upgrade to linux 2.6.10-1.12_FC2

[linux-2.6.git] / drivers / char / random.c

/*
 * random.c -- A strong random number generator
 *
 * Version 1.89, last modified 19-Sep-99
 * 
 * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999.  All
 * rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
 *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
 *    products derived from this software without specific prior
 *    written permission.
 * 
 * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
 * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
 * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
 * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
 * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
 * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
 * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
 * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
 * DAMAGE.
 */

/*
 * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....) 
 * 
 * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
 * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
 * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
 * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
 * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
 * predict by an attacker.
 *
 * Theory of operation
 * ===================
 * 
 * Computers are very predictable devices.  Hence it is extremely hard
 * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
 * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
 * algorithm.  Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess
 * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some
 * applications this is not acceptable.  So instead, we must try to
 * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which
 * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
 * generate random numbers.  In a Unix environment, this is best done
 * from inside the kernel.
 * 
 * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
 * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
 * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
 * outside observer to measure.  Randomness from these sources are
 * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function.
 * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming
 * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that
 * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable.
 * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
 * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
 * the random number generator's internal state.
 * 
 * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA
 * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool".  The SHA hash avoids
 * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool.  It is believed to
 * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information
 * about the input of SHA from its output.  Even if it is possible to
 * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data
 * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in
 * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable.  For this
 * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
 * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
 * outputs random numbers.
 * 
 * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
 * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
 * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
 * outputs.  This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is
 * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility.
 * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
 * of purposes.
 * 
 * Exported interfaces ---- output
 * ===============================
 * 
 * There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to
 * be used from within the kernel:
 *
 *      void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 *
 * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
 * and place it in the requested buffer.
 * 
 * The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and
 * /dev/urandom.  /dev/random is suitable for use when very high
 * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or
 * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
 * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator)
 * contained in the entropy pool.
 * 
 * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return
 * as many bytes as are requested.  As more and more random bytes are
 * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge,
 * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically
 * strong.  For many applications, however, this is acceptable.
 *
 * Exported interfaces ---- input
 * ==============================
 * 
 * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
 * from the devices are:
 * 
 *      void add_keyboard_randomness(unsigned char scancode);
 *      void add_mouse_randomness(__u32 mouse_data);
 *      void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
 * 
 * add_keyboard_randomness() uses the inter-keypress timing, as well as the
 * scancode as random inputs into the "entropy pool".
 * 
 * add_mouse_randomness() uses the mouse interrupt timing, as well as
 * the reported position of the mouse from the hardware.
 *
 * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the inter-interrupt timing as random
 * inputs to the entropy pool.  Note that not all interrupts are good
 * sources of randomness!  For example, the timer interrupts is not a
 * good choice, because the periodicity of the interrupts is too
 * regular, and hence predictable to an attacker.  Disk interrupts are
 * a better measure, since the timing of the disk interrupts are more
 * unpredictable.
 * 
 * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
 * particular randomness source.  They do this by keeping track of the
 * first and second order deltas of the event timings.
 *
 * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup
 * ============================================
 * 
 * When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence
 * of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially
 * if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator.
 * This reduces the actual number of bits of unpredictability in the
 * entropy pool below the value in entropy_count.  In order to
 * counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the
 * entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups.  To do this, put the
 * following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot
 * sequence: 
 *
 *      echo "Initializing random number generator..."
 *      random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
 *      # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up
 *      # Load and then save the whole entropy pool
 *      if [ -f $random_seed ]; then
 *              cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom
 *      else
 *              touch $random_seed
 *      fi
 *      chmod 600 $random_seed
 *      poolfile=/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
 *      [ -r $poolfile ] && bytes=`cat $poolfile` || bytes=512
 *      dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=$bytes
 *
 * and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as
 * the system is shutdown:
 *
 *      # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up
 *      # Save the whole entropy pool
 *      echo "Saving random seed..."
 *      random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
 *      touch $random_seed
 *      chmod 600 $random_seed
 *      poolfile=/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
 *      [ -r $poolfile ] && bytes=`cat $poolfile` || bytes=512
 *      dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=$bytes
 *
 * For example, on most modern systems using the System V init
 * scripts, such code fragments would be found in
 * /etc/rc.d/init.d/random.  On older Linux systems, the correct script
 * location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0.
 * 
 * Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool
 * to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at
 * start-up.  (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to
 * make sure that /etc/random-seed is different for every start-up,
 * even if the system crashes without executing rc.0.)  Even with
 * complete knowledge of the start-up activities, predicting the state
 * of the entropy pool requires knowledge of the previous history of
 * the system.
 *
 * Configuring the /dev/random driver under Linux
 * ==============================================
 *
 * The /dev/random driver under Linux uses minor numbers 8 and 9 of
 * the /dev/mem major number (#1).  So if your system does not have
 * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created
 * by using the commands:
 *
 *      mknod /dev/random c 1 8
 *      mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
 * 
 * Acknowledgements:
 * =================
 *
 * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived
 * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private
 * discussions with Phil Karn.  Colin Plumb provided a faster random
 * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy
 * pool, taken from PGPfone.  Dale Worley has also contributed many
 * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver.
 * 
 * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
 * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
 * 
 * The code for SHA transform was taken from Peter Gutmann's
 * implementation, which has been placed in the public domain.
 * The code for MD5 transform was taken from Colin Plumb's
 * implementation, which has been placed in the public domain.
 * The MD5 cryptographic checksum was devised by Ronald Rivest, and is
 * documented in RFC 1321, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm".
 * 
 * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
 * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
 * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
 */

#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/config.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/major.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/genhd.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>

#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/irq.h>
#include <asm/io.h>

/*
 * Configuration information
 */
#define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 512
#define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 128
#define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 256
#define USE_SHA

/*
 * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on
 * /dev/random.  Should be enough to do a significant reseed.
 */
static int random_read_wakeup_thresh = 64;

/*
 * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
 * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
 * access to /dev/random.
 */
static int random_write_wakeup_thresh = 128;

/*
 * When the input pool goes over trickle_thresh, start dropping most
 * samples to avoid wasting CPU time and reduce lock contention.
 */

static int trickle_thresh = DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE * 7;

static DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, trickle_count) = 0;

/*
 * A pool of size .poolwords is stirred with a primitive polynomial
 * of degree .poolwords over GF(2).  The taps for various sizes are
 * defined below.  They are chosen to be evenly spaced (minimum RMS
 * distance from evenly spaced; the numbers in the comments are a
 * scaled squared error sum) except for the last tap, which is 1 to
 * get the twisting happening as fast as possible.
 */
static struct poolinfo {
        int     poolwords;
        int     tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
} poolinfo_table[] = {
        /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1  -- 115 */
        { 2048, 1638,   1231,   819,    411,    1 },

        /* x^1024 + x^817 + x^615 + x^412 + x^204 + x + 1 -- 290 */
        { 1024, 817,    615,    412,    204,    1 },
#if 0                           /* Alternate polynomial */
        /* x^1024 + x^819 + x^616 + x^410 + x^207 + x^2 + 1 -- 115 */
        { 1024, 819,    616,    410,    207,    2 },
#endif

        /* x^512 + x^411 + x^308 + x^208 + x^104 + x + 1 -- 225 */
        { 512,  411,    308,    208,    104,    1 },
#if 0                           /* Alternates */
        /* x^512 + x^409 + x^307 + x^206 + x^102 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
        { 512,  409,    307,    206,    102,    2 },
        /* x^512 + x^409 + x^309 + x^205 + x^103 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
        { 512,  409,    309,    205,    103,    2 },
#endif

        /* x^256 + x^205 + x^155 + x^101 + x^52 + x + 1 -- 125 */
        { 256,  205,    155,    101,    52,     1 },

        /* x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 -- 105 */
        { 128,  103,    76,     51,     25,     1 },
#if 0   /* Alternate polynomial */
        /* x^128 + x^103 + x^78 + x^51 + x^27 + x^2 + 1 -- 70 */
        { 128,  103,    78,     51,     27,     2 },
#endif

        /* x^64 + x^52 + x^39 + x^26 + x^14 + x + 1 -- 15 */
        { 64,   52,     39,     26,     14,     1 },

        /* x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 -- 15 */
        { 32,   26,     20,     14,     7,      1 },

        { 0,    0,      0,      0,      0,      0 },
};

#define POOLBITS        poolwords*32
#define POOLBYTES       poolwords*4

/*
 * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as
 * well to make a twisted Generalized Feedback Shift Reigster
 *
 * (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992.  Twisted GFSR generators.  ACM
 * Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation 2(3):179-194.
 * Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994.  Twisted GFSR generators
 * II.  ACM Transactions on Mdeling and Computer Simulation 4:254-266)
 *
 * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
 * 
 * We have not analyzed the resultant polynomial to prove it primitive;
 * in fact it almost certainly isn't.  Nonetheless, the irreducible factors
 * of a random large-degree polynomial over GF(2) are more than large enough
 * that periodicity is not a concern.
 * 
 * The input hash is much less sensitive than the output hash.  All
 * that we want of it is that it be a good non-cryptographic hash;
 * i.e. it not produce collisions when fed "random" data of the sort
 * we expect to see.  As long as the pool state differs for different
 * inputs, we have preserved the input entropy and done a good job.
 * The fact that an intelligent attacker can construct inputs that
 * will produce controlled alterations to the pool's state is not
 * important because we don't consider such inputs to contribute any
 * randomness.  The only property we need with respect to them is that
 * the attacker can't increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state.
 * Since all additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the
 * input, you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has
 * any uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle
 * that uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would
 * decrease the uncertainty).
 *
 * The chosen system lets the state of the pool be (essentially) the input
 * modulo the generator polymnomial.  Now, for random primitive polynomials,
 * this is a universal class of hash functions, meaning that the chance
 * of a collision is limited by the attacker's knowledge of the generator
 * polynomail, so if it is chosen at random, an attacker can never force
 * a collision.  Here, we use a fixed polynomial, but we *can* assume that
 * ###--> it is unknown to the processes generating the input entropy. <-###
 * Because of this important property, this is a good, collision-resistant
 * hash; hash collisions will occur no more often than chance.
 */

/*
 * Linux 2.2 compatibility
 */
#ifndef DECLARE_WAITQUEUE
#define DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(WAIT, PTR)    struct wait_queue WAIT = { PTR, NULL }
#endif
#ifndef DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD
#define DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(WAIT) struct wait_queue *WAIT
#endif

/*
 * Static global variables
 */
static struct entropy_store *random_state; /* The default global store */
static struct entropy_store *sec_random_state; /* secondary store */
static struct entropy_store *urandom_state; /* For urandom */
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);

/*
 * Forward procedure declarations
 */
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static void sysctl_init_random(struct entropy_store *random_state);
#endif

/*****************************************************************
 *
 * Utility functions, with some ASM defined functions for speed
 * purposes
 * 
 *****************************************************************/

/*
 * Unfortunately, while the GCC optimizer for the i386 understands how
 * to optimize a static rotate left of x bits, it doesn't know how to
 * deal with a variable rotate of x bits.  So we use a bit of asm magic.
 */
#if (!defined (__i386__))
static inline __u32 rotate_left(int i, __u32 word)
{
        return (word << i) | (word >> (32 - i));
        
}
#else
static inline __u32 rotate_left(int i, __u32 word)
{
        __asm__("roll %%cl,%0"
                :"=r" (word)
                :"0" (word),"c" (i));
        return word;
}
#endif

/*
 * More asm magic....
 * 
 * For entropy estimation, we need to do an integral base 2
 * logarithm.  
 *
 * Note the "12bits" suffix - this is used for numbers between
 * 0 and 4095 only.  This allows a few shortcuts.
 */
#if 0   /* Slow but clear version */
static inline __u32 int_ln_12bits(__u32 word)
{
        __u32 nbits = 0;
        
        while (word >>= 1)
                nbits++;
        return nbits;
}
#else   /* Faster (more clever) version, courtesy Colin Plumb */
static inline __u32 int_ln_12bits(__u32 word)
{
        /* Smear msbit right to make an n-bit mask */
        word |= word >> 8;
        word |= word >> 4;
        word |= word >> 2;
        word |= word >> 1;
        /* Remove one bit to make this a logarithm */
        word >>= 1;
        /* Count the bits set in the word */
        word -= (word >> 1) & 0x555;
        word = (word & 0x333) + ((word >> 2) & 0x333);
        word += (word >> 4);
        word += (word >> 8);
        return word & 15;
}
#endif

#if 0
#define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "random: " fmt, ## arg)
#else
#define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) do {} while (0)
#endif

/**********************************************************************
 *
 * OS independent entropy store.   Here are the functions which handle
 * storing entropy in an entropy pool.
 * 
 **********************************************************************/

struct entropy_store {
        /* mostly-read data: */
        struct poolinfo poolinfo;
        __u32           *pool;
        const char      *name;

        /* read-write data: */
        spinlock_t lock ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
        unsigned        add_ptr;
        int             entropy_count;
        int             input_rotate;
};

/*
 * Initialize the entropy store.  The input argument is the size of
 * the random pool.
 *
 * Returns an negative error if there is a problem.
 */
static int create_entropy_store(int size, const char *name,
                                struct entropy_store **ret_bucket)
{
        struct  entropy_store   *r;
        struct  poolinfo        *p;
        int     poolwords;

        poolwords = (size + 3) / 4; /* Convert bytes->words */
        /* The pool size must be a multiple of 16 32-bit words */
        poolwords = ((poolwords + 15) / 16) * 16;

        for (p = poolinfo_table; p->poolwords; p++) {
                if (poolwords == p->poolwords)
                        break;
        }
        if (p->poolwords == 0)
                return -EINVAL;

        r = kmalloc(sizeof(struct entropy_store), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!r)
                return -ENOMEM;

        memset (r, 0, sizeof(struct entropy_store));
        r->poolinfo = *p;

        r->pool = kmalloc(POOLBYTES, GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!r->pool) {
                kfree(r);
                return -ENOMEM;
        }
        memset(r->pool, 0, POOLBYTES);
        r->lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
        r->name = name;
        *ret_bucket = r;
        return 0;
}

/* Clear the entropy pool and associated counters. */
static void clear_entropy_store(struct entropy_store *r)
{
        r->add_ptr = 0;
        r->entropy_count = 0;
        r->input_rotate = 0;
        memset(r->pool, 0, r->poolinfo.POOLBYTES);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static void free_entropy_store(struct entropy_store *r)
{
        if (r->pool)
                kfree(r->pool);
        kfree(r);
}
#endif
/*
 * This function adds a byte into the entropy "pool".  It does not
 * update the entropy estimate.  The caller should call
 * credit_entropy_store if this is appropriate.
 * 
 * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate
 * degree, and then twisted.  We twist by three bits at a time because
 * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
 * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
 */
static void __add_entropy_words(struct entropy_store *r, const __u32 *in,
                                int nwords, __u32 out[16])
{
        static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
                         0, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
                0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
        unsigned long i, add_ptr, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
        int new_rotate, input_rotate;
        int wordmask = r->poolinfo.poolwords - 1;
        __u32 w, next_w;
        unsigned long flags;

        /* Taps are constant, so we can load them without holding r->lock.  */
        tap1 = r->poolinfo.tap1;
        tap2 = r->poolinfo.tap2;
        tap3 = r->poolinfo.tap3;
        tap4 = r->poolinfo.tap4;
        tap5 = r->poolinfo.tap5;
        next_w = *in++;

        spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
        prefetch_range(r->pool, wordmask);
        input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
        add_ptr = r->add_ptr;

        while (nwords--) {
                w = rotate_left(input_rotate, next_w);
                if (nwords > 0)
                        next_w = *in++;
                i = add_ptr = (add_ptr - 1) & wordmask;
                /*
                 * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
                 * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits
                 * rotation, so that successive passes spread the
                 * input bits across the pool evenly.
                 */
                new_rotate = input_rotate + 14;
                if (i)
                        new_rotate = input_rotate + 7;
                input_rotate = new_rotate & 31;

                /* XOR in the various taps */
                w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask];
                w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask];
                w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask];
                w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask];
                w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask];
                w ^= r->pool[i];
                r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
        }

        r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
        r->add_ptr = add_ptr;

        if (out) {
                for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
                        out[i] = r->pool[add_ptr];
                        add_ptr = (add_ptr - 1) & wordmask;
                }
        }

        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
}

static inline void add_entropy_words(struct entropy_store *r, const __u32 *in,
                                     int nwords)
{
        __add_entropy_words(r, in, nwords, NULL);
}


/*
 * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy
 */
static void credit_entropy_store(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
{
        unsigned long flags;

        spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);

        if (r->entropy_count + nbits < 0) {
                DEBUG_ENT("negative entropy/overflow (%d+%d)\n",
                          r->entropy_count, nbits);
                r->entropy_count = 0;
        } else if (r->entropy_count + nbits > r->poolinfo.POOLBITS) {
                r->entropy_count = r->poolinfo.POOLBITS;
        } else {
                r->entropy_count += nbits;
                if (nbits)
                        DEBUG_ENT("Added %d entropy credits to %s, now %d\n",
                                  nbits, r->name, r->entropy_count);
        }

        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
}

/**********************************************************************
 *
 * Entropy batch input management
 *
 * We batch entropy to be added to avoid increasing interrupt latency
 *
 **********************************************************************/

struct sample {
        __u32 data[2];
        int credit;
};

static struct sample *batch_entropy_pool, *batch_entropy_copy;
static int      batch_head, batch_tail;
static spinlock_t batch_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;

static int      batch_max;
static void batch_entropy_process(void *private_);
static DECLARE_WORK(batch_work, batch_entropy_process, NULL);

/* note: the size must be a power of 2 */
static int __init batch_entropy_init(int size, struct entropy_store *r)
{
        batch_entropy_pool = kmalloc(size*sizeof(struct sample), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!batch_entropy_pool)
                return -1;
        batch_entropy_copy = kmalloc(size*sizeof(struct sample), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!batch_entropy_copy) {
                kfree(batch_entropy_pool);
                return -1;
        }
        batch_head = batch_tail = 0;
        batch_work.data = r;
        batch_max = size;
        return 0;
}

/*
 * Changes to the entropy data is put into a queue rather than being added to
 * the entropy counts directly.  This is presumably to avoid doing heavy
 * hashing calculations during an interrupt in add_timer_randomness().
 * Instead, the entropy is only added to the pool by keventd.
 */
static void batch_entropy_store(u32 a, u32 b, int num)
{
        int new;
        unsigned long flags;

        if (!batch_max)
                return;

        spin_lock_irqsave(&batch_lock, flags);

        batch_entropy_pool[batch_head].data[0] = a;
        batch_entropy_pool[batch_head].data[1] = b;
        batch_entropy_pool[batch_head].credit = num;

        if (((batch_head - batch_tail) & (batch_max-1)) >= (batch_max / 2)) {
                /*
                 * Schedule it for the next timer tick:
                 */
                schedule_delayed_work(&batch_work, 1);
        }

        new = (batch_head+1) & (batch_max-1);
        if (new == batch_tail) {
                DEBUG_ENT("batch entropy buffer full\n");
        } else {
                batch_head = new;
        }

        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch_lock, flags);
}

/*
 * Flush out the accumulated entropy operations, adding entropy to the passed
 * store (normally random_state).  If that store has enough entropy, alternate
 * between randomizing the data of the primary and secondary stores.
 */
static void batch_entropy_process(void *private_)
{
        struct entropy_store *r = (struct entropy_store *) private_, *p;
        int max_entropy = r->poolinfo.POOLBITS;
        unsigned head, tail;

        /* Mixing into the pool is expensive, so copy over the batch
         * data and release the batch lock. The pool is at least half
         * full, so don't worry too much about copying only the used
         * part.
         */
        spin_lock_irq(&batch_lock);

        memcpy(batch_entropy_copy, batch_entropy_pool,
               batch_max*sizeof(struct sample));

        head = batch_head;
        tail = batch_tail;
        batch_tail = batch_head;

        spin_unlock_irq(&batch_lock);

        p = r;
        while (head != tail) {
                if (r->entropy_count >= max_entropy) {
                        r = (r == sec_random_state) ?   random_state :
                                                        sec_random_state;
                        max_entropy = r->poolinfo.POOLBITS;
                }
                add_entropy_words(r, batch_entropy_copy[tail].data, 2);
                credit_entropy_store(r, batch_entropy_copy[tail].credit);
                tail = (tail+1) & (batch_max-1);
        }
        if (p->entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
                wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
}

/*********************************************************************
 *
 * Entropy input management
 *
 *********************************************************************/

/* There is one of these per entropy source */
struct timer_rand_state {
        cycles_t        last_time;
        long            last_delta,last_delta2;
        unsigned        dont_count_entropy:1;
};

static struct timer_rand_state keyboard_timer_state;
static struct timer_rand_state mouse_timer_state;
static struct timer_rand_state extract_timer_state;
static struct timer_rand_state *irq_timer_state[NR_IRQS];

/*
 * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
 * delays.  It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
 * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
 *
 * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
 * the type of event which just happened.  This is currently 0-255 for
 * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
 *
 */
static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
{
        cycles_t        time;
        long            delta, delta2, delta3;
        int             entropy = 0;

        preempt_disable();
        /* if over the trickle threshold, use only 1 in 4096 samples */
        if ( random_state->entropy_count > trickle_thresh &&
             (__get_cpu_var(trickle_count)++ & 0xfff))
                goto out;

        /*
         * Use get_cycles() if implemented, otherwise fall back to
         * jiffies.
         */
        time = get_cycles();
        if (time)
                num ^= (u32)((time >> 31) >> 1);
        else
                time = jiffies;

        /*
         * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
         * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
         * in order to make our estimate.
         */
        if (!state->dont_count_entropy) {
                delta = time - state->last_time;
                state->last_time = time;

                delta2 = delta - state->last_delta;
                state->last_delta = delta;

                delta3 = delta2 - state->last_delta2;
                state->last_delta2 = delta2;

                if (delta < 0)
                        delta = -delta;
                if (delta2 < 0)
                        delta2 = -delta2;
                if (delta3 < 0)
                        delta3 = -delta3;
                if (delta > delta2)
                        delta = delta2;
                if (delta > delta3)
                        delta = delta3;

                /*
                 * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
                 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
                 * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits.
                 */
                delta >>= 1;
                delta &= (1 << 12) - 1;

                entropy = int_ln_12bits(delta);
        }
        batch_entropy_store(num, time, entropy);
out:
        preempt_enable();
}

void add_keyboard_randomness(unsigned char scancode)
{
        static unsigned char last_scancode;
        /* ignore autorepeat (multiple key down w/o key up) */
        if (scancode != last_scancode) {
                last_scancode = scancode;
                add_timer_randomness(&keyboard_timer_state, scancode);
        }
}

void add_mouse_randomness(__u32 mouse_data)
{
        add_timer_randomness(&mouse_timer_state, mouse_data);
}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_mouse_randomness);

void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
{
        if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq] == 0)
                return;

        add_timer_randomness(irq_timer_state[irq], 0x100+irq);
}

void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
{
        if (!disk || !disk->random)
                return;
        /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */
        add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100+MKDEV(disk->major, disk->first_minor));
}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_disk_randomness);

/******************************************************************
 *
 * Hash function definition
 *
 *******************************************************************/

/*
 * This chunk of code defines a function
 * void HASH_TRANSFORM(__u32 digest[HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE],
 *              __u32 const data[16])
 * 
 * The function hashes the input data to produce a digest in the first
 * HASH_BUFFER_SIZE words of the digest[] array, and uses HASH_EXTRA_SIZE
 * more words for internal purposes.  (This buffer is exported so the
 * caller can wipe it once rather than this code doing it each call,
 * and tacking it onto the end of the digest[] array is the quick and
 * dirty way of doing it.)
 *
 * It so happens that MD5 and SHA share most of the initial vector
 * used to initialize the digest[] array before the first call:
 * 1) 0x67452301
 * 2) 0xefcdab89
 * 3) 0x98badcfe
 * 4) 0x10325476
 * 5) 0xc3d2e1f0 (SHA only)
 * 
 * For /dev/random purposes, the length of the data being hashed is
 * fixed in length, so appending a bit count in the usual way is not
 * cryptographically necessary.
 */

#ifdef USE_SHA

#define HASH_BUFFER_SIZE 5
#define HASH_EXTRA_SIZE 80
#define HASH_TRANSFORM SHATransform

/* Various size/speed tradeoffs are available.  Choose 0..3. */
#define SHA_CODE_SIZE 0

/*
 * SHA transform algorithm, taken from code written by Peter Gutmann,
 * and placed in the public domain.
 */

/* The SHA f()-functions.  */

#define f1(x,y,z)   ( z ^ (x & (y^z)) )         /* Rounds  0-19: x ? y : z */
#define f2(x,y,z)   (x ^ y ^ z)                 /* Rounds 20-39: XOR */
#define f3(x,y,z)   ( (x & y) + (z & (x ^ y)) ) /* Rounds 40-59: majority */
#define f4(x,y,z)   (x ^ y ^ z)                 /* Rounds 60-79: XOR */

/* The SHA Mysterious Constants */

#define K1  0x5A827999L                 /* Rounds  0-19: sqrt(2) * 2^30 */
#define K2  0x6ED9EBA1L                 /* Rounds 20-39: sqrt(3) * 2^30 */
#define K3  0x8F1BBCDCL                 /* Rounds 40-59: sqrt(5) * 2^30 */
#define K4  0xCA62C1D6L                 /* Rounds 60-79: sqrt(10) * 2^30 */

#define ROTL(n,X)  ( ( ( X ) << n ) | ( ( X ) >> ( 32 - n ) ) )

#define subRound(a, b, c, d, e, f, k, data) \
    ( e += ROTL( 5, a ) + f( b, c, d ) + k + data, b = ROTL( 30, b ) )


static void SHATransform(__u32 digest[85], __u32 const data[16])
{
    __u32 A, B, C, D, E;     /* Local vars */
    __u32 TEMP;
    int i;
#define W (digest + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE)   /* Expanded data array */

    /*
     * Do the preliminary expansion of 16 to 80 words.  Doing it
     * out-of-line line this is faster than doing it in-line on
     * register-starved machines like the x86, and not really any
     * slower on real processors.
     */
    memcpy(W, data, 16*sizeof(__u32));
    for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
            TEMP = W[i] ^ W[i+2] ^ W[i+8] ^ W[i+13];
            W[i+16] = ROTL(1, TEMP);
    }

    /* Set up first buffer and local data buffer */
    A = digest[ 0 ];
    B = digest[ 1 ];
    C = digest[ 2 ];
    D = digest[ 3 ];
    E = digest[ 4 ];

    /* Heavy mangling, in 4 sub-rounds of 20 iterations each. */
#if SHA_CODE_SIZE == 0
    /*
     * Approximately 50% of the speed of the largest version, but
     * takes up 1/16 the space.  Saves about 6k on an i386 kernel.
     */
    for (i = 0; i < 80; i++) {
        if (i < 40) {
            if (i < 20)
                TEMP = f1(B, C, D) + K1;
            else
                TEMP = f2(B, C, D) + K2;
        } else {
            if (i < 60)
                TEMP = f3(B, C, D) + K3;
            else
                TEMP = f4(B, C, D) + K4;
        }
        TEMP += ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
        E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
    }
#elif SHA_CODE_SIZE == 1
    for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
        TEMP = f1(B, C, D) + K1 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
        E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
    }
    for (; i < 40; i++) {
        TEMP = f2(B, C, D) + K2 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
        E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
    }
    for (; i < 60; i++) {
        TEMP = f3(B, C, D) + K3 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
        E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
    }
    for (; i < 80; i++) {
        TEMP = f4(B, C, D) + K4 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
        E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
    }
#elif SHA_CODE_SIZE == 2
    for (i = 0; i < 20; i += 5) {
        subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ i   ] );
        subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ i+1 ] );
        subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ i+2 ] );
        subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ i+3 ] );
        subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ i+4 ] );
    }
    for (; i < 40; i += 5) {
        subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ i   ] );
        subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ i+1 ] );
        subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ i+2 ] );
        subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ i+3 ] );
        subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ i+4 ] );
    }
    for (; i < 60; i += 5) {
        subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ i   ] );
        subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ i+1 ] );
        subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ i+2 ] );
        subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ i+3 ] );
        subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ i+4 ] );
    }
    for (; i < 80; i += 5) {
        subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ i   ] );
        subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ i+1 ] );
        subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ i+2 ] );
        subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ i+3 ] );
        subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ i+4 ] );
    }
#elif SHA_CODE_SIZE == 3 /* Really large version */
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[  0 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[  1 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[  2 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[  3 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[  4 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[  5 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[  6 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[  7 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[  8 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[  9 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 10 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 11 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 12 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 13 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 14 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 15 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 16 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 17 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 18 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 19 ] );

    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 20 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 21 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 22 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 23 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 24 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 25 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 26 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 27 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 28 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 29 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 30 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 31 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 32 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 33 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 34 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 35 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 36 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 37 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 38 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 39 ] );
    
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 40 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 41 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 42 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 43 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 44 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 45 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 46 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 47 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 48 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 49 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 50 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 51 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 52 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 53 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 54 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 55 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 56 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 57 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 58 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 59 ] );

    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 60 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 61 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 62 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 63 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 64 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 65 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 66 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 67 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 68 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 69 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 70 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 71 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 72 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 73 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 74 ] );
    subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 75 ] );
    subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 76 ] );
    subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 77 ] );
    subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 78 ] );
    subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 79 ] );
#else
#error Illegal SHA_CODE_SIZE
#endif

    /* Build message digest */
    digest[ 0 ] += A;
    digest[ 1 ] += B;
    digest[ 2 ] += C;
    digest[ 3 ] += D;
    digest[ 4 ] += E;

        /* W is wiped by the caller */
#undef W
}

#undef ROTL
#undef f1
#undef f2
#undef f3
#undef f4
#undef K1       
#undef K2
#undef K3       
#undef K4       
#undef subRound
        
#else /* !USE_SHA - Use MD5 */

#define HASH_BUFFER_SIZE 4
#define HASH_EXTRA_SIZE 0
#define HASH_TRANSFORM MD5Transform
        
/*
 * MD5 transform algorithm, taken from code written by Colin Plumb,
 * and put into the public domain
 */

/* The four core functions - F1 is optimized somewhat */

/* #define F1(x, y, z) (x & y | ~x & z) */
#define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
#define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y)
#define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
#define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z))

/* This is the central step in the MD5 algorithm. */
#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, data, s) \
        ( w += f(x, y, z) + data,  w = w<<s | w>>(32-s),  w += x )

/*
 * The core of the MD5 algorithm, this alters an existing MD5 hash to
 * reflect the addition of 16 longwords of new data.  MD5Update blocks
 * the data and converts bytes into longwords for this routine.
 */
static void MD5Transform(__u32 buf[HASH_BUFFER_SIZE], __u32 const in[16])
{
        __u32 a, b, c, d;

        a = buf[0];
        b = buf[1];
        c = buf[2];
        d = buf[3];

        MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 0]+0xd76aa478,  7);
        MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 1]+0xe8c7b756, 12);
        MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 2]+0x242070db, 17);
        MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 3]+0xc1bdceee, 22);
        MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 4]+0xf57c0faf,  7);
        MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 5]+0x4787c62a, 12);
        MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 6]+0xa8304613, 17);
        MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 7]+0xfd469501, 22);
        MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 8]+0x698098d8,  7);
        MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 9]+0x8b44f7af, 12);
        MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10]+0xffff5bb1, 17);
        MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11]+0x895cd7be, 22);
        MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12]+0x6b901122,  7);
        MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13]+0xfd987193, 12);
        MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14]+0xa679438e, 17);
        MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15]+0x49b40821, 22);

        MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 1]+0xf61e2562,  5);
        MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 6]+0xc040b340,  9);
        MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11]+0x265e5a51, 14);
        MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 0]+0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
        MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 5]+0xd62f105d,  5);
        MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10]+0x02441453,  9);
        MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15]+0xd8a1e681, 14);
        MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 4]+0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
        MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 9]+0x21e1cde6,  5);
        MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14]+0xc33707d6,  9);
        MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 3]+0xf4d50d87, 14);
        MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 8]+0x455a14ed, 20);
        MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13]+0xa9e3e905,  5);
        MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 2]+0xfcefa3f8,  9);
        MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 7]+0x676f02d9, 14);
        MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12]+0x8d2a4c8a, 20);

        MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 5]+0xfffa3942,  4);
        MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 8]+0x8771f681, 11);
        MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11]+0x6d9d6122, 16);
        MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14]+0xfde5380c, 23);
        MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 1]+0xa4beea44,  4);
        MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 4]+0x4bdecfa9, 11);
        MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 7]+0xf6bb4b60, 16);
        MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10]+0xbebfbc70, 23);
        MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13]+0x289b7ec6,  4);
        MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 0]+0xeaa127fa, 11);
        MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 3]+0xd4ef3085, 16);
        MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[ 6]+0x04881d05, 23);
        MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 9]+0xd9d4d039,  4);
        MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12]+0xe6db99e5, 11);
        MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15]+0x1fa27cf8, 16);
        MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[ 2]+0xc4ac5665, 23);

        MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 0]+0xf4292244,  6);
        MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[ 7]+0x432aff97, 10);
        MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14]+0xab9423a7, 15);
        MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[ 5]+0xfc93a039, 21);
        MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12]+0x655b59c3,  6);
        MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[ 3]+0x8f0ccc92, 10);
        MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10]+0xffeff47d, 15);
        MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[ 1]+0x85845dd1, 21);
        MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 8]+0x6fa87e4f,  6);
        MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15]+0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
        MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[ 6]+0xa3014314, 15);
        MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13]+0x4e0811a1, 21);
        MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 4]+0xf7537e82,  6);
        MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11]+0xbd3af235, 10);
        MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[ 2]+0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
        MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[ 9]+0xeb86d391, 21);

        buf[0] += a;
        buf[1] += b;
        buf[2] += c;
        buf[3] += d;
}

#undef F1
#undef F2
#undef F3
#undef F4
#undef MD5STEP

#endif /* !USE_SHA */

/*********************************************************************
 *
 * Entropy extraction routines
 *
 *********************************************************************/

#define EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER            1
#define EXTRACT_ENTROPY_SECONDARY       2
#define EXTRACT_ENTROPY_LIMIT           4
#define TMP_BUF_SIZE                    (HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE)
#define SEC_XFER_SIZE                   (TMP_BUF_SIZE*4)

static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void * buf,
                               size_t nbytes, int flags);

/*
 * This utility inline function is responsible for transfering entropy
 * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool. We make
 * sure we pull enough for a 'catastrophic reseed'.
 */
static inline void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r,
                                       size_t nbytes, __u32 *tmp)
{
        if (r->entropy_count < nbytes * 8 &&
            r->entropy_count < r->poolinfo.POOLBITS) {
                int bytes = max_t(int, random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8,
                                min_t(int, nbytes, TMP_BUF_SIZE));

                DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : going to reseed %s with %d bits "
                          "(%d of %d requested)\n",
                          random_state->entropy_count,
                          sec_random_state->entropy_count,
                          r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, r->entropy_count);

                bytes=extract_entropy(random_state, tmp, bytes,
                                      EXTRACT_ENTROPY_LIMIT);
                add_entropy_words(r, tmp, bytes);
                credit_entropy_store(r, bytes*8);
        }
}

/*
 * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
 * returns it in a buffer.  This function computes how many remaining
 * bits of entropy are left in the pool, but it does not restrict the
 * number of bytes that are actually obtained.  If the EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER
 * flag is given, then the buf pointer is assumed to be in user space.
 *
 * If the EXTRACT_ENTROPY_SECONDARY flag is given, then we are actually
 * extracting entropy from the secondary pool, and can refill from the
 * primary pool if needed.
 *
 * Note: extract_entropy() assumes that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words.
 */
static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void * buf,
                               size_t nbytes, int flags)
{
        ssize_t ret, i;
        __u32 tmp[TMP_BUF_SIZE], data[16];
        __u32 x;
        unsigned long cpuflags;


        /* Redundant, but just in case... */
        if (r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo.POOLBITS)
                r->entropy_count = r->poolinfo.POOLBITS;

        if (flags & EXTRACT_ENTROPY_SECONDARY)
                xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes, tmp);

        /* Hold lock while accounting */
        spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, cpuflags);

        DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : trying to extract %d bits from %s\n",
                  random_state->entropy_count,
                  sec_random_state->entropy_count,
                  nbytes * 8, r->name);

        if (flags & EXTRACT_ENTROPY_LIMIT && nbytes >= r->entropy_count / 8)
                nbytes = r->entropy_count / 8;

        if (r->entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes)
                r->entropy_count -= nbytes*8;
        else
                r->entropy_count = 0;

        if (r->entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
                wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);

        DEBUG_ENT("Debiting %d entropy credits from %s%s\n",
                  nbytes * 8, r->name,
                  flags & EXTRACT_ENTROPY_LIMIT ? "" : " (unlimited)");

        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, cpuflags);

        ret = 0;
        while (nbytes) {
                /*
                 * Check if we need to break out or reschedule....
                 */
                if ((flags & EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER) && need_resched()) {
                        if (signal_pending(current)) {
                                if (ret == 0)
                                        ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
                                break;
                        }

                        DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : extract feeling sleepy (%d bytes left)\n",
                                  random_state->entropy_count,
                                  sec_random_state->entropy_count, nbytes);

                        schedule();

                        DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : extract woke up\n",
                                  random_state->entropy_count,
                                  sec_random_state->entropy_count);
                }

                /* Hash the pool to get the output */
                tmp[0] = 0x67452301;
                tmp[1] = 0xefcdab89;
                tmp[2] = 0x98badcfe;
                tmp[3] = 0x10325476;
#ifdef USE_SHA
                tmp[4] = 0xc3d2e1f0;
#endif
                /*
                 * As we hash the pool, we mix intermediate values of
                 * the hash back into the pool.  This eliminates
                 * backtracking attacks (where the attacker knows
                 * the state of the pool plus the current outputs, and
                 * attempts to find previous ouputs), unless the hash
                 * function can be inverted.
                 */
                for (i = 0, x = 0; i < r->poolinfo.poolwords; i += 16, x+=2) {
                        HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp, r->pool+i);
                        add_entropy_words(r, &tmp[x%HASH_BUFFER_SIZE], 1);
                }

                /*
                 * To avoid duplicates, we atomically extract a
                 * portion of the pool while mixing, and hash one
                 * final time.
                 */
                __add_entropy_words(r, &tmp[x%HASH_BUFFER_SIZE], 1, data);
                HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp, data);

                /*
                 * In case the hash function has some recognizable
                 * output pattern, we fold it in half.
                 */
                for (i = 0; i <  HASH_BUFFER_SIZE/2; i++)
                        tmp[i] ^= tmp[i + (HASH_BUFFER_SIZE+1)/2];
#if HASH_BUFFER_SIZE & 1        /* There's a middle word to deal with */
                x = tmp[HASH_BUFFER_SIZE/2];
                x ^= (x >> 16);         /* Fold it in half */
                ((__u16 *)tmp)[HASH_BUFFER_SIZE-1] = (__u16)x;
#endif
                
                /* Copy data to destination buffer */
                i = min(nbytes, HASH_BUFFER_SIZE*sizeof(__u32)/2);
                if (flags & EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER) {
                        i -= copy_to_user(buf, (__u8 const *)tmp, i);
                        if (!i) {
                                ret = -EFAULT;
                                break;
                        }
                } else
                        memcpy(buf, (__u8 const *)tmp, i);
                nbytes -= i;
                buf += i;
                ret += i;
        }

        /* Wipe data just returned from memory */
        memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
        
        return ret;
}

/*
 * This function is the exported kernel interface.  It returns some
 * number of good random numbers, suitable for seeding TCP sequence
 * numbers, etc.
 */
void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
{
        struct entropy_store *r = urandom_state;
        int flags = EXTRACT_ENTROPY_SECONDARY;

        if (!r)
                r = sec_random_state;
        if (!r) {
                r = random_state;
                flags = 0;
        }
        if (!r) {
                printk(KERN_NOTICE "get_random_bytes called before "
                                   "random driver initialization\n");
                return;
        }
        extract_entropy(r, (char *) buf, nbytes, flags);
}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);

/*********************************************************************
 *
 * Functions to interface with Linux
 *
 *********************************************************************/

/*
 * Initialize the random pool with standard stuff.
 *
 * NOTE: This is an OS-dependent function.
 */
static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
{
        struct timeval  tv;
        __u32           words[2];
        char            *p;
        int             i;

        do_gettimeofday(&tv);
        words[0] = tv.tv_sec;
        words[1] = tv.tv_usec;
        add_entropy_words(r, words, 2);

        /*
         *      This doesn't lock system.utsname. However, we are generating
         *      entropy so a race with a name set here is fine.
         */
        p = (char *) &system_utsname;
        for (i = sizeof(system_utsname) / sizeof(words); i; i--) {
                memcpy(words, p, sizeof(words));
                add_entropy_words(r, words, sizeof(words)/4);
                p += sizeof(words);
        }
}

static int __init rand_initialize(void)
{
        int i;

        if (create_entropy_store(DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE, "primary", &random_state))
                goto err;
        if (batch_entropy_init(BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE, random_state))
                goto err;
        if (create_entropy_store(SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE, "secondary",
                                 &sec_random_state))
                goto err;
        if (create_entropy_store(SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE, "urandom",
                                 &urandom_state))
                goto err;
        clear_entropy_store(random_state);
        clear_entropy_store(sec_random_state);
        clear_entropy_store(urandom_state);
        init_std_data(random_state);
        init_std_data(sec_random_state);
        init_std_data(urandom_state);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
        sysctl_init_random(random_state);
#endif
        for (i = 0; i < NR_IRQS; i++)
                irq_timer_state[i] = NULL;
        memset(&keyboard_timer_state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
        memset(&mouse_timer_state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
        memset(&extract_timer_state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
        extract_timer_state.dont_count_entropy = 1;
        return 0;
err:
        return -1;
}
module_init(rand_initialize);

void rand_initialize_irq(int irq)
{
        struct timer_rand_state *state;
        
        if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq])
                return;

        /*
         * If kmalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
         * source.
         */
        state = kmalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (state) {
                memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
                irq_timer_state[irq] = state;
        }
}
 
void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
{
        struct timer_rand_state *state;
        
        /*
         * If kmalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
         * source.
         */
        state = kmalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (state) {
                memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
                disk->random = state;
        }
}

static ssize_t
random_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
{
        DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
        ssize_t                 n, retval = 0, count = 0;
        
        if (nbytes == 0)
                return 0;

        while (nbytes > 0) {
                n = nbytes;
                if (n > SEC_XFER_SIZE)
                        n = SEC_XFER_SIZE;

                DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : reading %d bits, p: %d s: %d\n",
                          random_state->entropy_count,
                          sec_random_state->entropy_count,
                          n*8, random_state->entropy_count,
                          sec_random_state->entropy_count);

                n = extract_entropy(sec_random_state, buf, n,
                                    EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER |
                                    EXTRACT_ENTROPY_LIMIT |
                                    EXTRACT_ENTROPY_SECONDARY);

                DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : read got %d bits (%d still needed)\n",
                          random_state->entropy_count,
                          sec_random_state->entropy_count,
                          n*8, (nbytes-n)*8);

                if (n == 0) {
                        if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
                                retval = -EAGAIN;
                                break;
                        }
                        if (signal_pending(current)) {
                                retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
                                break;
                        }

                        DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : sleeping?\n",
                                  random_state->entropy_count,
                                  sec_random_state->entropy_count);

                        set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
                        add_wait_queue(&random_read_wait, &wait);

                        if (sec_random_state->entropy_count / 8 == 0)
                                schedule();

                        set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
                        remove_wait_queue(&random_read_wait, &wait);

                        DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : waking up\n",
                                  random_state->entropy_count,
                                  sec_random_state->entropy_count);

                        continue;
                }

                if (n < 0) {
                        retval = n;
                        break;
                }
                count += n;
                buf += n;
                nbytes -= n;
                break;          /* This break makes the device work */
                                /* like a named pipe */
        }

        /*
         * If we gave the user some bytes, update the access time.
         */
        if (count)
                file_accessed(file);
        
        return (count ? count : retval);
}

static ssize_t
urandom_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
                      size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
{
        int flags = EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER;
        unsigned long cpuflags;

        spin_lock_irqsave(&random_state->lock, cpuflags);
        if (random_state->entropy_count > random_state->poolinfo.POOLBITS)
                flags |= EXTRACT_ENTROPY_SECONDARY;
        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_state->lock, cpuflags);

        return extract_entropy(urandom_state, buf, nbytes, flags);
}

static unsigned int
random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
{
        unsigned int mask;

        poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait);
        poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
        mask = 0;
        if (random_state->entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
                mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
        if (random_state->entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
                mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
        return mask;
}

static ssize_t
random_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buffer,
             size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
        int             ret = 0;
        size_t          bytes;
        __u32           buf[16];
        const char      __user *p = buffer;
        size_t          c = count;

        while (c > 0) {
                bytes = min(c, sizeof(buf));

                bytes -= copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes);
                if (!bytes) {
                        ret = -EFAULT;
                        break;
                }
                c -= bytes;
                p += bytes;

                add_entropy_words(random_state, buf, (bytes + 3) / 4);
        }
        if (p == buffer) {
                return (ssize_t)ret;
        } else {
                file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
                mark_inode_dirty(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
                return (ssize_t)(p - buffer);
        }
}

static int
random_ioctl(struct inode * inode, struct file * file,
             unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
        int size, ent_count;
        int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
        int retval;
        
        switch (cmd) {
        case RNDGETENTCNT:
                ent_count = random_state->entropy_count;
                if (put_user(ent_count, p))
                        return -EFAULT;
                return 0;
        case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
                if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                        return -EPERM;
                if (get_user(ent_count, p))
                        return -EFAULT;
                credit_entropy_store(random_state, ent_count);
                /*
                 * Wake up waiting processes if we have enough
                 * entropy.
                 */
                if (random_state->entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
                        wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
                return 0;
        case RNDADDENTROPY:
                if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                        return -EPERM;
                if (get_user(ent_count, p++))
                        return -EFAULT;
                if (ent_count < 0)
                        return -EINVAL;
                if (get_user(size, p++))
                        return -EFAULT;
                retval = random_write(file, (const char __user *) p,
                                      size, &file->f_pos);
                if (retval < 0)
                        return retval;
                credit_entropy_store(random_state, ent_count);
                /*
                 * Wake up waiting processes if we have enough
                 * entropy.
                 */
                if (random_state->entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
                        wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
                return 0;
        case RNDZAPENTCNT:
                if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                        return -EPERM;
                random_state->entropy_count = 0;
                return 0;
        case RNDCLEARPOOL:
                /* Clear the entropy pool and associated counters. */
                if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                        return -EPERM;
                clear_entropy_store(random_state);
                init_std_data(random_state);
                return 0;
        default:
                return -EINVAL;
        }
}

struct file_operations random_fops = {
        .read           = random_read,
        .write          = random_write,
        .poll           = random_poll,
        .ioctl          = random_ioctl,
};

struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
        .read           = urandom_read,
        .write          = random_write,
        .ioctl          = random_ioctl,
};

/***************************************************************
 * Random UUID interface
 * 
 * Used here for a Boot ID, but can be useful for other kernel 
 * drivers.
 ***************************************************************/

/*
 * Generate random UUID
 */
void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16])
{
        get_random_bytes(uuid_out, 16);
        /* Set UUID version to 4 --- truely random generation */
        uuid_out[6] = (uuid_out[6] & 0x0F) | 0x40;
        /* Set the UUID variant to DCE */
        uuid_out[8] = (uuid_out[8] & 0x3F) | 0x80;
}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(generate_random_uuid);

/********************************************************************
 *
 * Sysctl interface
 *
 ********************************************************************/

#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL

#include <linux/sysctl.h>

static int sysctl_poolsize;
static int min_read_thresh, max_read_thresh;
static int min_write_thresh, max_write_thresh;
static char sysctl_bootid[16];

/*
 * This function handles a request from the user to change the pool size 
 * of the primary entropy store.
 */
static int change_poolsize(int poolsize)
{
        struct entropy_store    *new_store, *old_store;
        int                     ret;
        
        if ((ret = create_entropy_store(poolsize, random_state->name,
                                        &new_store)))
                return ret;

        add_entropy_words(new_store, random_state->pool,
                          random_state->poolinfo.poolwords);
        credit_entropy_store(new_store, random_state->entropy_count);

        sysctl_init_random(new_store);
        old_store = random_state;
        random_state = batch_work.data = new_store;
        free_entropy_store(old_store);
        return 0;
}

static int proc_do_poolsize(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
                            void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
        int     ret;

        sysctl_poolsize = random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES;

        ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos);
        if (ret || !write ||
            (sysctl_poolsize == random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES))
                return ret;

        return change_poolsize(sysctl_poolsize);
}

static int poolsize_strategy(ctl_table *table, int __user *name, int nlen,
                             void __user *oldval, size_t __user *oldlenp,
                             void __user *newval, size_t newlen, void **context)
{
        unsigned int    len;
        
        sysctl_poolsize = random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES;

        /*
         * We only handle the write case, since the read case gets
         * handled by the default handler (and we don't care if the
         * write case happens twice; it's harmless).
         */
        if (newval && newlen) {
                len = newlen;
                if (len > table->maxlen)
                        len = table->maxlen;
                if (copy_from_user(table->data, newval, len))
                        return -EFAULT;
        }

        if (sysctl_poolsize != random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES)
                return change_poolsize(sysctl_poolsize);

        return 0;
}

/*
 * These functions is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
 * UUID.  The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
 * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
 * 
 * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, it will be returned
 * as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format.  If accesses via the 
 * sysctl system call, it is returned as 16 bytes of binary data.
 */
static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
                        void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
        ctl_table       fake_table;
        unsigned char   buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;

        uuid = table->data;
        if (!uuid) {
                uuid = tmp_uuid;
                uuid[8] = 0;
        }
        if (uuid[8] == 0)
                generate_random_uuid(uuid);

        sprintf(buf, "%02x%02x%02x%02x-%02x%02x-%02x%02x-%02x%02x-"
                "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
                uuid[0],  uuid[1],  uuid[2],  uuid[3],
                uuid[4],  uuid[5],  uuid[6],  uuid[7],
                uuid[8],  uuid[9],  uuid[10], uuid[11],
                uuid[12], uuid[13], uuid[14], uuid[15]);
        fake_table.data = buf;
        fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf);

        return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}

static int uuid_strategy(ctl_table *table, int __user *name, int nlen,
                         void __user *oldval, size_t __user *oldlenp,
                         void __user *newval, size_t newlen, void **context)
{
        unsigned char   tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
        unsigned int    len;

        if (!oldval || !oldlenp)
                return 1;

        uuid = table->data;
        if (!uuid) {
                uuid = tmp_uuid;
                uuid[8] = 0;
        }
        if (uuid[8] == 0)
                generate_random_uuid(uuid);

        if (get_user(len, oldlenp))
                return -EFAULT;
        if (len) {
                if (len > 16)
                        len = 16;
                if (copy_to_user(oldval, uuid, len) ||
                    put_user(len, oldlenp))
                        return -EFAULT;
        }
        return 1;
}

ctl_table random_table[] = {
        {
                .ctl_name       = RANDOM_POOLSIZE,
                .procname       = "poolsize",
                .data           = &sysctl_poolsize,
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0644,
                .proc_handler   = &proc_do_poolsize,
                .strategy       = &poolsize_strategy,
        },
        {
                .ctl_name       = RANDOM_ENTROPY_COUNT,
                .procname       = "entropy_avail",
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0444,
                .proc_handler   = &proc_dointvec,
        },
        {
                .ctl_name       = RANDOM_READ_THRESH,
                .procname       = "read_wakeup_threshold",
                .data           = &random_read_wakeup_thresh,
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0644,
                .proc_handler   = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
                .strategy       = &sysctl_intvec,
                .extra1         = &min_read_thresh,
                .extra2         = &max_read_thresh,
        },
        {
                .ctl_name       = RANDOM_WRITE_THRESH,
                .procname       = "write_wakeup_threshold",
                .data           = &random_write_wakeup_thresh,
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0644,
                .proc_handler   = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
                .strategy       = &sysctl_intvec,
                .extra1         = &min_write_thresh,
                .extra2         = &max_write_thresh,
        },
        {
                .ctl_name       = RANDOM_BOOT_ID,
                .procname       = "boot_id",
                .data           = &sysctl_bootid,
                .maxlen         = 16,
                .mode           = 0444,
                .proc_handler   = &proc_do_uuid,
                .strategy       = &uuid_strategy,
        },
        {
                .ctl_name       = RANDOM_UUID,
                .procname       = "uuid",
                .maxlen         = 16,
                .mode           = 0444,
                .proc_handler   = &proc_do_uuid,
                .strategy       = &uuid_strategy,
        },
        { .ctl_name = 0 }
};

static void sysctl_init_random(struct entropy_store *random_state)
{
        min_read_thresh = 8;
        min_write_thresh = 0;
        max_read_thresh = max_write_thresh = random_state->poolinfo.POOLBITS;
        random_table[1].data = &random_state->entropy_count;
}
#endif  /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */

/********************************************************************
 *
 * Random funtions for networking
 *
 ********************************************************************/

#ifdef CONFIG_INET
/*
 * TCP initial sequence number picking.  This uses the random number
 * generator to pick an initial secret value.  This value is hashed
 * along with the TCP endpoint information to provide a unique
 * starting point for each pair of TCP endpoints.  This defeats
 * attacks which rely on guessing the initial TCP sequence number.
 * This algorithm was suggested by Steve Bellovin.
 *
 * Using a very strong hash was taking an appreciable amount of the total
 * TCP connection establishment time, so this is a weaker hash,
 * compensated for by changing the secret periodically.
 */

/* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */
#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z)))
#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))

/*
 * The generic round function.  The application is so specific that
 * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally
 * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility.
 * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
 */
#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s)      \
        (a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32-s)))
#define K1 0
#define K2 013240474631UL
#define K3 015666365641UL

/*
 * Basic cut-down MD4 transform.  Returns only 32 bits of result.
 */
static __u32 halfMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[8])
{
        __u32   a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];

        /* Round 1 */
        ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[0] + K1,  3);
        ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[1] + K1,  7);
        ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[2] + K1, 11);
        ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[3] + K1, 19);
        ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[4] + K1,  3);
        ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[5] + K1,  7);
        ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[6] + K1, 11);
        ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[7] + K1, 19);

        /* Round 2 */
        ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[1] + K2,  3);
        ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[3] + K2,  5);
        ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[5] + K2,  9);
        ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[7] + K2, 13);
        ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[0] + K2,  3);
        ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[2] + K2,  5);
        ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[4] + K2,  9);
        ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[6] + K2, 13);

        /* Round 3 */
        ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[3] + K3,  3);
        ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[7] + K3,  9);
        ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[2] + K3, 11);
        ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[6] + K3, 15);
        ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[1] + K3,  3);
        ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[5] + K3,  9);
        ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[0] + K3, 11);
        ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[4] + K3, 15);

        return buf[1] + b;      /* "most hashed" word */
        /* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
}

#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)

static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
{
        __u32   a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];

        /* Round 1 */
        ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1,  3);
        ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + K1,  7);
        ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + K1, 11);
        ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + K1, 19);
        ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K1,  3);
        ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + K1,  7);
        ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + K1, 11);
        ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K1, 19);
        ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + K1,  3);
        ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + K1,  7);
        ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[10] + K1, 11);
        ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[11] + K1, 19);

        /* Round 2 */
        ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + K2,  3);
        ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 3] + K2,  5);
        ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 5] + K2,  9);
        ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K2, 13);
        ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K2,  3);
        ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[11] + K2,  5);
        ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 0] + K2,  9);
        ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K2, 13);
        ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K2,  3);
        ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + K2,  5);
        ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 8] + K2,  9);
        ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[10] + K2, 13);

        /* Round 3 */
        ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 3] + K3,  3);
        ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 7] + K3,  9);
        ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[11] + K3, 11);
        ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K3, 15);
        ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 6] + K3,  3);
        ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[10] + K3,  9);
        ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 1] + K3, 11);
        ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 5] + K3, 15);
        ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K3,  3);
        ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + K3,  9);
        ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
        ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);

        return buf[1] + b;      /* "most hashed" word */
        /* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
}
#endif

#undef ROUND
#undef F
#undef G
#undef H
#undef K1
#undef K2
#undef K3

/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
#define REKEY_INTERVAL  (300*HZ)
/*
 * Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
 * bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
 * bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
 *
 * The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
 * in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
 * - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
 * - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
 *      to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
 *      clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
 *
 * Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
 * 4.55 hours.
 *
 * SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
 *                      Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
 *              
 */
#define COUNT_BITS      8
#define COUNT_MASK      ( (1<<COUNT_BITS)-1)
#define HASH_BITS       24
#define HASH_MASK       ( (1<<HASH_BITS)-1 )

static struct keydata {
        __u32   count;          // already shifted to the final position
        __u32   secret[12];
} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];

static unsigned int ip_cnt;

static void rekey_seq_generator(void *private_);

static DECLARE_WORK(rekey_work, rekey_seq_generator, NULL);

/*
 * Lock avoidance:
 * The ISN generation runs lockless - it's just a hash over random data.
 * State changes happen every 5 minutes when the random key is replaced.
 * Synchronization is performed by having two copies of the hash function
 * state and rekey_seq_generator always updates the inactive copy.
 * The copy is then activated by updating ip_cnt.
 * The implementation breaks down if someone blocks the thread
 * that processes SYN requests for more than 5 minutes. Should never
 * happen, and even if that happens only a not perfectly compliant
 * ISN is generated, nothing fatal.
 */
static void rekey_seq_generator(void *private_)
{
        struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1^(ip_cnt&1)];

        get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
        keyptr->count = (ip_cnt&COUNT_MASK)<<HASH_BITS;
        smp_wmb();
        ip_cnt++;
        schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work, REKEY_INTERVAL);
}

static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
{
        struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt&1];

        smp_rmb();

        return keyptr;
}

static __init int seqgen_init(void)
{
        rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
        return 0;
}
late_initcall(seqgen_init);

#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32 *saddr, __u32 *daddr,
                                   __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
{
        struct timeval  tv;
        __u32           seq;
        __u32           hash[12];
        struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();

        /* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
         * Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
         */


        memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
        hash[4]=(sport << 16) + dport;
        memcpy(&hash[5],keyptr->secret,sizeof(__u32)*7);

        seq = twothirdsMD4Transform(daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
        seq += keyptr->count;

        do_gettimeofday(&tv);
        seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec*1000000;

        return seq;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
#endif

__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
                                 __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
{
        struct timeval  tv;
        __u32           seq;
        __u32   hash[4];
        struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();

        /*
         *  Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
         *  (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
         *  Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is 
         *  then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
         */
        hash[0]=saddr;
        hash[1]=daddr;
        hash[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
        hash[3]=keyptr->secret[11];

        seq = halfMD4Transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
        seq += keyptr->count;
        /*
         *      As close as possible to RFC 793, which
         *      suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
         *      Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
         *      For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
         *      That's funny, Linux has one built in!  Use it!
         *      (Networks are faster now - should this be increased?)
         */
        do_gettimeofday(&tv);
        seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec*1000000;
#if 0
        printk("init_seq(%lx, %lx, %d, %d) = %d\n",
               saddr, daddr, sport, dport, seq);
#endif
        return seq;
}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcp_sequence_number);

/*  The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
 *  All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw@msu.ru>.
 */
__u32 secure_ip_id(__u32 daddr)
{
        struct keydata *keyptr;
        __u32 hash[4];

        keyptr = get_keyptr();

        /*
         *  Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
         *  The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
         *  which is then hashed with random data.
         */
        hash[0] = daddr;
        hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
        hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
        hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];

        return halfMD4Transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
}

#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
/*
 * Secure SYN cookie computation. This is the algorithm worked out by
 * Dan Bernstein and Eric Schenk.
 *
 * For linux I implement the 1 minute counter by looking at the jiffies clock.
 * The count is passed in as a parameter, so this code doesn't much care.
 */

#define COOKIEBITS 24   /* Upper bits store count */
#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)

static int      syncookie_init;
static __u32    syncookie_secret[2][16-3+HASH_BUFFER_SIZE];

__u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
                __u16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __u32 data)
{
        __u32   tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
        __u32   seq;

        /*
         * Pick two random secrets the first time we need a cookie.
         */
        if (syncookie_init == 0) {
                get_random_bytes(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret));
                syncookie_init = 1;
        }

        /*
         * Compute the secure sequence number.
         * The output should be:
         *   HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24)
         *      + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24).
         * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every
         * minute by 1.
         * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
         * MSS into the second hash value.
         */

        memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
        tmp[0]=saddr;
        tmp[1]=daddr;
        tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
        HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);
        seq = tmp[17] + sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS);

        memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[1], sizeof(syncookie_secret[1]));
        tmp[0]=saddr;
        tmp[1]=daddr;
        tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
        tmp[3] = count; /* minute counter */
        HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);

        /* Add in the second hash and the data */
        return seq + ((tmp[17] + data) & COOKIEMASK);
}

/*
 * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie.
 * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
 * range.  This must be checked by the caller.
 *
 * The count value used to generate the cookie must be within
 * "maxdiff" if the current (passed-in) "count".  The return value
 * is (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
 */
__u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
                __u16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __u32 maxdiff)
{
        __u32   tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
        __u32   diff;

        if (syncookie_init == 0)
                return (__u32)-1;       /* Well, duh! */

        /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
        memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
        tmp[0]=saddr;
        tmp[1]=daddr;
        tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
        HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);
        cookie -= tmp[17] + sseq;
        /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */

        diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32)-1 >> COOKIEBITS);
        if (diff >= maxdiff)
                return (__u32)-1;

        memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[1], sizeof(syncookie_secret[1]));
        tmp[0] = saddr;
        tmp[1] = daddr;
        tmp[2] = (sport << 16) + dport;
        tmp[3] = count - diff;  /* minute counter */
        HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);

        return (cookie - tmp[17]) & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
}
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_INET */

/*
 * Get a random word:
 */
unsigned int get_random_int(void)
{
        unsigned int val = 0;

        if (!exec_shield_randomize)
                return 0;

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_HAS_TSC
        rdtscl(val);
#endif
        val += current->pid + jiffies + (int)val;

        /*
         * Use IP's RNG. It suits our purpose perfectly: it re-keys itself
         * every second, from the entropy pool (and thus creates a limited
         * drain on it), and uses halfMD4Transform within the second. We
         * also spice it with the TSC (if available), jiffies, PID and the
         * stack address:
         */
        return secure_ip_id(val);
}

unsigned long randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long len)
{
        unsigned long range = end - len - start;
        if (end <= start + len)
                return 0;
        return PAGE_ALIGN(get_random_int() % range + start);
}