Fedora kernel-2.6.17-1.2142_FC4 patched with stable patch-2.6.17.4-vs2.0.2-rc26.diff

[linux-2.6.git] / fs / read_write.c

diff --git a/fs/read_write.c b/fs/read_write.c
index c4c2bee..c71dd10 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/read_write.c
+++ b/fs/read_write.c
@@ -10,15 +10,16 @@
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/uio.h>
 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
-#include <linux/dnotify.h>
+#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 
-struct file_operations generic_ro_fops = {
+const struct file_operations generic_ro_fops = {
        .llseek         = generic_file_llseek,
        .read           = generic_file_read,
        .mmap           = generic_file_readonly_mmap,
@@ -32,7 +33,7 @@ loff_t generic_file_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int origin)
        long long retval;
        struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
 
-       down(&inode->i_sem);
+       mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
        switch (origin) {
                case 2:
                        offset += inode->i_size;
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ loff_t generic_file_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int origin)
                }
                retval = offset;
        }
-       up(&inode->i_sem);
+       mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
        return retval;
 }
 
@@ -182,27 +183,48 @@ bad:
 }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * rw_verify_area doesn't like huge counts. We limit
+ * them to something that fits in "int" so that others
+ * won't have to do range checks all the time.
+ */
+#define MAX_RW_COUNT (INT_MAX & PAGE_CACHE_MASK)
 
 int rw_verify_area(int read_write, struct file *file, loff_t *ppos, size_t count)
 {
        struct inode *inode;
        loff_t pos;
 
-       if (unlikely(count > file->f_maxcount))
+       if (unlikely((ssize_t) count < 0))
                goto Einval;
        pos = *ppos;
        if (unlikely((pos < 0) || (loff_t) (pos + count) < 0))
                goto Einval;
 
        inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
-       if (inode->i_flock && MANDATORY_LOCK(inode))
-               return locks_mandatory_area(read_write == READ ? FLOCK_VERIFY_READ : FLOCK_VERIFY_WRITE, inode, file, pos, count);
-       return 0;
+       if (unlikely(inode->i_flock && MANDATORY_LOCK(inode))) {
+               int retval = locks_mandatory_area(
+                       read_write == READ ? FLOCK_VERIFY_READ : FLOCK_VERIFY_WRITE,
+                       inode, file, pos, count);
+               if (retval < 0)
+                       return retval;
+       }
+       return count > MAX_RW_COUNT ? MAX_RW_COUNT : count;
 
 Einval:
        return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+static void wait_on_retry_sync_kiocb(struct kiocb *iocb)
+{
+       set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
+       if (!kiocbIsKicked(iocb))
+               schedule();
+       else
+               kiocbClearKicked(iocb);
+       __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
+}
+
 ssize_t do_sync_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
 {
        struct kiocb kiocb;
@@ -210,7 +232,10 @@ ssize_t do_sync_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *pp
 
        init_sync_kiocb(&kiocb, filp);
        kiocb.ki_pos = *ppos;
-       ret = filp->f_op->aio_read(&kiocb, buf, len, kiocb.ki_pos);
+       while (-EIOCBRETRY ==
+               (ret = filp->f_op->aio_read(&kiocb, buf, len, kiocb.ki_pos)))
+               wait_on_retry_sync_kiocb(&kiocb);
+
        if (-EIOCBQUEUED == ret)
                ret = wait_on_sync_kiocb(&kiocb);
        *ppos = kiocb.ki_pos;
@@ -231,7 +256,8 @@ ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
                return -EFAULT;
 
        ret = rw_verify_area(READ, file, pos, count);
-       if (!ret) {
+       if (ret >= 0) {
+               count = ret;
                ret = security_file_permission (file, MAY_READ);
                if (!ret) {
                        if (file->f_op->read)
@@ -239,7 +265,7 @@ ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
                        else
                                ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, pos);
                        if (ret > 0) {
-                               dnotify_parent(file->f_dentry, DN_ACCESS);
+                               fsnotify_access(file->f_dentry);
                                current->rchar += ret;
                        }
                        current->syscr++;
@@ -258,7 +284,10 @@ ssize_t do_sync_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, size_t len, lof
 
        init_sync_kiocb(&kiocb, filp);
        kiocb.ki_pos = *ppos;
-       ret = filp->f_op->aio_write(&kiocb, buf, len, kiocb.ki_pos);
+       while (-EIOCBRETRY ==
+              (ret = filp->f_op->aio_write(&kiocb, buf, len, kiocb.ki_pos)))
+               wait_on_retry_sync_kiocb(&kiocb);
+
        if (-EIOCBQUEUED == ret)
                ret = wait_on_sync_kiocb(&kiocb);
        *ppos = kiocb.ki_pos;
@@ -279,7 +308,8 @@ ssize_t vfs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_
                return -EFAULT;
 
        ret = rw_verify_area(WRITE, file, pos, count);
-       if (!ret) {
+       if (ret >= 0) {
+               count = ret;
                ret = security_file_permission (file, MAY_WRITE);
                if (!ret) {
                        if (file->f_op->write)
@@ -287,7 +317,7 @@ ssize_t vfs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_
                        else
                                ret = do_sync_write(file, buf, count, pos);
                        if (ret > 0) {
-                               dnotify_parent(file->f_dentry, DN_MODIFY);
+                               fsnotify_modify(file->f_dentry);
                                current->wchar += ret;
                        }
                        current->syscw++;
@@ -344,6 +374,8 @@ asmlinkage ssize_t sys_write(unsigned int fd, const char __user * buf, size_t co
        return ret;
 }
 
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sys_write);
+
 asmlinkage ssize_t sys_pread64(unsigned int fd, char __user *buf,
                             size_t count, loff_t pos)
 {
@@ -440,7 +472,7 @@ static ssize_t do_readv_writev(int type, struct file *file,
         * verify all the pointers
         */
        ret = -EINVAL;
-       if ((nr_segs > UIO_MAXIOV) || (nr_segs <= 0))
+       if (nr_segs > UIO_MAXIOV)
                goto out;
        if (!file->f_op)
                goto out;
@@ -481,6 +513,9 @@ static ssize_t do_readv_writev(int type, struct file *file,
        }
 
        ret = rw_verify_area(type, file, pos, tot_len);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+       ret = security_file_permission(file, type == READ ? MAY_READ : MAY_WRITE);
        if (ret)
                goto out;
 
@@ -523,9 +558,12 @@ static ssize_t do_readv_writev(int type, struct file *file,
 out:
        if (iov != iovstack)
                kfree(iov);
-       if ((ret + (type == READ)) > 0)
-               dnotify_parent(file->f_dentry,
-                               (type == READ) ? DN_ACCESS : DN_MODIFY);
+       if ((ret + (type == READ)) > 0) {
+               if (type == READ)
+                       fsnotify_access(file->f_dentry);
+               else
+                       fsnotify_modify(file->f_dentry);
+       }
        return ret;
 Efault:
        ret = -EFAULT;
@@ -631,8 +669,9 @@ static ssize_t do_sendfile(int out_fd, int in_fd, loff_t *ppos,
                if (!(in_file->f_mode & FMODE_PREAD))
                        goto fput_in;
        retval = rw_verify_area(READ, in_file, ppos, count);
-       if (retval)
+       if (retval < 0)
                goto fput_in;
+       count = retval;
 
        retval = security_file_permission (in_file, MAY_READ);
        if (retval)
@@ -652,8 +691,9 @@ static ssize_t do_sendfile(int out_fd, int in_fd, loff_t *ppos,
                goto fput_out;
        out_inode = out_file->f_dentry->d_inode;
        retval = rw_verify_area(WRITE, out_file, &out_file->f_pos, count);
-       if (retval)
+       if (retval < 0)
                goto fput_out;
+       count = retval;
 
        retval = security_file_permission (out_file, MAY_WRITE);
        if (retval)