* Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
*
* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
- * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
* All Rights Reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
* okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
*
- * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
- * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
- *
- * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
- * filesystem information.
- *
- * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
- * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <asm/atomic.h>
-#include <asm/types.h>
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/list.h>
-#include <linux/tty.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
-
-#include "audit.h"
-extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
+/* 0 = no checking
+ 1 = put_count checking
+ 2 = verbose put_count checking
+*/
+#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
extern int audit_enabled;
* path_lookup. */
#define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
+/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
+ a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
+ the syscall filter. */
+enum audit_state {
+ AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
+ * No syscall-specific audit records can
+ * be generated. */
+ AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
+ * but don't necessarily fill it in at
+ * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
+ * instead). */
+ AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
+ * and always fill it in at syscall
+ * entry time. This makes a full
+ * syscall record available if some
+ * other part of the kernel decides it
+ * should be recorded. */
+ AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
+ * always fill it in at syscall entry
+ * time, and always write out the audit
+ * record at syscall exit time. */
+};
+
/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
* we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
* pointers at syscall exit time).
struct audit_names {
const char *name;
unsigned long ino;
- unsigned long pino;
dev_t dev;
umode_t mode;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ unsigned flags;
};
struct audit_aux_data {
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
mode_t mode;
- u32 osid;
};
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
#endif
};
+ /* Public API */
+/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
+ * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
+ * syscall exit time. */
+static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
+#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
+#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
+#endif
+};
+
+struct audit_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ struct audit_rule rule;
+};
+
+extern int audit_pid;
+
+/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called from
+ * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */
+static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
+ && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
+ && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
+ return -1;
+ if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
+ return -1;
+ if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
+ return -1;
+
+ d->flags = s->flags;
+ d->action = s->action;
+ d->field_count = s->field_count;
+ for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
+ d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
+ d->values[i] = s->values[i];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
+ * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and
+ * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
+static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (a->flags != b->flags)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (a->action != b->action)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
+ if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
+ || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
+ if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
+ * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
+ * audit_netlink_sem. */
+static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
+ struct list_head *list)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *entry;
+
+ /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
+ * addition routine. */
+ list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) {
+ if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) {
+ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) {
+ kfree(entry);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
+ entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+ list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
+ } else {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
+ kfree(e);
+}
+
+/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
+ * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
+ * audit_netlink_sem. */
+static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
+ struct list_head *list)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+
+ /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
+ * deletion routine. */
+ list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
+ if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
+ list_del_rcu(&e->list);
+ call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
+}
+
+static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
+{
+ int pid, seq;
+ int *dest = _dest;
+ struct audit_entry *entry;
+ int i;
+
+ pid = dest[0];
+ seq = dest[1];
+ kfree(dest);
+
+ down(&audit_netlink_sem);
+
+ /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
+ always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
+ for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+ list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
+ audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
+ &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
+ }
+ audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
+
+ up(&audit_netlink_sem);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
+ uid_t loginuid)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk;
+ int *dest;
+ int err = 0;
+ unsigned listnr;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case AUDIT_LIST:
+ /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
+ * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
+ * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
+ * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
+ * trying to _send_ the stuff */
+
+ dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dest)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ dest[0] = pid;
+ dest[1] = seq;
+
+ tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
+ if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
+ kfree(dest);
+ err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_ADD:
+ listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+ if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
+ if (!err)
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_DEL:
+ listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+ if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
+ if (!err)
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
* otherwise. */
static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct audit_krule *rule,
+ struct audit_rule *rule,
struct audit_context *ctx,
enum audit_state *state)
{
- int i, j, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
+ int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
+ u32 value = rule->values[i];
int result = 0;
- switch (f->type) {
+ switch (field) {
case AUDIT_PID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->pid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_UID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->uid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_EUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->euid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_SUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->suid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_FSUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_GID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->gid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_EGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->egid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_SGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->sgid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_FSGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_PERS:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->personality == value);
break;
case AUDIT_ARCH:
- if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
+ if (ctx)
+ result = (ctx->arch == value);
break;
case AUDIT_EXIT:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (ctx->return_code == value);
break;
case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
- if (f->val)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
+ if (value)
+ result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
else
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
+ result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_FAILURE);
}
break;
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
+ if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
++result;
break;
}
case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
+ if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
++result;
break;
}
case AUDIT_INODE:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) ||
- audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) {
+ if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
++result;
break;
}
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
result = 0;
if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
- break;
- case AUDIT_SE_USER:
- case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
- /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
- a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
- match for now to avoid losing information that
- may be wanted. An error message will also be
- logged upon error */
- if (f->se_rule) {
- if (need_sid) {
- selinux_task_ctxid(tsk, &sid);
- need_sid = 0;
- }
- result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
- f->op,
- f->se_rule,
- ctx);
- }
+ result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_ARG0:
case AUDIT_ARG1:
case AUDIT_ARG2:
case AUDIT_ARG3:
if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
+ result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
break;
}
+ if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
+ result = !result;
if (!result)
return 0;
}
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
- * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
+ * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
*/
static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_context *ctx,
rcu_read_lock();
if (!list_empty(list)) {
- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
- && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return state;
- }
- }
+ int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+ int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+ if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
+ && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return state;
+ }
+ }
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
+static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
+ struct audit_rule *rule,
+ enum audit_state *state)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
+ u32 value = rule->values[i];
+ int result = 0;
+
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_PID:
+ result = (cb->creds.pid == value);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_UID:
+ result = (cb->creds.uid == value);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_GID:
+ result = (cb->creds.gid == value);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
+ result = (cb->loginuid == value);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
+ result = !result;
+ if (!result)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ switch (rule->action) {
+ case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
+ case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
+ case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+ enum audit_state state;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
+ if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
+ if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return ret; /* Audit by default */
+}
+
+/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
int return_valid,
int return_code)
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
if (context->auditable
||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
+ printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
" name_count=%d put_count=%d"
" ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__,
+ __LINE__,
context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
context->name_count, context->put_count,
context->ino_count);
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
context->names[i].name,
- context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
- }
+ context->names[i].name);
dump_stack();
return;
}
context->ino_count = 0;
#endif
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
if (context->names[i].name)
__putname(context->names[i].name);
- }
context->name_count = 0;
if (context->pwd)
dput(context->pwd);
dput(axi->dentry);
mntput(axi->mnt);
}
-
context->aux = aux->next;
kfree(aux);
}
return context;
}
-/**
- * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
- * @tsk: task
- *
- * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
+/* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
* if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
* specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
- * needed.
- */
+ * needed. */
int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct audit_context *context;
printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
}
-static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
- char *ctx = NULL;
- ssize_t len = 0;
-
- len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
- if (len < 0) {
- if (len != -EINVAL)
- goto error_path;
- return;
- }
-
- ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ctx)
- goto error_path;
-
- len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
- if (len < 0 )
- goto error_path;
-
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- return;
-
-error_path:
- if (ctx)
- kfree(ctx);
- audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
- return;
-}
-
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
- struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
+ char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
- /* tsk == current */
-
- get_task_comm(name, tsk);
+ get_task_comm(name, current);
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
- if (mm) {
- down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- vma = mm->mmap;
- while (vma) {
- if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
- vma->vm_file) {
- audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
- vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
- vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
- break;
- }
- vma = vma->vm_next;
+ if (!mm)
+ return;
+
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = mm->mmap;
+ while (vma) {
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
+ vma->vm_file) {
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
+ vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
+ vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
+ break;
}
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = vma->vm_next;
}
- audit_log_task_context(ab);
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
-static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
- int i, call_panic = 0;
+ int i;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
- const char *tty;
-
- /* tsk == current */
- ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
if (!ab)
return; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
context->return_code);
- if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
- tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
- else
- tty = "(none)";
audit_log_format(ab,
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
" pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
" euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
- " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
+ " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
context->argv[0],
context->argv[1],
context->argv[2],
context->uid,
context->gid,
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
- context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
- audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
+ context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
+ audit_log_task_info(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
- ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
case AUDIT_IPC: {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab,
- " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
- axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
- if (axi->osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
- axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
- axi->osid);
- call_panic = 1;
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
- }
- break; }
-
- case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
- struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
- audit_log_format(ab,
- " new qbytes=%lx new iuid=%u new igid=%u new mode=%x",
- axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
- if (axi->osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
- axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
- axi->osid);
- call_panic = 1;
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
- }
+ " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
+ axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
break; }
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
}
if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
- ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD);
if (ab) {
audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
- unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino;
- unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
-
- ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
-
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- if (context->names[i].name)
+ if (context->names[i].name) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
- else
- audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
-
- if (pino != (unsigned long)-1)
- audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino);
- if (ino != (unsigned long)-1)
- audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino);
- if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1))
- audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
- " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
- MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
- MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
- context->names[i].mode,
- context->names[i].uid,
- context->names[i].gid,
- MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
- MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
- if (context->names[i].osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
- context->names[i].osid, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
- context->names[i].osid);
- call_panic = 2;
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
}
-
+ audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags);
+
+ if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
+ " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
+ context->names[i].ino,
+ MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
+ MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
+ context->names[i].mode,
+ context->names[i].uid,
+ context->names[i].gid,
+ MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
+ MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
audit_log_end(ab);
}
- if (call_panic)
- audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
}
-/**
- * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
- * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
- *
- * Called from copy_process and do_exit
- */
+/* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and
+ * __put_task_struct. */
void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct audit_context *context;
+ task_lock(tsk);
context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
+ task_unlock(tsk);
+
if (likely(!context))
return;
* function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
* We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
* in the context of the idle thread */
- /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
+ audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
audit_free_context(context);
}
-/**
- * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
- * @tsk: task being audited
- * @arch: architecture type
- * @major: major syscall type (function)
- * @a1: additional syscall register 1
- * @a2: additional syscall register 2
- * @a3: additional syscall register 3
- * @a4: additional syscall register 4
- *
- * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
+/* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
* audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
* filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
* per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
* then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
- * be written).
- */
-void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
+ * be written). */
+void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
enum audit_state state;
BUG_ON(!context);
- /*
- * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
+ /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
* calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
* with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
* architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
*
* i386 no
* x86_64 no
- * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
+ * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
*
* This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
* (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
}
-/**
- * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
- * @tsk: task being audited
- * @valid: success/failure flag
- * @return_code: syscall return value
- *
- * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
+/* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
* auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
* filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
- * free the names stored from getname().
- */
-void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
+ * free the names stored from getname(). */
+void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context;
+ get_task_struct(tsk);
+ task_lock(tsk);
context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
+ task_unlock(tsk);
+ /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
+ * called __put_task_struct. */
if (likely(!context))
- return;
+ goto out;
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
+ audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
context->in_syscall = 0;
context->auditable = 0;
audit_free_aux(context);
tsk->audit_context = context;
}
+ out:
+ put_task_struct(tsk);
}
-/**
- * audit_getname - add a name to the list
- * @name: name to add
- *
- * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
- * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
- */
+/* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
void audit_getname(const char *name)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
}
-/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
- * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
- *
- * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
- * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
- * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
- */
+/* Intercept a putname request. Called from
+ * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from
+ * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
+ * exit. */
void audit_putname(const char *name)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
context->names[i].name,
- context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
+ context->names[i].name);
}
#endif
__putname(name);
#endif
}
-static void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
-{
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-
- selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &context->names[idx].osid);
-}
-
-
-/**
- * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
- * @name: name being audited
- * @inode: inode being audited
- * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup())
- *
- * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
- */
-void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
+/* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
+ * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
+void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
{
int idx;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
++context->ino_count;
#endif
}
+ context->names[idx].flags = flags;
+ context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
- if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) &&
- (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
- context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
- context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino;
- } else {
- context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
- context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1;
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
- * @dname: inode's dentry name
- * @inode: inode being audited
- * @pino: inode number of dentry parent
- *
- * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
- * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
- * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
- * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
- * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
- * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
- * unsuccessful attempts.
- */
-void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
- unsigned long pino)
-{
- int idx;
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-
- if (!context->in_syscall)
- return;
-
- /* determine matching parent */
- if (dname)
- for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
- if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
- const char *n;
- const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
- int dlen = strlen(dname);
- int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
-
- if (nlen < dlen)
- continue;
-
- /* disregard trailing slashes */
- n = name + nlen - 1;
- while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
- n--;
-
- /* find last path component */
- n = n - dlen + 1;
- if (n < name)
- continue;
- else if (n > name) {
- if (*--n != '/')
- continue;
- else
- n++;
- }
-
- if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
- goto update_context;
- }
-
- /* catch-all in case match not found */
- idx = context->name_count++;
- context->names[idx].name = NULL;
- context->names[idx].pino = pino;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
- context->ino_count++;
-#endif
-
-update_context:
- if (inode) {
- context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
- context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
- context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
- context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
- context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
- context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
- }
}
-/**
- * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
- * @ctx: audit_context for the task
- * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
- * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
- *
- * Also sets the context as auditable.
- */
void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
{
ctx->auditable = 1;
}
-/**
- * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
- * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
- * @loginuid: loginuid value
- *
- * Returns 0.
- *
- * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
- */
int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
{
if (task->audit_context) {
return 0;
}
-/**
- * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
- * @ctx: the audit_context
- *
- * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
- */
uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
{
return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
}
-/**
- * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
- * @ipcp: ipc permissions
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- */
-int audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
{
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
if (likely(!context))
return 0;
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!ax)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
- ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
- ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
- selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
-
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
- ax->d.next = context->aux;
- context->aux = (void *)ax;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
- * @qbytes: msgq bytes
- * @uid: msgq user id
- * @gid: msgq group id
- * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- */
-int audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
-{
- struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-
- if (likely(!context))
- return 0;
-
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ax)
return -ENOMEM;
ax->uid = uid;
ax->gid = gid;
ax->mode = mode;
- selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
- * @nargs: number of args
- * @args: args array
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- */
int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
{
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
- * @len: data length in user space
- * @a: data address in kernel space
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- */
int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
{
struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
- * @dentry: dentry to record
- * @mnt: mnt to record
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- *
- * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
- */
int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
- * @sig: signal value
- * @t: task being signaled
- *
- * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
- * and uid that is doing that.
- */
void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
}
}
}
+