1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
50 #include <linux/namei.h>
52 #include <linux/module.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/selinux.h>
66 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
71 extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
73 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
74 extern int audit_enabled;
76 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
77 * for saving names from getname(). */
78 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
80 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
81 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
83 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
85 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
86 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
88 /* number of audit rules */
91 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
92 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
93 * pointers at syscall exit time).
95 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
98 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
99 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
109 struct audit_aux_data {
110 struct audit_aux_data *next;
114 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
116 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
117 struct audit_aux_data d;
123 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv {
124 struct audit_aux_data d;
127 unsigned int msg_prio;
128 struct timespec abs_timeout;
131 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify {
132 struct audit_aux_data d;
134 struct sigevent notification;
137 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr {
138 struct audit_aux_data d;
140 struct mq_attr mqstat;
143 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
144 struct audit_aux_data d;
146 unsigned long qbytes;
153 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
154 struct audit_aux_data d;
160 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
161 struct audit_aux_data d;
163 unsigned long args[0];
166 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
167 struct audit_aux_data d;
172 struct audit_aux_data_path {
173 struct audit_aux_data d;
174 struct dentry *dentry;
175 struct vfsmount *mnt;
178 /* The per-task audit context. */
179 struct audit_context {
180 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
181 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
182 enum audit_state state;
183 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
184 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
185 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
186 int major; /* syscall number */
187 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
188 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
189 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
190 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
192 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
193 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
195 struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
196 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
197 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
199 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
201 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
202 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
203 unsigned long personality;
212 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
213 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
215 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
216 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
217 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
221 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
223 unsigned n = ctx->major;
224 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
226 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
227 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
229 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
230 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
232 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
233 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
236 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
237 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
238 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
240 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
241 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
243 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
244 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
248 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
250 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
251 case 4: /* socketcall */
252 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
254 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
260 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
261 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
263 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
264 struct audit_krule *rule,
265 struct audit_context *ctx,
266 struct audit_names *name,
267 enum audit_state *state)
269 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
272 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
273 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
278 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
282 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
285 result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
288 result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
291 result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
294 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
297 result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
300 result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
303 result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
306 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
309 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
313 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
317 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
318 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
321 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
323 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
325 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
330 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
333 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
334 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
343 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
346 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
347 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
356 result = (name->ino == f->val);
358 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
359 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
367 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
368 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
369 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
374 result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
376 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
377 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
378 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
381 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
382 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
383 match for now to avoid losing information that
384 may be wanted. An error message will also be
388 selinux_task_ctxid(tsk, &sid);
391 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
400 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
401 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
402 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
405 /* Find files that match */
407 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
408 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
411 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
412 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
421 /* Find ipc objects that match */
423 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
424 for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
426 if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
427 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
428 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
442 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
444 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
445 /* ignore this field for filtering */
449 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
457 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
458 switch (rule->action) {
459 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
460 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
465 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
466 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
467 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
469 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
471 struct audit_entry *e;
472 enum audit_state state;
475 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
476 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
482 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
485 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
486 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
487 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
488 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
490 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
491 struct audit_context *ctx,
492 struct list_head *list)
494 struct audit_entry *e;
495 enum audit_state state;
497 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
498 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
501 if (!list_empty(list)) {
502 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
503 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
505 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
506 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
507 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
515 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
518 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
519 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
520 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
521 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
523 enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
524 struct audit_context *ctx)
527 struct audit_entry *e;
528 enum audit_state state;
530 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
531 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
534 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
535 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
536 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
537 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
538 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
539 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
541 if (list_empty(list))
544 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
545 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
546 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
553 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
556 void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
561 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
565 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
567 if (likely(!context))
569 context->return_valid = return_valid;
570 context->return_code = return_code;
572 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
573 enum audit_state state;
575 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
576 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
577 context->auditable = 1;
581 state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
582 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
583 context->auditable = 1;
589 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
593 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
598 if (context->auditable
599 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
600 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
601 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
602 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
604 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
605 context->name_count, context->put_count,
607 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
608 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
609 context->names[i].name,
610 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
617 context->put_count = 0;
618 context->ino_count = 0;
621 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
622 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
623 __putname(context->names[i].name);
625 context->name_count = 0;
629 mntput(context->pwdmnt);
631 context->pwdmnt = NULL;
634 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
636 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
638 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
639 if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
640 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
645 context->aux = aux->next;
650 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
651 enum audit_state state)
653 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
655 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
656 context->state = state;
657 context->loginuid = loginuid;
660 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
662 struct audit_context *context;
664 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
666 audit_zero_context(context, state);
671 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
674 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
675 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
676 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
679 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
681 struct audit_context *context;
682 enum audit_state state;
684 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
685 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
687 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
688 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
691 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
692 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
696 /* Preserve login uid */
697 context->loginuid = -1;
698 if (current->audit_context)
699 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
701 tsk->audit_context = context;
702 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
706 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
708 struct audit_context *previous;
712 previous = context->previous;
713 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
715 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
716 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
717 context->serial, context->major,
718 context->name_count, count);
720 audit_free_names(context);
721 audit_free_aux(context);
722 kfree(context->filterkey);
727 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
730 static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
735 len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
742 ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
746 len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
750 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
755 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
759 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
761 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
762 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
763 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
767 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
768 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
769 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
772 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
775 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
777 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
778 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
779 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
784 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
786 audit_log_task_context(ab);
789 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
791 int i, call_panic = 0;
792 struct audit_buffer *ab;
793 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
797 context->pid = tsk->pid;
798 context->ppid = sys_getppid(); /* sic. tsk == current in all cases */
799 context->uid = tsk->uid;
800 context->gid = tsk->gid;
801 context->euid = tsk->euid;
802 context->suid = tsk->suid;
803 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
804 context->egid = tsk->egid;
805 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
806 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
807 context->personality = tsk->personality;
809 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
811 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
812 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
813 context->arch, context->major);
814 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
815 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
816 if (context->return_valid)
817 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
818 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
819 context->return_code);
821 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
822 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
823 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
824 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
827 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
829 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
830 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
831 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
832 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
843 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
844 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
846 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
848 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
849 if (context->filterkey) {
850 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
851 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
853 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
856 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
858 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
860 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
863 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
864 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *axi = (void *)aux;
866 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
867 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
868 axi->oflag, axi->mode, axi->attr.mq_flags,
869 axi->attr.mq_maxmsg, axi->attr.mq_msgsize,
870 axi->attr.mq_curmsgs);
873 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
874 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *axi = (void *)aux;
876 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
877 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
878 axi->mqdes, axi->msg_len, axi->msg_prio,
879 axi->abs_timeout.tv_sec, axi->abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
882 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
883 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *axi = (void *)aux;
885 "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
887 axi->notification.sigev_signo);
890 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
891 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *axi = (void *)aux;
893 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
896 axi->mqstat.mq_flags, axi->mqstat.mq_maxmsg,
897 axi->mqstat.mq_msgsize, axi->mqstat.mq_curmsgs);
901 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
903 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
904 axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
905 if (axi->osid != 0) {
908 if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
909 axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
910 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
914 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
919 case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
920 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
922 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
923 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
927 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
930 for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) {
931 audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
932 p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
933 audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
937 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
939 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
940 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
941 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
942 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
945 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
946 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
948 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
949 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
952 case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
953 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
954 audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
961 if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
962 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
964 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
968 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
969 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
971 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
973 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
975 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
978 switch(n->name_len) {
979 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
980 /* log the full path */
981 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
982 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
985 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
986 * directory component is the cwd */
987 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", context->pwd,
991 /* log the name's directory component */
992 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
993 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name_len,
997 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
999 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1000 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1001 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1002 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1015 if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
1016 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1017 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1020 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1027 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1031 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1032 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1034 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1036 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1038 struct audit_context *context;
1040 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1041 if (likely(!context))
1044 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1045 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1046 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1047 * in the context of the idle thread */
1048 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1049 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1050 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1052 audit_free_context(context);
1056 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1057 * @tsk: task being audited
1058 * @arch: architecture type
1059 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1060 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1061 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1062 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1063 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1065 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1066 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1067 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1068 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1069 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1070 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1073 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1074 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1075 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1077 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1078 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1079 enum audit_state state;
1084 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1085 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1086 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1087 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1088 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1092 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1094 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1095 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1097 if (context->in_syscall) {
1098 struct audit_context *newctx;
1102 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1103 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1104 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1106 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1108 newctx->previous = context;
1110 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1112 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1113 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1114 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1115 * to abandon auditing. */
1116 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1119 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1124 context->arch = arch;
1125 context->major = major;
1126 context->argv[0] = a1;
1127 context->argv[1] = a2;
1128 context->argv[2] = a3;
1129 context->argv[3] = a4;
1131 state = context->state;
1132 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1133 if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
1134 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1135 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1138 context->serial = 0;
1139 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1140 context->in_syscall = 1;
1141 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
1145 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1146 * @tsk: task being audited
1147 * @valid: success/failure flag
1148 * @return_code: syscall return value
1150 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1151 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1152 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1153 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1154 * free the names stored from getname().
1156 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1158 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1159 struct audit_context *context;
1161 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1163 if (likely(!context))
1166 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1167 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1169 context->in_syscall = 0;
1170 context->auditable = 0;
1172 if (context->previous) {
1173 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1174 context->previous = NULL;
1175 audit_free_context(context);
1176 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1178 audit_free_names(context);
1179 audit_free_aux(context);
1180 kfree(context->filterkey);
1181 context->filterkey = NULL;
1182 tsk->audit_context = context;
1187 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1188 * @name: name to add
1190 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1191 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1193 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1195 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1197 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1200 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1201 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1202 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1203 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1208 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1209 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1210 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1211 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1212 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1213 ++context->name_count;
1214 if (!context->pwd) {
1215 read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
1216 context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
1217 context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
1218 read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
1223 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1224 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1226 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1227 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1228 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1230 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1232 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1235 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1236 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1237 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1238 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1239 if (context->name_count) {
1241 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1242 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1243 context->names[i].name,
1244 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1251 ++context->put_count;
1252 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1253 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1254 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1257 context->serial, context->major,
1258 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1259 context->put_count);
1266 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1267 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode)
1269 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1270 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1271 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1272 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1273 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1274 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1275 selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
1279 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1280 * @name: name being audited
1281 * @inode: inode being audited
1283 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1285 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
1288 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1290 if (!context->in_syscall)
1292 if (context->name_count
1293 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1294 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1295 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1296 else if (context->name_count > 1
1297 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1298 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1299 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1301 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1302 * associated name? */
1303 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
1305 idx = context->name_count;
1306 if (context->name_count == (AUDIT_NAMES - 1)) {
1308 "name_count maxed and losing entry [%d]=%s\n",
1309 context->name_count,
1310 context->names[context->name_count].name ?:
1313 context->name_count++;
1314 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1316 ++context->ino_count;
1319 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1323 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1324 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1325 * @inode: inode being audited
1326 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1328 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1329 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1330 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1331 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1332 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1333 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1334 * unsuccessful attempts.
1336 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
1337 const struct inode *parent)
1340 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1341 const char *found_name = NULL;
1344 if (!context->in_syscall)
1347 /* determine matching parent */
1349 goto update_context;
1350 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
1351 if (context->names[idx].ino == parent->i_ino) {
1352 const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
1357 if (audit_compare_dname_path(dname, name, &dirlen) == 0) {
1358 context->names[idx].name_len = dirlen;
1365 idx = context->name_count;
1366 if (context->name_count == (AUDIT_NAMES - 1)) {
1367 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed and losing entry [%d]=%s\n",
1368 context->name_count,
1369 context->names[context->name_count].name ?: "(null)");
1371 context->name_count++;
1373 context->ino_count++;
1375 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent directory.
1376 * All names for this context are relinquished in audit_free_names() */
1377 context->names[idx].name = found_name;
1378 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1379 context->names[idx].name_put = 0; /* don't call __putname() */
1382 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1384 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1386 /* A parent was not found in audit_names, so copy the inode data for the
1387 * provided parent. */
1389 idx = context->name_count;
1390 if (context->name_count == (AUDIT_NAMES - 1)) {
1392 "name_count maxed and losing entry [%d]=%s\n",
1393 context->name_count,
1394 context->names[context->name_count].name ?:
1397 context->name_count++;
1399 context->ino_count++;
1401 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent);
1406 * audit_inode_update - update inode info for last collected name
1407 * @inode: inode being audited
1409 * When open() is called on an existing object with the O_CREAT flag, the inode
1410 * data audit initially collects is incorrect. This additional hook ensures
1411 * audit has the inode data for the actual object to be opened.
1413 void __audit_inode_update(const struct inode *inode)
1415 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1418 if (!context->in_syscall || !inode)
1421 if (context->name_count == 0) {
1422 context->name_count++;
1424 context->ino_count++;
1427 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1429 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1432 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
1435 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1436 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1437 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1438 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1440 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1442 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1443 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1446 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1447 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1448 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1449 *serial = ctx->serial;
1454 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
1455 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
1456 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1460 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
1462 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1464 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
1467 /* Only log if audit is enabled */
1468 if (context->in_syscall) {
1469 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1471 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1473 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1474 "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
1475 task->pid, task->uid,
1476 context->loginuid, loginuid);
1480 context->loginuid = loginuid;
1486 * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
1487 * @ctx: the audit_context
1489 * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
1491 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1493 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1497 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
1500 * @u_attr: queue attributes
1502 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1504 int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr)
1506 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *ax;
1507 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1512 if (likely(!context))
1515 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1519 if (u_attr != NULL) {
1520 if (copy_from_user(&ax->attr, u_attr, sizeof(ax->attr))) {
1525 memset(&ax->attr, 0, sizeof(ax->attr));
1530 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
1531 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1532 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1537 * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
1538 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1539 * @msg_len: Message length
1540 * @msg_prio: Message priority
1541 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
1543 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1545 int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
1546 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
1548 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
1549 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1554 if (likely(!context))
1557 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1561 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
1562 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
1567 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
1570 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
1571 ax->msg_prio = msg_prio;
1573 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
1574 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1575 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1580 * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
1581 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1582 * @msg_len: Message length
1583 * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
1584 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
1586 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1588 int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len,
1589 unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio,
1590 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
1592 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
1593 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1598 if (likely(!context))
1601 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1605 if (u_msg_prio != NULL) {
1606 if (get_user(ax->msg_prio, u_msg_prio)) {
1613 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
1614 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
1619 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
1622 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
1624 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
1625 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1626 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1631 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
1632 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1633 * @u_notification: Notification event
1635 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1638 int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification)
1640 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *ax;
1641 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1646 if (likely(!context))
1649 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1653 if (u_notification != NULL) {
1654 if (copy_from_user(&ax->notification, u_notification, sizeof(ax->notification))) {
1659 memset(&ax->notification, 0, sizeof(ax->notification));
1663 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
1664 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1665 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1670 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
1671 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1674 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1676 int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
1678 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *ax;
1679 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1684 if (likely(!context))
1687 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1692 ax->mqstat = *mqstat;
1694 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
1695 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1696 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1701 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
1702 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
1704 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1706 int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
1708 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1709 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1711 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1715 ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
1716 ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
1717 ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
1718 selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
1720 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
1721 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1722 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1727 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
1728 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
1729 * @uid: msgq user id
1730 * @gid: msgq group id
1731 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
1733 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1735 int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
1737 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1738 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1740 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1744 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1749 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
1750 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1751 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1755 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1757 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
1758 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1759 unsigned long p, next;
1762 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
1765 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p,
1770 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
1771 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
1772 for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) {
1773 struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE];
1774 void *kaddr = kmap(page);
1775 next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1776 memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p);
1781 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
1782 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1783 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1789 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
1790 * @nargs: number of args
1793 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1795 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
1797 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
1798 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1800 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
1803 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
1808 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
1810 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
1811 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1812 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1817 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
1818 * @len: data length in user space
1819 * @a: data address in kernel space
1821 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1823 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
1825 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
1826 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1828 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
1831 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1836 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
1838 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
1839 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1840 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1845 * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
1846 * @dentry: dentry to record
1847 * @mnt: mnt to record
1849 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1851 * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
1853 int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
1855 struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
1856 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1858 if (likely(!context))
1861 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1865 ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
1866 ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
1868 ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
1869 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1870 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1875 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
1876 * @sig: signal value
1877 * @t: task being signaled
1879 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
1880 * and uid that is doing that.
1882 void __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
1884 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
1885 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
1886 extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
1888 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) {
1889 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1890 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
1891 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
1893 audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
1895 audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
1896 selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);