-/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support -*- linux-c -*-
+/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
* Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
*
* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
-
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
/* 0 = no checking
struct audit_names {
const char *name;
unsigned long ino;
+ dev_t dev;
+ umode_t mode;
+ uid_t uid;
+ gid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
+ unsigned flags;
+};
+
+struct audit_aux_data {
+ struct audit_aux_data *next;
+ int type;
+};
+
+#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
+
+struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
+ struct audit_aux_data d;
+ struct ipc_perm p;
+ unsigned long qbytes;
+ uid_t uid;
+ gid_t gid;
+ mode_t mode;
+};
+
+struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
+ struct audit_aux_data d;
+ int nargs;
+ unsigned long args[0];
+};
+
+struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
+ struct audit_aux_data d;
+ int len;
+ char a[0];
+};
+
+struct audit_aux_data_path {
+ struct audit_aux_data d;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ struct vfsmount *mnt;
};
/* The per-task audit context. */
int major; /* syscall number */
unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
- int return_code;/* syscall return code */
+ long return_code;/* syscall return code */
int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
int name_count;
struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
+ struct dentry * pwd;
+ struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
+ struct audit_aux_data *aux;
/* Save things to print about task_struct */
pid_t pid;
uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
unsigned long personality;
+ int arch;
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
int put_count;
/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
* time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
* syscall exit time. */
-static LIST_HEAD(audit_tsklist);
-static LIST_HEAD(audit_entlist);
-static LIST_HEAD(audit_extlist);
+static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
+#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
+#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
+#endif
+};
struct audit_entry {
struct list_head list;
struct audit_rule rule;
};
+extern int audit_pid;
+
/* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
* audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
* audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
* audit_netlink_sem. */
-static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
- struct list_head *list)
+static inline void audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
+ struct list_head *list)
{
- if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_PREPEND) {
- entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_PREPEND;
+ if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
+ entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
} else {
list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
}
- return 0;
}
static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
return 0;
}
}
- return -EFAULT; /* No matching rule */
+ return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_NET
/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called during
* AUDIT_ADD. */
static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
return -1;
if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
return -1;
+ if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
+ return -1;
d->flags = s->flags;
d->action = s->action;
return 0;
}
-int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data)
+static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
{
- u32 flags;
+ int pid, seq;
+ int *dest = _dest;
struct audit_entry *entry;
+ int i;
+
+ pid = dest[0];
+ seq = dest[1];
+ kfree(dest);
+
+ down(&audit_netlink_sem);
+
+ /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
+ always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
+ for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+ list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
+ audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
+ &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
+ }
+ audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
+
+ up(&audit_netlink_sem);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
+ uid_t loginuid)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *entry;
+ struct task_struct *tsk;
+ int *dest;
int err = 0;
+ unsigned listnr;
switch (type) {
case AUDIT_LIST:
- /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
- always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
- list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_tsklist, list)
- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
- &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
- list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_entlist, list)
- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
- &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
- list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_extlist, list)
- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
- &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
+ /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
+ * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
+ * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
+ * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
+ * trying to _send_ the stuff */
+
+ dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dest)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ dest[0] = pid;
+ dest[1] = seq;
+
+ tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
+ if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
+ kfree(dest);
+ err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
+ }
break;
case AUDIT_ADD:
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
return -ENOMEM;
if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) {
kfree(entry);
return -EINVAL;
}
- flags = entry->rule.flags;
- if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
- err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_tsklist);
- if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
- err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_entlist);
- if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
- err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_extlist);
+ listnr = entry->rule.flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+ audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
break;
case AUDIT_DEL:
- flags =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags;
- if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
- err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_tsklist);
- if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
- err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_entlist);
- if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
- err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_extlist);
+ listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+ if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
+ if (!err)
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
return err;
}
-#endif
/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
* otherwise. */
case AUDIT_PERS:
result = (tsk->personality == value);
break;
+ case AUDIT_ARCH:
+ if (ctx)
+ result = (ctx->arch == value);
+ break;
case AUDIT_EXIT:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
break;
case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
- result = (ctx->return_code >= 0);
+ result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
break;
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].rdev)==value) {
+ if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
++result;
break;
}
case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].rdev)==value) {
+ if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
++result;
break;
}
case AUDIT_INODE:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].ino)==value) {
+ if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
++result;
break;
}
enum audit_state state;
rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_tsklist, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return state;
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
- * also not high enough that we already know we have to write and audit
+ * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
* record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
*/
static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+ if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
+ return AUDIT_DISABLED;
+
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
+static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
+ struct audit_rule *rule,
+ enum audit_state *state)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
+ u32 value = rule->values[i];
+ int result = 0;
+
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_PID:
+ result = (cb->creds.pid == value);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_UID:
+ result = (cb->creds.uid == value);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_GID:
+ result = (cb->creds.gid == value);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
+ result = (cb->loginuid == value);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
+ result = !result;
+ if (!result)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ switch (rule->action) {
+ case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
+ case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
+ case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+ enum audit_state state;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
+ if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
+ if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return ret; /* Audit by default */
+}
+
/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
int return_valid,
if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
enum audit_state state;
- state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_extlist);
+ state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
context->auditable = 1;
}
if (context->names[i].name)
__putname(context->names[i].name);
context->name_count = 0;
+ if (context->pwd)
+ dput(context->pwd);
+ if (context->pwdmnt)
+ mntput(context->pwdmnt);
+ context->pwd = NULL;
+ context->pwdmnt = NULL;
+}
+
+static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+
+ while ((aux = context->aux)) {
+ if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
+ struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
+ dput(axi->dentry);
+ mntput(axi->mnt);
+ }
+ context->aux = aux->next;
+ kfree(aux);
+ }
}
static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
/* Preserve login uid */
context->loginuid = -1;
- if (tsk->audit_context)
- context->loginuid = tsk->audit_context->loginuid;
+ if (current->audit_context)
+ context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
tsk->audit_context = context;
set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
context->name_count, count);
}
audit_free_names(context);
+ audit_free_aux(context);
kfree(context);
context = previous;
} while (context);
printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
}
-static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{
+ char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+ get_task_comm(name, current);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
+
+ if (!mm)
+ return;
+
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = mm->mmap;
+ while (vma) {
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
+ vma->vm_file) {
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
+ vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
+ vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
+ break;
+ }
+ vma = vma->vm_next;
+ }
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+}
+
+static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, unsigned int gfp_mask)
{
int i;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ struct audit_aux_data *aux;
- ab = audit_log_start(context);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
if (!ab)
return; /* audit_panic has been called */
- audit_log_format(ab, "syscall=%d", context->major);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
+ context->arch, context->major);
if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
if (context->return_valid)
- audit_log_format(ab, " exit=%d", context->return_code);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
+ (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
+ context->return_code);
audit_log_format(ab,
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
- " pid=%d loginuid=%d uid=%d gid=%d"
- " euid=%d suid=%d fsuid=%d"
- " egid=%d sgid=%d fsgid=%d",
+ " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
+ " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
+ " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
context->argv[0],
context->argv[1],
context->argv[2],
context->gid,
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
+ audit_log_task_info(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
+
+ for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
+ if (!ab)
+ continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
+
+ switch (aux->type) {
+ case AUDIT_IPC: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
+ axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+ break; }
+
+ case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
+ int i;
+ struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
+ for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
+ break; }
+
+ case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
+ audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
+ break; }
+
+ case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
+ break; }
+
+ }
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
+
+ if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
+ if (ab) {
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
+ }
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
- ab = audit_log_start(context);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
+
audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
- if (context->names[i].name)
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=%s",
- context->names[i].name);
+ if (context->names[i].name) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags);
+
if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
- audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu",
- context->names[i].ino);
- /* FIXME: should use format_dev_t, but ab structure is
- * opaque. */
- if (context->names[i].rdev != -1)
- audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x",
+ audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
+ " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
+ context->names[i].ino,
+ MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
+ MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
+ context->names[i].mode,
+ context->names[i].uid,
+ context->names[i].gid,
MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
audit_log_end(ab);
return;
/* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
- * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */
+ * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
+ * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
+ * in the context of the idle thread */
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context);
+ audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
audit_free_context(context);
}
-/* Compute a serial number for the audit record. Audit records are
- * written to user-space as soon as they are generated, so a complete
- * audit record may be written in several pieces. The timestamp of the
- * record and this serial number are used by the user-space daemon to
- * determine which pieces belong to the same audit record. The
- * (timestamp,serial) tuple is unique for each syscall and is live from
- * syscall entry to syscall exit.
- *
- * Atomic values are only guaranteed to be 24-bit, so we count down.
- *
- * NOTE: Another possibility is to store the formatted records off the
- * audit context (for those records that have a context), and emit them
- * all at syscall exit. However, this could delay the reporting of
- * significant errors until syscall exit (or never, if the system
- * halts). */
-static inline unsigned int audit_serial(void)
-{
- static atomic_t serial = ATOMIC_INIT(0xffffff);
- unsigned int a, b;
-
- do {
- a = atomic_read(&serial);
- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&serial))
- atomic_set(&serial, 0xffffff);
- b = atomic_read(&serial);
- } while (b != a - 1);
-
- return 0xffffff - b;
-}
-
/* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
* audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
* filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
* then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
* be written). */
-void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int major,
+void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
{
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
+ context->arch = arch;
context->major = major;
context->argv[0] = a1;
context->argv[1] = a2;
state = context->state;
if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
- state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_entlist);
+ state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
return;
* filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
* free the names stored from getname(). */
-void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int return_code)
+void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
{
struct audit_context *context;
get_task_struct(tsk);
task_lock(tsk);
- context = audit_get_context(tsk, 1, return_code);
+ context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
task_unlock(tsk);
/* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
return;
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context);
+ audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
context->in_syscall = 0;
context->auditable = 0;
+
if (context->previous) {
struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
context->previous = NULL;
tsk->audit_context = new_context;
} else {
audit_free_names(context);
+ audit_free_aux(context);
audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
tsk->audit_context = context;
}
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- BUG_ON(!context);
+ if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
+ return;
+
if (!context->in_syscall) {
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
- context->names[context->name_count].rdev = -1;
++context->name_count;
+ if (!context->pwd) {
+ read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
+ context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
+ context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
+ read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
+ }
+
}
/* Intercept a putname request. Called from
}
#endif
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_putname);
/* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
* fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
-void audit_inode(const char *name, unsigned long ino, dev_t rdev)
+void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
{
int idx;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
++context->ino_count;
#endif
}
- context->names[idx].ino = ino;
- context->names[idx].rdev = rdev;
+ context->names[idx].flags = flags;
+ context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
+ context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
+ context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
+ context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
+ context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
}
-void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct timespec *t, int *serial)
+void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
+ struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
{
- if (ctx) {
- t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
- t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
- *serial = ctx->serial;
- ctx->auditable = 1;
- } else {
- *t = CURRENT_TIME;
- *serial = 0;
- }
+ t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
+ t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
+ *serial = ctx->serial;
+ ctx->auditable = 1;
}
-int audit_set_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx, uid_t loginuid)
+int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
{
- if (ctx) {
- if (loginuid < 0)
- return -EINVAL;
- ctx->loginuid = loginuid;
+ if (task->audit_context) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
+ if (ab) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
+ "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
+ task->pid, task->uid,
+ task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
+ task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
}
return 0;
}
+
+uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
+}
+
+int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (likely(!context))
+ return 0;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ax->qbytes = qbytes;
+ ax->uid = uid;
+ ax->gid = gid;
+ ax->mode = mode;
+
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (likely(!context))
+ return 0;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ax->nargs = nargs;
+ memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (likely(!context))
+ return 0;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ax->len = len;
+ memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
+
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{
+ struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (likely(!context))
+ return 0;
+
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
+ ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
+
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
+ extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
+
+ if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) {
+ if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
+ struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
+ audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
+ if (ctx)
+ audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
+ else
+ audit_sig_uid = current->uid;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
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