Fedora kernel-2.6.17-1.2142_FC4 patched with stable patch-2.6.17.4-vs2.0.2-rc26.diff

[linux-2.6.git] / drivers / char / random.c

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index b1631b7..074bf22 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_thresh = 128;
  * samples to avoid wasting CPU time and reduce lock contention.
  */
 
-static int trickle_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 28;
+static int trickle_thresh __read_mostly = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 28;
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, trickle_count) = 0;
 
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ out:
        preempt_enable();
 }
 
-extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
                                 unsigned int value)
 {
        static unsigned char last_value;
@@ -1554,10 +1554,8 @@ __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcp_sequence_number);
 
-
-
-/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral TCP port search */
-u32 secure_tcp_port_ephemeral(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 dport)
+/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral IPV4 transport port search */
+u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 dport)
 {
        struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
        u32 hash[4];
@@ -1575,7 +1573,7 @@ u32 secure_tcp_port_ephemeral(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 dport)
 }
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-u32 secure_tcpv6_port_ephemeral(const __u32 *saddr, const __u32 *daddr, __u16 dport)
+u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __u32 *saddr, const __u32 *daddr, __u16 dport)
 {
        struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
        u32 hash[12];
@@ -1586,7 +1584,40 @@ u32 secure_tcpv6_port_ephemeral(const __u32 *saddr, const __u32 *daddr, __u16 dp
 
        return twothirdsMD4Transform(daddr, hash);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_port_ephemeral);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
+/* Similar to secure_tcp_sequence_number but generate a 48 bit value
+ * bit's 32-47 increase every key exchange
+ *       0-31  hash(source, dest)
+ */
+u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
+                               __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
+{
+       struct timeval tv;
+       u64 seq;
+       __u32 hash[4];
+       struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+
+       hash[0] = saddr;
+       hash[1] = daddr;
+       hash[2] = (sport << 16) + dport;
+       hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+
+       seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+       seq |= ((u64)keyptr->count) << (32 - HASH_BITS);
+
+       do_gettimeofday(&tv);
+       seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec * 1000000;
+       seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
+#if 0
+       printk("dccp init_seq(%lx, %lx, %d, %d) = %d\n",
+              saddr, daddr, sport, dport, seq);
+#endif
+       return seq;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
 #endif
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_INET */
@@ -1600,13 +1631,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_port_ephemeral);
  */
 unsigned int get_random_int(void)
 {
+       unsigned int val = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_HAS_TSC
+       rdtscl(val);
+#endif
        /*
         * Use IP's RNG. It suits our purpose perfectly: it re-keys itself
         * every second, from the entropy pool (and thus creates a limited
         * drain on it), and uses halfMD4Transform within the second. We
         * also mix it with jiffies and the PID:
         */
-       return secure_ip_id(current->pid + jiffies);
+       return secure_ip_id(current->pid + jiffies + (int)val);
 }
 
 /*