From: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2012 21:18:46 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: stream-ssl: Seed OpenSSL if it fails to seed itself.
X-Git-Tag: sliver-openvswitch-1.8.90-0~48^2~70
X-Git-Url: http://git.onelab.eu/?p=sliver-openvswitch.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=47ebcf25ef6d1475b5e634d79218ad553f72fdcd

stream-ssl: Seed OpenSSL if it fails to seed itself.

We occasionally see OpenSSL fail to seed its random number generator in
heavily loaded hypervisors.  I suspect the following scenario:

1. OpenSSL calls read() to get 32 bytes from /dev/urandom.
2. The kernel generates 10 bytes of randomness and copies it out.
3. A signal arrives (perhaps SIGALRM).
4. The kernel interrupts the system call to service the signal.
5. Userspace gets 10 bytes of entropy.
6. OpenSSL doesn't read again to get the final 22 bytes.  Therefore
   OpenSSL doesn't have enough entropy to consider itself initialized.
   It never tries again, so we're stuck forever.

The only part I'm not entirely sure about is #6, because the OpenSSL code
is so hard to read.

Thanks to Alex Yip for suggesting that this might be a startup problem.

Bug #10164.
Reported-by: Ram Jothikumar <ram@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com>
---

diff --git a/lib/stream-ssl.c b/lib/stream-ssl.c
index 42690e481..b9b341073 100644
--- a/lib/stream-ssl.c
+++ b/lib/stream-ssl.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <netinet/tcp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include <poll.h>
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include "coverage.h"
 #include "dynamic-string.h"
+#include "entropy.h"
 #include "leak-checker.h"
 #include "ofpbuf.h"
 #include "openflow/openflow.h"
@@ -900,6 +902,36 @@ do_ssl_init(void)
     SSL_library_init();
     SSL_load_error_strings();
 
+    if (!RAND_status()) {
+        /* We occasionally see OpenSSL fail to seed its random number generator
+         * in heavily loaded hypervisors.  I suspect the following scenario:
+         *
+         * 1. OpenSSL calls read() to get 32 bytes from /dev/urandom.
+         * 2. The kernel generates 10 bytes of randomness and copies it out.
+         * 3. A signal arrives (perhaps SIGALRM).
+         * 4. The kernel interrupts the system call to service the signal.
+         * 5. Userspace gets 10 bytes of entropy.
+         * 6. OpenSSL doesn't read again to get the final 22 bytes.  Therefore
+         *    OpenSSL doesn't have enough entropy to consider itself
+         *    initialized.
+         *
+         * The only part I'm not entirely sure about is #6, because the OpenSSL
+         * code is so hard to read. */
+        uint8_t seed[32];
+        int retval;
+
+        VLOG_WARN("OpenSSL random seeding failed, reseeding ourselves");
+
+        retval = get_entropy(seed, sizeof seed);
+        if (retval) {
+            VLOG_ERR("failed to obtain entropy (%s)",
+                     ovs_retval_to_string(retval));
+            return retval > 0 ? retval : ENOPROTOOPT;
+        }
+
+        RAND_seed(seed, sizeof seed);
+    }
+
     /* New OpenSSL changed TLSv1_method() to return a "const" pointer, so the
      * cast is needed to avoid a warning with those newer versions. */
     method = CONST_CAST(SSL_METHOD *, TLSv1_method());