*
*/
+#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
if (unlikely(q > end || q < p))
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
- res->data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ res->data = kmemdup(p, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(res->data == NULL))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- memcpy(res->data, p, len);
res->len = len;
return q;
}
static inline const void *
-get_key(const void *p, const void *end, struct crypto_tfm **res)
+get_key(const void *p, const void *end, struct crypto_blkcipher **res)
{
struct xdr_netobj key;
- int alg, alg_mode;
+ int alg;
char *alg_name;
p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &alg, sizeof(alg));
switch (alg) {
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
- alg_name = "des";
- alg_mode = CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CBC;
+ alg_name = "cbc(des)";
break;
default:
printk("gss_kerberos_mech: unsupported algorithm %d\n", alg);
goto out_err_free_key;
}
- if (!(*res = crypto_alloc_tfm(alg_name, alg_mode))) {
+ *res = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(*res)) {
printk("gss_kerberos_mech: unable to initialize crypto algorithm %s\n", alg_name);
+ *res = NULL;
goto out_err_free_key;
}
- if (crypto_cipher_setkey(*res, key.data, key.len)) {
+ if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(*res, key.data, key.len)) {
printk("gss_kerberos_mech: error setting key for crypto algorithm %s\n", alg_name);
goto out_err_free_tfm;
}
return p;
out_err_free_tfm:
- crypto_free_tfm(*res);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(*res);
out_err_free_key:
kfree(key.data);
p = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
{
const void *end = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
struct krb5_ctx *ctx;
+ int tmp;
- if (!(ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL)))
+ if (!(ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL)))
goto out_err;
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->initiate, sizeof(ctx->initiate));
if (IS_ERR(p))
goto out_err_free_ctx;
- p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->seed_init, sizeof(ctx->seed_init));
- if (IS_ERR(p))
+ /* The downcall format was designed before we completely understood
+ * the uses of the context fields; so it includes some stuff we
+ * just give some minimal sanity-checking, and some we ignore
+ * completely (like the next twenty bytes): */
+ if (unlikely(p + 20 > end || p + 20 < p))
goto out_err_free_ctx;
- p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, ctx->seed, sizeof(ctx->seed));
+ p += 20;
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &tmp, sizeof(tmp));
if (IS_ERR(p))
goto out_err_free_ctx;
- p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->signalg, sizeof(ctx->signalg));
- if (IS_ERR(p))
+ if (tmp != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5)
goto out_err_free_ctx;
- p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->sealalg, sizeof(ctx->sealalg));
+ p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &tmp, sizeof(tmp));
if (IS_ERR(p))
goto out_err_free_ctx;
+ if (tmp != SEAL_ALG_DES)
+ goto out_err_free_ctx;
p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &ctx->endtime, sizeof(ctx->endtime));
if (IS_ERR(p))
goto out_err_free_ctx;
}
ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = ctx;
- dprintk("RPC: Succesfully imported new context.\n");
+ dprintk("RPC: Successfully imported new context.\n");
return 0;
out_err_free_key2:
- crypto_free_tfm(ctx->seq);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->seq);
out_err_free_key1:
- crypto_free_tfm(ctx->enc);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->enc);
out_err_free_mech:
kfree(ctx->mech_used.data);
out_err_free_ctx:
gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx) {
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx;
- crypto_free_tfm(kctx->seq);
- crypto_free_tfm(kctx->enc);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(kctx->seq);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(kctx->enc);
kfree(kctx->mech_used.data);
kfree(kctx);
}