-#include <linux/config.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <net/esp.h>
#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/pfkeyv2.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
+#include <net/protocol.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
-/* decapsulation data for use when post-processing */
-struct esp_decap_data {
- xfrm_address_t saddr;
- __u16 sport;
- __u8 proto;
-};
-
static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
struct iphdr *top_iph;
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
- struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc;
struct esp_data *esp;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int blksize;
esp = x->data;
alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
- blksize = (crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(tfm) + 3) & ~3;
- clen = (clen + 2 + blksize-1)&~(blksize-1);
+ desc.tfm = tfm;
+ desc.flags = 0;
+ blksize = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm), 4);
+ clen = ALIGN(clen + 2, blksize);
if (esp->conf.padlen)
- clen = (clen + esp->conf.padlen-1)&~(esp->conf.padlen-1);
+ clen = ALIGN(clen, esp->conf.padlen);
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, clen-skb->len+alen, &trailer)) < 0)
goto error;
if (x->encap) {
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
struct udphdr *uh;
- u32 *udpdata32;
+ __be32 *udpdata32;
uh = (struct udphdr *)esph;
uh->source = encap->encap_sport;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(uh + 1);
break;
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
- udpdata32 = (u32 *)(uh + 1);
+ udpdata32 = (__be32 *)(uh + 1);
udpdata32[0] = udpdata32[1] = 0;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(udpdata32 + 2);
break;
esph->spi = x->id.spi;
esph->seq_no = htonl(++x->replay.oseq);
+ xfrm_aevent_doreplay(x);
- if (esp->conf.ivlen)
- crypto_cipher_set_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
+ if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
+ if (unlikely(!esp->conf.ivinitted)) {
+ get_random_bytes(esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
+ esp->conf.ivinitted = 1;
+ }
+ crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
+ }
do {
struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
goto error;
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, esph->enc_data+esp->conf.ivlen-skb->data, clen);
- crypto_cipher_encrypt(tfm, sg, sg, clen);
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg, sg, clen);
if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
kfree(sg);
} while (0);
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ goto error;
+
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
- memcpy(esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
- crypto_cipher_get_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
+ memcpy(esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
+ crypto_blkcipher_get_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
}
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
- esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, (u8*)esph-skb->data,
- sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen+clen, trailer->tail);
- pskb_put(skb, trailer, alen);
+ err = esp_mac_digest(esp, skb, (u8 *)esph - skb->data,
+ sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen + clen);
+ memcpy(pskb_put(skb, trailer, alen), esp->auth.work_icv, alen);
}
ip_send_check(top_iph);
- err = 0;
-
error:
return err;
}
* expensive, so we only support truncated data, which is the recommended
* and common case.
*/
-static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_decap_state *decap, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iphdr *iph;
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = tfm };
struct sk_buff *trailer;
- int blksize = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm);
+ int blksize = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm), 4);
int alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
int elen = skb->len - sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) - esp->conf.ivlen - alen;
int nfrags;
- int encap_len = 0;
+ int ihl;
+ u8 nexthdr[2];
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ int padlen;
+ int err;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr)))
goto out;
/* If integrity check is required, do this. */
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
- u8 sum[esp->auth.icv_full_len];
- u8 sum1[alen];
-
- esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, 0, skb->len-alen, sum);
+ u8 sum[alen];
+
+ err = esp_mac_digest(esp, skb, 0, skb->len - alen);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen, sum1, alen))
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len - alen, sum, alen))
BUG();
- if (unlikely(memcmp(sum, sum1, alen))) {
+ if (unlikely(memcmp(esp->auth.work_icv, sum, alen))) {
x->stats.integrity_failed++;
goto out;
}
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)skb->data;
- iph = skb->nh.iph;
/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
if (esp->conf.ivlen)
- crypto_cipher_set_iv(esp->conf.tfm, esph->enc_data, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(esp->conf.tfm));
-
- {
- u8 nexthdr[2];
- struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
- u8 workbuf[60];
- int padlen;
-
- if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
- sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!sg)
- goto out;
- }
- skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen, elen);
- crypto_cipher_decrypt(esp->conf.tfm, sg, sg, elen);
- if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
- kfree(sg);
+ crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivlen);
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen-2, nexthdr, 2))
- BUG();
+ sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
- padlen = nexthdr[0];
- if (padlen+2 >= elen)
+ if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
+ sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!sg)
goto out;
+ }
+ skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen, elen);
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg, sg, elen);
+ if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
+ kfree(sg);
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ return err;
+
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen-2, nexthdr, 2))
+ BUG();
+
+ padlen = nexthdr[0];
+ if (padlen+2 >= elen)
+ goto out;
- /* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */
-
- if (x->encap && decap && decap->decap_type) {
- struct esp_decap_data *encap_data;
- struct udphdr *uh = (struct udphdr *) (iph+1);
-
- encap_data = (struct esp_decap_data *) (decap->decap_data);
- encap_data->proto = 0;
+ /* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */
- switch (decap->decap_type) {
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
- encap_data->proto = AF_INET;
- encap_data->saddr.a4 = iph->saddr;
- encap_data->sport = uh->source;
- encap_len = (void*)esph - (void*)uh;
- break;
+ iph = skb->nh.iph;
+ ihl = iph->ihl * 4;
- default:
- goto out;
- }
+ if (x->encap) {
+ struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
+ struct udphdr *uh = (void *)(skb->nh.raw + ihl);
+
+ /*
+ * 1) if the NAT-T peer's IP or port changed then
+ * advertize the change to the keying daemon.
+ * This is an inbound SA, so just compare
+ * SRC ports.
+ */
+ if (iph->saddr != x->props.saddr.a4 ||
+ uh->source != encap->encap_sport) {
+ xfrm_address_t ipaddr;
+
+ ipaddr.a4 = iph->saddr;
+ km_new_mapping(x, &ipaddr, uh->source);
+
+ /* XXX: perhaps add an extra
+ * policy check here, to see
+ * if we should allow or
+ * reject a packet from a
+ * different source
+ * address/port.
+ */
}
-
- iph->protocol = nexthdr[1];
- pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - alen - padlen - 2);
- memcpy(workbuf, skb->nh.raw, iph->ihl*4);
- skb->h.raw = skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen);
- skb->nh.raw += encap_len + sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
- memcpy(skb->nh.raw, workbuf, iph->ihl*4);
- skb->nh.iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len);
+
+ /*
+ * 2) ignore UDP/TCP checksums in case
+ * of NAT-T in Transport Mode, or
+ * perform other post-processing fixes
+ * as per draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-06,
+ * section 3.1.2
+ */
+ if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT ||
+ x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_BEET)
+ skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
}
+ iph->protocol = nexthdr[1];
+ pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - alen - padlen - 2);
+ skb->h.raw = __skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*esph) + esp->conf.ivlen) - ihl;
+
return 0;
out:
return -EINVAL;
}
-static int esp_post_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_decap_state *decap, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-
- if (x->encap) {
- struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap;
- struct esp_decap_data *decap_data;
-
- encap = x->encap;
- decap_data = (struct esp_decap_data *)(decap->decap_data);
-
- /* first, make sure that the decap type == the encap type */
- if (encap->encap_type != decap->decap_type)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- switch (encap->encap_type) {
- default:
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
- case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
- /*
- * 1) if the NAT-T peer's IP or port changed then
- * advertize the change to the keying daemon.
- * This is an inbound SA, so just compare
- * SRC ports.
- */
- if (decap_data->proto == AF_INET &&
- (decap_data->saddr.a4 != x->props.saddr.a4 ||
- decap_data->sport != encap->encap_sport)) {
- xfrm_address_t ipaddr;
-
- ipaddr.a4 = decap_data->saddr.a4;
- km_new_mapping(x, &ipaddr, decap_data->sport);
-
- /* XXX: perhaps add an extra
- * policy check here, to see
- * if we should allow or
- * reject a packet from a
- * different source
- * address/port.
- */
- }
-
- /*
- * 2) ignore UDP/TCP checksums in case
- * of NAT-T in Transport Mode, or
- * perform other post-processing fixes
- * as per * draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-06,
- * section 3.1.2
- */
- if (!x->props.mode)
- skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
-
- break;
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
static u32 esp4_get_max_size(struct xfrm_state *x, int mtu)
{
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
- u32 blksize = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm);
-
- if (x->props.mode) {
- mtu = (mtu + 2 + blksize-1)&~(blksize-1);
- } else {
- /* The worst case. */
- mtu += 2 + blksize;
+ u32 blksize = ALIGN(crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm), 4);
+ int enclen = 0;
+
+ switch (x->props.mode) {
+ case XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL:
+ mtu = ALIGN(mtu +2, blksize);
+ break;
+ default:
+ case XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT:
+ /* The worst case */
+ mtu = ALIGN(mtu + 2, 4) + blksize - 4;
+ break;
+ case XFRM_MODE_BEET:
+ /* The worst case. */
+ enclen = IPV4_BEET_PHMAXLEN;
+ mtu = ALIGN(mtu + enclen + 2, blksize);
+ break;
}
+
if (esp->conf.padlen)
- mtu = (mtu + esp->conf.padlen-1)&~(esp->conf.padlen-1);
+ mtu = ALIGN(mtu, esp->conf.padlen);
- return mtu + x->props.header_len + esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
+ return mtu + x->props.header_len + esp->auth.icv_trunc_len - enclen;
}
static void esp4_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
x = xfrm_state_lookup((xfrm_address_t *)&iph->daddr, esph->spi, IPPROTO_ESP, AF_INET);
if (!x)
return;
- NETDEBUG(printk(KERN_DEBUG "pmtu discovery on SA ESP/%08x/%08x\n",
- ntohl(esph->spi), ntohl(iph->daddr)));
+ NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "pmtu discovery on SA ESP/%08x/%08x\n",
+ ntohl(esph->spi), ntohl(iph->daddr));
xfrm_state_put(x);
}
if (!esp)
return;
- if (esp->conf.tfm) {
- crypto_free_tfm(esp->conf.tfm);
- esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
- }
- if (esp->conf.ivec) {
- kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
- esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
- }
- if (esp->auth.tfm) {
- crypto_free_tfm(esp->auth.tfm);
- esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
- }
- if (esp->auth.work_icv) {
- kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
- esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
- }
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(esp->conf.tfm);
+ esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
+ kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
+ esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
+ crypto_free_hash(esp->auth.tfm);
+ esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
+ kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
+ esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
kfree(esp);
}
-static int esp_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x, void *args)
+static int esp_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
struct esp_data *esp = NULL;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
/* null auth and encryption can have zero length keys */
if (x->aalg) {
if (x->ealg == NULL)
goto error;
- esp = kmalloc(sizeof(*esp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ esp = kzalloc(sizeof(*esp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (esp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- memset(esp, 0, sizeof(*esp));
-
if (x->aalg) {
struct xfrm_algo_desc *aalg_desc;
+ struct crypto_hash *hash;
esp->auth.key = x->aalg->alg_key;
esp->auth.key_len = (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
- esp->auth.tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
- if (esp->auth.tfm == NULL)
+ hash = crypto_alloc_hash(x->aalg->alg_name, 0,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(hash))
+ goto error;
+
+ esp->auth.tfm = hash;
+ if (crypto_hash_setkey(hash, esp->auth.key, esp->auth.key_len))
goto error;
- esp->auth.icv = esp_hmac_digest;
aalg_desc = xfrm_aalg_get_byname(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
BUG_ON(!aalg_desc);
if (aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8 !=
- crypto_tfm_alg_digestsize(esp->auth.tfm)) {
- NETDEBUG(printk(KERN_INFO "ESP: %s digestsize %u != %hu\n",
- x->aalg->alg_name,
- crypto_tfm_alg_digestsize(esp->auth.tfm),
- aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8));
+ crypto_hash_digestsize(hash)) {
+ NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "ESP: %s digestsize %u != %hu\n",
+ x->aalg->alg_name,
+ crypto_hash_digestsize(hash),
+ aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8);
goto error;
}
}
esp->conf.key = x->ealg->alg_key;
esp->conf.key_len = (x->ealg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
- if (x->props.ealgo == SADB_EALG_NULL)
- esp->conf.tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(x->ealg->alg_name, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB);
- else
- esp->conf.tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(x->ealg->alg_name, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CBC);
- if (esp->conf.tfm == NULL)
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(x->ealg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
goto error;
- esp->conf.ivlen = crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(esp->conf.tfm);
+ esp->conf.tfm = tfm;
+ esp->conf.ivlen = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
esp->conf.padlen = 0;
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
esp->conf.ivec = kmalloc(esp->conf.ivlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(esp->conf.ivec == NULL))
goto error;
- get_random_bytes(esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
+ esp->conf.ivinitted = 0;
}
- if (crypto_cipher_setkey(esp->conf.tfm, esp->conf.key, esp->conf.key_len))
+ if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, esp->conf.key, esp->conf.key_len))
goto error;
x->props.header_len = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
- if (x->props.mode)
+ if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL)
x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct iphdr);
if (x->encap) {
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
.destructor = esp_destroy,
.get_max_size = esp4_get_max_size,
.input = esp_input,
- .post_input = esp_post_input,
.output = esp_output
};
static int __init esp4_init(void)
{
- struct xfrm_decap_state decap;
-
- if (sizeof(struct esp_decap_data) >
- sizeof(decap.decap_data)) {
- extern void decap_data_too_small(void);
-
- decap_data_too_small();
- }
-
if (xfrm_register_type(&esp_type, AF_INET) < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "ip esp init: can't add xfrm type\n");
return -EAGAIN;
git://git.onelab.eu / linux-2.6.git / blobdiff