# Credentials are signed XML files that assign a subject gid privileges to an object gid
##
-import os
+import os, os.path
+import subprocess
from types import StringTypes
import datetime
from StringIO import StringIO
from sfa.util.faults import CredentialNotVerifiable, ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent
from sfa.util.sfalogging import logger
-from sfa.util.sfatime import utcparse
-from sfa.trust.credential_legacy import CredentialLegacy
+from sfa.util.sfatime import utcparse, SFATIME_FORMAT
from sfa.trust.rights import Right, Rights, determine_rights
from sfa.trust.gid import GID
from sfa.util.xrn import urn_to_hrn, hrn_authfor_hrn
-# 2 weeks, in seconds
-DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME = 86400 * 31
+# 31 days, in seconds
+DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME = 86400 * 28
# TODO:
def encode(self):
self.xml = signature_template % (self.get_refid(), self.get_refid())
-
##
# A credential provides a caller gid with privileges to an object gid.
# A signed credential is signed by the object's authority.
#
-# Credentials are encoded in one of two ways. The legacy style places
-# it in the subjectAltName of an X509 certificate. The new credentials
-# are placed in signed XML.
+# Credentials are encoded in one of two ways.
+# The legacy style (now unsupported) places it in the subjectAltName of an X509 certificate.
+# The new credentials are placed in signed XML.
#
# WARNING:
# In general, a signed credential obtained externally should
# @param string If string!=None, load the credential from the string
# @param filename If filename!=None, load the credential from the file
# FIXME: create and subject are ignored!
- def __init__(self, create=False, subject=None, string=None, filename=None):
+ def __init__(self, create=False, subject=None, string=None, filename=None, cred=None):
self.gidCaller = None
self.gidObject = None
self.expiration = None
self.signature = None
self.xml = None
self.refid = None
- self.legacy = None
+ self.type = None
+ self.version = None
+
+ if cred:
+ if isinstance(cred, StringTypes):
+ string = cred
+ self.type = 'geni_sfa'
+ self.version = '1.0'
+ elif isinstance(cred, dict):
+ string = cred['geni_value']
+ self.type = cred['geni_type']
+ self.version = cred['geni_version']
+
- # Check if this is a legacy credential, translate it if so
if string or filename:
if string:
str = string
elif filename:
str = file(filename).read()
- if str.strip().startswith("-----"):
- self.legacy = CredentialLegacy(False,string=str)
- self.translate_legacy(str)
+ # if this is a legacy credential, write error and bail out
+ if isinstance (str, StringTypes) and str.strip().startswith("-----"):
+ logger.error("Legacy credentials not supported any more - giving up with %s..."%str[:10])
+ return
else:
self.xml = str
self.decode()
if os.path.isfile(path + '/' + 'xmlsec1'):
self.xmlsec_path = path + '/' + 'xmlsec1'
break
- if not self.xmlsec_path:
- logger.warn("Could not locate binary for xmlsec1 - SFA will be unable to sign stuff !!")
def get_subject(self):
+ subject = ""
if not self.gidObject:
self.decode()
- return self.gidObject.get_subject()
+ if self.gidObject:
+ subject = self.gidObject.pretty_cert()
+ return subject
# sounds like this should be __repr__ instead ??
- def get_summary_tostring(self):
+ def pretty_cred(self):
if not self.gidObject:
self.decode()
- obj = self.gidObject.get_printable_subject()
- caller = self.gidCaller.get_printable_subject()
+ obj = self.gidObject.pretty_cert()
+ caller = self.gidCaller.pretty_cert()
exp = self.get_expiration()
# Summarize the rights too? The issuer?
- return "[ Grant %s rights on %s until %s ]" % (caller, obj, exp)
+ return "[Cred. for {caller} rights on {obj} until {exp} ]".format(**locals())
def get_signature(self):
if not self.signature:
self.signature = sig
- ##
- # Translate a legacy credential into a new one
- #
- # @param String of the legacy credential
-
- def translate_legacy(self, str):
- legacy = CredentialLegacy(False,string=str)
- self.gidCaller = legacy.get_gid_caller()
- self.gidObject = legacy.get_gid_object()
- lifetime = legacy.get_lifetime()
- if not lifetime:
- self.set_expiration(datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(seconds=DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME))
- else:
- self.set_expiration(int(lifetime))
- self.lifeTime = legacy.get_lifetime()
- self.set_privileges(legacy.get_privileges())
- self.get_privileges().delegate_all_privileges(legacy.get_delegate())
-
##
# Need the issuer's private key and name
# @param key Keypair object containing the private key of the issuer
# Expiration: an absolute UTC time of expiration (as either an int or string or datetime)
#
def set_expiration(self, expiration):
- if isinstance(expiration, (int, float)):
- self.expiration = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(expiration)
- elif isinstance (expiration, datetime.datetime):
- self.expiration = expiration
- elif isinstance (expiration, StringTypes):
- self.expiration = utcparse (expiration)
+ expiration_datetime = utcparse (expiration)
+ if expiration_datetime is not None:
+ self.expiration = expiration_datetime
else:
- logger.error ("unexpected input type in Credential.set_expiration")
-
+ logger.error ("unexpected input %s in Credential.set_expiration"%expiration)
##
# get the lifetime of the credential (always in datetime format)
# at this point self.expiration is normalized as a datetime - DON'T call utcparse again
return self.expiration
- ##
- # For legacy sake
- def get_lifetime(self):
- return self.get_expiration()
-
##
# set the privileges
#
doc = Document()
signed_cred = doc.createElement("signed-credential")
-# Declare namespaces
-# Note that credential/policy.xsd are really the PG schemas
-# in a PL namespace.
-# Note that delegation of credentials between the 2 only really works
-# cause those schemas are identical.
-# Also note these PG schemas talk about PG tickets and CM policies.
+ # Declare namespaces
+ # Note that credential/policy.xsd are really the PG schemas
+ # in a PL namespace.
+ # Note that delegation of credentials between the 2 only really works
+ # cause those schemas are identical.
+ # Also note these PG schemas talk about PG tickets and CM policies.
signed_cred.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")
signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/credential.xsd")
signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/ext/policy/1 http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
-# PG says for those last 2:
-# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")
-# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
+ # PG says for those last 2:
+ #signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")
+ # signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
doc.appendChild(signed_cred)
append_sub(doc, cred, "target_urn", self.gidObject.get_urn())
append_sub(doc, cred, "uuid", "")
if not self.expiration:
+ logger.debug("Creating credential valid for %s s"%DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME)
self.set_expiration(datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(seconds=DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME))
self.expiration = self.expiration.replace(microsecond=0)
- append_sub(doc, cred, "expires", self.expiration.isoformat())
+ append_sub(doc, cred, "expires", self.expiration.strftime(SFATIME_FORMAT))
privileges = doc.createElement("privileges")
cred.appendChild(privileges)
# and we need to include those again here or else their signature
# no longer matches on the credential.
# We expect three of these, but here we copy them all:
-# signed_cred.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")
-# and from PG (PL is equivalent, as shown above):
-# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")
-# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
+ # signed_cred.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")
+ # and from PG (PL is equivalent, as shown above):
+ # signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")
+ # signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
# HOWEVER!
# PL now also declares these, with different URLs, so
# Below throws InUse exception if we forgot to clone the attribute first
oldAttr = signed_cred.setAttributeNode(attr.cloneNode(True))
if oldAttr and oldAttr.value != attr.value:
- msg = "Delegating cred from owner %s to %s over %s replaced attribute %s value '%s' with '%s'" % (self.parent.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidObject.get_urn(), oldAttr.name, oldAttr.value, attr.value)
+ msg = "Delegating cred from owner %s to %s over %s:\n - Replaced attribute %s value '%s' with '%s'" % \
+ (self.parent.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidObject.get_urn(), oldAttr.name, oldAttr.value, attr.value)
logger.warn(msg)
#raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Can't encode new valid delegated credential: %s" % msg)
self.xml = signed
- # This is no longer a legacy credential
- if self.legacy:
- self.legacy = None
-
# Update signatures
self.decode()
def decode(self):
if not self.xml:
return
+
+ doc = None
+ try:
+ doc = parseString(self.xml)
+ except ExpatError,e:
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Malformed credential")
doc = parseString(self.xml)
sigs = []
signed_cred = doc.getElementsByTagName("signed-credential")
self.decode()
# validate against RelaxNG schema
- if HAVELXML and not self.legacy:
+ if HAVELXML:
if schema and os.path.exists(schema):
tree = etree.parse(StringIO(self.xml))
schema_doc = etree.parse(schema)
xmlschema = etree.XMLSchema(schema_doc)
if not xmlschema.validate(tree):
error = xmlschema.error_log.last_error
- message = "%s: %s (line %s)" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), error.message, error.line)
+ message = "%s: %s (line %s)" % (self.pretty_cred(), error.message, error.line)
raise CredentialNotVerifiable(message)
if trusted_certs_required and trusted_certs is None:
trusted_cert_objects.append(GID(filename=f))
ok_trusted_certs.append(f)
except Exception, exc:
- logger.error("Failed to load trusted cert from %s: %r", f, exc)
+ logger.error("Failed to load trusted cert from %s: %r"%( f, exc))
trusted_certs = ok_trusted_certs
- # Use legacy verification if this is a legacy credential
- if self.legacy:
- self.legacy.verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
- if self.legacy.client_gid:
- self.legacy.client_gid.verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
- if self.legacy.object_gid:
- self.legacy.object_gid.verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
- return True
-
# make sure it is not expired
if self.get_expiration() < datetime.datetime.utcnow():
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Credential %s expired at %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), self.expiration.isoformat()))
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Credential %s expired at %s" % \
+ (self.pretty_cred(),
+ self.expiration.strftime(SFATIME_FORMAT)))
# Verify the signatures
filename = self.save_to_random_tmp_file()
- if trusted_certs is not None:
- cert_args = " ".join(['--trusted-pem %s' % x for x in trusted_certs])
# If caller explicitly passed in None that means skip cert chain validation.
# - Strange and not typical
if trusted_certs is None:
break
-# print "Doing %s --verify --node-id '%s' %s %s 2>&1" % \
-# (self.xmlsec_path, ref, cert_args, filename)
- verified = os.popen('%s --verify --node-id "%s" %s %s 2>&1' \
- % (self.xmlsec_path, ref, cert_args, filename)).read()
- if not verified.strip().startswith("OK"):
+ # Thierry - jan 2015
+ # up to fedora20 we used os.popen and checked that the output begins with OK
+ # turns out, with fedora21, there is extra input before this 'OK' thing
+ # looks like we're better off just using the exit code - that's what it is made for
+ #cert_args = " ".join(['--trusted-pem %s' % x for x in trusted_certs])
+ #command = '{} --verify --node-id "{}" {} {} 2>&1'.\
+ # format(self.xmlsec_path, ref, cert_args, filename)
+ command = [ self.xmlsec_path, '--verify', '--node-id', ref ]
+ for trusted in trusted_certs:
+ command += ["--trusted-pem", trusted ]
+ command += [ filename ]
+ logger.debug("Running " + " ".join(command))
+ try:
+ verified = subprocess.check_output(command, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)
+ logger.debug("xmlsec command returned {}".format(verified))
+ if "OK\n" not in verified:
+ logger.warning("WARNING: xmlsec1 seemed to return fine but without a OK in its output")
+ except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
+ verified = e.output
# xmlsec errors have a msg= which is the interesting bit.
mstart = verified.find("msg=")
msg = ""
mstart = mstart + 4
mend = verified.find('\\', mstart)
msg = verified[mstart:mend]
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("xmlsec1 error verifying cred %s using Signature ID %s: %s %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), ref, msg, verified.strip()))
+ logger.warning("Credential.verify - failed - xmlsec1 returned {}".format(verified.strip()))
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("xmlsec1 error verifying cred %s using Signature ID %s: %s" % \
+ (self.pretty_cred(), ref, msg))
os.remove(filename)
# Verify the parents (delegation)
if trusted_gids and len(trusted_gids) > 0:
root_cred_signer.verify_chain(trusted_gids)
else:
- logger.debug("No trusted gids. Cannot verify that cred signer is signed by a trusted authority. Skipping that check.")
+ logger.debug("Cannot verify that cred signer is signed by a trusted authority. "
+ "No trusted gids. Skipping that check.")
# See if the signer is an authority over the domain of the target.
# There are multiple types of authority - accept them all here
# Maybe should be (hrn, type) = urn_to_hrn(root_cred_signer.get_urn())
root_cred_signer_type = root_cred_signer.get_type()
- if (root_cred_signer_type.find('authority') == 0):
+ if root_cred_signer_type.find('authority') == 0:
#logger.debug('Cred signer is an authority')
# signer is an authority, see if target is in authority's domain
signerhrn = root_cred_signer.get_hrn()
# Give up, credential does not pass issuer verification
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Could not verify credential owned by %s for object %s. Cred signer %s not the trusted authority for Cred target %s" % (self.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidObject.get_urn(), root_cred_signer.get_hrn(), root_target_gid.get_hrn()))
-
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable(
+ "Could not verify credential owned by {} for object {}. "
+ "Cred signer {} not the trusted authority for Cred target {}"
+ .format(self.gidCaller.get_hrn(), self.gidObject.get_hrn(),
+ root_cred_signer.get_hrn(), root_target_gid.get_hrn()))
##
# -- For Delegates (credentials with parents) verify that:
# make sure the rights given to the child are a subset of the
# parents rights (and check delegate bits)
if not parent_cred.get_privileges().is_superset(self.get_privileges()):
- raise ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent(("Parent cred ref %s rights " % parent_cred.get_refid()) +
- self.parent.get_privileges().save_to_string() + (" not superset of delegated cred %s ref %s rights " % (self.get_summary_tostring(), self.get_refid())) +
- self.get_privileges().save_to_string())
+ raise ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent(
+ "Parent cred (ref {}) rights {} "
+ .format(parent_cred.get_refid(),
+ self.parent.get_privileges().save_to_string())
+ + " not superset of delegated cred %s (ref %s) rights {}"
+ .format(self.pretty_cred(), self.get_refid(),
+ self.get_privileges().save_to_string()))
# make sure my target gid is the same as the parent's
if not parent_cred.get_gid_object().save_to_string() == \
self.get_gid_object().save_to_string():
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated cred %s: Target gid not equal between parent and child. Parent %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), parent_cred.get_summary_tostring()))
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable(
+ "Delegated cred {}: Target gid not equal between parent and child. Parent {}"
+ .format(self.pretty_cred(), parent_cred.pretty_cred()))
# make sure my expiry time is <= my parent's
if not parent_cred.get_expiration() >= self.get_expiration():
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated credential %s expires after parent %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), parent_cred.get_summary_tostring()))
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable(
+ "Delegated credential {} expires after parent {}"
+ .format(self.pretty_cred(), parent_cred.pretty_cred()))
# make sure my signer is the parent's caller
if not parent_cred.get_gid_caller().save_to_string(False) == \
self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().save_to_string(False):
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated credential %s not signed by parent %s's caller" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), parent_cred.get_summary_tostring()))
+ message = "Delegated credential {} not signed by parent {}'s caller"\
+ .format(self.pretty_cred(), parent_cred.pretty_cred())
+ logger.error(message)
+ logger.error("compare1 parent {}".format(parent_cred.get_gid_caller().save_to_string()))
+ logger.error("compare2 self {}".format(self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().save_to_string()))
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable(message)
# Recurse
if parent_cred.parent:
# only informative
def get_filename(self):
return getattr(self,'filename',None)
-
+
+ def actual_caller_hrn (self):
+ """a helper method used by some API calls like e.g. Allocate
+ to try and find out who really is the original caller
+
+ This admittedly is a bit of a hack, please USE IN LAST RESORT
+
+ This code uses a heuristic to identify a delegated credential
+
+ A first known restriction if for traffic that gets through a slice manager
+ in this case the hrn reported is the one from the last SM in the call graph
+ which is not at all what is meant here"""
+
+ caller_hrn = self.get_gid_caller().get_hrn()
+ issuer_hrn = self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().get_hrn()
+ subject_hrn = self.get_gid_object().get_hrn()
+ # if we find that the caller_hrn is an immediate descendant of the issuer, then
+ # this seems to be a 'regular' credential
+ if caller_hrn.startswith(issuer_hrn):
+ actual_caller_hrn=caller_hrn
+ # else this looks like a delegated credential, and the real caller is the issuer
+ else:
+ actual_caller_hrn=issuer_hrn
+ logger.info("actual_caller_hrn: caller_hrn=%s, issuer_hrn=%s, returning %s"
+ %(caller_hrn,issuer_hrn,actual_caller_hrn))
+ return actual_caller_hrn
+
##
# Dump the contents of a credential to stdout in human-readable format
#
def dump (self, *args, **kwargs):
print self.dump_string(*args, **kwargs)
-
- def dump_string(self, dump_parents=False):
+ # show_xml is ignored
+ def dump_string(self, dump_parents=False, show_xml=None):
result=""
result += "CREDENTIAL %s\n" % self.get_subject()
filename=self.get_filename()
if filename: result += "Filename %s\n"%filename
- result += " privs: %s\n" % self.get_privileges().save_to_string()
+ privileges = self.get_privileges()
+ if privileges:
+ result += " privs: %s\n" % privileges.save_to_string()
+ else:
+ result += " privs: \n"
gidCaller = self.get_gid_caller()
if gidCaller:
result += " gidCaller:\n"
print " gidIssuer:"
self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().dump(8, dump_parents)
+ if self.expiration:
+ print " expiration:", self.expiration.strftime(SFATIME_FORMAT)
+
gidObject = self.get_gid_object()
if gidObject:
result += " gidObject:\n"