Revert to Fedora kernel-2.6.17-1.2187_FC5 patched with vs2.0.2.1; there are too many...

[linux-2.6.git] / kernel / ptrace.c

diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 80e780e..78119a7 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/signal.h>
-#include <linux/vs_base.h>
+#include <linux/vs_cvirt.h>
 
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
  *
  * Must be called with the tasklist lock write-held.
  */
-void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent)
+void __ptrace_link(task_t *child, task_t *new_parent)
 {
        BUG_ON(!list_empty(&child->ptrace_list));
        if (child->parent == new_parent)
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent)
  * TASK_TRACED, resume it now.
  * Requires that irqs be disabled.
  */
-void ptrace_untrace(struct task_struct *child)
+void ptrace_untrace(task_t *child)
 {
        spin_lock(&child->sighand->siglock);
        if (child->state == TASK_TRACED) {
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ void ptrace_untrace(struct task_struct *child)
  *
  * Must be called with the tasklist lock write-held.
  */
-void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child)
+void __ptrace_unlink(task_t *child)
 {
        BUG_ON(!child->ptrace);
 
@@ -117,18 +117,8 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill)
 
 int __ptrace_may_attach(struct task_struct *task)
 {
-       /* May we inspect the given task?
-        * This check is used both for attaching with ptrace
-        * and for allowing access to sensitive information in /proc.
-        *
-        * ptrace_attach denies several cases that /proc allows
-        * because setting up the necessary parent/child relationship
-        * or halting the specified task is impossible.
-        */
-       int dumpable = 0;
-       /* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
-       if (task == current)
-               return 0;
+       if (!task->mm)
+               return -EPERM;
        if (((current->uid != task->euid) ||
             (current->uid != task->suid) ||
             (current->uid != task->uid) ||
@@ -137,9 +127,7 @@ int __ptrace_may_attach(struct task_struct *task)
             (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
                return -EPERM;
        smp_rmb();
-       if (task->mm)
-               dumpable = task->mm->dumpable;
-       if (!dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+       if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
                return -EPERM;
 
        return security_ptrace(current, task);
@@ -185,8 +173,6 @@ repeat:
                goto repeat;
        }
 
-       if (!task->mm)
-               goto bad;
        /* the same process cannot be attached many times */
        if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
                goto bad;
@@ -211,7 +197,7 @@ out:
        return retval;
 }
 
-static inline void __ptrace_detach(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int data)
+void __ptrace_detach(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int data)
 {
        child->exit_code = data;
        /* .. re-parent .. */
@@ -230,7 +216,6 @@ int ptrace_detach(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int data)
        ptrace_disable(child);
 
        write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
-       /* protect against de_thread()->release_task() */
        if (child->ptrace)
                __ptrace_detach(child, data);
        write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);