-#----------------------------------------------------------------------
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Copyright (c) 2008 Board of Trustees, Princeton University
#
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
# included in all copies or substantial portions of the Work.
#
-# THE WORK IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
-# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
-# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
-# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT
-# HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
-# WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
-# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORK OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
+# THE WORK IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT
+# HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
+# WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORK OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
# IN THE WORK.
-#----------------------------------------------------------------------
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
##
# Implements SFA Credentials
#
-# Credentials are signed XML files that assign a subject gid privileges to an object gid
+# Credentials are signed XML files that assign a subject gid
+# privileges to an object gid
##
-from __future__ import print_function
-import os, os.path
+
+import os
+import os.path
import subprocess
import datetime
from tempfile import mkstemp
from sfa.util.py23 import PY3, StringType, StringIO
-HAVELXML = False
-try:
- from lxml import etree
- HAVELXML = True
-except:
- pass
-
from xml.parsers.expat import ExpatError
-from sfa.util.faults import CredentialNotVerifiable, ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent
+from sfa.util.faults import (CredentialNotVerifiable,
+ ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent)
from sfa.util.sfalogging import logger
from sfa.util.sfatime import utcparse, SFATIME_FORMAT
from sfa.trust.rights import Right, Rights, determine_rights
from sfa.trust.gid import GID
from sfa.util.xrn import urn_to_hrn, hrn_authfor_hrn
-# 31 days, in seconds
+HAVELXML = False
+try:
+ from lxml import etree
+ HAVELXML = True
+except:
+ pass
+
+
+# 31 days, in seconds
DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME = 86400 * 31
# . add namespaces to signed-credential element?
signature_format = \
-'''
+ '''
<Signature xml:id="Sig_{refid}" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/>
##
# Convert a string into a bool
# used to convert an xsd:boolean to a Python boolean
+
+
def str2bool(str):
- if str.lower() in ['true','1']:
+ if str.lower() in ('true', '1'):
return True
return False
def getTextNode(element, subele):
sub = element.getElementsByTagName(subele)[0]
- if len(sub.childNodes) > 0:
+ if len(sub.childNodes) > 0:
return sub.childNodes[0].nodeValue
else:
return None
-
+
##
# Utility function to set the text of an XML element
# It creates the element, adds the text to it,
# and then appends it to the parent.
+
def append_sub(doc, parent, element, text):
ele = doc.createElement(element)
ele.appendChild(doc.createTextNode(text))
# for a signed-credential
#
+
class Signature(object):
-
+
def __init__(self, string=None):
self.refid = None
self.issuer_gid = None
self.xml = string
self.decode()
-
def get_refid(self):
if not self.refid:
self.decode()
def get_issuer_gid(self):
if not self.gid:
self.decode()
- return self.gid
+ return self.gid
def set_issuer_gid(self, gid):
self.gid = gid
def decode(self):
- # Helper function to pull characters off the front of a string if present
+ # Helper function to pull characters off the front of a string if
+ # present
def remove_prefix(text, prefix):
if text and prefix and text.startswith(prefix):
return text[len(prefix):]
logger.log_exc("Failed to parse credential, {}".format(self.xml))
raise
sig = doc.getElementsByTagName("Signature")[0]
- ## This code until the end of function rewritten by Aaron Helsinger
+ # This code until the end of function rewritten by Aaron Helsinger
ref_id = remove_prefix(sig.getAttribute("xml:id").strip(), "Sig_")
- # The xml:id tag is optional, and could be in a
+ # The xml:id tag is optional, and could be in a
# Reference xml:id or Reference UID sub element instead
if not ref_id or ref_id == '':
reference = sig.getElementsByTagName('Reference')[0]
- ref_id = remove_prefix(reference.getAttribute('xml:id').strip(), "Sig_")
+ ref_id = remove_prefix(
+ reference.getAttribute('xml:id').strip(), "Sig_")
if not ref_id or ref_id == '':
- ref_id = remove_prefix(reference.getAttribute('URI').strip(), "#")
+ ref_id = remove_prefix(
+ reference.getAttribute('URI').strip(), "#")
self.set_refid(ref_id)
keyinfos = sig.getElementsByTagName("X509Data")
gids = None
if len(cert.childNodes) > 0:
szgid = cert.childNodes[0].nodeValue
szgid = szgid.strip()
- szgid = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n{}\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----".format(szgid)
+ szgid = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"\
+ "{}\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----".format(
+ szgid)
if gids is None:
gids = szgid
else:
gids += "\n" + szgid
if gids is None:
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Malformed XML: No certificate found in signature")
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable(
+ "Malformed XML: No certificate found in signature")
self.set_issuer_gid(GID(string=gids))
-
+
def encode(self):
self.xml = signature_format.format(refid=self.get_refid())
# A credential provides a caller gid with privileges to an object gid.
# A signed credential is signed by the object's authority.
#
-# Credentials are encoded in one of two ways.
-# The legacy style (now unsupported) places it in the subjectAltName of an X509 certificate.
+# Credentials are encoded in one of two ways. The legacy style (now
+# unsupported) places it in the subjectAltName of an X509 certificate.
# The new credentials are placed in signed XML.
#
# WARNING:
# In general, a signed credential obtained externally should
# not be changed else the signature is no longer valid. So, once
-# you have loaded an existing signed credential, do not call encode() or sign() on it.
+# you have loaded an existing signed credential, do not call encode() or
+# sign() on it.
+
def filter_creds_by_caller(creds, caller_hrn_list):
- """
- Returns a list of creds who's gid caller matches the
- specified caller hrn
- """
- if not isinstance(creds, list): creds = [creds]
- if not isinstance(caller_hrn_list, list):
- caller_hrn_list = [caller_hrn_list]
- caller_creds = []
- for cred in creds:
- try:
- tmp_cred = Credential(string=cred)
- if tmp_cred.type != Credential.SFA_CREDENTIAL_TYPE:
- continue
- if tmp_cred.get_gid_caller().get_hrn() in caller_hrn_list:
- caller_creds.append(cred)
- except: pass
- return caller_creds
+ """
+ Returns a list of creds who's gid caller matches the
+ specified caller hrn
+ """
+ if not isinstance(creds, list):
+ creds = [creds]
+ if not isinstance(caller_hrn_list, list):
+ caller_hrn_list = [caller_hrn_list]
+ caller_creds = []
+ for cred in creds:
+ try:
+ tmp_cred = Credential(string=cred)
+ if tmp_cred.type != Credential.SFA_CREDENTIAL_TYPE:
+ continue
+ if tmp_cred.get_gid_caller().get_hrn() in caller_hrn_list:
+ caller_creds.append(cred)
+ except:
+ pass
+ return caller_creds
+
class Credential(object):
# Create a Credential object
#
# @param create If true, create a blank x509 certificate
- # @param subject If subject!=None, create an x509 cert with the subject name
+ # @param subject If subject!=None,
+ # create an x509 cert with the subject name
# @param string If string!=None, load the credential from the string
# @param filename If filename!=None, load the credential from the file
# FIXME: create and subject are ignored!
- def __init__(self, create=False, subject=None, string=None, filename=None, cred=None):
+ def __init__(self, create=False, subject=None, string=None,
+ filename=None, cred=None):
self.gidCaller = None
self.gidObject = None
self.expiration = None
self.version = cred['geni_version']
if string or filename:
- if string:
+ if string:
str = string
elif filename:
with open(filename) as infile:
str = infile.read()
-
+
# if this is a legacy credential, write error and bail out
if isinstance(str, StringType) and str.strip().startswith("-----"):
- logger.error("Legacy credentials not supported any more - giving up with {}...".format(str[:10]))
+ logger.error(
+ "Legacy credentials not supported any more "
+ "- giving up with {}..."
+ .format(str[:10]))
return
else:
self.xml = str
if not getattr(Credential, 'xmlsec1_path', None):
# Find a xmlsec1 binary path
Credential.xmlsec1_path = ''
- paths = ['/usr/bin', '/usr/local/bin', '/bin', '/opt/bin', '/opt/local/bin']
- try: paths += os.getenv('PATH').split(':')
- except: pass
+ paths = ['/usr/bin', '/usr/local/bin',
+ '/bin', '/opt/bin', '/opt/local/bin']
+ try:
+ paths += os.getenv('PATH').split(':')
+ except:
+ pass
for path in paths:
xmlsec1 = os.path.join(path, 'xmlsec1')
if os.path.isfile(xmlsec1):
Credential.xmlsec1_path = xmlsec1
break
if not Credential.xmlsec1_path:
- logger.error("Could not locate required binary 'xmlsec1' - SFA will be unable to sign stuff !!")
+ logger.error(
+ "Could not locate required binary 'xmlsec1' -"
+ "SFA will be unable to sign stuff !!")
return Credential.xmlsec1_path
def get_subject(self):
caller = self.gidCaller.pretty_cert()
exp = self.get_expiration()
# Summarize the rights too? The issuer?
- return "[Cred. for {caller} rights on {obj} until {exp} ]".format(**locals())
+ return "[Cred. for {caller} rights on {obj} until {exp} ]"\
+ .format(**locals())
def get_signature(self):
if not self.signature:
def set_signature(self, sig):
self.signature = sig
-
##
# Need the issuer's private key and name
# @param key Keypair object containing the private key of the issuer
self.issuer_privkey = privkey
self.issuer_gid = gid
-
##
# Set this credential's parent
def set_parent(self, cred):
if not self.gidObject:
self.decode()
return self.gidObject
-
- ##
- # Expiration: an absolute UTC time of expiration (as either an int or string or datetime)
- #
+
+ #
+ # Expiration: an absolute UTC time of expiration (as either an int
+ # or string or datetime)
+ #
def set_expiration(self, expiration):
expiration_datetime = utcparse(expiration)
if expiration_datetime is not None:
self.expiration = expiration_datetime
else:
- logger.error("unexpected input {} in Credential.set_expiration".format(expiration))
+ logger.error(
+ "unexpected input {} in Credential.set_expiration"
+ .format(expiration))
##
# get the lifetime of the credential (always in datetime format)
def get_expiration(self):
if not self.expiration:
self.decode()
- # at this point self.expiration is normalized as a datetime - DON'T call utcparse again
+ # at this point self.expiration is normalized as a datetime - DON'T
+ # call utcparse again
return self.expiration
##
# set the privileges
#
- # @param privs either a comma-separated list of privileges of a Rights object
+ # @param privs either a comma-separated list of privileges of a
+ # Rights object
def set_privileges(self, privs):
if isinstance(privs, str):
- self.privileges = Rights(string = privs)
+ self.privileges = Rights(string=privs)
else:
- self.privileges = privs
+ self.privileges = privs
##
# return the privileges as a Rights object
# determine whether the credential allows a particular operation to be
# performed
#
- # @param op_name string specifying name of operation ("lookup", "update", etc)
+ # @param op_name string specifying name of operation
+ # ("lookup", "update", etc)
def can_perform(self, op_name):
rights = self.get_privileges()
-
+
if not rights:
return False
return rights.can_perform(op_name)
-
##
- # Encode the attributes of the credential into an XML string
- # This should be done immediately before signing the credential.
+ # Encode the attributes of the credential into an XML string
+ # This should be done immediately before signing the credential.
# WARNING:
# In general, a signed credential obtained externally should
# not be changed else the signature is no longer valid. So, once
- # you have loaded an existing signed credential, do not call encode() or sign() on it.
+ # you have loaded an existing signed credential, do not call encode() or
+ # sign() on it.
def encode(self):
# Create the XML document
# Note that delegation of credentials between the 2 only really works
# cause those schemas are identical.
# Also note these PG schemas talk about PG tickets and CM policies.
- signed_cred.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")
- # FIXME: See v2 schema at www.geni.net/resources/credential/2/credential.xsd
- signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/credential.xsd")
- signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/ext/policy/1 http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
+ signed_cred.setAttribute(
+ "xmlns:xsi", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")
+ # FIXME: See v2 schema at
+ # www.geni.net/resources/credential/2/credential.xsd
+ signed_cred.setAttribute(
+ "xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation",
+ "http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/credential.xsd")
+ signed_cred.setAttribute(
+ "xsi:schemaLocation",
+ "http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/ext/policy/1 "
+ "http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
# PG says for those last 2:
- # signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")
- # signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
+ # signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation",
+ # "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")
+ # signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation",
+ # "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 "
+ # "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
- doc.appendChild(signed_cred)
-
- # Fill in the <credential> bit
+ doc.appendChild(signed_cred)
+
+ # Fill in the <credential> bit
cred = doc.createElement("credential")
cred.setAttribute("xml:id", self.get_refid())
signed_cred.appendChild(cred)
append_sub(doc, cred, "target_urn", self.gidObject.get_urn())
append_sub(doc, cred, "uuid", "")
if not self.expiration:
- logger.debug("Creating credential valid for {} s".format(DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME))
- self.set_expiration(datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(seconds=DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME))
+ logger.debug("Creating credential valid for {} s".format(
+ DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME))
+ self.set_expiration(datetime.datetime.utcnow(
+ ) + datetime.timedelta(seconds=DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME))
self.expiration = self.expiration.replace(microsecond=0)
- if self.expiration.tzinfo is not None and self.expiration.tzinfo.utcoffset(self.expiration) is not None:
+ if self.expiration.tzinfo is not None \
+ and self.expiration.tzinfo.utcoffset(self.expiration) is not None:
# TZ aware. Make sure it is UTC - by Aaron Helsinger
self.expiration = self.expiration.astimezone(tz.tzutc())
- append_sub(doc, cred, "expires", self.expiration.strftime(SFATIME_FORMAT))
+ append_sub(doc, cred, "expires",
+ self.expiration.strftime(SFATIME_FORMAT))
privileges = doc.createElement("privileges")
cred.appendChild(privileges)
for right in rights.rights:
priv = doc.createElement("privilege")
append_sub(doc, priv, "name", right.kind)
- append_sub(doc, priv, "can_delegate", str(right.delegate).lower())
+ append_sub(doc, priv, "can_delegate",
+ str(right.delegate).lower())
privileges.appendChild(priv)
# Add the parent credential if it exists
# If the root node is a signed-credential (it should be), then
# get all its attributes and attach those to our signed_cred
# node.
- # Specifically, PG and PLadd attributes for namespaces (which is reasonable),
+ # Specifically, PG and PL add attributes for namespaces
+ # (which is reasonable),
# and we need to include those again here or else their signature
# no longer matches on the credential.
# We expect three of these, but here we copy them all:
- # signed_cred.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")
+ # signed_cred.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi",
+ # "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")
# and from PG (PL is equivalent, as shown above):
- # signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")
- # signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
+ # signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation",
+ # "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")
+ # signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation",
+ # "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 "
+ # "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")
# HOWEVER!
# PL now also declares these, with different URLs, so
# the contents of the schemas are the same,
# or something else, but it seems odd. And this works.
parentRoot = sdoc.documentElement
- if parentRoot.tagName == "signed-credential" and parentRoot.hasAttributes():
+ if parentRoot.tagName == "signed-credential" and \
+ parentRoot.hasAttributes():
for attrIx in range(0, parentRoot.attributes.length):
attr = parentRoot.attributes.item(attrIx)
# returns the old attribute of same name that was
# on the credential
- # Below throws InUse exception if we forgot to clone the attribute first
- oldAttr = signed_cred.setAttributeNode(attr.cloneNode(True))
+ # Below throws InUse exception if we forgot to clone the
+ # attribute first
+ oldAttr = signed_cred.setAttributeNode(
+ attr.cloneNode(True))
if oldAttr and oldAttr.value != attr.value:
msg = "Delegating cred from owner {} to {} over {}:\n"
"- Replaced attribute {} value '{}' with '{}'"\
- .format(self.parent.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidCaller.get_urn(),
- self.gidObject.get_urn(), oldAttr.name, oldAttr.value, attr.value)
- logger.warn(msg)
- #raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Can't encode new valid delegated credential: {}".format(msg))
-
- p_cred = doc.importNode(sdoc.getElementsByTagName("credential")[0], True)
+ .format(self.parent.gidCaller.get_urn(),
+ self.gidCaller.get_urn(),
+ self.gidObject.get_urn(),
+ oldAttr.name, oldAttr.value, attr.value)
+ logger.warning(msg)
+ # raise CredentialNotVerifiable(
+ # "Can't encode new valid delegated credential: {}"
+ # .format(msg))
+
+ p_cred = doc.importNode(
+ sdoc.getElementsByTagName("credential")[0], True)
p = doc.createElement("parent")
p.appendChild(p_cred)
cred.appendChild(p)
if self.parent:
for cur_cred in self.get_credential_list()[1:]:
sdoc = parseString(cur_cred.get_signature().get_xml())
- ele = doc.importNode(sdoc.getElementsByTagName("Signature")[0], True)
+ ele = doc.importNode(
+ sdoc.getElementsByTagName("Signature")[0], True)
signatures.appendChild(ele)
-
+
# Get the finished product
self.xml = doc.toxml("utf-8")
-
- def save_to_random_tmp_file(self):
+ def save_to_random_tmp_file(self):
fp, filename = mkstemp(suffix='cred', text=True)
fp = os.fdopen(fp, "w")
self.save_to_file(filename, save_parents=True, filep=fp)
return filename
-
+
def save_to_file(self, filename, save_parents=True, filep=None):
if not self.xml:
self.encode()
if filep:
- f = filep
+ f = filep
else:
f = open(filename, "w")
if PY3 and isinstance(self.xml, bytes):
# Figure out what refids exist, and update this credential's id
# so that it doesn't clobber the others. Returns the refids of
# the parents.
-
+
def updateRefID(self):
if not self.parent:
self.set_refid('ref0')
return []
-
+
refs = []
next_cred = self.parent
else:
next_cred = None
-
# Find a unique refid for this credential
rid = self.get_refid()
while rid in refs:
# WARNING:
# In general, a signed credential obtained externally should
# not be changed else the signature is no longer valid. So, once
- # you have loaded an existing signed credential, do not call encode() or sign() on it.
+ # you have loaded an existing signed credential, do not call encode() or
+ # sign() on it.
def sign(self):
if not self.issuer_privkey:
- logger.warn("Cannot sign credential (no private key)")
+ logger.warning("Cannot sign credential (no private key)")
return
if not self.issuer_gid:
- logger.warn("Cannot sign credential (no issuer gid)")
+ logger.warning("Cannot sign credential (no issuer gid)")
return
doc = parseString(self.get_xml())
sigs = doc.getElementsByTagName("signatures")[0]
# Create the signature template to be signed
signature = Signature()
signature.set_refid(self.get_refid())
- sdoc = parseString(signature.get_xml())
- sig_ele = doc.importNode(sdoc.getElementsByTagName("Signature")[0], True)
+ sdoc = parseString(signature.get_xml())
+ sig_ele = doc.importNode(
+ sdoc.getElementsByTagName("Signature")[0], True)
sigs.appendChild(sig_ele)
self.xml = doc.toxml("utf-8")
-
# Split the issuer GID into multiple certificates if it's a chain
chain = GID(filename=self.issuer_gid)
gid_files = []
else:
chain = None
-
# Call out to xmlsec1 to sign it
ref = 'Sig_{}'.format(self.get_refid())
filename = self.save_to_random_tmp_file()
if not xmlsec1:
raise Exception("Could not locate required 'xmlsec1' program")
command = '{} --sign --node-id "{}" --privkey-pem {},{} {}' \
- .format(xmlsec1, ref, self.issuer_privkey, ",".join(gid_files), filename)
+ .format(xmlsec1, ref, self.issuer_privkey,
+ ",".join(gid_files), filename)
signed = os.popen(command).read()
os.remove(filename)
self.xml = signed
# Update signatures
- self.decode()
-
+ self.decode()
##
# Retrieve the attributes of the credential from the XML.
sigs = signatures[0].getElementsByTagName("Signature")
else:
creds = doc.getElementsByTagName("credential")
-
+
if creds is None or len(creds) == 0:
# malformed cred file
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Malformed XML: No credential tag found")
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable(
+ "Malformed XML: No credential tag found")
# Just take the first cred if there are more than one
cred = creds[0]
self.gidCaller = GID(string=getTextNode(cred, "owner_gid"))
self.gidObject = GID(string=getTextNode(cred, "target_gid"))
-
- ## This code until the end of function rewritten by Aaron Helsinger
+ # This code until the end of function rewritten by Aaron Helsinger
# Process privileges
rlist = Rights()
priv_nodes = cred.getElementsByTagName("privileges")
kind = getTextNode(priv, "name")
deleg = str2bool(getTextNode(priv, "can_delegate"))
if kind == '*':
- # Convert * into the default privileges for the credential's type
+ # Convert * into the default privileges
+ # for the credential's type
# Each inherits the delegatability from the * above
- _ , type = urn_to_hrn(self.gidObject.get_urn())
+ _, type = urn_to_hrn(self.gidObject.get_urn())
rl = determine_rights(type, self.gidObject.get_urn())
for r in rl.rights:
r.delegate = deleg
rlist.add(Right(kind.strip(), deleg))
self.set_privileges(rlist)
-
# Is there a parent?
parent = cred.getElementsByTagName("parent")
if len(parent) > 0:
parent_doc = parent[0].getElementsByTagName("credential")[0]
parent_xml = parent_doc.toxml("utf-8")
if parent_xml is None or parent_xml.strip() == "":
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Malformed XML: Had parent tag but it is empty")
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable(
+ "Malformed XML: Had parent tag but it is empty")
self.parent = Credential(string=parent_xml)
self.updateRefID()
for cur_cred in self.get_credential_list():
if cur_cred.get_refid() == Sig.get_refid():
cur_cred.set_signature(Sig)
-
-
+
##
# Verify
- # trusted_certs: A list of trusted GID filenames (not GID objects!)
- # Chaining is not supported within the GIDs by xmlsec1.
+ # trusted_certs: A list of trusted GID filenames (not GID objects!)
+ # Chaining is not supported within the GIDs by xmlsec1.
#
# trusted_certs_required: Should usually be true. Set False means an
- # empty list of trusted_certs would still let this method pass.
- # It just skips xmlsec1 verification et al. Only used by some utils
- #
+ # empty list of trusted_certs would still let this method pass.
+ # It just skips xmlsec1 verification et al.
+ # Only used by some utils
+ #
# Verify that:
# . All of the signatures are valid and that the issuers trace back
# to trusted roots (performed by xmlsec1)
#
# -- For Delegates (credentials with parents)
# . The privileges must be a subset of the parent credentials
- # . The privileges must have "can_delegate" set for each delegated privilege
+ # . The privileges must have "can_delegate"
+ # set for each delegated privilege
# . The target gid must be the same between child and parents
# . The expiry time on the child must be no later than the parent
# . The signer of the child must be the owner of the parent
# must be done elsewhere
#
# @param trusted_certs: The certificates of trusted CA certificates
- def verify(self, trusted_certs=None, schema=None, trusted_certs_required=True):
+ def verify(self, trusted_certs=None, schema=None,
+ trusted_certs_required=True):
if not self.xml:
self.decode()
xmlschema = etree.XMLSchema(schema_doc)
if not xmlschema.validate(tree):
error = xmlschema.error_log.last_error
- message = "{}: {} (line {})".format(self.pretty_cred(),
- error.message, error.line)
+ message = "{}: {} (line {})"\
+ .format(self.pretty_cred(),
+ error.message, error.line)
raise CredentialNotVerifiable(message)
if trusted_certs_required and trusted_certs is None:
# trusted_cert_objects = [GID(filename=f) for f in trusted_certs]
trusted_cert_objects = []
ok_trusted_certs = []
- # If caller explicitly passed in None that means skip cert chain validation.
- # Strange and not typical
+ # If caller explicitly passed in None, that means
+ # skip cert chain validation. Strange and not typical
if trusted_certs is not None:
for f in trusted_certs:
try:
trusted_cert_objects.append(GID(filename=f))
ok_trusted_certs.append(f)
except Exception as exc:
- logger.error("Failed to load trusted cert from {}: {}".format(f, exc))
+ logger.exception(
+ "Failed to load trusted cert from {}".format(f))
trusted_certs = ok_trusted_certs
# make sure it is not expired
if self.get_expiration() < datetime.datetime.utcnow():
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Credential {} expired at {}" \
- .format(self.pretty_cred(),
- self.expiration.strftime(SFATIME_FORMAT)))
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable(
+ "Credential {} expired at {}"
+ .format(self.pretty_cred(),
+ self.expiration.strftime(SFATIME_FORMAT)))
# Verify the signatures
filename = self.save_to_random_tmp_file()
- # If caller explicitly passed in None that means skip cert chain validation.
- # - Strange and not typical
+ # If caller explicitly passed in None that means
+ # skip cert chain validation. Strange and not typical
if trusted_certs is not None:
- # Verify the gids of this cred and of its parents
+ # Verify the caller and object gids of this cred and of its parents
for cur_cred in self.get_credential_list():
- cur_cred.get_gid_object().verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
- cur_cred.get_gid_caller().verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
+ # check both the caller and the subject
+ for gid in (cur_cred.get_gid_object(),
+ cur_cred.get_gid_caller()):
+ logger.debug("Credential.verify: verifying chain {}"
+ .format(gid.pretty_cert()))
+ logger.debug("Credential.verify: against trusted {}"
+ .format(" ".join(trusted_certs)))
+ gid.verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
refs = []
refs.append("Sig_{}".format(self.get_refid()))
refs.append("Sig_{}".format(ref))
for ref in refs:
- # If caller explicitly passed in None that means skip xmlsec1 validation.
- # Strange and not typical
+ # If caller explicitly passed in None that means
+ # skip xmlsec1 validation. Strange and not typical
if trusted_certs is None:
break
# Thierry - jan 2015
- # up to fedora20 we used os.popen and checked that the output begins with OK
- # turns out, with fedora21, there is extra input before this 'OK' thing
- # looks like we're better off just using the exit code - that's what it is made for
- #cert_args = " ".join(['--trusted-pem {}'.format(x) for x in trusted_certs])
- #command = '{} --verify --node-id "{}" {} {} 2>&1'.\
+ # up to fedora20 we used os.popen and checked
+ # that the output begins with OK; turns out, with fedora21,
+ # there is extra input before this 'OK' thing
+ # looks like we're better off just using the exit code
+ # that's what it is made for
+ # cert_args = " ".join(['--trusted-pem {}'.format(x) for x in trusted_certs])
+ # command = '{} --verify --node-id "{}" {} {} 2>&1'.\
# format(self.xmlsec_path, ref, cert_args, filename)
xmlsec1 = self.get_xmlsec1_path()
if not xmlsec1:
raise Exception("Could not locate required 'xmlsec1' program")
- command = [ xmlsec1, '--verify', '--node-id', ref ]
+ command = [xmlsec1, '--verify', '--node-id', ref]
for trusted in trusted_certs:
- command += ["--trusted-pem", trusted ]
- command += [ filename ]
+ command += ["--trusted-pem", trusted]
+ command += [filename]
logger.debug("Running " + " ".join(command))
try:
- verified = subprocess.check_output(command, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)
+ verified = subprocess.check_output(
+ command, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)
logger.debug("xmlsec command returned {}".format(verified))
if "OK\n" not in verified:
- logger.warning("WARNING: xmlsec1 seemed to return fine but without a OK in its output")
+ logger.warning(
+ "WARNING: xmlsec1 seemed to return fine but without a OK in its output")
except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
verified = e.output
# xmlsec errors have a msg= which is the interesting bit.
mstart = mstart + 4
mend = verified.find('\\', mstart)
msg = verified[mstart:mend]
- logger.warning("Credential.verify - failed - xmlsec1 returned {}".format(verified.strip()))
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("xmlsec1 error verifying cred {} using Signature ID {}: {}"\
- .format(self.pretty_cred(), ref, msg))
+ logger.warning(
+ "Credential.verify - failed - xmlsec1 returned {}"
+ .format(verified.strip()))
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable(
+ "xmlsec1 error verifying cred {} using Signature ID {}: {}"
+ .format(self.pretty_cred(), ref, msg))
os.remove(filename)
# Verify the parents (delegation)
return True
##
- # Creates a list of the credential and its parents, with the root
+ # Creates a list of the credential and its parents, with the root
# (original delegated credential) as the last item in the list
- def get_credential_list(self):
+ def get_credential_list(self):
cur_cred = self
list = []
while cur_cred:
else:
cur_cred = None
return list
-
+
##
# Make sure the credential's target gid (a) was signed by or (b)
# is the same as the entity that signed the original credential,
root_target_gid = root_cred.get_gid_object()
if root_cred.get_signature() is None:
# malformed
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Could not verify credential owned by {} for object {}. "
- "Cred has no signature" \
- .format(self.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidObject.get_urn()))
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable(
+ "Could not verify credential owned by {} for object {}. "
+ "Cred has no signature"
+ .format(self.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidObject.get_urn()))
root_cred_signer = root_cred.get_signature().get_issuer_gid()
# Case 2:
# Allow someone to sign credential about themeselves. Used?
# If not, remove this.
- #root_target_gid_str = root_target_gid.save_to_string()
- #root_cred_signer_str = root_cred_signer.save_to_string()
- #if root_target_gid_str == root_cred_signer_str:
+ # root_target_gid_str = root_target_gid.save_to_string()
+ # root_cred_signer_str = root_cred_signer.save_to_string()
+ # if root_target_gid_str == root_cred_signer_str:
# # cred signer is target, return success
# return
if trusted_gids and len(trusted_gids) > 0:
root_cred_signer.verify_chain(trusted_gids)
else:
- logger.debug("Cannot verify that cred signer is signed by a trusted authority. "
- "No trusted gids. Skipping that check.")
+ logger.debug(
+ "Cannot verify that cred signer is signed by a trusted authority. "
+ "No trusted gids. Skipping that check.")
# See if the signer is an authority over the domain of the target.
# There are multiple types of authority - accept them all here
# Maybe should be (hrn, type) = urn_to_hrn(root_cred_signer.get_urn())
root_cred_signer_type = root_cred_signer.get_type()
if root_cred_signer_type.find('authority') == 0:
- #logger.debug('Cred signer is an authority')
+ # logger.debug('Cred signer is an authority')
# signer is an authority, see if target is in authority's domain
signerhrn = root_cred_signer.get_hrn()
if hrn_authfor_hrn(signerhrn, root_target_gid.get_hrn()):
# . The privileges must have "can_delegate" set for each delegated privilege
# . The target gid must be the same between child and parents
# . The expiry time on the child must be no later than the parent
- # . The signer of the child must be the owner of the parent
+ # . The signer of the child must be the owner of the parent
def verify_parent(self, parent_cred):
# make sure the rights given to the child are a subset of the
# parents rights (and check delegate bits)
message = (
"Parent cred {} (ref {}) rights {} "
" not superset of delegated cred {} (ref {}) rights {}"
- .format(parent_cred.pretty_cred(),parent_cred.get_refid(),
+ .format(parent_cred.pretty_cred(), parent_cred.get_refid(),
parent_cred.get_privileges().pretty_rights(),
self.pretty_cred(), self.get_refid(),
self.get_privileges().pretty_rights()))
logger.error(message)
- logger.error("parent details {}".format(parent_cred.get_privileges().save_to_string()))
- logger.error("self details {}".format(self.get_privileges().save_to_string()))
+ logger.error("parent details {}".format(
+ parent_cred.get_privileges().save_to_string()))
+ logger.error("self details {}".format(
+ self.get_privileges().save_to_string()))
raise ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent(message)
# make sure my target gid is the same as the parent's
"Delegated cred {}: Target gid not equal between parent and child. Parent {}"
.format(self.pretty_cred(), parent_cred.pretty_cred()))
logger.error(message)
- logger.error("parent details {}".format(parent_cred.save_to_string()))
+ logger.error("parent details {}".format(
+ parent_cred.save_to_string()))
logger.error("self details {}".format(self.save_to_string()))
raise CredentialNotVerifiable(message)
message = "Delegated credential {} not signed by parent {}'s caller"\
.format(self.pretty_cred(), parent_cred.pretty_cred())
logger.error(message)
- logger.error("compare1 parent {}".format(parent_cred.get_gid_caller().pretty_cert()))
- logger.error("compare1 parent details {}".format(parent_cred.get_gid_caller().save_to_string()))
- logger.error("compare2 self {}".format(self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().pretty_crert()))
- logger.error("compare2 self details {}".format(self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().save_to_string()))
+ logger.error("compare1 parent {}".format(
+ parent_cred.get_gid_caller().pretty_cert()))
+ logger.error("compare1 parent details {}".format(
+ parent_cred.get_gid_caller().save_to_string()))
+ logger.error("compare2 self {}".format(
+ self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().pretty_crert()))
+ logger.error("compare2 self details {}".format(
+ self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().save_to_string()))
raise CredentialNotVerifiable(message)
-
+
# Recurse
if parent_cred.parent:
parent_cred.verify_parent(parent_cred.parent)
-
def delegate(self, delegee_gidfile, caller_keyfile, caller_gidfile):
"""
- Return a delegated copy of this credential, delegated to the
- specified gid's user.
+ Return a delegated copy of this credential, delegated to the
+ specified gid's user.
"""
# get the gid of the object we are delegating
object_gid = self.get_gid_object()
- object_hrn = object_gid.get_hrn()
-
+ object_hrn = object_gid.get_hrn()
+
# the hrn of the user who will be delegated to
delegee_gid = GID(filename=delegee_gidfile)
delegee_hrn = delegee_gid.get_hrn()
-
- #user_key = Keypair(filename=keyfile)
- #user_hrn = self.get_gid_caller().get_hrn()
+
+ # user_key = Keypair(filename=keyfile)
+ # user_hrn = self.get_gid_caller().get_hrn()
subject_string = "{} delegated to {}".format(object_hrn, delegee_hrn)
dcred = Credential(subject=subject_string)
dcred.set_gid_caller(delegee_gid)
dcred.set_expiration(self.get_expiration())
dcred.set_privileges(self.get_privileges())
dcred.get_privileges().delegate_all_privileges(True)
- #dcred.set_issuer_keys(keyfile, delegee_gidfile)
+ # dcred.set_issuer_keys(keyfile, delegee_gidfile)
dcred.set_issuer_keys(caller_keyfile, caller_gidfile)
dcred.encode()
dcred.sign()
# only informative
def get_filename(self):
- return getattr(self,'filename',None)
+ return getattr(self, 'filename', None)
def actual_caller_hrn(self):
- """a helper method used by some API calls like e.g. Allocate
+ """
+ a helper method used by some API calls like e.g. Allocate
to try and find out who really is the original caller
This admittedly is a bit of a hack, please USE IN LAST RESORT
This code uses a heuristic to identify a delegated credential
- A first known restriction if for traffic that gets through a slice manager
- in this case the hrn reported is the one from the last SM in the call graph
- which is not at all what is meant here"""
+ A first known restriction if for traffic that gets through a
+ slice manager in this case the hrn reported is the one from
+ the last SM in the call graph which is not at all what is
+ meant here
+ """
- caller_hrn = self.get_gid_caller().get_hrn()
- issuer_hrn = self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().get_hrn()
+ caller_hrn, caller_type = urn_to_hrn(self.get_gid_caller().get_urn())
+ issuer_hrn, issuer_type = urn_to_hrn(
+ self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().get_urn())
subject_hrn = self.get_gid_object().get_hrn()
- # if we find that the caller_hrn is an immediate descendant of the issuer, then
- # this seems to be a 'regular' credential
- if caller_hrn.startswith(issuer_hrn):
- actual_caller_hrn=caller_hrn
- # else this looks like a delegated credential, and the real caller is the issuer
+ # if the caller is a user and the issuer is not
+ # it's probably the former
+ if caller_type == "user" and issuer_type != "user":
+ actual_caller_hrn = caller_hrn
+ # if we find that the caller_hrn is an immediate descendant
+ # of the issuer, then this seems to be a 'regular' credential
+ elif caller_hrn.startswith(issuer_hrn):
+ actual_caller_hrn = caller_hrn
+ # else this looks like a delegated credential, and the real caller is
+ # the issuer
else:
- actual_caller_hrn=issuer_hrn
- logger.info("actual_caller_hrn: caller_hrn={}, issuer_hrn={}, returning {}"
- .format(caller_hrn,issuer_hrn,actual_caller_hrn))
+ actual_caller_hrn = issuer_hrn
+ logger.info(
+ "actual_caller_hrn: caller_hrn={}, issuer_hrn={}, returning {}"
+ .format(caller_hrn, issuer_hrn, actual_caller_hrn))
return actual_caller_hrn
##
# SFA code ignores show_xml and disables printing the cred xml
def dump_string(self, dump_parents=False, show_xml=False):
- result=""
+ result = ""
result += "CREDENTIAL {}\n".format(self.pretty_subject())
- filename=self.get_filename()
- if filename: result += "Filename {}\n".format(filename)
+ filename = self.get_filename()
+ if filename:
+ result += "Filename {}\n".format(filename)
privileges = self.get_privileges()
if privileges:
result += " privs: {}\n".format(privileges.save_to_string())
if self.get_signature():
result += " gidIssuer:\n"
- result += self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().dump_string(8, dump_parents)
+ result += self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid()\
+ .dump_string(8, dump_parents)
if self.expiration:
- result += " expiration: " + self.expiration.strftime(SFATIME_FORMAT) + "\n"
+ result += " expiration: " + \
+ self.expiration.strftime(SFATIME_FORMAT) + "\n"
gidObject = self.get_gid_object()
if gidObject:
git://git.onelab.eu / sfa.git / blobdiff