# Credentials are signed XML files that assign a subject gid privileges to an object gid
##
-import os
+import os,sys
from types import StringTypes
import datetime
from StringIO import StringIO
except:
pass
-from sfa.util.faults import *
+from xml.parsers.expat import ExpatError
+
+from sfa.util.faults import CredentialNotVerifiable, ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent
from sfa.util.sfalogging import logger
from sfa.util.sfatime import utcparse
-from sfa.trust.certificate import Keypair
from sfa.trust.credential_legacy import CredentialLegacy
from sfa.trust.rights import Right, Rights, determine_rights
from sfa.trust.gid import GID
from sfa.util.xrn import urn_to_hrn, hrn_authfor_hrn
# 2 weeks, in seconds
-DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME = 86400 * 14
+DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME = 86400 * 31
# TODO:
def get_refid(self):
+ #print>>sys.stderr," \r\n \r\n credential.py Signature get_refid\ self.refid %s " %(self.refid)
if not self.refid:
self.decode()
+ #print>>sys.stderr," \r\n \r\n credential.py Signature get_refid self.refid %s " %(self.refid)
return self.refid
def get_xml(self):
self.gid = gid
def decode(self):
- doc = parseString(self.xml)
+ try:
+ doc = parseString(self.xml)
+ except ExpatError,e:
+ logger.log_exc ("Failed to parse credential, %s"%self.xml)
+ raise
sig = doc.getElementsByTagName("Signature")[0]
self.set_refid(sig.getAttribute("xml:id").strip("Sig_"))
keyinfo = sig.getElementsByTagName("X509Data")[0]
# not be changed else the signature is no longer valid. So, once
# you have loaded an existing signed credential, do not call encode() or sign() on it.
-def filter_creds_by_caller(creds, caller_hrn):
+def filter_creds_by_caller(creds, caller_hrn_list):
"""
Returns a list of creds who's gid caller matches the
specified caller hrn
"""
if not isinstance(creds, list): creds = [creds]
+ if not isinstance(caller_hrn_list, list):
+ caller_hrn_list = [caller_hrn_list]
caller_creds = []
for cred in creds:
try:
tmp_cred = Credential(string=cred)
- if tmp_cred.get_gid_caller().get_hrn() == caller_hrn:
+ if tmp_cred.get_gid_caller().get_hrn() in caller_hrn_list:
caller_creds.append(cred)
except: pass
return caller_creds
self.decode()
return self.gidObject.get_printable_subject()
+ # sounds like this should be __repr__ instead ??
def get_summary_tostring(self):
if not self.gidObject:
self.decode()
def updateRefID(self):
if not self.parent:
- self.set_refid('ref0')
+ self.set_refid('ref0')
+ #print>>sys.stderr, " \r\n \r\n updateRefID next_cred ref0 "
return []
refs = []
next_cred = self.parent
+
while next_cred:
+
refs.append(next_cred.get_refid())
if next_cred.parent:
next_cred = next_cred.parent
+ #print>>sys.stderr, " \r\n \r\n updateRefID next_cred "
else:
next_cred = None
+ #print>>sys.stderr, " \r\n \r\n updateRefID next_cred NONE"
# Find a unique refid for this credential
# Failures here include unreadable files
# or non PEM files
trusted_cert_objects.append(GID(filename=f))
+ #print>>sys.stderr, " \r\n \t\t\t credential.py verify trusted_certs %s" %(GID(filename=f).get_hrn())
ok_trusted_certs.append(f)
except Exception, exc:
logger.error("Failed to load trusted cert from %s: %r", f, exc)
trusted_certs = ok_trusted_certs
+ #print>>sys.stderr, " \r\n \t\t\t credential.py verify trusted_certs elemnebts %s" %(len(trusted_certs))
# Use legacy verification if this is a legacy credential
if self.legacy:
# Verify the gids of this cred and of its parents
for cur_cred in self.get_credential_list():
cur_cred.get_gid_object().verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
- cur_cred.get_gid_caller().verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
+ cur_cred.get_gid_caller().verify_chain(trusted_cert_objects)
+ #print>>sys.stderr, " \r\n \t\t\t credential.py verify cur_cred get_gid_object hrn %s get_gid_caller %s" %(cur_cred.get_gid_object().get_hrn(),cur_cred.get_gid_caller().get_hrn())
refs = []
refs.append("Sig_%s" % self.get_refid())
parentRefs = self.updateRefID()
for ref in parentRefs:
refs.append("Sig_%s" % ref)
-
+ #print>>sys.stderr, " \r\n \t\t\t credential.py verify trusted_certs refs", ref
for ref in refs:
# If caller explicitly passed in None that means skip xmlsec1 validation.
# Strange and not typical
# (self.xmlsec_path, ref, cert_args, filename)
verified = os.popen('%s --verify --node-id "%s" %s %s 2>&1' \
% (self.xmlsec_path, ref, cert_args, filename)).read()
+ #print>>sys.stderr, " \r\n \t\t\t credential.py verify filename %s verified %s " %(filename,verified)
if not verified.strip().startswith("OK"):
# xmlsec errors have a msg= which is the interesting bit.
mstart = verified.find("msg=")
msg = verified[mstart:mend]
raise CredentialNotVerifiable("xmlsec1 error verifying cred %s using Signature ID %s: %s %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), ref, msg, verified.strip()))
os.remove(filename)
-
+
+ #print>>sys.stderr, " \r\n \t\t\t credential.py HUMMM parents %s", self.parent
# Verify the parents (delegation)
if self.parent:
self.verify_parent(self.parent)
-
+ #print>>sys.stderr, " \r\n \t\t\t credential.py verify trusted_certs parents"
# Make sure the issuer is the target's authority, and is
# itself a valid GID
self.verify_issuer(trusted_cert_objects)
# But we haven't verified that it is _signed by_ an authority
# We also don't know if xmlsec1 requires that cert signers
# are marked as CAs.
- root_cred_signer.verify_chain(trusted_gids)
+
+ # Note that if verify() gave us no trusted_gids then this
+ # call will fail. So skip it if we have no trusted_gids
+ if trusted_gids and len(trusted_gids) > 0:
+ root_cred_signer.verify_chain(trusted_gids)
+ else:
+ logger.debug("No trusted gids. Cannot verify that cred signer is signed by a trusted authority. Skipping that check.")
# See if the signer is an authority over the domain of the target.
# There are multiple types of authority - accept them all here
# . The expiry time on the child must be no later than the parent
# . The signer of the child must be the owner of the parent
def verify_parent(self, parent_cred):
+ #print>>sys.stderr, " \r\n\r\n \t verify_parent parent_cred.get_gid_caller().save_to_string(False) %s self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().save_to_string(False) %s" %(parent_cred.get_gid_caller().get_hrn(),self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().get_hrn())
# make sure the rights given to the child are a subset of the
# parents rights (and check delegate bits)
if not parent_cred.get_privileges().is_superset(self.get_privileges()):
git://git.onelab.eu / sfa.git / blobdiff