Merge to Fedora kernel-2.6.7-1.492

[linux-2.6.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b2a1418..72cd0e5 100644 (file)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1389,11 +1389,11 @@ static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effect
 {
        int error;
 
-       error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
+       error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
        if (error)
                return error;
 
-       return secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+       return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
 }
 
 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1427,6 +1427,10 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
        u32 tsid;
        int rc;
 
+       rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
+
        tsec = current->security;
 
        rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
@@ -1690,7 +1694,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-       return 0;
+       return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
 }
 
 
@@ -1708,12 +1712,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                                         PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL, NULL);
        }
 
-       /* Note that we must include the legacy uid/gid test below
-          to retain it, as the new userland will simply use the
-          value passed by AT_SECURE to decide whether to enable
-          secure mode. */
-       return ( atsecure || current->euid != current->uid ||
-               current->egid != current->gid);
+       return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
 }
 
 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -1793,7 +1792,8 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
 
        spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
        for (;;) {
-               unsigned long set, i, fd;
+               unsigned long set, i;
+               int fd;
 
                j++;
                i = j * __NFDBITS;
@@ -2058,6 +2058,12 @@ static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
                          unsigned long flags,
                          void * data)
 {
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
+
        if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
                return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
                                           FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
@@ -2068,6 +2074,12 @@ static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
 
 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
+
        return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
                                   FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
 }
@@ -2111,6 +2123,11 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *ino
 
 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
        return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
 }
 
@@ -2141,6 +2158,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 
 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
 {
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
+
        return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
 }
 
@@ -2179,6 +2202,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
                                    struct nameidata *nd)
 {
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
+
        if (!mask) {
                /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
                return 0;
@@ -2190,6 +2219,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
 
 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 {
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
+
        if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
                               ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
                return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
@@ -2456,6 +2491,11 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
        u32 av;
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, prot, flags);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
 
        if (file) {
                /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
@@ -2476,6 +2516,12 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, unsigned lon
 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
                                 unsigned long prot)
 {
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, prot);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
+
        return selinux_file_mmap(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags);
 }
 
@@ -2573,6 +2619,12 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
 
 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 {
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
+
        return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
 }
 
@@ -2648,12 +2700,23 @@ static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
 
 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
+
        return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
        struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->rlim + resource;
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
 
        /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
           lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
@@ -2688,6 +2751,11 @@ static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
 {
        u32 perm;
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
 
        if (info && ((unsigned long)info == 1 ||
                     (unsigned long)info == 2 || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
@@ -3129,6 +3197,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
        struct avc_audit_data ad;
        int err;
 
+       err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
+       if (err)
+               return err;
+
        isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
        other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
 
@@ -3363,28 +3435,6 @@ out:
        return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-       int err = 0;
-       
-       if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
-               cap_raise (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
-       else
-               NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = 0;
-       
-       if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
-               err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
-       
-       return err;
-}
-
-static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-       if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
-               return -EPERM;
-       return 0;
-}
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
 
 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
@@ -3520,8 +3570,37 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
 
+#else
+
+static inline int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+       return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
+static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+       int err = 0;
+
+       if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+               cap_raise (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
+       else
+               NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = 0;
+
+       if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
+               err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
+
+       return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+       if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;
+       return 0;
+}
+
 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
                              struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
                              u16 sclass)
@@ -3847,6 +3926,11 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
                             char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
 {
        u32 perms;
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
 
        if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
                perms = SHM__READ;