# Credentials are signed XML files that assign a subject gid privileges to an object gid\r
##\r
\r
-### $Id$\r
-### $URL$\r
-\r
import os\r
+from types import StringTypes\r
import datetime\r
+from StringIO import StringIO\r
from tempfile import mkstemp\r
from xml.dom.minidom import Document, parseString\r
-from lxml import etree\r
-from dateutil.parser import parse\r
-from StringIO import StringIO\r
+\r
+HAVELXML = False\r
+try:\r
+ from lxml import etree\r
+ HAVELXML = True\r
+except:\r
+ pass\r
\r
from sfa.util.faults import *\r
from sfa.util.sfalogging import logger\r
+from sfa.util.sfatime import utcparse\r
from sfa.trust.certificate import Keypair\r
from sfa.trust.credential_legacy import CredentialLegacy\r
-from sfa.trust.rights import Right, Rights\r
+from sfa.trust.rights import Right, Rights, determine_rights\r
from sfa.trust.gid import GID\r
-from sfa.util.namespace import *\r
+from sfa.util.xrn import urn_to_hrn, hrn_authfor_hrn\r
\r
# 2 weeks, in seconds \r
DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL_LIFETIME = 86400 * 14\r
def get_subject(self):\r
if not self.gidObject:\r
self.decode()\r
- return self.gidObject.get_subject() \r
+ return self.gidObject.get_printable_subject()\r
+\r
+ def get_summary_tostring(self):\r
+ if not self.gidObject:\r
+ self.decode()\r
+ obj = self.gidObject.get_printable_subject()\r
+ caller = self.gidCaller.get_printable_subject()\r
+ exp = self.get_expiration()\r
+ # Summarize the rights too? The issuer?\r
+ return "[ Grant %s rights on %s until %s ]" % (caller, obj, exp)\r
\r
def get_signature(self):\r
if not self.signature:\r
\r
\r
##\r
- # Expiration: an absolute UTC time of expiration (as either an int or datetime)\r
+ # Expiration: an absolute UTC time of expiration (as either an int or string or datetime)\r
# \r
def set_expiration(self, expiration):\r
- if isinstance(expiration, int):\r
+ if isinstance(expiration, (int, float)):\r
self.expiration = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(expiration)\r
- else:\r
+ elif isinstance (expiration, datetime.datetime):\r
self.expiration = expiration\r
- \r
+ elif isinstance (expiration, StringTypes):\r
+ self.expiration = utcparse (expiration)\r
+ else:\r
+ logger.error ("unexpected input type in Credential.set_expiration")\r
+\r
\r
##\r
- # get the lifetime of the credential (in datetime format)\r
+ # get the lifetime of the credential (always in datetime format)\r
\r
def get_expiration(self):\r
if not self.expiration:\r
self.decode()\r
+ # at this point self.expiration is normalized as a datetime - DON'T call utcparse again\r
return self.expiration\r
\r
##\r
doc = Document()\r
signed_cred = doc.createElement("signed-credential")\r
\r
-# PG adds these. It would be nice to be consistent.\r
-# But it's kind of odd for PL to use PG schemas that talk\r
-# about tickets, and the PG CM policies.\r
-# Note the careful addition of attributes from the parent below...\r
-# signed_cred.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")\r
-# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsinoNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")\r
+# Declare namespaces\r
+# Note that credential/policy.xsd are really the PG schemas\r
+# in a PL namespace.\r
+# Note that delegation of credentials between the 2 only really works\r
+# cause those schemas are identical.\r
+# Also note these PG schemas talk about PG tickets and CM policies.\r
+ signed_cred.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")\r
+ signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/credential.xsd")\r
+ signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/ext/policy/1 http://www.planet-lab.org/resources/sfa/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")\r
+\r
+# PG says for those last 2:\r
+# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")\r
# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")\r
\r
doc.appendChild(signed_cred) \r
# If the root node is a signed-credential (it should be), then\r
# get all its attributes and attach those to our signed_cred\r
# node.\r
- # Specifically, PG adds attributes for namespaces (which is reasonable),\r
+ # Specifically, PG and PLadd attributes for namespaces (which is reasonable),\r
# and we need to include those again here or else their signature\r
# no longer matches on the credential.\r
# We expect three of these, but here we copy them all:\r
# signed_cred.setAttribute("xmlns:xsi", "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance")\r
-# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsinoNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")\r
+# and from PG (PL is equivalent, as shown above):\r
+# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/credential.xsd")\r
# signed_cred.setAttribute("xsi:schemaLocation", "http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1 http://www.protogeni.net/resources/credential/ext/policy/1/policy.xsd")\r
+\r
+ # HOWEVER!\r
+ # PL now also declares these, with different URLs, so\r
+ # the code notices those attributes already existed with\r
+ # different values, and complains.\r
+ # This happens regularly on delegation now that PG and\r
+ # PL both declare the namespace with different URLs.\r
+ # If the content ever differs this is a problem,\r
+ # but for now it works - different URLs (values in the attributes)\r
+ # but the same actual schema, so using the PG schema\r
+ # on delegated-to-PL credentials works fine.\r
+\r
+ # Note: you could also not copy attributes\r
+ # which already exist. It appears that both PG and PL\r
+ # will actually validate a slicecred with a parent\r
+ # signed using PG namespaces and a child signed with PL\r
+ # namespaces over the whole thing. But I don't know\r
+ # if that is a bug in xmlsec1, an accident since\r
+ # the contents of the schemas are the same,\r
+ # or something else, but it seems odd. And this works.\r
parentRoot = sdoc.documentElement\r
if parentRoot.tagName == "signed-credential" and parentRoot.hasAttributes():\r
for attrIx in range(0, parentRoot.attributes.length):\r
# Below throws InUse exception if we forgot to clone the attribute first\r
oldAttr = signed_cred.setAttributeNode(attr.cloneNode(True))\r
if oldAttr and oldAttr.value != attr.value:\r
- msg = "Delegating cred from owner %s to %s over %s replaced attribute %s value %s with %s" % (self.parent.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidObject.get_urn(), oldAttr.name, oldAttr.value, attr.value)\r
- logger.error(msg)\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Can't encode new valid delegated credential: %s" % msg)\r
+ msg = "Delegating cred from owner %s to %s over %s replaced attribute %s value '%s' with '%s'" % (self.parent.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidCaller.get_urn(), self.gidObject.get_urn(), oldAttr.name, oldAttr.value, attr.value)\r
+ logger.warn(msg)\r
+ #raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Can't encode new valid delegated credential: %s" % msg)\r
\r
p_cred = doc.importNode(sdoc.getElementsByTagName("credential")[0], True)\r
p = doc.createElement("parent")\r
\r
# Is this a signed-cred or just a cred?\r
if len(signed_cred) > 0:\r
- cred = signed_cred[0].getElementsByTagName("credential")[0]\r
+ creds = signed_cred[0].getElementsByTagName("credential")\r
signatures = signed_cred[0].getElementsByTagName("signatures")\r
if len(signatures) > 0:\r
sigs = signatures[0].getElementsByTagName("Signature")\r
else:\r
- cred = doc.getElementsByTagName("credential")[0]\r
+ creds = doc.getElementsByTagName("credential")\r
\r
+ if creds is None or len(creds) == 0:\r
+ # malformed cred file\r
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Malformed XML: No credential tag found")\r
+\r
+ # Just take the first cred if there are more than one\r
+ cred = creds[0]\r
\r
self.set_refid(cred.getAttribute("xml:id"))\r
- self.set_expiration(parse(getTextNode(cred, "expires")))\r
+ self.set_expiration(utcparse(getTextNode(cred, "expires")))\r
self.gidCaller = GID(string=getTextNode(cred, "owner_gid"))\r
self.gidObject = GID(string=getTextNode(cred, "target_gid")) \r
\r
# Convert * into the default privileges for the credential's type\r
# Each inherits the delegatability from the * above\r
_ , type = urn_to_hrn(self.gidObject.get_urn())\r
- rl = rlist.determine_rights(type, self.gidObject.get_urn())\r
+ rl = determine_rights(type, self.gidObject.get_urn())\r
for r in rl.rights:\r
r.delegate = deleg\r
rlist.add(r)\r
# . That the issuer of the credential is the authority in the target's urn\r
# . In the case of a delegated credential, this must be true of the root\r
# . That all of the gids presented in the credential are valid\r
+ # . Including verifying GID chains, and includ the issuer\r
# . The credential is not expired\r
#\r
# -- For Delegates (credentials with parents)\r
self.decode()\r
\r
# validate against RelaxNG schema\r
- if not self.legacy:\r
+ if HAVELXML and not self.legacy:\r
if schema and os.path.exists(schema):\r
tree = etree.parse(StringIO(self.xml))\r
schema_doc = etree.parse(schema)\r
xmlschema = etree.XMLSchema(schema_doc)\r
if not xmlschema.validate(tree):\r
error = xmlschema.error_log.last_error\r
- message = "%s (line %s)" % (error.message, error.line)\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable(message) \r
+ message = "%s: %s (line %s)" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), error.message, error.line)\r
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable(message)\r
\r
if trusted_certs_required and trusted_certs is None:\r
trusted_certs = []\r
\r
# make sure it is not expired\r
if self.get_expiration() < datetime.datetime.utcnow():\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Credential expired at %s" % self.expiration.isoformat())\r
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Credential %s expired at %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), self.expiration.isoformat()))\r
\r
# Verify the signatures\r
filename = self.save_to_random_tmp_file()\r
cert_args = " ".join(['--trusted-pem %s' % x for x in trusted_certs])\r
\r
# If caller explicitly passed in None that means skip cert chain validation.\r
- # Strange and not typical\r
+ # - Strange and not typical\r
if trusted_certs is not None:\r
# Verify the gids of this cred and of its parents\r
for cur_cred in self.get_credential_list():\r
mstart = mstart + 4\r
mend = verified.find('\\', mstart)\r
msg = verified[mstart:mend]\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("xmlsec1 error verifying cred using Signature ID %s: %s %s" % (ref, msg, verified.strip()))\r
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("xmlsec1 error verifying cred %s using Signature ID %s: %s %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), ref, msg, verified.strip()))\r
os.remove(filename)\r
\r
# Verify the parents (delegation)\r
if self.parent:\r
self.verify_parent(self.parent)\r
\r
- # Make sure the issuer is the target's authority\r
- self.verify_issuer()\r
+ # Make sure the issuer is the target's authority, and is\r
+ # itself a valid GID\r
+ self.verify_issuer(trusted_cert_objects)\r
return True\r
\r
##\r
return list\r
\r
##\r
- # Make sure the credential's target gid was signed by (or is the same) the entity that signed\r
- # the original credential or an authority over that namespace.\r
- def verify_issuer(self): \r
+ # Make sure the credential's target gid (a) was signed by or (b)\r
+ # is the same as the entity that signed the original credential,\r
+ # or (c) is an authority over the target's namespace.\r
+ # Also ensure that the credential issuer / signer itself has a valid\r
+ # GID signature chain (signed by an authority with namespace rights).\r
+ def verify_issuer(self, trusted_gids):\r
root_cred = self.get_credential_list()[-1]\r
root_target_gid = root_cred.get_gid_object()\r
root_cred_signer = root_cred.get_signature().get_issuer_gid()\r
\r
+ # Case 1:\r
+ # Allow non authority to sign target and cred about target.\r
+ #\r
+ # Why do we need to allow non authorities to sign?\r
+ # If in the target gid validation step we correctly\r
+ # checked that the target is only signed by an authority,\r
+ # then this is just a special case of case 3.\r
+ # This short-circuit is the common case currently -\r
+ # and cause GID validation doesn't check 'authority',\r
+ # this allows users to generate valid slice credentials.\r
if root_target_gid.is_signed_by_cert(root_cred_signer):\r
# cred signer matches target signer, return success\r
return\r
\r
- root_target_gid_str = root_target_gid.save_to_string()\r
- root_cred_signer_str = root_cred_signer.save_to_string()\r
- if root_target_gid_str == root_cred_signer_str:\r
- # cred signer is target, return success\r
- return\r
-\r
- # See if it the signer is an authority over the domain of the target\r
+ # Case 2:\r
+ # Allow someone to sign credential about themeselves. Used?\r
+ # If not, remove this.\r
+ #root_target_gid_str = root_target_gid.save_to_string()\r
+ #root_cred_signer_str = root_cred_signer.save_to_string()\r
+ #if root_target_gid_str == root_cred_signer_str:\r
+ # # cred signer is target, return success\r
+ # return\r
+\r
+ # Case 3:\r
+\r
+ # root_cred_signer is not the target_gid\r
+ # So this is a different gid that we have not verified.\r
+ # xmlsec1 verified the cert chain on this already, but\r
+ # it hasn't verified that the gid meets the HRN namespace\r
+ # requirements.\r
+ # Below we'll ensure that it is an authority.\r
+ # But we haven't verified that it is _signed by_ an authority\r
+ # We also don't know if xmlsec1 requires that cert signers\r
+ # are marked as CAs.\r
+ root_cred_signer.verify_chain(trusted_gids)\r
+\r
+ # See if the signer is an authority over the domain of the target.\r
+ # There are multiple types of authority - accept them all here\r
# Maybe should be (hrn, type) = urn_to_hrn(root_cred_signer.get_urn())\r
root_cred_signer_type = root_cred_signer.get_type()\r
- if (root_cred_signer_type == 'authority'):\r
- #sfa_logger.debug('Cred signer is an authority')\r
+ if (root_cred_signer_type.find('authority') == 0):\r
+ #logger.debug('Cred signer is an authority')\r
# signer is an authority, see if target is in authority's domain\r
- hrn = root_cred_signer.get_hrn()\r
- if root_target_gid.get_hrn().startswith(hrn):\r
+ signerhrn = root_cred_signer.get_hrn()\r
+ if hrn_authfor_hrn(signerhrn, root_target_gid.get_hrn()):\r
return\r
\r
# We've required that the credential be signed by an authority\r
# make sure the rights given to the child are a subset of the\r
# parents rights (and check delegate bits)\r
if not parent_cred.get_privileges().is_superset(self.get_privileges()):\r
- raise ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent(("Parent cred ref %s rights " % self.parent.get_refid()) + \r
- self.parent.get_privileges().save_to_string() + (" not superset of delegated cred ref %s rights " % self.get_refid()) +\r
+ raise ChildRightsNotSubsetOfParent(("Parent cred ref %s rights " % parent_cred.get_refid()) +\r
+ self.parent.get_privileges().save_to_string() + (" not superset of delegated cred %s ref %s rights " % (self.get_summary_tostring(), self.get_refid())) +\r
self.get_privileges().save_to_string())\r
\r
# make sure my target gid is the same as the parent's\r
if not parent_cred.get_gid_object().save_to_string() == \\r
self.get_gid_object().save_to_string():\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Target gid not equal between parent and child")\r
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated cred %s: Target gid not equal between parent and child. Parent %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), parent_cred.get_summary_tostring()))\r
\r
# make sure my expiry time is <= my parent's\r
if not parent_cred.get_expiration() >= self.get_expiration():\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated credential expires after parent")\r
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated credential %s expires after parent %s" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), parent_cred.get_summary_tostring()))\r
\r
# make sure my signer is the parent's caller\r
if not parent_cred.get_gid_caller().save_to_string(False) == \\r
self.get_signature().get_issuer_gid().save_to_string(False):\r
- raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated credential not signed by parent caller")\r
+ raise CredentialNotVerifiable("Delegated credential %s not signed by parent %s's caller" % (self.get_summary_tostring(), parent_cred.get_summary_tostring()))\r
\r
# Recurse\r
if parent_cred.parent:\r
# only informative\r
def get_filename(self):\r
return getattr(self,'filename',None)\r
- \r
+\r
##\r
# Dump the contents of a credential to stdout in human-readable format\r
#\r
\r
if self.parent and dump_parents:\r
result += "\nPARENT"\r
- result += self.parent.dump(True)\r
+ result += self.parent.dump_string(True)\r
\r
return result\r
git://git.onelab.eu / sfa.git / blobdiff