* random.c -- A strong random number generator
*
* Version 1.89, last modified 19-Sep-99
- *
+ *
* Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All
* rights reserved.
*
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior
* written permission.
- *
+ *
* ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
* the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
* required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
* necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
* the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
*/
/*
- * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
- *
+ * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
+ *
* This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
* and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
* Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
*
* Theory of operation
* ===================
- *
+ *
* Computers are very predictable devices. Hence it is extremely hard
* to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
* pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
* must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
* generate random numbers. In a Unix environment, this is best done
* from inside the kernel.
- *
+ *
* Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
* timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
* events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
* As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
* an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
* the random number generator's internal state.
- *
+ *
* When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA
* hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The SHA hash avoids
* exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to
* reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
* bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
* outputs random numbers.
- *
+ *
* If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
* random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
* able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
* not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility.
* Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
* of purposes.
- *
+ *
* Exported interfaces ---- output
* ===============================
- *
+ *
* There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to
* be used from within the kernel:
*
*
* This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
* and place it in the requested buffer.
- *
+ *
* The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and
* /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high
* quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or
* one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
* bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator)
* contained in the entropy pool.
- *
+ *
* The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return
* as many bytes as are requested. As more and more random bytes are
* requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge,
*
* Exported interfaces ---- input
* ==============================
- *
+ *
* The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
* from the devices are:
- *
- * void add_keyboard_randomness(unsigned char scancode);
- * void add_mouse_randomness(__u32 mouse_data);
+ *
+ * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+ * unsigned int value);
* void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
- *
- * add_keyboard_randomness() uses the inter-keypress timing, as well as the
- * scancode as random inputs into the "entropy pool".
- *
- * add_mouse_randomness() uses the mouse interrupt timing, as well as
- * the reported position of the mouse from the hardware.
+ *
+ * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
+ * the event type information from the hardware.
*
* add_interrupt_randomness() uses the inter-interrupt timing as random
* inputs to the entropy pool. Note that not all interrupts are good
* regular, and hence predictable to an attacker. Disk interrupts are
* a better measure, since the timing of the disk interrupts are more
* unpredictable.
- *
+ *
* All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
* particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the
* first and second order deltas of the event timings.
*
* Ensuring unpredictability at system startup
* ============================================
- *
+ *
* When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence
* of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially
* if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator.
* counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the
* entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups. To do this, put the
* following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot
- * sequence:
+ * sequence:
*
* echo "Initializing random number generator..."
* random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
* touch $random_seed
* fi
* chmod 600 $random_seed
- * poolfile=/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
- * [ -r $poolfile ] && bytes=`cat $poolfile` || bytes=512
- * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=$bytes
+ * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
*
* and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as
* the system is shutdown:
* random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
* touch $random_seed
* chmod 600 $random_seed
- * poolfile=/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
- * [ -r $poolfile ] && bytes=`cat $poolfile` || bytes=512
- * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=$bytes
+ * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
*
* For example, on most modern systems using the System V init
* scripts, such code fragments would be found in
* /etc/rc.d/init.d/random. On older Linux systems, the correct script
* location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0.
- *
+ *
* Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool
* to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at
* start-up. (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to
*
* mknod /dev/random c 1 8
* mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
- *
+ *
* Acknowledgements:
* =================
*
* number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy
* pool, taken from PGPfone. Dale Worley has also contributed many
* useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver.
- *
+ *
* Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
* not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
- *
+ *
* The code for SHA transform was taken from Peter Gutmann's
* implementation, which has been placed in the public domain.
* The code for MD5 transform was taken from Colin Plumb's
* implementation, which has been placed in the public domain.
* The MD5 cryptographic checksum was devised by Ronald Rivest, and is
* documented in RFC 1321, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm".
- *
+ *
* Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
* RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
* Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
* get the twisting happening as fast as possible.
*/
static struct poolinfo {
- int poolwords;
- int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
+ int poolwords;
+ int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
} poolinfo_table[] = {
/* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */
{ 2048, 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 },
* II. ACM Transactions on Mdeling and Computer Simulation 4:254-266)
*
* Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
- *
+ *
* We have not analyzed the resultant polynomial to prove it primitive;
* in fact it almost certainly isn't. Nonetheless, the irreducible factors
* of a random large-degree polynomial over GF(2) are more than large enough
* that periodicity is not a concern.
- *
+ *
* The input hash is much less sensitive than the output hash. All
* that we want of it is that it be a good non-cryptographic hash;
* i.e. it not produce collisions when fed "random" data of the sort
* Linux 2.2 compatibility
*/
#ifndef DECLARE_WAITQUEUE
-#define DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(WAIT, PTR) struct wait_queue WAIT = { PTR, NULL }
+#define DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(WAIT, PTR) struct wait_queue WAIT = { PTR, NULL }
#endif
#ifndef DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD
#define DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(WAIT) struct wait_queue *WAIT
*
* Utility functions, with some ASM defined functions for speed
* purposes
- *
+ *
*****************************************************************/
/*
static inline __u32 rotate_left(int i, __u32 word)
{
return (word << i) | (word >> (32 - i));
-
}
#else
static inline __u32 rotate_left(int i, __u32 word)
/*
* More asm magic....
- *
+ *
* For entropy estimation, we need to do an integral base 2
- * logarithm.
+ * logarithm.
*
* Note the "12bits" suffix - this is used for numbers between
* 0 and 4095 only. This allows a few shortcuts.
static inline __u32 int_ln_12bits(__u32 word)
{
__u32 nbits = 0;
-
+
while (word >>= 1)
nbits++;
return nbits;
#endif
#if 0
-#define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "random: " fmt, ## arg)
+static int debug = 0;
+module_param(debug, bool, 0644);
+#define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) do { if (debug) \
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "random %04d %04d %04d: " \
+ fmt,\
+ random_state->entropy_count,\
+ sec_random_state->entropy_count,\
+ urandom_state->entropy_count,\
+ ## arg); } while (0)
#else
#define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) do {} while (0)
#endif
*
* OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle
* storing entropy in an entropy pool.
- *
+ *
**********************************************************************/
struct entropy_store {
/* mostly-read data: */
struct poolinfo poolinfo;
- __u32 *pool;
- const char *name;
+ __u32 *pool;
+ const char *name;
/* read-write data: */
spinlock_t lock ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
- unsigned add_ptr;
- int entropy_count;
- int input_rotate;
+ unsigned add_ptr;
+ int entropy_count;
+ int input_rotate;
};
/*
static int create_entropy_store(int size, const char *name,
struct entropy_store **ret_bucket)
{
- struct entropy_store *r;
- struct poolinfo *p;
- int poolwords;
+ struct entropy_store *r;
+ struct poolinfo *p;
+ int poolwords;
poolwords = (size + 3) / 4; /* Convert bytes->words */
/* The pool size must be a multiple of 16 32-bit words */
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset(r->pool, 0, POOLBYTES);
- r->lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
+ spin_lock_init(&r->lock);
r->name = name;
*ret_bucket = r;
return 0;
r->input_rotate = 0;
memset(r->pool, 0, r->poolinfo.POOLBYTES);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
-static void free_entropy_store(struct entropy_store *r)
-{
- if (r->pool)
- kfree(r->pool);
- kfree(r);
-}
-#endif
+
/*
* This function adds a byte into the entropy "pool". It does not
* update the entropy estimate. The caller should call
* credit_entropy_store if this is appropriate.
- *
+ *
* The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate
* degree, and then twisted. We twist by three bits at a time because
* it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
* the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
*/
-static void add_entropy_words(struct entropy_store *r, const __u32 *in,
- int nwords)
+static void __add_entropy_words(struct entropy_store *r, const __u32 *in,
+ int nwords, __u32 out[16])
{
static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
- 0, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
+ 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
unsigned long i, add_ptr, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
int new_rotate, input_rotate;
r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
r->add_ptr = add_ptr;
+ if (out) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ out[i] = r->pool[add_ptr];
+ add_ptr = (add_ptr - 1) & wordmask;
+ }
+ }
+
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
}
+static inline void add_entropy_words(struct entropy_store *r, const __u32 *in,
+ int nwords)
+{
+ __add_entropy_words(r, in, nwords, NULL);
+}
+
/*
* Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy
*/
} else {
r->entropy_count += nbits;
if (nbits)
- DEBUG_ENT("Added %d entropy credits to %s, now %d\n",
- nbits, r->name, r->entropy_count);
+ DEBUG_ENT("added %d entropy credits to %s\n",
+ nbits, r->name);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
};
static struct sample *batch_entropy_pool, *batch_entropy_copy;
-static int batch_head, batch_tail;
-static spinlock_t batch_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
+static int batch_head, batch_tail;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(batch_lock);
-static int batch_max;
+static int batch_max;
static void batch_entropy_process(void *private_);
static DECLARE_WORK(batch_work, batch_entropy_process, NULL);
* hashing calculations during an interrupt in add_timer_randomness().
* Instead, the entropy is only added to the pool by keventd.
*/
-void batch_entropy_store(u32 a, u32 b, int num)
+static void batch_entropy_store(u32 a, u32 b, int num)
{
int new;
unsigned long flags;
batch_entropy_pool[batch_head].data[1] = b;
batch_entropy_pool[batch_head].credit = num;
- if (((batch_head - batch_tail) & (batch_max-1)) >= (batch_max / 2)) {
- /*
- * Schedule it for the next timer tick:
- */
+ if (((batch_head - batch_tail) & (batch_max - 1)) >= (batch_max / 2))
schedule_delayed_work(&batch_work, 1);
- }
- new = (batch_head+1) & (batch_max-1);
- if (new == batch_tail) {
+ new = (batch_head + 1) & (batch_max - 1);
+ if (new == batch_tail)
DEBUG_ENT("batch entropy buffer full\n");
- } else {
+ else
batch_head = new;
- }
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch_lock, flags);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(batch_entropy_store);
-
/*
* Flush out the accumulated entropy operations, adding entropy to the passed
* store (normally random_state). If that store has enough entropy, alternate
spin_lock_irq(&batch_lock);
memcpy(batch_entropy_copy, batch_entropy_pool,
- batch_max*sizeof(struct sample));
+ batch_max * sizeof(struct sample));
head = batch_head;
tail = batch_tail;
p = r;
while (head != tail) {
if (r->entropy_count >= max_entropy) {
- r = (r == sec_random_state) ? random_state :
- sec_random_state;
+ r = (r == sec_random_state) ? random_state :
+ sec_random_state;
max_entropy = r->poolinfo.POOLBITS;
}
add_entropy_words(r, batch_entropy_copy[tail].data, 2);
credit_entropy_store(r, batch_entropy_copy[tail].credit);
- tail = (tail+1) & (batch_max-1);
+ tail = (tail + 1) & (batch_max - 1);
}
if (p->entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
/* There is one of these per entropy source */
struct timer_rand_state {
- cycles_t last_time;
- long last_delta,last_delta2;
- unsigned dont_count_entropy:1;
+ cycles_t last_time;
+ long last_delta,last_delta2;
+ unsigned dont_count_entropy:1;
};
-static struct timer_rand_state keyboard_timer_state;
-static struct timer_rand_state mouse_timer_state;
+static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state;
static struct timer_rand_state extract_timer_state;
static struct timer_rand_state *irq_timer_state[NR_IRQS];
*/
static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
{
- cycles_t time;
- long delta, delta2, delta3;
- int entropy = 0;
+ cycles_t data;
+ long delta, delta2, delta3, time;
+ int entropy = 0;
preempt_disable();
/* if over the trickle threshold, use only 1 in 4096 samples */
- if ( random_state->entropy_count > trickle_thresh &&
- (__get_cpu_var(trickle_count)++ & 0xfff))
+ if (random_state->entropy_count > trickle_thresh &&
+ (__get_cpu_var(trickle_count)++ & 0xfff))
goto out;
- /*
- * Use get_cycles() if implemented, otherwise fall back to
- * jiffies.
- */
- time = get_cycles();
- if (time != 0) {
- if (sizeof(time) > 4)
- num ^= (u32)(time >> 32);
- } else {
- time = jiffies;
- }
-
/*
* Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
* We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
* in order to make our estimate.
*/
+ time = jiffies;
+
if (!state->dont_count_entropy) {
delta = time - state->last_time;
state->last_time = time;
entropy = int_ln_12bits(delta);
}
- batch_entropy_store(num, time, entropy);
+
+ /*
+ * Use get_cycles() if implemented, otherwise fall back to
+ * jiffies.
+ */
+ data = get_cycles();
+ if (data)
+ num ^= (u32)((data >> 31) >> 1);
+ else
+ data = time;
+
+ batch_entropy_store(num, data, entropy);
out:
preempt_enable();
}
-void add_keyboard_randomness(unsigned char scancode)
+extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+ unsigned int value)
{
- static unsigned char last_scancode;
- /* ignore autorepeat (multiple key down w/o key up) */
- if (scancode != last_scancode) {
- last_scancode = scancode;
- add_timer_randomness(&keyboard_timer_state, scancode);
- }
-}
+ static unsigned char last_value;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_keyboard_randomness);
+ /* ignore autorepeat and the like */
+ if (value == last_value)
+ return;
-void add_mouse_randomness(__u32 mouse_data)
-{
- add_timer_randomness(&mouse_timer_state, mouse_data);
+ DEBUG_ENT("input event\n");
+ last_value = value;
+ add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
+ (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_mouse_randomness);
-
void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
{
if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq] == 0)
return;
- add_timer_randomness(irq_timer_state[irq], 0x100+irq);
+ DEBUG_ENT("irq event %d\n", irq);
+ add_timer_randomness(irq_timer_state[irq], 0x100 + irq);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_interrupt_randomness);
-
void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
{
if (!disk || !disk->random)
return;
/* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */
- add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100+MKDEV(disk->major, disk->first_minor));
+ DEBUG_ENT("disk event %d:%d\n", disk->major, disk->first_minor);
+
+ add_timer_randomness(disk->random,
+ 0x100 + MKDEV(disk->major, disk->first_minor));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_disk_randomness);
* This chunk of code defines a function
* void HASH_TRANSFORM(__u32 digest[HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE],
* __u32 const data[16])
- *
+ *
* The function hashes the input data to produce a digest in the first
* HASH_BUFFER_SIZE words of the digest[] array, and uses HASH_EXTRA_SIZE
* more words for internal purposes. (This buffer is exported so the
* 3) 0x98badcfe
* 4) 0x10325476
* 5) 0xc3d2e1f0 (SHA only)
- *
+ *
* For /dev/random purposes, the length of the data being hashed is
* fixed in length, so appending a bit count in the usual way is not
* cryptographically necessary.
/* The SHA f()-functions. */
-#define f1(x,y,z) ( z ^ (x & (y^z)) ) /* Rounds 0-19: x ? y : z */
+#define f1(x,y,z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z))) /* Rounds 0-19: x ? y : z */
#define f2(x,y,z) (x ^ y ^ z) /* Rounds 20-39: XOR */
-#define f3(x,y,z) ( (x & y) + (z & (x ^ y)) ) /* Rounds 40-59: majority */
+#define f3(x,y,z) ((x & y) + (z & (x ^ y))) /* Rounds 40-59: majority */
#define f4(x,y,z) (x ^ y ^ z) /* Rounds 60-79: XOR */
/* The SHA Mysterious Constants */
#define K3 0x8F1BBCDCL /* Rounds 40-59: sqrt(5) * 2^30 */
#define K4 0xCA62C1D6L /* Rounds 60-79: sqrt(10) * 2^30 */
-#define ROTL(n,X) ( ( ( X ) << n ) | ( ( X ) >> ( 32 - n ) ) )
+#define ROTL(n,X) (((X) << n ) | ((X) >> (32 - n)))
#define subRound(a, b, c, d, e, f, k, data) \
- ( e += ROTL( 5, a ) + f( b, c, d ) + k + data, b = ROTL( 30, b ) )
-
+ (e += ROTL(5, a) + f(b, c, d) + k + data, b = ROTL(30, b))
static void SHATransform(__u32 digest[85], __u32 const data[16])
{
- __u32 A, B, C, D, E; /* Local vars */
- __u32 TEMP;
- int i;
+ __u32 A, B, C, D, E; /* Local vars */
+ __u32 TEMP;
+ int i;
#define W (digest + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE) /* Expanded data array */
- /*
- * Do the preliminary expansion of 16 to 80 words. Doing it
- * out-of-line line this is faster than doing it in-line on
- * register-starved machines like the x86, and not really any
- * slower on real processors.
- */
- memcpy(W, data, 16*sizeof(__u32));
- for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
- TEMP = W[i] ^ W[i+2] ^ W[i+8] ^ W[i+13];
- W[i+16] = ROTL(1, TEMP);
- }
-
- /* Set up first buffer and local data buffer */
- A = digest[ 0 ];
- B = digest[ 1 ];
- C = digest[ 2 ];
- D = digest[ 3 ];
- E = digest[ 4 ];
-
- /* Heavy mangling, in 4 sub-rounds of 20 iterations each. */
+ /*
+ * Do the preliminary expansion of 16 to 80 words. Doing it
+ * out-of-line line this is faster than doing it in-line on
+ * register-starved machines like the x86, and not really any
+ * slower on real processors.
+ */
+ memcpy(W, data, 16*sizeof(__u32));
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ TEMP = W[i] ^ W[i+2] ^ W[i+8] ^ W[i+13];
+ W[i+16] = ROTL(1, TEMP);
+ }
+
+ /* Set up first buffer and local data buffer */
+ A = digest[ 0 ];
+ B = digest[ 1 ];
+ C = digest[ 2 ];
+ D = digest[ 3 ];
+ E = digest[ 4 ];
+
+ /* Heavy mangling, in 4 sub-rounds of 20 iterations each. */
#if SHA_CODE_SIZE == 0
- /*
- * Approximately 50% of the speed of the largest version, but
- * takes up 1/16 the space. Saves about 6k on an i386 kernel.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 80; i++) {
- if (i < 40) {
- if (i < 20)
- TEMP = f1(B, C, D) + K1;
- else
- TEMP = f2(B, C, D) + K2;
- } else {
- if (i < 60)
- TEMP = f3(B, C, D) + K3;
- else
- TEMP = f4(B, C, D) + K4;
+ /*
+ * Approximately 50% of the speed of the largest version, but
+ * takes up 1/16 the space. Saves about 6k on an i386 kernel.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 80; i++) {
+ if (i < 40) {
+ if (i < 20)
+ TEMP = f1(B, C, D) + K1;
+ else
+ TEMP = f2(B, C, D) + K2;
+ } else {
+ if (i < 60)
+ TEMP = f3(B, C, D) + K3;
+ else
+ TEMP = f4(B, C, D) + K4;
+ }
+ TEMP += ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
+ E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
}
- TEMP += ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
- E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
- }
#elif SHA_CODE_SIZE == 1
- for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
- TEMP = f1(B, C, D) + K1 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
- E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
- }
- for (; i < 40; i++) {
- TEMP = f2(B, C, D) + K2 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
- E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
- }
- for (; i < 60; i++) {
- TEMP = f3(B, C, D) + K3 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
- E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
- }
- for (; i < 80; i++) {
- TEMP = f4(B, C, D) + K4 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
- E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
+ TEMP = f1(B, C, D) + K1 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
+ E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
+ }
+ for (; i < 40; i++) {
+ TEMP = f2(B, C, D) + K2 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
+ E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
+ }
+ for (; i < 60; i++) {
+ TEMP = f3(B, C, D) + K3 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
+ E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
+ }
+ for (; i < 80; i++) {
+ TEMP = f4(B, C, D) + K4 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
+ E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
+ }
#elif SHA_CODE_SIZE == 2
- for (i = 0; i < 20; i += 5) {
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ i ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ i+1 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ i+2 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ i+3 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ i+4 ] );
- }
- for (; i < 40; i += 5) {
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ i ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ i+1 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ i+2 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ i+3 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ i+4 ] );
- }
- for (; i < 60; i += 5) {
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ i ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ i+1 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ i+2 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ i+3 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ i+4 ] );
- }
- for (; i < 80; i += 5) {
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ i ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ i+1 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ i+2 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ i+3 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ i+4 ] );
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i += 5) {
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[i ]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[i+1]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[i+2]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[i+3]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[i+4]);
+ }
+ for (; i < 40; i += 5) {
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[i ]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[i+1]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[i+2]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[i+3]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[i+4]);
+ }
+ for (; i < 60; i += 5) {
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[i ]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[i+1]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[i+2]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[i+3]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[i+4]);
+ }
+ for (; i < 80; i += 5) {
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[i ]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[i+1]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[i+2]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[i+3]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[i+4]);
+ }
#elif SHA_CODE_SIZE == 3 /* Really large version */
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 0 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 1 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 2 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 3 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 4 ] );
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 5 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 6 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 7 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 8 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 9 ] );
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 10 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 11 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 12 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 13 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 14 ] );
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 15 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 16 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 17 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 18 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 19 ] );
-
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 20 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 21 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 22 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 23 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 24 ] );
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 25 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 26 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 27 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 28 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 29 ] );
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 30 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 31 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 32 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 33 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 34 ] );
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 35 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 36 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 37 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 38 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 39 ] );
-
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 40 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 41 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 42 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 43 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 44 ] );
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 45 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 46 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 47 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 48 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 49 ] );
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 50 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 51 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 52 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 53 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 54 ] );
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 55 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 56 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 57 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 58 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 59 ] );
-
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 60 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 61 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 62 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 63 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 64 ] );
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 65 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 66 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 67 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 68 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 69 ] );
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 70 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 71 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 72 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 73 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 74 ] );
- subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 75 ] );
- subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 76 ] );
- subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 77 ] );
- subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 78 ] );
- subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 79 ] );
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 0]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 1]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 2]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 3]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 4]);
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 5]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 6]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 7]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 8]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 9]);
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[10]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[11]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[12]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[13]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[14]);
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[15]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[16]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[17]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[18]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[19]);
+
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[20]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[21]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[22]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[23]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[24]);
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[25]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[26]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[27]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[28]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[29]);
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[30]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[31]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[32]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[33]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[34]);
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[35]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[36]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[37]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[38]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[39]);
+
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[40]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[41]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[42]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[43]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[44]);
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[45]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[46]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[47]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[48]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[49]);
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[50]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[51]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[52]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[53]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[54]);
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[55]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[56]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[57]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[58]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[59]);
+
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[60]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[61]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[62]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[63]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[64]);
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[65]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[66]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[67]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[68]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[69]);
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[70]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[71]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[72]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[73]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[74]);
+ subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[75]);
+ subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[76]);
+ subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[77]);
+ subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[78]);
+ subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[79]);
#else
#error Illegal SHA_CODE_SIZE
#endif
- /* Build message digest */
- digest[ 0 ] += A;
- digest[ 1 ] += B;
- digest[ 2 ] += C;
- digest[ 3 ] += D;
- digest[ 4 ] += E;
+ /* Build message digest */
+ digest[0] += A;
+ digest[1] += B;
+ digest[2] += C;
+ digest[3] += D;
+ digest[4] += E;
/* W is wiped by the caller */
#undef W
#undef f2
#undef f3
#undef f4
-#undef K1
+#undef K1
#undef K2
-#undef K3
-#undef K4
+#undef K3
+#undef K4
#undef subRound
-
+
#else /* !USE_SHA - Use MD5 */
#define HASH_BUFFER_SIZE 4
#define HASH_EXTRA_SIZE 0
#define HASH_TRANSFORM MD5Transform
-
+
/*
* MD5 transform algorithm, taken from code written by Colin Plumb,
* and put into the public domain
/* This is the central step in the MD5 algorithm. */
#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, data, s) \
- ( w += f(x, y, z) + data, w = w<<s | w>>(32-s), w += x )
+ (w += f(x, y, z) + data, w = w << s | w >> (32 - s), w += x )
/*
* The core of the MD5 algorithm, this alters an existing MD5 hash to
int bytes = max_t(int, random_read_wakeup_thresh / 8,
min_t(int, nbytes, TMP_BUF_SIZE));
- DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : going to reseed %s with %d bits "
+ DEBUG_ENT("going to reseed %s with %d bits "
"(%d of %d requested)\n",
- random_state->entropy_count,
- sec_random_state->entropy_count,
r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, r->entropy_count);
bytes=extract_entropy(random_state, tmp, bytes,
EXTRACT_ENTROPY_LIMIT);
- add_entropy_words(r, tmp, bytes);
+ add_entropy_words(r, tmp, (bytes + 3) / 4);
credit_entropy_store(r, bytes*8);
}
}
size_t nbytes, int flags)
{
ssize_t ret, i;
- __u32 tmp[TMP_BUF_SIZE];
+ __u32 tmp[TMP_BUF_SIZE], data[16];
__u32 x;
unsigned long cpuflags;
-
/* Redundant, but just in case... */
if (r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo.POOLBITS)
r->entropy_count = r->poolinfo.POOLBITS;
/* Hold lock while accounting */
spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, cpuflags);
- DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : trying to extract %d bits from %s\n",
- random_state->entropy_count,
- sec_random_state->entropy_count,
+ DEBUG_ENT("trying to extract %d bits from %s\n",
nbytes * 8, r->name);
if (flags & EXTRACT_ENTROPY_LIMIT && nbytes >= r->entropy_count / 8)
if (r->entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
- DEBUG_ENT("Debiting %d entropy credits from %s%s\n",
+ DEBUG_ENT("debiting %d entropy credits from %s%s\n",
nbytes * 8, r->name,
flags & EXTRACT_ENTROPY_LIMIT ? "" : " (unlimited)");
break;
}
- DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : extract feeling sleepy (%d bytes left)\n",
- random_state->entropy_count,
- sec_random_state->entropy_count, nbytes);
-
schedule();
-
- DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : extract woke up\n",
- random_state->entropy_count,
- sec_random_state->entropy_count);
}
/* Hash the pool to get the output */
HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp, r->pool+i);
add_entropy_words(r, &tmp[x%HASH_BUFFER_SIZE], 1);
}
-
+
+ /*
+ * To avoid duplicates, we atomically extract a
+ * portion of the pool while mixing, and hash one
+ * final time.
+ */
+ __add_entropy_words(r, &tmp[x%HASH_BUFFER_SIZE], 1, data);
+ HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp, data);
+
/*
* In case the hash function has some recognizable
* output pattern, we fold it in half.
x ^= (x >> 16); /* Fold it in half */
((__u16 *)tmp)[HASH_BUFFER_SIZE-1] = (__u16)x;
#endif
-
+
/* Copy data to destination buffer */
i = min(nbytes, HASH_BUFFER_SIZE*sizeof(__u32)/2);
if (flags & EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER) {
}
} else
memcpy(buf, (__u8 const *)tmp, i);
+
nbytes -= i;
buf += i;
ret += i;
/* Wipe data just returned from memory */
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
-
+
return ret;
}
*/
static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
{
- struct timeval tv;
- __u32 words[2];
- char *p;
- int i;
+ struct timeval tv;
+ __u32 words[2];
+ char *p;
+ int i;
do_gettimeofday(&tv);
words[0] = tv.tv_sec;
#endif
for (i = 0; i < NR_IRQS; i++)
irq_timer_state[i] = NULL;
- memset(&keyboard_timer_state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
- memset(&mouse_timer_state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
+ memset(&input_timer_state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
memset(&extract_timer_state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
extract_timer_state.dont_count_entropy = 1;
return 0;
void rand_initialize_irq(int irq)
{
struct timer_rand_state *state;
-
+
if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq])
return;
irq_timer_state[irq] = state;
}
}
-
+
void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
{
struct timer_rand_state *state;
-
+
/*
* If kmalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
* source.
random_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
- ssize_t n, retval = 0, count = 0;
-
+ ssize_t n, retval = 0, count = 0;
+
if (nbytes == 0)
return 0;
if (n > SEC_XFER_SIZE)
n = SEC_XFER_SIZE;
- DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : reading %d bits, p: %d s: %d\n",
- random_state->entropy_count,
- sec_random_state->entropy_count,
- n*8, random_state->entropy_count,
- sec_random_state->entropy_count);
+ DEBUG_ENT("reading %d bits\n", n*8);
n = extract_entropy(sec_random_state, buf, n,
EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER |
EXTRACT_ENTROPY_LIMIT |
EXTRACT_ENTROPY_SECONDARY);
- DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : read got %d bits (%d still needed)\n",
- random_state->entropy_count,
- sec_random_state->entropy_count,
+ DEBUG_ENT("read got %d bits (%d still needed)\n",
n*8, (nbytes-n)*8);
if (n == 0) {
break;
}
- DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : sleeping?\n",
- random_state->entropy_count,
- sec_random_state->entropy_count);
-
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
add_wait_queue(&random_read_wait, &wait);
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(&random_read_wait, &wait);
- DEBUG_ENT("%04d %04d : waking up\n",
- random_state->entropy_count,
- sec_random_state->entropy_count);
-
continue;
}
*/
if (count)
file_accessed(file);
-
+
return (count ? count : retval);
}
random_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- int ret = 0;
- size_t bytes;
- __u32 buf[16];
- const char __user *p = buffer;
- size_t c = count;
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t bytes;
+ __u32 buf[16];
+ const char __user *p = buffer;
+ size_t c = count;
while (c > 0) {
bytes = min(c, sizeof(buf));
if (p == buffer) {
return (ssize_t)ret;
} else {
- file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
- mark_inode_dirty(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+ inode->i_mtime = current_fs_time(inode->i_sb);
+ mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return (ssize_t)(p - buffer);
}
}
int size, ent_count;
int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
int retval;
-
+
switch (cmd) {
case RNDGETENTCNT:
ent_count = random_state->entropy_count;
}
struct file_operations random_fops = {
- .read = random_read,
- .write = random_write,
- .poll = random_poll,
- .ioctl = random_ioctl,
+ .read = random_read,
+ .write = random_write,
+ .poll = random_poll,
+ .ioctl = random_ioctl,
};
struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
- .read = urandom_read,
- .write = random_write,
- .ioctl = random_ioctl,
+ .read = urandom_read,
+ .write = random_write,
+ .ioctl = random_ioctl,
};
/***************************************************************
* Random UUID interface
- *
- * Used here for a Boot ID, but can be useful for other kernel
+ *
+ * Used here for a Boot ID, but can be useful for other kernel
* drivers.
***************************************************************/
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
-static int sysctl_poolsize;
static int min_read_thresh, max_read_thresh;
static int min_write_thresh, max_write_thresh;
static char sysctl_bootid[16];
-/*
- * This function handles a request from the user to change the pool size
- * of the primary entropy store.
- */
-static int change_poolsize(int poolsize)
-{
- struct entropy_store *new_store, *old_store;
- int ret;
-
- if ((ret = create_entropy_store(poolsize, random_state->name,
- &new_store)))
- return ret;
-
- add_entropy_words(new_store, random_state->pool,
- random_state->poolinfo.poolwords);
- credit_entropy_store(new_store, random_state->entropy_count);
-
- sysctl_init_random(new_store);
- old_store = random_state;
- random_state = batch_work.data = new_store;
- free_entropy_store(old_store);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int proc_do_poolsize(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
- void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- int ret;
-
- sysctl_poolsize = random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES;
-
- ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos);
- if (ret || !write ||
- (sysctl_poolsize == random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES))
- return ret;
-
- return change_poolsize(sysctl_poolsize);
-}
-
-static int poolsize_strategy(ctl_table *table, int __user *name, int nlen,
- void __user *oldval, size_t __user *oldlenp,
- void __user *newval, size_t newlen, void **context)
-{
- int len;
-
- sysctl_poolsize = random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES;
-
- /*
- * We only handle the write case, since the read case gets
- * handled by the default handler (and we don't care if the
- * write case happens twice; it's harmless).
- */
- if (newval && newlen) {
- len = newlen;
- if (len > table->maxlen)
- len = table->maxlen;
- if (copy_from_user(table->data, newval, len))
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- if (sysctl_poolsize != random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES)
- return change_poolsize(sysctl_poolsize);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/*
* These functions is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
* UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
* then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
- *
+ *
* If the user accesses this via the proc interface, it will be returned
- * as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format. If accesses via the
+ * as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format. If accesses via the
* sysctl system call, it is returned as 16 bytes of binary data.
*/
static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
- ctl_table fake_table;
- unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
+ ctl_table fake_table;
+ unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
uuid = table->data;
if (!uuid) {
void __user *oldval, size_t __user *oldlenp,
void __user *newval, size_t newlen, void **context)
{
- unsigned char tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
- unsigned int len;
+ unsigned char tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
+ unsigned int len;
if (!oldval || !oldlenp)
return 1;
return 1;
}
+static int sysctl_poolsize = DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE;
ctl_table random_table[] = {
{
- .ctl_name = RANDOM_POOLSIZE,
+ .ctl_name = RANDOM_POOLSIZE,
.procname = "poolsize",
.data = &sysctl_poolsize,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
- .mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = &proc_do_poolsize,
- .strategy = &poolsize_strategy,
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
},
{
.ctl_name = RANDOM_ENTROPY_COUNT,
*
********************************************************************/
+#ifdef CONFIG_INET
/*
* TCP initial sequence number picking. This uses the random number
* generator to pick an initial secret value. This value is hashed
* Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
*/
#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s) \
- (a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32-s)))
+ (a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)))
#define K1 0
#define K2 013240474631UL
#define K3 015666365641UL
*/
static __u32 halfMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[8])
{
- __u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
+ __u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
/* Round 1 */
ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[0] + K1, 3);
static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
{
- __u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
+ __u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
/* Round 1 */
ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1, 3);
ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);
- return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
+ return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
/* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
}
#endif
#undef K3
/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
-#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300*HZ)
+#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
/*
* Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
* bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
*
* SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
* Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
- *
+ *
*/
-#define COUNT_BITS 8
-#define COUNT_MASK ( (1<<COUNT_BITS)-1)
-#define HASH_BITS 24
-#define HASH_MASK ( (1<<HASH_BITS)-1 )
+#define COUNT_BITS 8
+#define COUNT_MASK ((1 << COUNT_BITS) - 1)
+#define HASH_BITS 24
+#define HASH_MASK ((1 << HASH_BITS) - 1)
static struct keydata {
- __u32 count; // already shifted to the final position
- __u32 secret[12];
+ __u32 count; /* already shifted to the final position */
+ __u32 secret[12];
} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];
static unsigned int ip_cnt;
*/
static void rekey_seq_generator(void *private_)
{
- struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1^(ip_cnt&1)];
+ struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)];
get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
- keyptr->count = (ip_cnt&COUNT_MASK)<<HASH_BITS;
+ keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS;
smp_wmb();
ip_cnt++;
schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work, REKEY_INTERVAL);
static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
{
- struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt&1];
+ struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1];
smp_rmb();
__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32 *saddr, __u32 *daddr,
__u16 sport, __u16 dport)
{
- struct timeval tv;
- __u32 seq;
- __u32 hash[12];
+ struct timeval tv;
+ __u32 seq;
+ __u32 hash[12];
struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
/* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
* Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
*/
-
memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
hash[4]=(sport << 16) + dport;
- memcpy(&hash[5],keyptr->secret,sizeof(__u32)*7);
+ memcpy(&hash[5],keyptr->secret,sizeof(__u32) * 7);
seq = twothirdsMD4Transform(daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
seq += keyptr->count;
do_gettimeofday(&tv);
- seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec*1000000;
+ seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec * 1000000;
return seq;
}
__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
__u16 sport, __u16 dport)
{
- struct timeval tv;
- __u32 seq;
- __u32 hash[4];
+ struct timeval tv;
+ __u32 seq;
+ __u32 hash[4];
struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
/*
* Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
* (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
- * Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
+ * Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
* then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
*/
hash[0]=saddr;
* (Networks are faster now - should this be increased?)
*/
do_gettimeofday(&tv);
- seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec*1000000;
+ seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec * 1000000;
#if 0
printk("init_seq(%lx, %lx, %d, %d) = %d\n",
saddr, daddr, sport, dport, seq);
return halfMD4Transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
}
+/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral TCP port search */
+u32 secure_tcp_port_ephemeral(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 dport)
+{
+ struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+ u32 hash[4];
+
+ /*
+ * Pick a unique starting offset for each ephemeral port search
+ * (saddr, daddr, dport) and 48bits of random data.
+ */
+ hash[0] = saddr;
+ hash[1] = daddr;
+ hash[2] = dport ^ keyptr->secret[10];
+ hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+
+ return halfMD4Transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
/*
* Secure SYN cookie computation. This is the algorithm worked out by
#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
-static int syncookie_init;
-static __u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-3+HASH_BUFFER_SIZE];
+static int syncookie_init;
+static __u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-3+HASH_BUFFER_SIZE];
__u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
__u16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __u32 data)
{
- __u32 tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
- __u32 seq;
+ __u32 tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
+ __u32 seq;
/*
* Pick two random secrets the first time we need a cookie.
* MSS into the second hash value.
*/
- memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
+ memcpy(tmp + 3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
tmp[0]=saddr;
tmp[1]=daddr;
tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);
seq = tmp[17] + sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS);
- memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[1], sizeof(syncookie_secret[1]));
+ memcpy(tmp + 3, syncookie_secret[1], sizeof(syncookie_secret[1]));
tmp[0]=saddr;
tmp[1]=daddr;
tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
tmp[3] = count; /* minute counter */
- HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);
+ HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp + 16, tmp);
/* Add in the second hash and the data */
return seq + ((tmp[17] + data) & COOKIEMASK);
__u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
__u16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __u32 maxdiff)
{
- __u32 tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
- __u32 diff;
+ __u32 tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
+ __u32 diff;
if (syncookie_init == 0)
- return (__u32)-1; /* Well, duh! */
+ return (__u32)-1; /* Well, duh! */
/* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
- memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
+ memcpy(tmp + 3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
tmp[0]=saddr;
tmp[1]=daddr;
tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
- HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);
+ HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp + 16, tmp);
cookie -= tmp[17] + sseq;
/* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
tmp[1] = daddr;
tmp[2] = (sport << 16) + dport;
tmp[3] = count - diff; /* minute counter */
- HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);
+ HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp + 16, tmp);
return (cookie - tmp[17]) & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
}
#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_INET */
git://git.onelab.eu / linux-2.6.git / blobdiff