* in exit.c or in signal.c.
*/
-/* determines which flags the user has access to. */
-/* 1 = access 0 = no access */
-#define FLAG_MASK 0x44dd5UL
+/*
+ * Determines which flags the user has access to [1 = access, 0 = no access].
+ * Prohibits changing ID(21), VIP(20), VIF(19), VM(17), IOPL(12-13), IF(9).
+ * Also masks reserved bits (63-22, 15, 5, 3, 1).
+ */
+#define FLAG_MASK 0x54dd5UL
/* set's the trap flag. */
#define TRAP_FLAG 0x100UL
return (*((unsigned long *)stack));
}
-static inline struct pt_regs *get_child_regs(struct task_struct *task)
-{
- struct pt_regs *regs = (void *)task->thread.rsp0;
- return regs - 1;
-}
-
/*
* this routine will put a word on the processes privileged stack.
* the offset is how far from the base addr as stored in the TSS.
static void set_singlestep(struct task_struct *child)
{
- struct pt_regs *regs = get_child_regs(child);
+ struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
/*
* Always set TIF_SINGLESTEP - this guarantees that
/* But touch TF only if it was set by us.. */
if (child->ptrace & PT_DTRACE) {
- struct pt_regs *regs = get_child_regs(child);
+ struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
regs->eflags &= ~TRAP_FLAG;
child->ptrace &= ~PT_DTRACE;
}
value &= 0xffff;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,fs_base):
- if (value >= TASK_SIZE)
+ if (value >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child))
return -EIO;
child->thread.fs = value;
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct,gs_base):
- if (value >= TASK_SIZE)
+ if (value >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child))
return -EIO;
child->thread.gs = value;
return 0;
return -EIO;
value &= 0xffff;
break;
- case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, rip):
- /* Check if the new RIP address is canonical */
- if (value >= TASK_SIZE)
- return -EIO;
- break;
}
put_stack_long(child, regno - sizeof(struct pt_regs), value);
return 0;
}
-asmlinkage long sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, unsigned long addr, long data)
+long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request, long addr, long data)
{
- struct task_struct *child;
long i, ret;
unsigned ui;
- /* This lock_kernel fixes a subtle race with suid exec */
- lock_kernel();
- ret = -EPERM;
- if (request == PTRACE_TRACEME) {
- /* are we already being traced? */
- if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
- goto out;
- ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- /* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
- current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
- ret = 0;
- goto out;
- }
- ret = -ESRCH;
- read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
- child = find_task_by_pid(pid);
- if (child)
- get_task_struct(child);
- read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
- if (!child)
- goto out;
- if (!vx_check(vx_task_xid(child), VX_WATCH|VX_IDENT))
- goto out_tsk;
-
- ret = -EPERM;
- if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */
- goto out_tsk;
-
- if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
- ret = ptrace_attach(child);
- goto out_tsk;
- }
- ret = ptrace_check_attach(child, request == PTRACE_KILL);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out_tsk;
-
switch (request) {
/* when I and D space are separate, these will need to be fixed. */
case PTRACE_PEEKTEXT: /* read word at location addr. */
break;
case PTRACE_POKEUSR: /* write the word at location addr in the USER area */
+ {
+ int dsize = test_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_IA32) ? 3 : 7;
ret = -EIO;
if ((addr & 7) ||
addr > sizeof(struct user) - 7)
break;
/* Disallows to set a breakpoint into the vsyscall */
case offsetof(struct user, u_debugreg[0]):
- if (data >= TASK_SIZE-7) break;
+ if (data >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child) - dsize) break;
child->thread.debugreg0 = data;
ret = 0;
break;
case offsetof(struct user, u_debugreg[1]):
- if (data >= TASK_SIZE-7) break;
+ if (data >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child) - dsize) break;
child->thread.debugreg1 = data;
ret = 0;
break;
case offsetof(struct user, u_debugreg[2]):
- if (data >= TASK_SIZE-7) break;
+ if (data >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child) - dsize) break;
child->thread.debugreg2 = data;
ret = 0;
break;
case offsetof(struct user, u_debugreg[3]):
- if (data >= TASK_SIZE-7) break;
+ if (data >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child) - dsize) break;
child->thread.debugreg3 = data;
ret = 0;
break;
case offsetof(struct user, u_debugreg[7]):
/* See arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c for an explanation of
* this awkward check.*/
- data &= ~DR_CONTROL_RESERVED;
- for(i=0; i<4; i++)
- if ((0x5454 >> ((data >> (16 + 4*i)) & 0xf)) & 1)
+ data &= ~DR_CONTROL_RESERVED;
+ for(i=0; i<4; i++)
+ if ((0x5554 >> ((data >> (16 + 4*i)) & 0xf)) & 1)
break;
if (i == 4) {
child->thread.debugreg7 = data;
break;
}
break;
+ }
case PTRACE_SYSCALL: /* continue and stop at next (return from) syscall */
case PTRACE_CONT: /* restart after signal. */
ret = ptrace_request(child, request, addr, data);
break;
}
-out_tsk:
- put_task_struct(child);
-out:
- unlock_kernel();
return ret;
}
if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) {
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) {
- audit_syscall_entry(current, AUDIT_ARCH_I386,
+ audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_I386,
regs->orig_rax,
regs->rbx, regs->rcx,
regs->rdx, regs->rsi);
} else {
- audit_syscall_entry(current, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64,
+ audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64,
regs->orig_rax,
regs->rdi, regs->rsi,
regs->rdx, regs->r10);
asmlinkage void syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
- audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->rax), regs->rax);
+ audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->rax), regs->rax);
if ((test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
|| test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP))
git://git.onelab.eu / linux-2.6.git / blobdiff