#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/major.h>
-#include <linux/personality.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
{
int error;
- error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
if (error)
return error;
- return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
+ return secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
u32 tsid;
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
tsec = current->security;
rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
if (rc)
return rc;
- /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
- current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
-
/* Set the security field to the new SID. */
bsec->sid = newsid;
}
static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
+ return 0;
}
PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL, NULL);
}
- return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+ /* Note that we must include the legacy uid/gid test below
+ to retain it, as the new userland will simply use the
+ value passed by AT_SECURE to decide whether to enable
+ secure mode. */
+ return ( atsecure || current->euid != current->uid ||
+ current->egid != current->gid);
}
static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
for (;;) {
- unsigned long set, i;
- int fd;
+ unsigned long set, i, fd;
j++;
i = j * __NFDBITS;
unsigned long flags,
void * data)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
}
static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
}
static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
}
static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
struct nameidata *nd)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
if (!mask) {
/* No permission to check. Existence test. */
return 0;
static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 av;
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, prot, flags);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
if (file) {
/* read access is always possible with a mapping */
static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long prot)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, prot);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return selinux_file_mmap(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags);
}
static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
}
static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->rlim + resource;
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
{
u32 perm;
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
if (info && ((unsigned long)info == 1 ||
(unsigned long)info == 2 || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
struct avc_audit_data ad;
int err;
- err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
return err;
}
+static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ cap_raise (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
+ else
+ NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = 0;
+
+ if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
+ err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
-#else
-
-static inline int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
-static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- int err = 0;
-
- if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
- cap_raise (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
- else
- NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = 0;
-
- if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
- err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
-
- return err;
-}
-
-static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
-}
-
static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
u16 sclass)
char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
{
u32 perms;
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
perms = SHM__READ;
git://git.onelab.eu / linux-2.6.git / blobdiff