\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Creates a list of the credential and its parents, with the root \r
- # (original delegated credential) as the last item in the list\r
- def get_credential_list(self): \r
- cur_cred = self\r
- list = []\r
- while cur_cred:\r
- list.append(cur_cred)\r
- if cur_cred.parent:\r
- cur_cred = cur_cred.parent\r
- else:\r
- cur_cred = None\r
- return list\r
- \r
- ##\r
- # Make sure the credential's target gid (a) was signed by or (b)\r
- # is the same as the entity that signed the original credential,\r
- # or (c) is an authority over the target's namespace.\r
- # Also ensure that the credential issuer / signer itself has a valid\r
- # GID signature chain (signed by an authority with namespace rights).\r
- def verify_issuer(self, trusted_gids):\r
- root_cred = self.get_credential_list()[-1]\r
- root_target_gid = root_cred.get_gid_object()\r
- root_cred_signer = root_cred.get_signature().get_issuer_gid()\r
-\r
- # Case 1:\r
- # Allow non authority to sign target and cred about target.\r
- #\r
- # Why do we need to allow non authorities to sign?\r
- # If in the target gid validation step we correctly\r
- # checked that the target is only signed by an authority,\r
- # then this is just a special case of case 3.\r
- # This short-circuit is the common case currently -\r
- # and cause GID validation doesn't check 'authority',\r
- # this allows users to generate valid slice credentials.\r
- if root_target_gid.is_signed_by_cert(root_cred_signer):\r
- # cred signer matches target signer, return success\r
- return\r
-\r
- # Case 2:\r
- # Allow someone to sign credential about themeselves. Used?\r
- # If not, remove this.\r
- #root_target_gid_str = root_target_gid.save_to_string()\r
- #root_cred_signer_str = root_cred_signer.save_to_string()\r
- #if root_target_gid_str == root_cred_signer_str:\r
- # # cred signer is target, return success\r
- # return\r
-\r
- # Case 3:\r
-\r
- # root_cred_signer is not the target_gid\r
- # So this is a different gid that we have not verified.\r
- # xmlsec1 verified the cert chain on this already, but\r
- # it hasn't verified that the gid meets the HRN namespace\r
- # requirements.\r
- # Below we'll ensure that it is an authority.\r
- # But we haven't verified that it is _signed by_ an authority\r
- # We also don't know if xmlsec1 requires that cert signers\r
- # are marked as CAs.\r
-\r
- # Note that if verify() gave us no trusted_gids then this\r
- # call will fail. So skip it if we have no trusted_gids\r
- if trusted_gids and len(trusted_gids) > 0:\r
- root_cred_signer.verify_chain(trusted_gids)\r
- else:\r
- logger.debug("No trusted gids. Cannot verify that cred signer is signed by a trusted authority. Skipping that check.")\r
-\r
- # See if the signer is an authority over the domain of the target.\r
- # There are multiple types of authority - accept them all here\r
- # Maybe should be (hrn, type) = urn_to_hrn(root_cred_signer.get_urn())\r
- root_cred_signer_type = root_cred_signer.get_type()\r
- if (root_cred_signer_type.find('authority') == 0):\r
- #logger.debug('Cred signer is an authority')\r
- # signer is an authority, see if target is in authority's domain\r
- signerhrn = root_cred_signer.get_hrn()\r
- if hrn_authfor_hrn(signerhrn, root_target_gid.get_hrn()):\r
- return\r
-\r
- # We've required that the credential be signed by an authority\r
- # for that domain. Reasonable and probably correct.\r
- # A looser model would also allow the signer to be an authority\r
- # in my control framework - eg My CA or CH. Even if it is not\r
- # the CH that issued these, eg, user credentials.\r
-\r
- # Give up, credential does not pass issuer verification\r
-\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Could not verify credential owned by %s for object %s. Cred signer %s not the trusted authority for Cred target %s" % (self.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidObject.get_urn(), root_cred_signer.get_hrn(), root_target_gid.get_hrn()))\r
-\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # -- For Delegates (credentials with parents) verify that:\r
- # . The privileges must be a subset of the parent credentials\r
- # . The privileges must have "can_delegate" set for each delegated privilege\r
- # . The target gid must be the same between child and parents\r
- # . The expiry time on the child must be no later than the parent\r
- # . The signer of the child must be the owner of the parent \r
- def verify_parent(self, parent_cred):\r
- # make sure the rights given to the child are a subset of the\r
- # parents rights (and check delegate bits)\r
- if not parent_cred.get_privileges().is_superset(self.get_privileges()):\r
- raise ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent(("Parent cred ref %s rights " % parent_cred.get_refid()) +\r
- self.parent.get_privileges().save_to_string() + (" not superset of delegated cred %s ref %s rights " % (self.get_summary_tostring(), self.get_refid())) +\r
- self.get_privileges().save_to_string())\r
-\r
- # make sure my target gid is the same as the parent's\r
- if not parent_cred.get_gid_object().save_to_string() == \\r
- self.get_gid_object().save_to_string():\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated cred %s: Target gid not equal between parent and child. Parent %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), parent_cred.get_summary_tostring()))\r
-\r
- # make sure my expiry time is <= my parent's\r
- if not parent_cred.get_expiration() >= self.get_expiration():\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated credential %s expires after parent %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), parent_cred.get_summary_tostring()))\r
-\r
- # make sure my signer is the parent's caller\r
- if not parent_cred.get_gid_caller().save_to_string(False) == \\r
- self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().save_to_string(False):\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated credential %s not signed by parent %s's caller" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), parent_cred.get_summary_tostring()))\r
- \r
- # Recurse\r
- if parent_cred.parent:\r
- parent_cred.verify_parent(parent_cred.parent)\r
-\r
-\r
- def delegate(self, delegee_gidfile, caller_keyfile, caller_gidfile):\r
- """\r
- Return a delegated copy of this credential, delegated to the \r
- specified gid's user. \r
- """\r
- # get the gid of the object we are delegating\r
- object_gid = self.get_gid_object()\r
- object_hrn = object_gid.get_hrn() \r
- \r
- # the hrn of the user who will be delegated to\r
- delegee_gid = GID(filename=delegee_gidfile)\r
- delegee_hrn = delegee_gid.get_hrn()\r
- \r
- #user_key = Keypair(filename=keyfile)\r
- #user_hrn = self.get_gid_caller().get_hrn()\r
- subject_string = "%s delegated to %s" % (object_hrn, delegee_hrn)\r
- dcred = Credential(subject=subject_string)\r
- dcred.set_gid_caller(delegee_gid)\r
- dcred.set_gid_object(object_gid)\r
- dcred.set_parent(self)\r
- dcred.set_expiration(self.get_expiration())\r
- dcred.set_privileges(self.get_privileges())\r
- dcred.get_privileges().delegate_all_privileges(True)\r
- #dcred.set_issuer_keys(keyfile, delegee_gidfile)\r
- dcred.set_issuer_keys(caller_keyfile, caller_gidfile)\r
- dcred.encode()\r
- dcred.sign()\r
-\r
- return dcred\r
-\r
- # only informative\r
- def get_filename(self):\r
- return getattr(self,'filename',None)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Dump the contents of a credential to stdout in human-readable format\r
- #\r
- # @param dump_parents If true, also dump the parent certificates\r
- def dump (self, *args, **kwargs):\r
- print self.dump_string(*args, **kwargs)\r
-\r
-\r
- def dump_string(self, dump_parents=False):\r
- result=""\r
- result += "CREDENTIAL %s\n" % self.get_subject()\r
- filename=self.get_filename()\r
- if filename: result += "Filename %s\n"%filename\r
- result += " privs: %s\n" % self.get_privileges().save_to_string()\r
- gidCaller = self.get_gid_caller()\r
- if gidCaller:\r
- result += " gidCaller:\n"\r
- result += gidCaller.dump_string(8, dump_parents)\r
-\r
- if self.get_signature():\r
- print " gidIssuer:"\r
- self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().dump(8, dump_parents)\r
-\r
- gidObject = self.get_gid_object()\r
- if gidObject:\r
- result += " gidObject:\n"\r
- result += gidObject.dump_string(8, dump_parents)\r
-\r
- if self.parent and dump_parents:\r
- result += "\nPARENT"\r
- result += self.parent.dump_string(True)\r
-\r
- return result\r
+#----------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Copyright (c) 2008 Board of Trustees, Princeton University
+#
+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+# a copy of this software and/or hardware specification (the "Work") to
+# deal in the Work without restriction, including without limitation the
+# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
+# and/or sell copies of the Work, and to permit persons to whom the Work
+# is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+#
+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+# included in all copies or substantial portions of the Work.
+#
+# THE WORK IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT
+# HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
+# WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORK OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
+# IN THE WORK.
+#----------------------------------------------------------------------
+##
+# Implements SFA Credentials
+#
+# Credentials are signed XML files that assign a subject gid privileges to an object gid
+##
+
+import os
+from types import StringTypes
+import datetime
+from StringIO import StringIO
+from tempfile import mkstemp
+from xml.dom.minidom import Document, parseString
+
+HAVELXML = False
+try:
+ from lxml import etree
+ HAVELXML = True
+except:
+ pass
+
+from xml.parsers.expat import ExpatError
+
+from sfa.util.faults import CredentialNotVerifiable, ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent
+from sfa.util.sfalogging import logger
+from sfa.util.sfatime import utcparse
+from sfa.trust.credential_legacy import CredentialLegacy
+from sfa.trust.rights import Right, Rights, determine_rights
+from sfa.trust.gid import GID
+from sfa.util.xrn import urn_to_hrn, hrn_authfor_hrn
+
+# 2 weeks, in seconds
+DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME = 86400 * 31
+
+
+# TODO:
+# . make privs match between PG and PL
+# . Need to add support for other types of credentials, e.g. tickets
+# . add namespaces to signed-credential element?
+
+signature_template = \
+'''
+<Signature xml:id="Sig_%s" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
+ <SignedInfo>
+ <CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/>
+ <SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
+ <Reference URI="#%s">
+ <Transforms>
+ <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" />
+ </Transforms>
+ <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
+ <DigestValue></DigestValue>
+ </Reference>
+ </SignedInfo>
+ <SignatureValue />
+ <KeyInfo>
+ <X509Data>
+ <X509SubjectName/>
+ <X509IssuerSerial/>
+ <X509Certificate/>
+ </X509Data>
+ <KeyValue />
+ </KeyInfo>
+</Signature>
+'''
+
+# PG formats the template (whitespace) slightly differently.
+# Note that they don't include the xmlns in the template, but add it later.
+# Otherwise the two are equivalent.
+#signature_template_as_in_pg = \
+#'''
+#<Signature xml:id="Sig_%s" >
+# <SignedInfo>
+# <CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/>
+# <SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
+# <Reference URI="#%s">
+# <Transforms>
+# <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" />
+# </Transforms>
+# <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
+# <DigestValue></DigestValue>
+# </Reference>
+# </SignedInfo>
+# <SignatureValue />
+# <KeyInfo>
+# <X509Data >
+# <X509SubjectName/>
+# <X509IssuerSerial/>
+# <X509Certificate/>
+# </X509Data>
+# <KeyValue />
+# </KeyInfo>
+#</Signature>
+#'''
+
+##
+# Convert a string into a bool
+# used to convert an xsd:boolean to a Python boolean
+def str2bool(str):
+ if str.lower() in ['true','1']:
+ return True
+ return False
+
+
+##
+# Utility function to get the text of an XML element
+
+def getTextNode(element, subele):
+ sub = element.getElementsByTagName(subele)[0]
+ if len(sub.childNodes) > 0:
+ return sub.childNodes[0].nodeValue
+ else:
+ return None
+
+##
+# Utility function to set the text of an XML element
+# It creates the element, adds the text to it,
+# and then appends it to the parent.
+
+def append_sub(doc, parent, element, text):
+ ele = doc.createElement(element)
+ ele.appendChild(doc.createTextNode(text))
+ parent.appendChild(ele)
+
+##
+# Signature contains information about an xmlsec1 signature
+# for a signed-credential
+#
+
+class Signature(object):
+
+ def __init__(self, string=None):
+ self.refid = None
+ self.issuer_gid = None
+ self.xml = None
+ if string:
+ self.xml = string
+ self.decode()
+
+
+ def get_refid(self):
+ if not self.refid:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.refid
+
+ def get_xml(self):
+ if not self.xml:
+ self.encode()
+ return self.xml
+
+ def set_refid(self, id):
+ self.refid = id
+
+ def get_issuer_gid(self):
+ if not self.gid:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.gid
+
+ def set_issuer_gid(self, gid):
+ self.gid = gid
+
+ def decode(self):
+ try:
+ doc = parseString(self.xml)
+ except ExpatError,e:
+ logger.log_exc ("Failed to parse credential, %s"%self.xml)
+ raise
+ sig = doc.getElementsByTagName("Signature")[0]
+ self.set_refid(sig.getAttribute("xml:id").strip("Sig_"))
+ keyinfo = sig.getElementsByTagName("X509Data")[0]
+ szgid = getTextNode(keyinfo, "X509Certificate")
+ szgid = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n%s\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----" % szgid
+ self.set_issuer_gid(GID(string=szgid))
+
+ def encode(self):
+ self.xml = signature_template % (self.get_refid(), self.get_refid())
+
+
+##
+# A credential provides a caller gid with privileges to an object gid.
+# A signed credential is signed by the object's authority.
+#
+# Credentials are encoded in one of two ways. The legacy style places
+# it in the subjectAltName of an X509 certificate. The new credentials
+# are placed in signed XML.
+#
+# WARNING:
+# In general, a signed credential obtained externally should
+# not be changed else the signature is no longer valid. So, once
+# you have loaded an existing signed credential, do not call encode() or sign() on it.
+
+def filter_creds_by_caller(creds, caller_hrn_list):
+ """
+ Returns a list of creds who's gid caller matches the
+ specified caller hrn
+ """
+ if not isinstance(creds, list): creds = [creds]
+ if not isinstance(caller_hrn_list, list):
+ caller_hrn_list = [caller_hrn_list]
+ caller_creds = []
+ for cred in creds:
+ try:
+ tmp_cred = Credential(string=cred)
+ if tmp_cred.get_gid_caller().get_hrn() in caller_hrn_list:
+ caller_creds.append(cred)
+ except: pass
+ return caller_creds
+
+class Credential(object):
+
+ ##
+ # Create a Credential object
+ #
+ # @param create If true, create a blank x509 certificate
+ # @param subject If subject!=None, create an x509 cert with the subject name
+ # @param string If string!=None, load the credential from the string
+ # @param filename If filename!=None, load the credential from the file
+ # FIXME: create and subject are ignored!
+ def __init__(self, create=False, subject=None, string=None, filename=None):
+ self.gidCaller = None
+ self.gidObject = None
+ self.expiration = None
+ self.privileges = None
+ self.issuer_privkey = None
+ self.issuer_gid = None
+ self.issuer_pubkey = None
+ self.parent = None
+ self.signature = None
+ self.xml = None
+ self.refid = None
+ self.legacy = None
+
+ # Check if this is a legacy credential, translate it if so
+ if string or filename:
+ if string:
+ str = string
+ elif filename:
+ str = file(filename).read()
+
+ if str.strip().startswith("-----"):
+ self.legacy = CredentialLegacy(False,string=str)
+ self.translate_legacy(str)
+ else:
+ self.xml = str
+ self.decode()
+
+ # Find an xmlsec1 path
+ self.xmlsec_path = ''
+ paths = ['/usr/bin','/usr/local/bin','/bin','/opt/bin','/opt/local/bin']
+ for path in paths:
+ if os.path.isfile(path + '/' + 'xmlsec1'):
+ self.xmlsec_path = path + '/' + 'xmlsec1'
+ break
+
+ def get_subject(self):
+ if not self.gidObject:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.gidObject.get_printable_subject()
+
+ # sounds like this should be __repr__ instead ??
+ def get_summary_tostring(self):
+ if not self.gidObject:
+ self.decode()
+ obj = self.gidObject.get_printable_subject()
+ caller = self.gidCaller.get_printable_subject()
+ exp = self.get_expiration()
+ # Summarize the rights too? The issuer?
+ return "[ Grant %s rights on %s until %s ]" % (caller, obj, exp)
+
+ def get_signature(self):
+ if not self.signature:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.signature
+
+ def set_signature(self, sig):
+ self.signature = sig
+
+
+ ##
+ # Translate a legacy credential into a new one
+ #
+ # @param String of the legacy credential
+
+ def translate_legacy(self, str):
+ legacy = CredentialLegacy(False,string=str)
+ self.gidCaller = legacy.get_gid_caller()
+ self.gidObject = legacy.get_gid_object()
+ lifetime = legacy.get_lifetime()
+ if not lifetime:
+ self.set_expiration(datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(seconds=DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME))
+ else:
+ self.set_expiration(int(lifetime))
+ self.lifeTime = legacy.get_lifetime()
+ self.set_privileges(legacy.get_privileges())
+ self.get_privileges().delegate_all_privileges(legacy.get_delegate())
+
+ ##
+ # Need the issuer's private key and name
+ # @param key Keypair object containing the private key of the issuer
+ # @param gid GID of the issuing authority
+
+ def set_issuer_keys(self, privkey, gid):
+ self.issuer_privkey = privkey
+ self.issuer_gid = gid
+
+
+ ##
+ # Set this credential's parent
+ def set_parent(self, cred):
+ self.parent = cred
+ self.updateRefID()
+
+ ##
+ # set the GID of the caller
+ #
+ # @param gid GID object of the caller
+
+ def set_gid_caller(self, gid):
+ self.gidCaller = gid
+ # gid origin caller is the caller's gid by default
+ self.gidOriginCaller = gid
+
+ ##
+ # get the GID of the object
+
+ def get_gid_caller(self):
+ if not self.gidCaller:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.gidCaller
+
+ ##
+ # set the GID of the object
+ #
+ # @param gid GID object of the object
+
+ def set_gid_object(self, gid):
+ self.gidObject = gid
+
+ ##
+ # get the GID of the object
+
+ def get_gid_object(self):
+ if not self.gidObject:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.gidObject
+
+ ##
+ # Expiration: an absolute UTC time of expiration (as either an int or string or datetime)
+ #
+ def set_expiration(self, expiration):
+ if isinstance(expiration, (int, float)):
+ self.expiration = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(expiration)
+ elif isinstance (expiration, datetime.datetime):
+ self.expiration = expiration
+ elif isinstance (expiration, StringTypes):
+ self.expiration = utcparse (expiration)
+ else:
+ logger.error ("unexpected input type in Credential.set_expiration")
+
+
+ ##
+ # get the lifetime of the credential (always in datetime format)
+
+ def get_expiration(self):
+ if not self.expiration:
+ self.decode()
+ # at this point self.expiration is normalized as a datetime - DON'T call utcparse again
+ return self.expiration
+
+ ##
+ # For legacy sake
+ def get_lifetime(self):
+ return self.get_expiration()
+
+ ##
+ # set the privileges
+ #
+ # @param privs either a comma-separated list of privileges of a Rights object
+
+ def set_privileges(self, privs):
+ if isinstance(privs, str):
+ self.privileges = Rights(string = privs)
+ else:
+ self.privileges = privs
+
+ ##
+ # return the privileges as a Rights object
+
+ def get_privileges(self):
+ if not self.privileges:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.privileges
+
+ ##
+ # determine whether the credential allows a particular operation to be
+ # performed
+ #
+ # @param op_name string specifying name of operation ("lookup", "update", etc)
+
+ def can_perform(self, op_name):
+ rights = self.get_privileges()
+
+ if not rights:
+ return False
+
+ return rights.can_perform(op_name)
+
+
+ ##
+ # Encode the attributes of the credential into an XML string
+ # This should be done immediately before signing the credential.
+ # WARNING:
+ # In general, a signed credential obtained externally should
+ # not be changed else the signature is no longer valid. So, once
+ # you have loaded an existing signed credential, do not call encode() or sign() on it.
+
+ def encode(self):
+ # Create the XML document
+ doc = Document()
+ signed_cred = doc.createElement("signed-credential")
+
+# Declare namespaces
+# Note that credential/policy.xsd are really the PG schemas
+# in a PL namespace.
+# Note that delegation of credentials between the 2 only really works
+# cause those schemas are identical.
+# Also note these PG schemas talk about PG tickets and CM policies.
+ signed_cred.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")
+ signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/credential.xsd")
+ signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/ext/policy/1 http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
+
+# PG says for those last 2:
+# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")
+# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
+
+ doc.appendChild(signed_cred)
+
+ # Fill in the <credential> bit
+ cred = doc.createElement("credential")
+ cred.setAttribute("xml:id", self.get_refid())
+ signed_cred.appendChild(cred)
+ append_sub(doc, cred, "type", "privilege")
+ append_sub(doc, cred, "serial", "8")
+ append_sub(doc, cred, "owner_gid", self.gidCaller.save_to_string())
+ append_sub(doc, cred, "owner_urn", self.gidCaller.get_urn())
+ append_sub(doc, cred, "target_gid", self.gidObject.save_to_string())
+ append_sub(doc, cred, "target_urn", self.gidObject.get_urn())
+ append_sub(doc, cred, "uuid", "")
+ if not self.expiration:
+ self.set_expiration(datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(seconds=DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME))
+ self.expiration = self.expiration.replace(microsecond=0)
+ append_sub(doc, cred, "expires", self.expiration.isoformat())
+ privileges = doc.createElement("privileges")
+ cred.appendChild(privileges)
+
+ if self.privileges:
+ rights = self.get_privileges()
+ for right in rights.rights:
+ priv = doc.createElement("privilege")
+ append_sub(doc, priv, "name", right.kind)
+ append_sub(doc, priv, "can_delegate", str(right.delegate).lower())
+ privileges.appendChild(priv)
+
+ # Add the parent credential if it exists
+ if self.parent:
+ sdoc = parseString(self.parent.get_xml())
+ # If the root node is a signed-credential (it should be), then
+ # get all its attributes and attach those to our signed_cred
+ # node.
+ # Specifically, PG and PLadd attributes for namespaces (which is reasonable),
+ # and we need to include those again here or else their signature
+ # no longer matches on the credential.
+ # We expect three of these, but here we copy them all:
+# signed_cred.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")
+# and from PG (PL is equivalent, as shown above):
+# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")
+# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
+
+ # HOWEVER!
+ # PL now also declares these, with different URLs, so
+ # the code notices those attributes already existed with
+ # different values, and complains.
+ # This happens regularly on delegation now that PG and
+ # PL both declare the namespace with different URLs.
+ # If the content ever differs this is a problem,
+ # but for now it works - different URLs (values in the attributes)
+ # but the same actual schema, so using the PG schema
+ # on delegated-to-PL credentials works fine.
+
+ # Note: you could also not copy attributes
+ # which already exist. It appears that both PG and PL
+ # will actually validate a slicecred with a parent
+ # signed using PG namespaces and a child signed with PL
+ # namespaces over the whole thing. But I don't know
+ # if that is a bug in xmlsec1, an accident since
+ # the contents of the schemas are the same,
+ # or something else, but it seems odd. And this works.
+ parentRoot = sdoc.documentElement
+ if parentRoot.tagName == "signed-credential" and parentRoot.hasAttributes():
+ for attrIx in range(0, parentRoot.attributes.length):
+ attr = parentRoot.attributes.item(attrIx)
+ # returns the old attribute of same name that was
+ # on the credential
+ # Below throws InUse exception if we forgot to clone the attribute first
+ oldAttr = signed_cred.setAttributeNode(attr.cloneNode(True))
+ if oldAttr and oldAttr.value != attr.value:
+ msg = "Delegating cred from owner %s to %s over %s replaced attribute %s value '%s' with '%s'" % (self.parent.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidObject.get_urn(), oldAttr.name, oldAttr.value, attr.value)
+ logger.warn(msg)
+ #raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Can't encode new valid delegated credential: %s" % msg)
+
+ p_cred = doc.importNode(sdoc.getElementsByTagName("credential")[0], True)
+ p = doc.createElement("parent")
+ p.appendChild(p_cred)
+ cred.appendChild(p)
+ # done handling parent credential
+
+ # Create the <signatures> tag
+ signatures = doc.createElement("signatures")
+ signed_cred.appendChild(signatures)
+
+ # Add any parent signatures
+ if self.parent:
+ for cur_cred in self.get_credential_list()[1:]:
+ sdoc = parseString(cur_cred.get_signature().get_xml())
+ ele = doc.importNode(sdoc.getElementsByTagName("Signature")[0], True)
+ signatures.appendChild(ele)
+
+ # Get the finished product
+ self.xml = doc.toxml()
+
+
+ def save_to_random_tmp_file(self):
+ fp, filename = mkstemp(suffix='cred', text=True)
+ fp = os.fdopen(fp, "w")
+ self.save_to_file(filename, save_parents=True, filep=fp)
+ return filename
+
+ def save_to_file(self, filename, save_parents=True, filep=None):
+ if not self.xml:
+ self.encode()
+ if filep:
+ f = filep
+ else:
+ f = open(filename, "w")
+ f.write(self.xml)
+ f.close()
+
+ def save_to_string(self, save_parents=True):
+ if not self.xml:
+ self.encode()
+ return self.xml
+
+ def get_refid(self):
+ if not self.refid:
+ self.refid = 'ref0'
+ return self.refid
+
+ def set_refid(self, rid):
+ self.refid = rid
+
+ ##
+ # Figure out what refids exist, and update this credential's id
+ # so that it doesn't clobber the others. Returns the refids of
+ # the parents.
+
+ def updateRefID(self):
+ if not self.parent:
+ self.set_refid('ref0')
+ return []
+
+ refs = []
+
+ next_cred = self.parent
+ while next_cred:
+ refs.append(next_cred.get_refid())
+ if next_cred.parent:
+ next_cred = next_cred.parent
+ else:
+ next_cred = None
+
+
+ # Find a unique refid for this credential
+ rid = self.get_refid()
+ while rid in refs:
+ val = int(rid[3:])
+ rid = "ref%d" % (val + 1)
+
+ # Set the new refid
+ self.set_refid(rid)
+
+ # Return the set of parent credential ref ids
+ return refs
+
+ def get_xml(self):
+ if not self.xml:
+ self.encode()
+ return self.xml
+
+ ##
+ # Sign the XML file created by encode()
+ #
+ # WARNING:
+ # In general, a signed credential obtained externally should
+ # not be changed else the signature is no longer valid. So, once
+ # you have loaded an existing signed credential, do not call encode() or sign() on it.
+
+ def sign(self):
+ if not self.issuer_privkey or not self.issuer_gid:
+ return
+ doc = parseString(self.get_xml())
+ sigs = doc.getElementsByTagName("signatures")[0]
+
+ # Create the signature template to be signed
+ signature = Signature()
+ signature.set_refid(self.get_refid())
+ sdoc = parseString(signature.get_xml())
+ sig_ele = doc.importNode(sdoc.getElementsByTagName("Signature")[0], True)
+ sigs.appendChild(sig_ele)
+
+ self.xml = doc.toxml()
+
+
+ # Split the issuer GID into multiple certificates if it's a chain
+ chain = GID(filename=self.issuer_gid)
+ gid_files = []
+ while chain:
+ gid_files.append(chain.save_to_random_tmp_file(False))
+ if chain.get_parent():
+ chain = chain.get_parent()
+ else:
+ chain = None
+
+
+ # Call out to xmlsec1 to sign it
+ ref = 'Sig_%s' % self.get_refid()
+ filename = self.save_to_random_tmp_file()
+ signed = os.popen('%s --sign --node-id "%s" --privkey-pem %s,%s %s' \
+ % (self.xmlsec_path, ref, self.issuer_privkey, ",".join(gid_files), filename)).read()
+ os.remove(filename)
+
+ for gid_file in gid_files:
+ os.remove(gid_file)
+
+ self.xml = signed
+
+ # This is no longer a legacy credential
+ if self.legacy:
+ self.legacy = None
+
+ # Update signatures
+ self.decode()
+
+
+ ##
+ # Retrieve the attributes of the credential from the XML.
+ # This is automatically called by the various get_* methods of
+ # this class and should not need to be called explicitly.
+
+ def decode(self):
+ if not self.xml:
+ return
+ doc = parseString(self.xml)
+ sigs = []
+ signed_cred = doc.getElementsByTagName("signed-credential")
+
+ # Is this a signed-cred or just a cred?
+ if len(signed_cred) > 0:
+ creds = signed_cred[0].getElementsByTagName("credential")
+ signatures = signed_cred[0].getElementsByTagName("signatures")
+ if len(signatures) > 0:
+ sigs = signatures[0].getElementsByTagName("Signature")
+ else:
+ creds = doc.getElementsByTagName("credential")
+
+ if creds is None or len(creds) == 0:
+ # malformed cred file
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Malformed XML: No credential tag found")
+
+ # Just take the first cred if there are more than one
+ cred = creds[0]
+
+ self.set_refid(cred.getAttribute("xml:id"))
+ self.set_expiration(utcparse(getTextNode(cred, "expires")))
+ self.gidCaller = GID(string=getTextNode(cred, "owner_gid"))
+ self.gidObject = GID(string=getTextNode(cred, "target_gid"))
+
+
+ # Process privileges
+ privs = cred.getElementsByTagName("privileges")[0]
+ rlist = Rights()
+ for priv in privs.getElementsByTagName("privilege"):
+ kind = getTextNode(priv, "name")
+ deleg = str2bool(getTextNode(priv, "can_delegate"))
+ if kind == '*':
+ # Convert * into the default privileges for the credential's type
+ # Each inherits the delegatability from the * above
+ _ , type = urn_to_hrn(self.gidObject.get_urn())
+ rl = determine_rights(type, self.gidObject.get_urn())
+ for r in rl.rights:
+ r.delegate = deleg
+ rlist.add(r)
+ else:
+ rlist.add(Right(kind.strip(), deleg))
+ self.set_privileges(rlist)
+
+
+ # Is there a parent?
+ parent = cred.getElementsByTagName("parent")
+ if len(parent) > 0:
+ parent_doc = parent[0].getElementsByTagName("credential")[0]
+ parent_xml = parent_doc.toxml()
+ self.parent = Credential(string=parent_xml)
+ self.updateRefID()
+
+ # Assign the signatures to the credentials
+ for sig in sigs:
+ Sig = Signature(string=sig.toxml())
+
+ for cur_cred in self.get_credential_list():
+ if cur_cred.get_refid() == Sig.get_refid():
+ cur_cred.set_signature(Sig)
+
+
+ ##
+ # Verify
+ # trusted_certs: A list of trusted GID filenames (not GID objects!)
+ # Chaining is not supported within the GIDs by xmlsec1.
+ #
+ # trusted_certs_required: Should usually be true. Set False means an
+ # empty list of trusted_certs would still let this method pass.
+ # It just skips xmlsec1 verification et al. Only used by some utils
+ #
+ # Verify that:
+ # . All of the signatures are valid and that the issuers trace back
+ # to trusted roots (performed by xmlsec1)
+ # . The XML matches the credential schema
+ # . That the issuer of the credential is the authority in the target's urn
+ # . In the case of a delegated credential, this must be true of the root
+ # . That all of the gids presented in the credential are valid
+ # . Including verifying GID chains, and includ the issuer
+ # . The credential is not expired
+ #
+ # -- For Delegates (credentials with parents)
+ # . The privileges must be a subset of the parent credentials
+ # . The privileges must have "can_delegate" set for each delegated privilege
+ # . The target gid must be the same between child and parents
+ # . The expiry time on the child must be no later than the parent
+ # . The signer of the child must be the owner of the parent
+ #
+ # -- Verify does *NOT*
+ # . ensure that an xmlrpc client's gid matches a credential gid, that
+ # must be done elsewhere
+ #
+ # @param trusted_certs: The certificates of trusted CA certificates
+ def verify(self, trusted_certs=None, schema=None, trusted_certs_required=True):
+ if not self.xml:
+ self.decode()
+
+ # validate against RelaxNG schema
+ if HAVELXML and not self.legacy:
+ if schema and os.path.exists(schema):
+ tree = etree.parse(StringIO(self.xml))
+ schema_doc = etree.parse(schema)
+ xmlschema = etree.XMLSchema(schema_doc)
+ if not xmlschema.validate(tree):
+ error = xmlschema.error_log.last_error
+ message = "%s: %s (line %s)" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), error.message, error.line)
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable(message)
+
+ if trusted_certs_required and trusted_certs is None:
+ trusted_certs = []
+
+# trusted_cert_objects = [GID(filename=f) for f in trusted_certs]
+ trusted_cert_objects = []
+ ok_trusted_certs = []
+ # If caller explicitly passed in None that means skip cert chain validation.
+ # Strange and not typical
+ if trusted_certs is not None:
+ for f in trusted_certs:
+ try:
+ # Failures here include unreadable files
+ # or non PEM files
+ trusted_cert_objects.append(GID(filename=f))
+ ok_trusted_certs.append(f)
+ except Exception, exc:
+ logger.error("Failed to load trusted cert from %s: %r", f, exc)
+ trusted_certs = ok_trusted_certs
+
+ # Use legacy verification if this is a legacy credential
+ if self.legacy:
+ self.legacy.verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
+ if self.legacy.client_gid:
+ self.legacy.client_gid.verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
+ if self.legacy.object_gid:
+ self.legacy.object_gid.verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
+ return True
+
+ # make sure it is not expired
+ if self.get_expiration() < datetime.datetime.utcnow():
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Credential %s expired at %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), self.expiration.isoformat()))
+
+ # Verify the signatures
+ filename = self.save_to_random_tmp_file()
+ if trusted_certs is not None:
+ cert_args = " ".join(['--trusted-pem %s' % x for x in trusted_certs])
+
+ # If caller explicitly passed in None that means skip cert chain validation.
+ # - Strange and not typical
+ if trusted_certs is not None:
+ # Verify the gids of this cred and of its parents
+ for cur_cred in self.get_credential_list():
+ cur_cred.get_gid_object().verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
+ cur_cred.get_gid_caller().verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
+
+ refs = []
+ refs.append("Sig_%s" % self.get_refid())
+
+ parentRefs = self.updateRefID()
+ for ref in parentRefs:
+ refs.append("Sig_%s" % ref)
+
+ for ref in refs:
+ # If caller explicitly passed in None that means skip xmlsec1 validation.
+ # Strange and not typical
+ if trusted_certs is None:
+ break
+
+# print "Doing %s --verify --node-id '%s' %s %s 2>&1" % \
+# (self.xmlsec_path, ref, cert_args, filename)
+ verified = os.popen('%s --verify --node-id "%s" %s %s 2>&1' \
+ % (self.xmlsec_path, ref, cert_args, filename)).read()
+ if not verified.strip().startswith("OK"):
+ # xmlsec errors have a msg= which is the interesting bit.
+ mstart = verified.find("msg=")
+ msg = ""
+ if mstart > -1 and len(verified) > 4:
+ mstart = mstart + 4
+ mend = verified.find('\\', mstart)
+ msg = verified[mstart:mend]
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("xmlsec1 error verifying cred %s using Signature ID %s: %s %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), ref, msg, verified.strip()))
+ os.remove(filename)
+
+ # Verify the parents (delegation)
+ if self.parent:
+ self.verify_parent(self.parent)
+
+ # Make sure the issuer is the target's authority, and is
+ # itself a valid GID
+ self.verify_issuer(trusted_cert_objects)
+ return True
+
+ ##
+ # Creates a list of the credential and its parents, with the root
+ # (original delegated credential) as the last item in the list
+ def get_credential_list(self):
+ cur_cred = self
+ list = []
+ while cur_cred:
+ list.append(cur_cred)
+ if cur_cred.parent:
+ cur_cred = cur_cred.parent
+ else:
+ cur_cred = None
+ return list
+
+ ##
+ # Make sure the credential's target gid (a) was signed by or (b)
+ # is the same as the entity that signed the original credential,
+ # or (c) is an authority over the target's namespace.
+ # Also ensure that the credential issuer / signer itself has a valid
+ # GID signature chain (signed by an authority with namespace rights).
+ def verify_issuer(self, trusted_gids):
+ root_cred = self.get_credential_list()[-1]
+ root_target_gid = root_cred.get_gid_object()
+ root_cred_signer = root_cred.get_signature().get_issuer_gid()
+
+ # Case 1:
+ # Allow non authority to sign target and cred about target.
+ #
+ # Why do we need to allow non authorities to sign?
+ # If in the target gid validation step we correctly
+ # checked that the target is only signed by an authority,
+ # then this is just a special case of case 3.
+ # This short-circuit is the common case currently -
+ # and cause GID validation doesn't check 'authority',
+ # this allows users to generate valid slice credentials.
+ if root_target_gid.is_signed_by_cert(root_cred_signer):
+ # cred signer matches target signer, return success
+ return
+
+ # Case 2:
+ # Allow someone to sign credential about themeselves. Used?
+ # If not, remove this.
+ #root_target_gid_str = root_target_gid.save_to_string()
+ #root_cred_signer_str = root_cred_signer.save_to_string()
+ #if root_target_gid_str == root_cred_signer_str:
+ # # cred signer is target, return success
+ # return
+
+ # Case 3:
+
+ # root_cred_signer is not the target_gid
+ # So this is a different gid that we have not verified.
+ # xmlsec1 verified the cert chain on this already, but
+ # it hasn't verified that the gid meets the HRN namespace
+ # requirements.
+ # Below we'll ensure that it is an authority.
+ # But we haven't verified that it is _signed by_ an authority
+ # We also don't know if xmlsec1 requires that cert signers
+ # are marked as CAs.
+
+ # Note that if verify() gave us no trusted_gids then this
+ # call will fail. So skip it if we have no trusted_gids
+ if trusted_gids and len(trusted_gids) > 0:
+ root_cred_signer.verify_chain(trusted_gids)
+ else:
+ logger.debug("No trusted gids. Cannot verify that cred signer is signed by a trusted authority. Skipping that check.")
+
+ # See if the signer is an authority over the domain of the target.
+ # There are multiple types of authority - accept them all here
+ # Maybe should be (hrn, type) = urn_to_hrn(root_cred_signer.get_urn())
+ root_cred_signer_type = root_cred_signer.get_type()
+ if (root_cred_signer_type.find('authority') == 0):
+ #logger.debug('Cred signer is an authority')
+ # signer is an authority, see if target is in authority's domain
+ signerhrn = root_cred_signer.get_hrn()
+ if hrn_authfor_hrn(signerhrn, root_target_gid.get_hrn()):
+ return
+
+ # We've required that the credential be signed by an authority
+ # for that domain. Reasonable and probably correct.
+ # A looser model would also allow the signer to be an authority
+ # in my control framework - eg My CA or CH. Even if it is not
+ # the CH that issued these, eg, user credentials.
+
+ # Give up, credential does not pass issuer verification
+
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Could not verify credential owned by %s for object %s. Cred signer %s not the trusted authority for Cred target %s" % (self.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidObject.get_urn(), root_cred_signer.get_hrn(), root_target_gid.get_hrn()))
+
+
+ ##
+ # -- For Delegates (credentials with parents) verify that:
+ # . The privileges must be a subset of the parent credentials
+ # . The privileges must have "can_delegate" set for each delegated privilege
+ # . The target gid must be the same between child and parents
+ # . The expiry time on the child must be no later than the parent
+ # . The signer of the child must be the owner of the parent
+ def verify_parent(self, parent_cred):
+ # make sure the rights given to the child are a subset of the
+ # parents rights (and check delegate bits)
+ if not parent_cred.get_privileges().is_superset(self.get_privileges()):
+ raise ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent(("Parent cred ref %s rights " % parent_cred.get_refid()) +
+ self.parent.get_privileges().save_to_string() + (" not superset of delegated cred %s ref %s rights " % (self.get_summary_tostring(), self.get_refid())) +
+ self.get_privileges().save_to_string())
+
+ # make sure my target gid is the same as the parent's
+ if not parent_cred.get_gid_object().save_to_string() == \
+ self.get_gid_object().save_to_string():
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated cred %s: Target gid not equal between parent and child. Parent %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), parent_cred.get_summary_tostring()))
+
+ # make sure my expiry time is <= my parent's
+ if not parent_cred.get_expiration() >= self.get_expiration():
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated credential %s expires after parent %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), parent_cred.get_summary_tostring()))
+
+ # make sure my signer is the parent's caller
+ if not parent_cred.get_gid_caller().save_to_string(False) == \
+ self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().save_to_string(False):
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated credential %s not signed by parent %s's caller" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), parent_cred.get_summary_tostring()))
+
+ # Recurse
+ if parent_cred.parent:
+ parent_cred.verify_parent(parent_cred.parent)
+
+
+ def delegate(self, delegee_gidfile, caller_keyfile, caller_gidfile):
+ """
+ Return a delegated copy of this credential, delegated to the
+ specified gid's user.
+ """
+ # get the gid of the object we are delegating
+ object_gid = self.get_gid_object()
+ object_hrn = object_gid.get_hrn()
+
+ # the hrn of the user who will be delegated to
+ delegee_gid = GID(filename=delegee_gidfile)
+ delegee_hrn = delegee_gid.get_hrn()
+
+ #user_key = Keypair(filename=keyfile)
+ #user_hrn = self.get_gid_caller().get_hrn()
+ subject_string = "%s delegated to %s" % (object_hrn, delegee_hrn)
+ dcred = Credential(subject=subject_string)
+ dcred.set_gid_caller(delegee_gid)
+ dcred.set_gid_object(object_gid)
+ dcred.set_parent(self)
+ dcred.set_expiration(self.get_expiration())
+ dcred.set_privileges(self.get_privileges())
+ dcred.get_privileges().delegate_all_privileges(True)
+ #dcred.set_issuer_keys(keyfile, delegee_gidfile)
+ dcred.set_issuer_keys(caller_keyfile, caller_gidfile)
+ dcred.encode()
+ dcred.sign()
+
+ return dcred
+
+ # only informative
+ def get_filename(self):
+ return getattr(self,'filename',None)
+
+ ##
+ # Dump the contents of a credential to stdout in human-readable format
+ #
+ # @param dump_parents If true, also dump the parent certificates
+ def dump (self, *args, **kwargs):
+ print self.dump_string(*args, **kwargs)
+
+
+ def dump_string(self, dump_parents=False):
+ result=""
+ result += "CREDENTIAL %s\n" % self.get_subject()
+ filename=self.get_filename()
+ if filename: result += "Filename %s\n"%filename
+ result += " privs: %s\n" % self.get_privileges().save_to_string()
+ gidCaller = self.get_gid_caller()
+ if gidCaller:
+ result += " gidCaller:\n"
+ result += gidCaller.dump_string(8, dump_parents)
+
+ if self.get_signature():
+ print " gidIssuer:"
+ self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().dump(8, dump_parents)
+
+ gidObject = self.get_gid_object()
+ if gidObject:
+ result += " gidObject:\n"
+ result += gidObject.dump_string(8, dump_parents)
+
+ if self.parent and dump_parents:
+ result += "\nPARENT"
+ result += self.parent.dump_string(True)
+
+ return result
-#----------------------------------------------------------------------\r
-# Copyright (c) 2008 Board of Trustees, Princeton University\r
-#\r
-# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining\r
-# a copy of this software and/or hardware specification (the "Work") to\r
-# deal in the Work without restriction, including without limitation the\r
-# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,\r
-# and/or sell copies of the Work, and to permit persons to whom the Work\r
-# is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:\r
-#\r
-# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be\r
-# included in all copies or substantial portions of the Work.\r
-#\r
-# THE WORK IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS \r
-# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF \r
-# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND \r
-# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT \r
-# HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, \r
-# WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, \r
-# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORK OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS \r
-# IN THE WORK.\r
-#----------------------------------------------------------------------\r
-##\r
-# Implements SFA Credentials\r
-#\r
-# Credentials are layered on top of certificates, and are essentially a\r
-# certificate that stores a tuple of parameters.\r
-##\r
-\r
-\r
-import xmlrpclib\r
-\r
-from sfa.util.faults import MissingDelegateBit, ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent\r
-from sfa.trust.certificate import Certificate\r
-from sfa.trust.gid import GID\r
-\r
-##\r
-# Credential is a tuple:\r
-# (GIDCaller, GIDObject, LifeTime, Privileges, Delegate)\r
-#\r
-# These fields are encoded using xmlrpc into the subjectAltName field of the\r
-# x509 certificate. Note: Call encode() once the fields have been filled in\r
-# to perform this encoding.\r
-\r
-class CredentialLegacy(Certificate):\r
- gidCaller = None\r
- gidObject = None\r
- lifeTime = None\r
- privileges = None\r
- delegate = False\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Create a Credential object\r
- #\r
- # @param create If true, create a blank x509 certificate\r
- # @param subject If subject!=None, create an x509 cert with the subject name\r
- # @param string If string!=None, load the credential from the string\r
- # @param filename If filename!=None, load the credential from the file\r
-\r
- def __init__(self, create=False, subject=None, string=None, filename=None):\r
- Certificate.__init__(self, create, subject, string, filename)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # set the GID of the caller\r
- #\r
- # @param gid GID object of the caller\r
-\r
- def set_gid_caller(self, gid):\r
- self.gidCaller = gid\r
- # gid origin caller is the caller's gid by default\r
- self.gidOriginCaller = gid\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # get the GID of the object\r
-\r
- def get_gid_caller(self):\r
- if not self.gidCaller:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.gidCaller\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # set the GID of the object\r
- #\r
- # @param gid GID object of the object\r
-\r
- def set_gid_object(self, gid):\r
- self.gidObject = gid\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # get the GID of the object\r
-\r
- def get_gid_object(self):\r
- if not self.gidObject:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.gidObject\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # set the lifetime of this credential\r
- #\r
- # @param lifetime lifetime of credential\r
-\r
- def set_lifetime(self, lifeTime):\r
- self.lifeTime = lifeTime\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # get the lifetime of the credential\r
-\r
- def get_lifetime(self):\r
- if not self.lifeTime:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.lifeTime\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # set the delegate bit\r
- #\r
- # @param delegate boolean (True or False)\r
-\r
- def set_delegate(self, delegate):\r
- self.delegate = delegate\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # get the delegate bit\r
-\r
- def get_delegate(self):\r
- if not self.delegate:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.delegate\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # set the privileges\r
- #\r
- # @param privs either a comma-separated list of privileges of a Rights object\r
-\r
- def set_privileges(self, privs):\r
- if isinstance(privs, str):\r
- self.privileges = Rights(string = privs)\r
- else:\r
- self.privileges = privs\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # return the privileges as a Rights object\r
-\r
- def get_privileges(self):\r
- if not self.privileges:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.privileges\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # determine whether the credential allows a particular operation to be\r
- # performed\r
- #\r
- # @param op_name string specifying name of operation ("lookup", "update", etc)\r
-\r
- def can_perform(self, op_name):\r
- rights = self.get_privileges()\r
- if not rights:\r
- return False\r
- return rights.can_perform(op_name)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Encode the attributes of the credential into a string and store that\r
- # string in the alt-subject-name field of the X509 object. This should be\r
- # done immediately before signing the credential.\r
-\r
- def encode(self):\r
- dict = {"gidCaller": None,\r
- "gidObject": None,\r
- "lifeTime": self.lifeTime,\r
- "privileges": None,\r
- "delegate": self.delegate}\r
- if self.gidCaller:\r
- dict["gidCaller"] = self.gidCaller.save_to_string(save_parents=True)\r
- if self.gidObject:\r
- dict["gidObject"] = self.gidObject.save_to_string(save_parents=True)\r
- if self.privileges:\r
- dict["privileges"] = self.privileges.save_to_string()\r
- str = xmlrpclib.dumps((dict,), allow_none=True)\r
- self.set_data('URI:http://' + str)\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Retrieve the attributes of the credential from the alt-subject-name field\r
- # of the X509 certificate. This is automatically done by the various\r
- # get_* methods of this class and should not need to be called explicitly.\r
-\r
- def decode(self):\r
- data = self.get_data().lstrip('URI:http://')\r
- \r
- if data:\r
- dict = xmlrpclib.loads(data)[0][0]\r
- else:\r
- dict = {}\r
-\r
- self.lifeTime = dict.get("lifeTime", None)\r
- self.delegate = dict.get("delegate", None)\r
-\r
- privStr = dict.get("privileges", None)\r
- if privStr:\r
- self.privileges = Rights(string = privStr)\r
- else:\r
- self.privileges = None\r
-\r
- gidCallerStr = dict.get("gidCaller", None)\r
- if gidCallerStr:\r
- self.gidCaller = GID(string=gidCallerStr)\r
- else:\r
- self.gidCaller = None\r
-\r
- gidObjectStr = dict.get("gidObject", None)\r
- if gidObjectStr:\r
- self.gidObject = GID(string=gidObjectStr)\r
- else:\r
- self.gidObject = None\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Verify that a chain of credentials is valid (see cert.py:verify). In\r
- # addition to the checks for ordinary certificates, verification also\r
- # ensures that the delegate bit was set by each parent in the chain. If\r
- # a delegate bit was not set, then an exception is thrown.\r
- #\r
- # Each credential must be a subset of the rights of the parent.\r
-\r
- def verify_chain(self, trusted_certs = None):\r
- # do the normal certificate verification stuff\r
- Certificate.verify_chain(self, trusted_certs)\r
-\r
- if self.parent:\r
- # make sure the parent delegated rights to the child\r
- if not self.parent.get_delegate():\r
- raise MissingDelegateBit(self.parent.get_subject())\r
-\r
- # make sure the rights given to the child are a subset of the\r
- # parents rights\r
- if not self.parent.get_privileges().is_superset(self.get_privileges()):\r
- raise ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent(self.get_subject() \r
- + " " + self.parent.get_privileges().save_to_string()\r
- + " " + self.get_privileges().save_to_string())\r
-\r
- return\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Dump the contents of a credential to stdout in human-readable format\r
- #\r
- # @param dump_parents If true, also dump the parent certificates\r
-\r
- def dump(self, *args, **kwargs):\r
- print self.dump_string(*args,**kwargs)\r
-\r
- def dump_string(self, dump_parents=False):\r
- result=""\r
- result += "CREDENTIAL %s\n" % self.get_subject()\r
-\r
- result += " privs: %s\n" % self.get_privileges().save_to_string()\r
-\r
- gidCaller = self.get_gid_caller()\r
- if gidCaller:\r
- result += " gidCaller:\n"\r
- gidCaller.dump(8, dump_parents)\r
-\r
- gidObject = self.get_gid_object()\r
- if gidObject:\r
- result += " gidObject:\n"\r
- result += gidObject.dump_string(8, dump_parents)\r
-\r
- result += " delegate: %s" % self.get_delegate()\r
-\r
- if self.parent and dump_parents:\r
- result += "PARENT\n"\r
- result += self.parent.dump_string(dump_parents)\r
-\r
- return result\r
+#----------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Copyright (c) 2008 Board of Trustees, Princeton University
+#
+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+# a copy of this software and/or hardware specification (the "Work") to
+# deal in the Work without restriction, including without limitation the
+# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
+# and/or sell copies of the Work, and to permit persons to whom the Work
+# is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+#
+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+# included in all copies or substantial portions of the Work.
+#
+# THE WORK IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT
+# HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
+# WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORK OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
+# IN THE WORK.
+#----------------------------------------------------------------------
+##
+# Implements SFA Credentials
+#
+# Credentials are layered on top of certificates, and are essentially a
+# certificate that stores a tuple of parameters.
+##
+
+
+import xmlrpclib
+
+from sfa.util.faults import MissingDelegateBit, ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent
+from sfa.trust.certificate import Certificate
+from sfa.trust.gid import GID
+
+##
+# Credential is a tuple:
+# (GIDCaller, GIDObject, LifeTime, Privileges, Delegate)
+#
+# These fields are encoded using xmlrpc into the subjectAltName field of the
+# x509 certificate. Note: Call encode() once the fields have been filled in
+# to perform this encoding.
+
+class CredentialLegacy(Certificate):
+ gidCaller = None
+ gidObject = None
+ lifeTime = None
+ privileges = None
+ delegate = False
+
+ ##
+ # Create a Credential object
+ #
+ # @param create If true, create a blank x509 certificate
+ # @param subject If subject!=None, create an x509 cert with the subject name
+ # @param string If string!=None, load the credential from the string
+ # @param filename If filename!=None, load the credential from the file
+
+ def __init__(self, create=False, subject=None, string=None, filename=None):
+ Certificate.__init__(self, create, subject, string, filename)
+
+ ##
+ # set the GID of the caller
+ #
+ # @param gid GID object of the caller
+
+ def set_gid_caller(self, gid):
+ self.gidCaller = gid
+ # gid origin caller is the caller's gid by default
+ self.gidOriginCaller = gid
+
+ ##
+ # get the GID of the object
+
+ def get_gid_caller(self):
+ if not self.gidCaller:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.gidCaller
+
+ ##
+ # set the GID of the object
+ #
+ # @param gid GID object of the object
+
+ def set_gid_object(self, gid):
+ self.gidObject = gid
+
+ ##
+ # get the GID of the object
+
+ def get_gid_object(self):
+ if not self.gidObject:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.gidObject
+
+ ##
+ # set the lifetime of this credential
+ #
+ # @param lifetime lifetime of credential
+
+ def set_lifetime(self, lifeTime):
+ self.lifeTime = lifeTime
+
+ ##
+ # get the lifetime of the credential
+
+ def get_lifetime(self):
+ if not self.lifeTime:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.lifeTime
+
+ ##
+ # set the delegate bit
+ #
+ # @param delegate boolean (True or False)
+
+ def set_delegate(self, delegate):
+ self.delegate = delegate
+
+ ##
+ # get the delegate bit
+
+ def get_delegate(self):
+ if not self.delegate:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.delegate
+
+ ##
+ # set the privileges
+ #
+ # @param privs either a comma-separated list of privileges of a Rights object
+
+ def set_privileges(self, privs):
+ if isinstance(privs, str):
+ self.privileges = Rights(string = privs)
+ else:
+ self.privileges = privs
+
+ ##
+ # return the privileges as a Rights object
+
+ def get_privileges(self):
+ if not self.privileges:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.privileges
+
+ ##
+ # determine whether the credential allows a particular operation to be
+ # performed
+ #
+ # @param op_name string specifying name of operation ("lookup", "update", etc)
+
+ def can_perform(self, op_name):
+ rights = self.get_privileges()
+ if not rights:
+ return False
+ return rights.can_perform(op_name)
+
+ ##
+ # Encode the attributes of the credential into a string and store that
+ # string in the alt-subject-name field of the X509 object. This should be
+ # done immediately before signing the credential.
+
+ def encode(self):
+ dict = {"gidCaller": None,
+ "gidObject": None,
+ "lifeTime": self.lifeTime,
+ "privileges": None,
+ "delegate": self.delegate}
+ if self.gidCaller:
+ dict["gidCaller"] = self.gidCaller.save_to_string(save_parents=True)
+ if self.gidObject:
+ dict["gidObject"] = self.gidObject.save_to_string(save_parents=True)
+ if self.privileges:
+ dict["privileges"] = self.privileges.save_to_string()
+ str = xmlrpclib.dumps((dict,), allow_none=True)
+ self.set_data('URI:http://' + str)
+
+ ##
+ # Retrieve the attributes of the credential from the alt-subject-name field
+ # of the X509 certificate. This is automatically done by the various
+ # get_* methods of this class and should not need to be called explicitly.
+
+ def decode(self):
+ data = self.get_data().lstrip('URI:http://')
+
+ if data:
+ dict = xmlrpclib.loads(data)[0][0]
+ else:
+ dict = {}
+
+ self.lifeTime = dict.get("lifeTime", None)
+ self.delegate = dict.get("delegate", None)
+
+ privStr = dict.get("privileges", None)
+ if privStr:
+ self.privileges = Rights(string = privStr)
+ else:
+ self.privileges = None
+
+ gidCallerStr = dict.get("gidCaller", None)
+ if gidCallerStr:
+ self.gidCaller = GID(string=gidCallerStr)
+ else:
+ self.gidCaller = None
+
+ gidObjectStr = dict.get("gidObject", None)
+ if gidObjectStr:
+ self.gidObject = GID(string=gidObjectStr)
+ else:
+ self.gidObject = None
+
+ ##
+ # Verify that a chain of credentials is valid (see cert.py:verify). In
+ # addition to the checks for ordinary certificates, verification also
+ # ensures that the delegate bit was set by each parent in the chain. If
+ # a delegate bit was not set, then an exception is thrown.
+ #
+ # Each credential must be a subset of the rights of the parent.
+
+ def verify_chain(self, trusted_certs = None):
+ # do the normal certificate verification stuff
+ Certificate.verify_chain(self, trusted_certs)
+
+ if self.parent:
+ # make sure the parent delegated rights to the child
+ if not self.parent.get_delegate():
+ raise MissingDelegateBit(self.parent.get_subject())
+
+ # make sure the rights given to the child are a subset of the
+ # parents rights
+ if not self.parent.get_privileges().is_superset(self.get_privileges()):
+ raise ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent(self.get_subject()
+ + " " + self.parent.get_privileges().save_to_string()
+ + " " + self.get_privileges().save_to_string())
+
+ return
+
+ ##
+ # Dump the contents of a credential to stdout in human-readable format
+ #
+ # @param dump_parents If true, also dump the parent certificates
+
+ def dump(self, *args, **kwargs):
+ print self.dump_string(*args,**kwargs)
+
+ def dump_string(self, dump_parents=False):
+ result=""
+ result += "CREDENTIAL %s\n" % self.get_subject()
+
+ result += " privs: %s\n" % self.get_privileges().save_to_string()
+
+ gidCaller = self.get_gid_caller()
+ if gidCaller:
+ result += " gidCaller:\n"
+ gidCaller.dump(8, dump_parents)
+
+ gidObject = self.get_gid_object()
+ if gidObject:
+ result += " gidObject:\n"
+ result += gidObject.dump_string(8, dump_parents)
+
+ result += " delegate: %s" % self.get_delegate()
+
+ if self.parent and dump_parents:
+ result += "PARENT\n"
+ result += self.parent.dump_string(dump_parents)
+
+ return result
-#----------------------------------------------------------------------\r
-# Copyright (c) 2008 Board of Trustees, Princeton University\r
-#\r
-# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining\r
-# a copy of this software and/or hardware specification (the "Work") to\r
-# deal in the Work without restriction, including without limitation the\r
-# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,\r
-# and/or sell copies of the Work, and to permit persons to whom the Work\r
-# is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:\r
-#\r
-# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be\r
-# included in all copies or substantial portions of the Work.\r
-#\r
-# THE WORK IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS \r
-# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF \r
-# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND \r
-# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT \r
-# HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, \r
-# WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, \r
-# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORK OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS \r
-# IN THE WORK.\r
-#----------------------------------------------------------------------\r
-##\r
-# Implements SFA GID. GIDs are based on certificates, and the GID class is a\r
-# descendant of the certificate class.\r
-##\r
-\r
-import xmlrpclib\r
-import uuid\r
-\r
-from sfa.trust.certificate import Certificate\r
-\r
-from sfa.util.faults import GidInvalidParentHrn, GidParentHrn\r
-from sfa.util.sfalogging import logger\r
-from sfa.util.xrn import hrn_to_urn, urn_to_hrn, hrn_authfor_hrn\r
-\r
-##\r
-# Create a new uuid. Returns the UUID as a string.\r
-\r
-def create_uuid():\r
- return str(uuid.uuid4().int)\r
-\r
-##\r
-# GID is a tuple:\r
-# (uuid, urn, public_key)\r
-#\r
-# UUID is a unique identifier and is created by the python uuid module\r
-# (or the utility function create_uuid() in gid.py).\r
-#\r
-# HRN is a human readable name. It is a dotted form similar to a backward domain\r
-# name. For example, planetlab.us.arizona.bakers.\r
-#\r
-# URN is a human readable identifier of form:\r
-# "urn:publicid:IDN+toplevelauthority[:sub-auth.]*[\res. type]\ +object name"\r
-# For example, urn:publicid:IDN+planetlab:us:arizona+user+bakers \r
-#\r
-# PUBLIC_KEY is the public key of the principal identified by the UUID/HRN.\r
-# It is a Keypair object as defined in the cert.py module.\r
-#\r
-# It is expected that there is a one-to-one pairing between UUIDs and HRN,\r
-# but it is uncertain how this would be inforced or if it needs to be enforced.\r
-#\r
-# These fields are encoded using xmlrpc into the subjectAltName field of the\r
-# x509 certificate. Note: Call encode() once the fields have been filled in\r
-# to perform this encoding.\r
-\r
-\r
-class GID(Certificate):\r
- uuid = None\r
- hrn = None\r
- urn = None\r
- email = None # for adding to the SubjectAltName\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Create a new GID object\r
- #\r
- # @param create If true, create the X509 certificate\r
- # @param subject If subject!=None, create the X509 cert and set the subject name\r
- # @param string If string!=None, load the GID from a string\r
- # @param filename If filename!=None, load the GID from a file\r
- # @param lifeDays life of GID in days - default is 1825==5 years\r
-\r
- def __init__(self, create=False, subject=None, string=None, filename=None, uuid=None, hrn=None, urn=None, lifeDays=1825):\r
- \r
- Certificate.__init__(self, lifeDays, create, subject, string, filename)\r
- if subject:\r
- logger.debug("Creating GID for subject: %s" % subject)\r
- if uuid:\r
- self.uuid = int(uuid)\r
- if hrn:\r
- self.hrn = hrn\r
- self.urn = hrn_to_urn(hrn, 'unknown')\r
- if urn:\r
- self.urn = urn\r
- self.hrn, type = urn_to_hrn(urn)\r
-\r
- def set_uuid(self, uuid):\r
- if isinstance(uuid, str):\r
- self.uuid = int(uuid)\r
- else:\r
- self.uuid = uuid\r
-\r
- def get_uuid(self):\r
- if not self.uuid:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.uuid\r
-\r
- def set_hrn(self, hrn):\r
- self.hrn = hrn\r
-\r
- def get_hrn(self):\r
- if not self.hrn:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.hrn\r
-\r
- def set_urn(self, urn):\r
- self.urn = urn\r
- self.hrn, type = urn_to_hrn(urn)\r
- \r
- def get_urn(self):\r
- if not self.urn:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.urn \r
-\r
- # Will be stuffed into subjectAltName\r
- def set_email(self, email):\r
- self.email = email\r
-\r
- def get_email(self):\r
- if not self.email:\r
- self.decode()\r
- return self.email\r
-\r
- def get_type(self):\r
- if not self.urn:\r
- self.decode()\r
- _, t = urn_to_hrn(self.urn)\r
- return t\r
- \r
- ##\r
- # Encode the GID fields and package them into the subject-alt-name field\r
- # of the X509 certificate. This must be called prior to signing the\r
- # certificate. It may only be called once per certificate.\r
-\r
- def encode(self):\r
- if self.urn:\r
- urn = self.urn\r
- else:\r
- urn = hrn_to_urn(self.hrn, None)\r
- \r
- str = "URI:" + urn\r
-\r
- if self.uuid:\r
- str += ", " + "URI:" + uuid.UUID(int=self.uuid).urn\r
- \r
- if self.email:\r
- str += ", " + "email:" + self.email\r
-\r
- self.set_data(str, 'subjectAltName')\r
-\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Decode the subject-alt-name field of the X509 certificate into the\r
- # fields of the GID. This is automatically called by the various get_*()\r
- # functions in this class.\r
-\r
- def decode(self):\r
- data = self.get_data('subjectAltName')\r
- dict = {}\r
- if data:\r
- if data.lower().startswith('uri:http://<params>'):\r
- dict = xmlrpclib.loads(data[11:])[0][0]\r
- else:\r
- spl = data.split(', ')\r
- for val in spl:\r
- if val.lower().startswith('uri:urn:uuid:'):\r
- dict['uuid'] = uuid.UUID(val[4:]).int\r
- elif val.lower().startswith('uri:urn:publicid:idn+'):\r
- dict['urn'] = val[4:]\r
- elif val.lower().startswith('email:'):\r
- # FIXME: Ensure there isn't cruft in that address...\r
- # EG look for email:copy,....\r
- dict['email'] = val[6:]\r
- \r
- self.uuid = dict.get("uuid", None)\r
- self.urn = dict.get("urn", None)\r
- self.hrn = dict.get("hrn", None)\r
- self.email = dict.get("email", None)\r
- if self.urn:\r
- self.hrn = urn_to_hrn(self.urn)[0]\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Dump the credential to stdout.\r
- #\r
- # @param indent specifies a number of spaces to indent the output\r
- # @param dump_parents If true, also dump the parents of the GID\r
-\r
- def dump(self, *args, **kwargs):\r
- print self.dump_string(*args,**kwargs)\r
-\r
- def dump_string(self, indent=0, dump_parents=False):\r
- result=" "*(indent-2) + "GID\n"\r
- result += " "*indent + "hrn:" + str(self.get_hrn()) +"\n"\r
- result += " "*indent + "urn:" + str(self.get_urn()) +"\n"\r
- result += " "*indent + "uuid:" + str(self.get_uuid()) + "\n"\r
- if self.get_email() is not None:\r
- result += " "*indent + "email:" + str(self.get_email()) + "\n"\r
- filename=self.get_filename()\r
- if filename: result += "Filename %s\n"%filename\r
-\r
- if self.parent and dump_parents:\r
- result += " "*indent + "parent:\n"\r
- result += self.parent.dump_string(indent+4, dump_parents)\r
- return result\r
-\r
- ##\r
- # Verify the chain of authenticity of the GID. First perform the checks\r
- # of the certificate class (verifying that each parent signs the child,\r
- # etc). In addition, GIDs also confirm that the parent's HRN is a prefix\r
- # of the child's HRN, and the parent is of type 'authority'.\r
- #\r
- # Verifying these prefixes prevents a rogue authority from signing a GID\r
- # for a principal that is not a member of that authority. For example,\r
- # planetlab.us.arizona cannot sign a GID for planetlab.us.princeton.foo.\r
-\r
- def verify_chain(self, trusted_certs = None):\r
- # do the normal certificate verification stuff\r
- trusted_root = Certificate.verify_chain(self, trusted_certs) \r
- \r
- if self.parent:\r
- # make sure the parent's hrn is a prefix of the child's hrn\r
- if not hrn_authfor_hrn(self.parent.get_hrn(), self.get_hrn()):\r
- raise GidParentHrn("This cert HRN %s isn't in the namespace for parent HRN %s" % (self.get_hrn(), self.parent.get_hrn()))\r
-\r
- # Parent must also be an authority (of some type) to sign a GID\r
- # There are multiple types of authority - accept them all here\r
- if not self.parent.get_type().find('authority') == 0:\r
- raise GidInvalidParentHrn("This cert %s's parent %s is not an authority (is a %s)" % (self.get_hrn(), self.parent.get_hrn(), self.parent.get_type()))\r
-\r
- # Then recurse up the chain - ensure the parent is a trusted\r
- # root or is in the namespace of a trusted root\r
- self.parent.verify_chain(trusted_certs)\r
- else:\r
- # make sure that the trusted root's hrn is a prefix of the child's\r
- trusted_gid = GID(string=trusted_root.save_to_string())\r
- trusted_type = trusted_gid.get_type()\r
- trusted_hrn = trusted_gid.get_hrn()\r
- #if trusted_type == 'authority':\r
- # trusted_hrn = trusted_hrn[:trusted_hrn.rindex('.')]\r
- cur_hrn = self.get_hrn()\r
- if not hrn_authfor_hrn(trusted_hrn, cur_hrn):\r
- raise GidParentHrn("Trusted root with HRN %s isn't a namespace authority for this cert: %s" % (trusted_hrn, cur_hrn))\r
-\r
- # There are multiple types of authority - accept them all here\r
- if not trusted_type.find('authority') == 0:\r
- raise GidInvalidParentHrn("This cert %s's trusted root signer %s is not an authority (is a %s)" % (self.get_hrn(), trusted_hrn, trusted_type))\r
-\r
- return\r
+#----------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Copyright (c) 2008 Board of Trustees, Princeton University
+#
+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+# a copy of this software and/or hardware specification (the "Work") to
+# deal in the Work without restriction, including without limitation the
+# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense,
+# and/or sell copies of the Work, and to permit persons to whom the Work
+# is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+#
+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+# included in all copies or substantial portions of the Work.
+#
+# THE WORK IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT
+# HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
+# WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORK OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
+# IN THE WORK.
+#----------------------------------------------------------------------
+##
+# Implements SFA GID. GIDs are based on certificates, and the GID class is a
+# descendant of the certificate class.
+##
+
+import xmlrpclib
+import uuid
+
+from sfa.trust.certificate import Certificate
+
+from sfa.util.faults import GidInvalidParentHrn, GidParentHrn
+from sfa.util.sfalogging import logger
+from sfa.util.xrn import hrn_to_urn, urn_to_hrn, hrn_authfor_hrn
+
+##
+# Create a new uuid. Returns the UUID as a string.
+
+def create_uuid():
+ return str(uuid.uuid4().int)
+
+##
+# GID is a tuple:
+# (uuid, urn, public_key)
+#
+# UUID is a unique identifier and is created by the python uuid module
+# (or the utility function create_uuid() in gid.py).
+#
+# HRN is a human readable name. It is a dotted form similar to a backward domain
+# name. For example, planetlab.us.arizona.bakers.
+#
+# URN is a human readable identifier of form:
+# "urn:publicid:IDN+toplevelauthority[:sub-auth.]*[\res. type]\ +object name"
+# For example, urn:publicid:IDN+planetlab:us:arizona+user+bakers
+#
+# PUBLIC_KEY is the public key of the principal identified by the UUID/HRN.
+# It is a Keypair object as defined in the cert.py module.
+#
+# It is expected that there is a one-to-one pairing between UUIDs and HRN,
+# but it is uncertain how this would be inforced or if it needs to be enforced.
+#
+# These fields are encoded using xmlrpc into the subjectAltName field of the
+# x509 certificate. Note: Call encode() once the fields have been filled in
+# to perform this encoding.
+
+
+class GID(Certificate):
+ uuid = None
+ hrn = None
+ urn = None
+ email = None # for adding to the SubjectAltName
+
+ ##
+ # Create a new GID object
+ #
+ # @param create If true, create the X509 certificate
+ # @param subject If subject!=None, create the X509 cert and set the subject name
+ # @param string If string!=None, load the GID from a string
+ # @param filename If filename!=None, load the GID from a file
+ # @param lifeDays life of GID in days - default is 1825==5 years
+
+ def __init__(self, create=False, subject=None, string=None, filename=None, uuid=None, hrn=None, urn=None, lifeDays=1825):
+
+ Certificate.__init__(self, lifeDays, create, subject, string, filename)
+ if subject:
+ logger.debug("Creating GID for subject: %s" % subject)
+ if uuid:
+ self.uuid = int(uuid)
+ if hrn:
+ self.hrn = hrn
+ self.urn = hrn_to_urn(hrn, 'unknown')
+ if urn:
+ self.urn = urn
+ self.hrn, type = urn_to_hrn(urn)
+
+ def set_uuid(self, uuid):
+ if isinstance(uuid, str):
+ self.uuid = int(uuid)
+ else:
+ self.uuid = uuid
+
+ def get_uuid(self):
+ if not self.uuid:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.uuid
+
+ def set_hrn(self, hrn):
+ self.hrn = hrn
+
+ def get_hrn(self):
+ if not self.hrn:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.hrn
+
+ def set_urn(self, urn):
+ self.urn = urn
+ self.hrn, type = urn_to_hrn(urn)
+
+ def get_urn(self):
+ if not self.urn:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.urn
+
+ # Will be stuffed into subjectAltName
+ def set_email(self, email):
+ self.email = email
+
+ def get_email(self):
+ if not self.email:
+ self.decode()
+ return self.email
+
+ def get_type(self):
+ if not self.urn:
+ self.decode()
+ _, t = urn_to_hrn(self.urn)
+ return t
+
+ ##
+ # Encode the GID fields and package them into the subject-alt-name field
+ # of the X509 certificate. This must be called prior to signing the
+ # certificate. It may only be called once per certificate.
+
+ def encode(self):
+ if self.urn:
+ urn = self.urn
+ else:
+ urn = hrn_to_urn(self.hrn, None)
+
+ str = "URI:" + urn
+
+ if self.uuid:
+ str += ", " + "URI:" + uuid.UUID(int=self.uuid).urn
+
+ if self.email:
+ str += ", " + "email:" + self.email
+
+ self.set_data(str, 'subjectAltName')
+
+
+ ##
+ # Decode the subject-alt-name field of the X509 certificate into the
+ # fields of the GID. This is automatically called by the various get_*()
+ # functions in this class.
+
+ def decode(self):
+ data = self.get_data('subjectAltName')
+ dict = {}
+ if data:
+ if data.lower().startswith('uri:http://<params>'):
+ dict = xmlrpclib.loads(data[11:])[0][0]
+ else:
+ spl = data.split(', ')
+ for val in spl:
+ if val.lower().startswith('uri:urn:uuid:'):
+ dict['uuid'] = uuid.UUID(val[4:]).int
+ elif val.lower().startswith('uri:urn:publicid:idn+'):
+ dict['urn'] = val[4:]
+ elif val.lower().startswith('email:'):
+ # FIXME: Ensure there isn't cruft in that address...
+ # EG look for email:copy,....
+ dict['email'] = val[6:]
+
+ self.uuid = dict.get("uuid", None)
+ self.urn = dict.get("urn", None)
+ self.hrn = dict.get("hrn", None)
+ self.email = dict.get("email", None)
+ if self.urn:
+ self.hrn = urn_to_hrn(self.urn)[0]
+
+ ##
+ # Dump the credential to stdout.
+ #
+ # @param indent specifies a number of spaces to indent the output
+ # @param dump_parents If true, also dump the parents of the GID
+
+ def dump(self, *args, **kwargs):
+ print self.dump_string(*args,**kwargs)
+
+ def dump_string(self, indent=0, dump_parents=False):
+ result=" "*(indent-2) + "GID\n"
+ result += " "*indent + "hrn:" + str(self.get_hrn()) +"\n"
+ result += " "*indent + "urn:" + str(self.get_urn()) +"\n"
+ result += " "*indent + "uuid:" + str(self.get_uuid()) + "\n"
+ if self.get_email() is not None:
+ result += " "*indent + "email:" + str(self.get_email()) + "\n"
+ filename=self.get_filename()
+ if filename: result += "Filename %s\n"%filename
+
+ if self.parent and dump_parents:
+ result += " "*indent + "parent:\n"
+ result += self.parent.dump_string(indent+4, dump_parents)
+ return result
+
+ ##
+ # Verify the chain of authenticity of the GID. First perform the checks
+ # of the certificate class (verifying that each parent signs the child,
+ # etc). In addition, GIDs also confirm that the parent's HRN is a prefix
+ # of the child's HRN, and the parent is of type 'authority'.
+ #
+ # Verifying these prefixes prevents a rogue authority from signing a GID
+ # for a principal that is not a member of that authority. For example,
+ # planetlab.us.arizona cannot sign a GID for planetlab.us.princeton.foo.
+
+ def verify_chain(self, trusted_certs = None):
+ # do the normal certificate verification stuff
+ trusted_root = Certificate.verify_chain(self, trusted_certs)
+
+ if self.parent:
+ # make sure the parent's hrn is a prefix of the child's hrn
+ if not hrn_authfor_hrn(self.parent.get_hrn(), self.get_hrn()):
+ raise GidParentHrn("This cert HRN %s isn't in the namespace for parent HRN %s" % (self.get_hrn(), self.parent.get_hrn()))
+
+ # Parent must also be an authority (of some type) to sign a GID
+ # There are multiple types of authority - accept them all here
+ if not self.parent.get_type().find('authority') == 0:
+ raise GidInvalidParentHrn("This cert %s's parent %s is not an authority (is a %s)" % (self.get_hrn(), self.parent.get_hrn(), self.parent.get_type()))
+
+ # Then recurse up the chain - ensure the parent is a trusted
+ # root or is in the namespace of a trusted root
+ self.parent.verify_chain(trusted_certs)
+ else:
+ # make sure that the trusted root's hrn is a prefix of the child's
+ trusted_gid = GID(string=trusted_root.save_to_string())
+ trusted_type = trusted_gid.get_type()
+ trusted_hrn = trusted_gid.get_hrn()
+ #if trusted_type == 'authority':
+ # trusted_hrn = trusted_hrn[:trusted_hrn.rindex('.')]
+ cur_hrn = self.get_hrn()
+ if not hrn_authfor_hrn(trusted_hrn, cur_hrn):
+ raise GidParentHrn("Trusted root with HRN %s isn't a namespace authority for this cert: %s" % (trusted_hrn, cur_hrn))
+
+ # There are multiple types of authority - accept them all here
+ if not trusted_type.find('authority') == 0:
+ raise GidInvalidParentHrn("This cert %s's trusted root signer %s is not an authority (is a %s)" % (self.get_hrn(), trusted_hrn, trusted_type))
+
+ return