Merge to Fedora kernel-2.6.18-1.2224_FC5 patched with stable patch-2.6.18.1-vs2.0...
[linux-2.6.git] / arch / ia64 / kernel / gate.S
index 86064ca..30c2dc3 100644 (file)
@@ -6,14 +6,15 @@
  *     David Mosberger-Tang <davidm@hpl.hp.com>
  */
 
-#include <linux/config.h>
-
 #include <asm/asmmacro.h>
 #include <asm/errno.h>
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/sigcontext.h>
 #include <asm/system.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_IA64_VDSO_PARAVIRT
+# include <asm/privop.h>
+#endif
 
 /*
  * We can't easily refer to symbols inside the kernel.  To avoid full runtime relocation,
 [1:](pr)brl.cond.sptk 0;                               \
        .xdata4 ".data.patch.brl_fsys_bubble_down", 1b-.
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_IA64_VDSO_PARAVIRT
+       // The page in which hyperprivop lives must be pinned by ITR.
+       // However vDSO area isn't pinned. So issuing hyperprivop
+       // from vDSO page causes trouble that Kevin pointed out.
+       // After clearing vpsr.ic, the vcpu is pre-empted and the itlb
+       // is flushed. Then vcpu get cpu again, tlb miss fault occures.
+       // However it results in nested dtlb fault because vpsr.ic is off.
+       // To avoid such a situation, we jump into the kernel text area
+       // which is pinned, and then issue hyperprivop and return back
+       // to vDSO page.
+       // This is Dan Magenheimer's idea.
+
+       // Currently is_running_on_xen() is defined as running_on_xen.
+       // If is_running_on_xen() is a real function, we must update
+       // according to it.
+       .section ".data.patch.running_on_xen", "a"
+       .previous
+#define LOAD_RUNNING_ON_XEN(reg)                       \
+[1:]   movl reg=0;                                     \
+       .xdata4 ".data.patch.running_on_xen", 1b-.
+
+       .section ".data.patch.brl_xen_rsm_be_i", "a"
+       .previous
+#define BRL_COND_XEN_RSM_BE_I(pr)                      \
+[1:](pr)brl.cond.sptk 0;                               \
+       .xdata4 ".data.patch.brl_xen_rsm_be_i", 1b-.
+
+       .section ".data.patch.brl_xen_get_psr", "a"
+       .previous
+#define BRL_COND_XEN_GET_PSR(pr)                       \
+[1:](pr)brl.cond.sptk 0;                               \
+       .xdata4 ".data.patch.brl_xen_get_psr", 1b-.
+
+       .section ".data.patch.brl_xen_ssm_i_0", "a"
+       .previous
+#define BRL_COND_XEN_SSM_I_0(pr)                       \
+[1:](pr)brl.cond.sptk 0;                               \
+       .xdata4 ".data.patch.brl_xen_ssm_i_0", 1b-.
+
+       .section ".data.patch.brl_xen_ssm_i_1", "a"
+       .previous
+#define BRL_COND_XEN_SSM_I_1(pr)                       \
+[1:](pr)brl.cond.sptk 0;                               \
+       .xdata4 ".data.patch.brl_xen_ssm_i_1", 1b-.
+#endif
+
 GLOBAL_ENTRY(__kernel_syscall_via_break)
        .prologue
        .altrp b6
@@ -77,7 +124,39 @@ GLOBAL_ENTRY(__kernel_syscall_via_epc)
        epc                                     // B    causes split-issue
 }
        ;;
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_IA64_VDSO_PARAVIRT
+       // r20 = 1
+       // r22 = &vcpu->evtchn_mask
+       // r23 = &vpsr.ic
+       // r24 = &vcpu->pending_interruption
+       // r25 = tmp
+       // r28 = &running_on_xen
+       // r30 = running_on_xen
+       // r31 = tmp
+       // p11 = tmp
+       // p12 = running_on_xen
+       // p13 = !running_on_xen
+       // p14 = tmp
+       // p15 = tmp
+#define isXen  p12
+#define isRaw  p13
+       LOAD_RUNNING_ON_XEN(r28)
+       movl r22=XSI_PSR_I_ADDR
+       movl r23=XSI_PSR_IC
+       movl r24=XSI_PSR_I_ADDR+(XSI_PEND_OFS-XSI_PSR_I_ADDR_OFS)
+       mov r20=1
+       ;;
+       ld4 r30=[r28]
+       ;;
+       cmp.ne isXen,isRaw=r0,r30
+       ;;
+(isRaw)        rsm psr.be | psr.i
+       BRL_COND_XEN_RSM_BE_I(isXen)
+       .global .vdso_rsm_be_i_ret
+.vdso_rsm_be_i_ret:
+#else
        rsm psr.be | psr.i                      // M2 (5 cyc to srlz.d)
+#endif
        LOAD_FSYSCALL_TABLE(r14)                // X
        ;;
        mov r16=IA64_KR(CURRENT)                // M2 (12 cyc)
@@ -85,7 +164,14 @@ GLOBAL_ENTRY(__kernel_syscall_via_epc)
        mov r19=NR_syscalls-1                   // A
        ;;
        lfetch [r18]                            // M0|1
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_IA64_VDSO_PARAVIRT
+(isRaw)        mov r29=psr
+       BRL_COND_XEN_GET_PSR(isXen)
+       .global .vdso_get_psr_ret
+.vdso_get_psr_ret:
+#else
        mov r29=psr                             // M2 (12 cyc)
+#endif
        // If r17 is a NaT, p6 will be zero
        cmp.geu p6,p7=r19,r17                   // A    (sysnr > 0 && sysnr < 1024+NR_syscalls)?
        ;;
@@ -99,9 +185,21 @@ GLOBAL_ENTRY(__kernel_syscall_via_epc)
        ;;
        nop.m 0
 (p6)   tbit.z.unc p8,p0=r18,0                  // I0 (dual-issues with "mov b7=r18"!)
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_IA64_VDSO_PARAVIRT
+       ;;
+       // p14 = running_on_xen && p8
+       // p15 = !running_on_xen && p8
+(p8)   cmp.ne.unc p14,p15=r0,r30
+       ;;
+(p15)  ssm psr.i
+       BRL_COND_XEN_SSM_I_0(p14)
+       .global .vdso_ssm_i_0_ret
+.vdso_ssm_i_0_ret:
+#else
        nop.i 0
        ;;
 (p8)   ssm psr.i
+#endif
 (p6)   mov b7=r18                              // I0
 (p8)   br.dptk.many b7                         // B
 
@@ -122,9 +220,21 @@ GLOBAL_ENTRY(__kernel_syscall_via_epc)
 #else
        BRL_COND_FSYS_BUBBLE_DOWN(p6)
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_IA64_VDSO_PARAVIRT
+(isRaw)        ssm psr.i
+       BRL_COND_XEN_SSM_I_1(isXen)
+       .global .vdso_ssm_i_1_ret
+.vdso_ssm_i_1_ret:
+#else
        ssm psr.i
+#endif
        mov r10=-1
 (p10)  mov r8=EINVAL
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_IA64_VDSO_PARAVIRT
+       dv_serialize_data // shut up gas warning.
+                         // we know xen_hyper_ssm_i_0 or xen_hyper_ssm_i_1
+                         // doesn't change p9 and p10
+#endif
 (p9)   mov r8=ENOSYS
        FSYS_RETURN
 END(__kernel_syscall_via_epc)