* Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
*
* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
- * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
* All Rights Reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
* okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
*
- * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
- * 2006.
- *
- * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
- * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
- *
- * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
- * filesystem information.
- *
- * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
- * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <asm/atomic.h>
-#include <asm/types.h>
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
-#include <linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/list.h>
-#include <linux/tty.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
-#include <linux/binfmts.h>
-#include <linux/syscalls.h>
-#include "audit.h"
-
-extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
+/* 0 = no checking
+ 1 = put_count checking
+ 2 = verbose put_count checking
+*/
+#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
extern int audit_enabled;
* path_lookup. */
#define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
-/* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
-#define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
-
-/* number of audit rules */
-int audit_n_rules;
+/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
+ a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
+ the syscall filter. */
+enum audit_state {
+ AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
+ * No syscall-specific audit records can
+ * be generated. */
+ AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
+ * but don't necessarily fill it in at
+ * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
+ * instead). */
+ AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
+ * and always fill it in at syscall
+ * entry time. This makes a full
+ * syscall record available if some
+ * other part of the kernel decides it
+ * should be recorded. */
+ AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
+ * always fill it in at syscall entry
+ * time, and always write out the audit
+ * record at syscall exit time. */
+};
/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
* we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
* Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
struct audit_names {
const char *name;
- int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
- unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
unsigned long ino;
dev_t dev;
umode_t mode;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ unsigned flags;
};
struct audit_aux_data {
#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
-struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
- struct audit_aux_data d;
- int oflag;
- mode_t mode;
- struct mq_attr attr;
-};
-
-struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv {
- struct audit_aux_data d;
- mqd_t mqdes;
- size_t msg_len;
- unsigned int msg_prio;
- struct timespec abs_timeout;
-};
-
-struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify {
- struct audit_aux_data d;
- mqd_t mqdes;
- struct sigevent notification;
-};
-
-struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr {
- struct audit_aux_data d;
- mqd_t mqdes;
- struct mq_attr mqstat;
-};
-
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
struct audit_aux_data d;
struct ipc_perm p;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
mode_t mode;
- u32 osid;
-};
-
-struct audit_aux_data_execve {
- struct audit_aux_data d;
- int argc;
- int envc;
- char mem[0];
};
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
/* The per-task audit context. */
struct audit_context {
- int dummy; /* must be the first element */
int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
enum audit_state state;
unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
int name_count;
struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
- char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
struct dentry * pwd;
struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
/* Save things to print about task_struct */
- pid_t pid, ppid;
+ pid_t pid;
uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
unsigned long personality;
#endif
};
-#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
-static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
+ /* Public API */
+/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
+ * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
+ * syscall exit time. */
+static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
+#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
+#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
+#endif
+};
+
+struct audit_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ struct audit_rule rule;
+};
+
+extern int audit_pid;
+
+/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called from
+ * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */
+static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
{
- int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
- if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
- n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
- return n & mask;
+ int i;
+
+ if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
+ && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
+ && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
+ return -1;
+ if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
+ return -1;
+ if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
+ return -1;
+
+ d->flags = s->flags;
+ d->action = s->action;
+ d->field_count = s->field_count;
+ for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
+ d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
+ d->values[i] = s->values[i];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
+ return 0;
}
-static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
+/* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
+ * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and
+ * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
+static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
{
- unsigned n = ctx->major;
- switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
- case 0: /* native */
- if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
- audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
- return 1;
- if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
- audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
- return 1;
- if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
- audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
- return 1;
- return 0;
- case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
- if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
- audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
- return 1;
- if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
- audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
+ int i;
+
+ if (a->flags != b->flags)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (a->action != b->action)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
+ if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
+ || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
return 1;
- if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
- audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
+ if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
return 1;
- return 0;
- case 2: /* open */
- return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
- case 3: /* openat */
- return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
- case 4: /* socketcall */
- return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
- case 5: /* execve */
- return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
+ * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
+ * audit_netlink_sem. */
+static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
+ struct list_head *list)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *entry;
+
+ /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
+ * addition routine. */
+ list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) {
+ if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) {
+ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) {
+ kfree(entry);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
+ entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+ list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
+ } else {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
+ kfree(e);
+}
+
+/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
+ * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
+ * audit_netlink_sem. */
+static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
+ struct list_head *list)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+
+ /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
+ * deletion routine. */
+ list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
+ if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
+ list_del_rcu(&e->list);
+ call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
+}
+
+static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
+{
+ int pid, seq;
+ int *dest = _dest;
+ struct audit_entry *entry;
+ int i;
+
+ pid = dest[0];
+ seq = dest[1];
+ kfree(dest);
+
+ down(&audit_netlink_sem);
+
+ /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
+ always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
+ for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+ list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
+ audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
+ &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
+ }
+ audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
+
+ up(&audit_netlink_sem);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
+ uid_t loginuid)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk;
+ int *dest;
+ int err = 0;
+ unsigned listnr;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case AUDIT_LIST:
+ /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
+ * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
+ * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
+ * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
+ * trying to _send_ the stuff */
+
+ dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dest)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ dest[0] = pid;
+ dest[1] = seq;
+
+ tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
+ if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
+ kfree(dest);
+ err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_ADD:
+ listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+ if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
+ if (!err)
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_DEL:
+ listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
+ if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
+ if (!err)
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
+ break;
default:
- return 0;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
+
+ return err;
}
-/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
* otherwise. */
static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct audit_krule *rule,
+ struct audit_rule *rule,
struct audit_context *ctx,
- struct audit_names *name,
enum audit_state *state)
{
- int i, j, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
+ int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
+ u32 value = rule->values[i];
int result = 0;
- switch (f->type) {
+ switch (field) {
case AUDIT_PID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
- break;
- case AUDIT_PPID:
- if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->pid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_UID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->uid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_EUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->euid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_SUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->suid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_FSUID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_GID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->gid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_EGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->egid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_SGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->sgid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_FSGID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_PERS:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (tsk->personality == value);
break;
case AUDIT_ARCH:
- if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
+ if (ctx)
+ result = (ctx->arch == value);
break;
case AUDIT_EXIT:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
+ result = (ctx->return_code == value);
break;
case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
- if (f->val)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
+ if (value)
+ result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
else
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
+ result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_FAILURE);
}
break;
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
- if (name)
- result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
- f->op, f->val);
- else if (ctx) {
+ if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
+ if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
++result;
break;
}
}
break;
case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
- if (name)
- result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
- f->op, f->val);
- else if (ctx) {
+ if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
+ if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
++result;
break;
}
}
break;
case AUDIT_INODE:
- if (name)
- result = (name->ino == f->val);
- else if (ctx) {
+ if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
+ if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
++result;
break;
}
}
}
break;
- case AUDIT_WATCH:
- if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
- result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
- name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
- break;
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
result = 0;
if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
- break;
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
- a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
- match for now to avoid losing information that
- may be wanted. An error message will also be
- logged upon error */
- if (f->se_rule) {
- if (need_sid) {
- selinux_task_ctxid(tsk, &sid);
- need_sid = 0;
- }
- result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
- f->op,
- f->se_rule,
- ctx);
- }
- break;
- case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
- also applies here */
- if (f->se_rule) {
- /* Find files that match */
- if (name) {
- result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid, f->type, f->op,
- f->se_rule, ctx);
- } else if (ctx) {
- for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
- ctx->names[j].osid,
- f->type, f->op,
- f->se_rule, ctx)) {
- ++result;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- /* Find ipc objects that match */
- if (ctx) {
- struct audit_aux_data *aux;
- for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
- aux = aux->next) {
- if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
- struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
- if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
- ++result;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
+ result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
break;
case AUDIT_ARG0:
case AUDIT_ARG1:
case AUDIT_ARG2:
case AUDIT_ARG3:
if (ctx)
- result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
- break;
- case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
- /* ignore this field for filtering */
- result = 1;
- break;
- case AUDIT_PERM:
- result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
+ result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
break;
}
+ if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
+ result = !result;
if (!result)
return 0;
}
- if (rule->filterkey)
- ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
switch (rule->action) {
case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
+ case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
}
return 1;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
- if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
+ if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return state;
}
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
- * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
+ * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
*/
static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_context *ctx,
rcu_read_lock();
if (!list_empty(list)) {
- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
- audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
- &state)) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return state;
- }
- }
+ int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+ int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+ if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
+ && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return state;
+ }
+ }
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
-/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
- * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
- * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
- * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
- */
-enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct audit_context *ctx)
+static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
+ struct audit_rule *rule,
+ enum audit_state *state)
{
int i;
- struct audit_entry *e;
- enum audit_state state;
- if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
- return AUDIT_DISABLED;
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
+ u32 value = rule->values[i];
+ int result = 0;
- rcu_read_lock();
- for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
- struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
- int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
- struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
-
- if (list_empty(list))
- continue;
-
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
- audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return state;
- }
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_PID:
+ result = (cb->creds.pid == value);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_UID:
+ result = (cb->creds.uid == value);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_GID:
+ result = (cb->creds.gid == value);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
+ result = (cb->loginuid == value);
+ break;
}
+
+ if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
+ result = !result;
+ if (!result)
+ return 0;
}
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
+ switch (rule->action) {
+ case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
+ case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
+ case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
-void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
+int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
{
- ctx->auditable = 1;
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+ enum audit_state state;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
+ if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
+ if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return ret; /* Audit by default */
}
+/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
int return_valid,
int return_code)
context->return_valid = return_valid;
context->return_code = return_code;
- if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
+ if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
enum audit_state state;
-
state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
- if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
- context->auditable = 1;
- goto get_context;
- }
-
- state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
context->auditable = 1;
-
}
-get_context:
-
+ context->pid = tsk->pid;
+ context->uid = tsk->uid;
+ context->gid = tsk->gid;
+ context->euid = tsk->euid;
+ context->suid = tsk->suid;
+ context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
+ context->egid = tsk->egid;
+ context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
+ context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
+ context->personality = tsk->personality;
tsk->audit_context = NULL;
return context;
}
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
if (context->auditable
||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
+ printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
" name_count=%d put_count=%d"
" ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__,
+ __LINE__,
context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
context->name_count, context->put_count,
context->ino_count);
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
context->names[i].name,
- context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
- }
+ context->names[i].name);
dump_stack();
return;
}
context->ino_count = 0;
#endif
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
- if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+ if (context->names[i].name)
__putname(context->names[i].name);
- }
context->name_count = 0;
if (context->pwd)
dput(context->pwd);
dput(axi->dentry);
mntput(axi->mnt);
}
-
context->aux = aux->next;
kfree(aux);
}
return context;
}
-/**
- * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
- * @tsk: task
- *
- * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
+/* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
* if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
* specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
- * needed.
- */
+ * needed. */
int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct audit_context *context;
}
audit_free_names(context);
audit_free_aux(context);
- kfree(context->filterkey);
kfree(context);
context = previous;
} while (context);
printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
}
-static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
- char *ctx = NULL;
- ssize_t len = 0;
-
- len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
- if (len < 0) {
- if (len != -EINVAL)
- goto error_path;
- return;
- }
-
- ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ctx)
- goto error_path;
-
- len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
- if (len < 0 )
- goto error_path;
-
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- return;
-
-error_path:
- kfree(ctx);
- audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
- return;
-}
-
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
- struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
+ char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
- /* tsk == current */
-
- get_task_comm(name, tsk);
+ get_task_comm(name, current);
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
- if (mm) {
- down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- vma = mm->mmap;
- while (vma) {
- if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
- vma->vm_file) {
- audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
- vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
- vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
- break;
- }
- vma = vma->vm_next;
+ if (!mm)
+ return;
+
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = mm->mmap;
+ while (vma) {
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
+ vma->vm_file) {
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
+ vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
+ vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
+ break;
}
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = vma->vm_next;
}
- audit_log_task_context(ab);
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
-static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
- int i, call_panic = 0;
+ int i;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
- const char *tty;
-
- /* tsk == current */
- context->pid = tsk->pid;
- context->ppid = sys_getppid(); /* sic. tsk == current in all cases */
- context->uid = tsk->uid;
- context->gid = tsk->gid;
- context->euid = tsk->euid;
- context->suid = tsk->suid;
- context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
- context->egid = tsk->egid;
- context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
- context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
- context->personality = tsk->personality;
- ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
if (!ab)
return; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
context->return_code);
-
- mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
- read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
- if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
- tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
- else
- tty = "(none)";
- read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
audit_log_format(ab,
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
- " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
+ " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
" euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
- " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
+ " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
context->argv[0],
context->argv[1],
context->argv[2],
context->argv[3],
context->name_count,
- context->ppid,
context->pid,
context->loginuid,
context->uid,
context->gid,
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
- context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
-
- mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
-
- audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
- if (context->filterkey) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
+ context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
+ audit_log_task_info(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
- ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
switch (aux->type) {
- case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
- struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *axi = (void *)aux;
- audit_log_format(ab,
- "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
- "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
- axi->oflag, axi->mode, axi->attr.mq_flags,
- axi->attr.mq_maxmsg, axi->attr.mq_msgsize,
- axi->attr.mq_curmsgs);
- break; }
-
- case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
- struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *axi = (void *)aux;
- audit_log_format(ab,
- "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
- "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
- axi->mqdes, axi->msg_len, axi->msg_prio,
- axi->abs_timeout.tv_sec, axi->abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
- break; }
-
- case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
- struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *axi = (void *)aux;
- audit_log_format(ab,
- "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
- axi->mqdes,
- axi->notification.sigev_signo);
- break; }
-
- case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
- struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *axi = (void *)aux;
- audit_log_format(ab,
- "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
- "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
- axi->mqdes,
- axi->mqstat.mq_flags, axi->mqstat.mq_maxmsg,
- axi->mqstat.mq_msgsize, axi->mqstat.mq_curmsgs);
- break; }
-
case AUDIT_IPC: {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab,
- "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
- axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
- if (axi->osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
- axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
- axi->osid);
- call_panic = 1;
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
- }
- break; }
-
- case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
- struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
- audit_log_format(ab,
- "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
- axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
- break; }
-
- case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
- struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
- int i;
- const char *p;
- for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) {
- audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
- p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
- audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
- }
+ " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
+ axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
break; }
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
}
if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
- ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD);
if (ab) {
audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
- struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
-
- ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
-
- if (n->name) {
- switch(n->name_len) {
- case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
- /* log the full path */
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
- break;
- case 0:
- /* name was specified as a relative path and the
- * directory component is the cwd */
- audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", context->pwd,
- context->pwdmnt);
- break;
- default:
- /* log the name's directory component */
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name_len,
- n->name);
- }
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
-
- if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
- " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
- " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
- n->ino,
- MAJOR(n->dev),
- MINOR(n->dev),
- n->mode,
- n->uid,
- n->gid,
- MAJOR(n->rdev),
- MINOR(n->rdev));
- }
- if (n->osid != 0) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
- call_panic = 2;
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ if (context->names[i].name) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
}
-
+ audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags);
+
+ if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
+ " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
+ context->names[i].ino,
+ MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
+ MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
+ context->names[i].mode,
+ context->names[i].uid,
+ context->names[i].gid,
+ MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
+ MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
audit_log_end(ab);
}
- if (call_panic)
- audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
}
-/**
- * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
- * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
- *
- * Called from copy_process and do_exit
- */
+/* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and
+ * __put_task_struct. */
void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct audit_context *context;
+ task_lock(tsk);
context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
+ task_unlock(tsk);
+
if (likely(!context))
return;
* function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
* We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
* in the context of the idle thread */
- /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
+ audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
audit_free_context(context);
}
-/**
- * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
- * @tsk: task being audited
- * @arch: architecture type
- * @major: major syscall type (function)
- * @a1: additional syscall register 1
- * @a2: additional syscall register 2
- * @a3: additional syscall register 3
- * @a4: additional syscall register 4
- *
- * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
+/* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
* audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
* filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
* per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
* then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
- * be written).
- */
-void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
+ * be written). */
+void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
enum audit_state state;
BUG_ON(!context);
- /*
- * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
+ /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
* calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
* with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
* architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
*
* i386 no
* x86_64 no
- * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
+ * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
*
* This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
* (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
context->argv[3] = a4;
state = context->state;
- context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
- if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
+ if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
return;
context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
}
-/**
- * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
- * @tsk: task being audited
- * @valid: success/failure flag
- * @return_code: syscall return value
- *
- * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
+/* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
* auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
* filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
- * free the names stored from getname().
- */
-void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
+ * free the names stored from getname(). */
+void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context;
+ get_task_struct(tsk);
+ task_lock(tsk);
context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
+ task_unlock(tsk);
+ /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
+ * called __put_task_struct. */
if (likely(!context))
- return;
+ goto out;
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
+ audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
context->in_syscall = 0;
context->auditable = 0;
} else {
audit_free_names(context);
audit_free_aux(context);
- kfree(context->filterkey);
- context->filterkey = NULL;
tsk->audit_context = context;
}
+ out:
+ put_task_struct(tsk);
}
-/**
- * audit_getname - add a name to the list
- * @name: name to add
- *
- * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
- * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
- */
-void __audit_getname(const char *name)
+/* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
+void audit_getname(const char *name)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
+ if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
return;
if (!context->in_syscall) {
}
BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
- context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
- context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
++context->name_count;
if (!context->pwd) {
}
-/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
- * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
- *
- * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
- * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
- * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
- */
+/* Intercept a putname request. Called from
+ * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from
+ * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
+ * exit. */
void audit_putname(const char *name)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
context->names[i].name,
- context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
+ context->names[i].name);
}
#endif
__putname(name);
#endif
}
-/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
-static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode)
-{
- name->ino = inode->i_ino;
- name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
- name->mode = inode->i_mode;
- name->uid = inode->i_uid;
- name->gid = inode->i_gid;
- name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
- * @name: name being audited
- * @inode: inode being audited
- *
- * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
- */
-void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
+/* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
+ * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
+void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
{
int idx;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
* associated name? */
if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
return;
- idx = context->name_count;
- if (context->name_count == (AUDIT_NAMES - 1)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG
- "name_count maxed and losing entry [%d]=%s\n",
- context->name_count,
- context->names[context->name_count].name ?:
- "(null)");
- } else
- context->name_count++;
+ idx = context->name_count++;
context->names[idx].name = NULL;
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
++context->ino_count;
#endif
}
- audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
- * @dname: inode's dentry name
- * @inode: inode being audited
- * @parent: inode of dentry parent
- *
- * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
- * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
- * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
- * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
- * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
- * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
- * unsuccessful attempts.
- */
-void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
- const struct inode *parent)
-{
- int idx;
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- const char *found_name = NULL;
- int dirlen = 0;
-
- if (!context->in_syscall)
- return;
-
- /* determine matching parent */
- if (!dname)
- goto update_context;
- for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
- if (context->names[idx].ino == parent->i_ino) {
- const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
-
- if (!name)
- continue;
-
- if (audit_compare_dname_path(dname, name, &dirlen) == 0) {
- context->names[idx].name_len = dirlen;
- found_name = name;
- break;
- }
- }
-
-update_context:
- idx = context->name_count;
- if (context->name_count == (AUDIT_NAMES - 1)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed and losing entry [%d]=%s\n",
- context->name_count,
- context->names[context->name_count].name ?: "(null)");
- } else
- context->name_count++;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
- context->ino_count++;
-#endif
- /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent directory.
- * All names for this context are relinquished in audit_free_names() */
- context->names[idx].name = found_name;
- context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
- context->names[idx].name_put = 0; /* don't call __putname() */
-
- if (!inode)
- context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
- else
- audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
-
- /* A parent was not found in audit_names, so copy the inode data for the
- * provided parent. */
- if (!found_name) {
- idx = context->name_count;
- if (context->name_count == (AUDIT_NAMES - 1)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG
- "name_count maxed and losing entry [%d]=%s\n",
- context->name_count,
- context->names[context->name_count].name ?:
- "(null)");
- } else
- context->name_count++;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
- context->ino_count++;
-#endif
- audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent);
- }
+ context->names[idx].flags = flags;
+ context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
+ context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
+ context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
+ context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
+ context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
}
-/**
- * audit_inode_update - update inode info for last collected name
- * @inode: inode being audited
- *
- * When open() is called on an existing object with the O_CREAT flag, the inode
- * data audit initially collects is incorrect. This additional hook ensures
- * audit has the inode data for the actual object to be opened.
- */
-void __audit_inode_update(const struct inode *inode)
-{
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- int idx;
-
- if (!context->in_syscall || !inode)
- return;
-
- if (context->name_count == 0) {
- context->name_count++;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
- context->ino_count++;
-#endif
- }
- idx = context->name_count - 1;
-
- audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
-}
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
-
-/**
- * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
- * @ctx: audit_context for the task
- * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
- * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
- *
- * Also sets the context as auditable.
- */
void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
{
ctx->auditable = 1;
}
-/**
- * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
- * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
- * @loginuid: loginuid value
- *
- * Returns 0.
- *
- * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
- */
int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
{
- struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
-
- if (context) {
- /* Only log if audit is enabled */
- if (context->in_syscall) {
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
-
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
- if (ab) {
- audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
- "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
- task->pid, task->uid,
- context->loginuid, loginuid);
- audit_log_end(ab);
- }
+ if (task->audit_context) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
+ if (ab) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
+ "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
+ task->pid, task->uid,
+ task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
}
- context->loginuid = loginuid;
+ task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
}
return 0;
}
-/**
- * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
- * @ctx: the audit_context
- *
- * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
- */
uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
{
return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
}
-/**
- * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
- * @oflag: open flag
- * @mode: mode bits
- * @u_attr: queue attributes
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- */
-int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr)
-{
- struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *ax;
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-
- if (!audit_enabled)
- return 0;
-
- if (likely(!context))
- return 0;
-
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!ax)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- if (u_attr != NULL) {
- if (copy_from_user(&ax->attr, u_attr, sizeof(ax->attr))) {
- kfree(ax);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- } else
- memset(&ax->attr, 0, sizeof(ax->attr));
-
- ax->oflag = oflag;
- ax->mode = mode;
-
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
- ax->d.next = context->aux;
- context->aux = (void *)ax;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
- * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
- * @msg_len: Message length
- * @msg_prio: Message priority
- * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- */
-int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
- const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
-{
- struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-
- if (!audit_enabled)
- return 0;
-
- if (likely(!context))
- return 0;
-
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!ax)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
- if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
- kfree(ax);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- } else
- memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
-
- ax->mqdes = mqdes;
- ax->msg_len = msg_len;
- ax->msg_prio = msg_prio;
-
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
- ax->d.next = context->aux;
- context->aux = (void *)ax;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
- * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
- * @msg_len: Message length
- * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
- * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- */
-int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len,
- unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio,
- const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
-{
- struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-
- if (!audit_enabled)
- return 0;
-
- if (likely(!context))
- return 0;
-
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!ax)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- if (u_msg_prio != NULL) {
- if (get_user(ax->msg_prio, u_msg_prio)) {
- kfree(ax);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- } else
- ax->msg_prio = 0;
-
- if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
- if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
- kfree(ax);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- } else
- memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
-
- ax->mqdes = mqdes;
- ax->msg_len = msg_len;
-
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
- ax->d.next = context->aux;
- context->aux = (void *)ax;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
- * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
- * @u_notification: Notification event
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- */
-
-int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification)
-{
- struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *ax;
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-
- if (!audit_enabled)
- return 0;
-
- if (likely(!context))
- return 0;
-
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!ax)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- if (u_notification != NULL) {
- if (copy_from_user(&ax->notification, u_notification, sizeof(ax->notification))) {
- kfree(ax);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- } else
- memset(&ax->notification, 0, sizeof(ax->notification));
-
- ax->mqdes = mqdes;
-
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
- ax->d.next = context->aux;
- context->aux = (void *)ax;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
- * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
- * @mqstat: MQ flags
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- */
-int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
+int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
{
- struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *ax;
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- if (!audit_enabled)
- return 0;
-
if (likely(!context))
return 0;
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!ax)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- ax->mqdes = mqdes;
- ax->mqstat = *mqstat;
-
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
- ax->d.next = context->aux;
- context->aux = (void *)ax;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
- * @ipcp: ipc permissions
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- */
-int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
-{
- struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!ax)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
- ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
- ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
- selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
-
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
- ax->d.next = context->aux;
- context->aux = (void *)ax;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
- * @qbytes: msgq bytes
- * @uid: msgq user id
- * @gid: msgq group id
- * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- */
-int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
-{
- struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ax)
return -ENOMEM;
ax->gid = gid;
ax->mode = mode;
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
- ax->d.next = context->aux;
- context->aux = (void *)ax;
- return 0;
-}
-
-int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- unsigned long p, next;
- void *to;
-
- if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
- return 0;
-
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ax)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- ax->argc = bprm->argc;
- ax->envc = bprm->envc;
- for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) {
- struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE];
- void *kaddr = kmap(page);
- next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
- memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p);
- to += next - p;
- kunmap(page);
- }
-
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;
return 0;
}
-
-/**
- * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
- * @nargs: number of args
- * @args: args array
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- */
int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
{
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
+ if (likely(!context))
return 0;
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
return 0;
}
-/**
- * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
- * @len: data length in user space
- * @a: data address in kernel space
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- */
int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
{
struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
+ if (likely(!context))
return 0;
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
return 0;
}
-/**
- * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
- * @dentry: dentry to record
- * @mnt: mnt to record
- *
- * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
- *
- * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
- */
int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
- * @sig: signal value
- * @t: task being signaled
- *
- * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
- * and uid that is doing that.
- */
-void __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
- extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
-
- if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) {
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
- struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
- audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
- if (ctx)
- audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
- else
- audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
+
+ if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) {
+ if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
+ struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
+ audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
+ if (ctx)
+ audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
+ else
+ audit_sig_uid = current->uid;
+ }
}
}
+
git://git.onelab.eu / linux-2.6.git / blobdiff